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A NOTE ON TUE SPELLING, NOTES AND MA PS 
Indonesian spelling has been used for all South Sulawesi place names 
and for apanage titles. For example, Luwu is used instead of the Bugis 
Luwu' or the Makassar Luu', and Karaeng Sumanna instead of Karaeng 
Sumanna'. However, the neutral vowel ft is used in Bugis words and 
names to distinguish it from the vowel e. 
In the notes there are frequent references to "KA". This stands for 
"Koloniaal Archief", the Colonial Archives of the Dutch East India 
Company housed in the Algemeen Rijksarchief in The Hague. The KA 
references are cited in full in the bibliography under "Unpublished 
Manuscripts", section A. The notation "L-l, L-2, etc." refers to South 
Sulawesi lontara' sources which are listed under "Unpublished Manu-
scripts", section B. 
The large fold-out map has been re-drawn from an original Dutch 
East India Company map dated 1693 and listed in the map section of the 
Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, as VEL nr. 1293 (Leupe 1867: 
192). The original is extremely detailed and consequently only those 
names used in the text and certain important landmarks have been 
reproduced. The sketches of Fort Rotterdam and Environs and of 
Cenrana have been re-drawn from 17th century originals (no precise 
date is given) kept in the Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, VEL 
nr. 1309 and nr. 1306, respectively (Leupe 1867: 194-5). In the sketch 
of the Makassar fortresses along the harbour of Makassar in 1666-9, 
there are three fortresses with question-marks beside their names: 
Baro 'boso, Mariso, and Garassi. The location of these fortresses is from 
an M.A. thesis written by a South Sulawesi student using oral traditions 
in the Makassar area (Abdul Rauf 1974:116). The ot her fortresses are 
mentioned in the archival sources dealing with the Makassar War of 
1666-9 and are listed in the 1693 map, VEL nr. 1293, in the Algemeen 
Rijksarchief in The Hague. 
ABBREVIATIONS 
BKI Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (van 
Nederlandsch-Indië) 
Bingkisan Bingkisan, Yayasan Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan dan 
Tenggara, Ujung Pandang, Indonesia 
Dagh-Register Dagh-Register gehouden in 't Casteel Batavia van 't 
passerende daer ter plaetse als over geheel Nederlandts 
Indië, 1624-82, Batavia 1887, etc. 
IG De Indische Gids 
JMBRAS Journalof the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic 
Society 
JSEAS Journalof Southeast Asian Studies 
KA Koloniaal Archief (Colonial Archives) 
OB Overgekomen Brieven (Incoming Letters from 
Batavia) 
O.U.P. Oxford University Press 
TBG Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 
VKI Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor 
Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 
VBG Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van 
Kunsten en Wetenschappen 
VOC Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (United Dutch 
East India Company) 

INTRODUCflON 
The 17th century was a remarkable period in the history of South 
Sulawesi. Nowhere are the pervasive changes that were to occur better 
exemplified than in the speed with which many local rulers and their 
subjects were converted to Islam. Islam's success in the initial two 
decades of that century was due principally to the first Moslem ruler of 
the kingdom of Goa who believed it his religious duty to bring this new 
faith to his neighbours, by conquest if necessary. After subduing the 
most powerful of its opponents, the kingdom of Bone, Goa went on to 
become the foremost power in South Sulawesi. For the first time in 
recorded history there was one state which could claim overlordship 
throughout the whole peninsuIa. Goa, however, never undertook the 
subjugation of Luwu, a kingdom which had once dominated the area, 
had been the first to embrace Islam, and the first to support Goa's goal of 
spreading th is religion to other lands. 
Once Goa had brought most of South Sulawesi under its sway, its 
rulers sent armies abroad as far west as Lombok and as far east as the 
Aru-Kei Islands. By the middle of the 17th century Goa had become one 
of the most powerful and extensive empires in the history of the 
archipelago. So legendary were Goa's might and riches th at the people 
of Eastem Indonesia could hardly believe the audacity of the Dutch East 
India Company in daring to mount achallenge to its authority. But it was 
the unexpected alliance between the Company and the Bugis enernies of 
Goa which was to bring the latter'sglorious period to an abrupt and 
violent end. In 1669 Sombaopu, Goa's heavily fortified royal citadel and 
the symbol of its greatness, feil to the enemy. Even before the pillaging 
had ceased news of this victory was spreading rapidly throughout neigh-
bouring kingdoms, proclaiming the rise of a new star, Arung Palakka, 
who was destined to inherit the Goa empire. For the rest of the 17th 
century the triumphant Bugis from Bone and Soppeng were to dominate 
affairs in Sulawesi. 
Today many Makassar people still remember the overthrow of Goa's 
power with some bittemess. They cla~m th at a truly "Indonesian" 
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empire had been betrayed by another "Indonesian" group, leaving the 
Dutch, the "colonialists", as the ultimate victors. This line of reasoning 
was especially dominant af ter Indonesia obtained its independence from 
the Dutch following a bitter revolution in the years 1945-50. Bugis and 
Makassar alike debated the merits of Goa's Sultan Hasanuddin and 
Bone-Soppeng's Arung Palakka as true "national heroes" of Indonesia. 
Although there were some who rightly deplored applying contemporary 
standards to evaluate activities in the 17th century, the emotions evoked 
by nationalism were not easily assuaged. Arung Palakka and the Bugis 
had allied with the Company against "fellow Indonesians" and were 
therefore considered "traitors" to the new Republic of Indonesia. Long 
af ter the cooling of revolutionary fervour the de bate has continued, still 
influencing local politics and the naming of streets and even the capitalof 
South Sulawesi. As long as the knowledge of this significant period of 
South Sulawesi history remains imperfectly known, there appears little 
hope that the controversy will ever be stilled. 
Although some local histories dealing with events in the second half of 
the 17th century have been compiled in Indonesian, they are of ten 
written from the perspective of one particular kingdom or area 
(Abdurrazak 1965, 1967, 1967/8, 1968, 1969a, 1969b, 1970; Sanusi 
1967; Zainal Abidin 1969; Mahmud Nuhung 1974; Tangdilintin 1974; 
Fihr 1947). They are therefore regionally-centred and rarely look at the 
implications for the whole of South Sulawesi. Because of persisting local 
pride, no doubt a heritage of the nature of early political units in the 
area, there is a widespread reluctance to encroach on another state's 
affairs. When this attitude also influences the writing of history, it is 
unlikely that any one local historian would dare draw up a general 
history which would entail choices between conflicting versions. If such a 
history were to be written it would have to come from an outsider 
because his motives would be less suspect and his claims to impartiality 
more convincing. It was this consideration, most of all, which motivated 
the writing of this book. By introducing much hitherto unknown mate-
rial from the Dutch East India Company records to the study of South 
Sulawesi, the present author hopes to build on and ex pand the historical 
groundwork already laid by local scholars. Both written and oral South 
Sulawesi sources have also been consulted so th at a broad perspective 
could be adopted before assaying any statements regarding the signifi-
cance of events. 
During the course of research for this book, an interesting theme 
began to emerge: the manner in which alocal Indonesian prince was able 
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to use the Dutch presence to institute far-reaching innovations in his 
society. It became apparent that, while the Company's initial involve-
ment with South Sulawesi had required some militaryaction, its sub-
sequent activities were of ten limited to that of arbiter in local disputes. 
Yet its approval was an essential element without which no local prince 
could exercise authority confidently. The reputation of the Company 
helped to sustain its position and that of anyone fortunate or clever 
enough to become linked with it. Arung Palakka's repeated references 
throughout his life to this link served a dual purpose: it reaffirmed his 
continuing devotion and loyalty to the Company, while reminding the 
people of South Sulawesi of the weapon which he could wield if neces-
sary to maintain power. Bearing the Company's trust as a right, Arung 
Palakka was able to introduce changes with little real opposition from 
within Sou th Sulawesi. The Company has of ten been blamed for radical 
innovations in Malay-Indonesian societies, but as this study shows, in 
South Sulawesi at least the initiative clearly came from alocal ruler. Only 
research in other areas influenced by the Company's presence will 
demonstrate whether or not the South Sulawesi experience was unique. 
A secondary but nonetheless important reason for this study was to 
examine the roots of the large scale emigrations from South Sulawesi in 
the second half of the 17th century. So important were these movements 
of people that they caused major political and demographic changes 
throughout the archipelago. The phenomenon, however, has usually 
been studied from the point of view of the area in which the South 
Sulawesi refugees settled or attempted to settle. As aresuit their motives 
and deeds are of ten described in unflattering terms, a characterization 
which has unfortunately been incorporated in general history books on 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Since there appears such a glaring discrepancy 
between these accounts and what is known about the people of South 
Sulawesi in their home land, an attempt has been made in this study to 
see the refugees within the context of events in South Sulawesi. Only by 
th is means can there be a fair basis upon which to judge their activities 
abroad. 
There are two principal sources for this study. The first is the contem-
porary records of the Dutch East India Company housed in the General 
State Archives in The Hague. The nature of these sources has already 
been adequately discussed in previous works (Ricklefs 1974:xvi-xviii; L. 
Y. Andaya 1975:13-15; B. W. Andaya 1979:4-6). What is worth 
repeating, however, is the varying quality of the reports which were sent 
by the Dutch governor or president from Fort Rotterdam in Makassar to 
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the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies in Batavia. Admiral 
Cornelis Speelman was only in South Sulawesi for a brief period from 
1667 to 1669, but the amount of material which he compiled about the 
area far surpassed that of many of his successors with much longer 
tenures of office. His monumental Notitie, which was left as a final report 
for his successor, amounts to 646 folio pages and provides a brief but 
comprehensive account of the history of South Sulawesi up to his time. 
This work became the most valuable source of information for all 
subsequent heads of Fort Rotterdam and later historians. In addition to 
his Notitie, Speelman wrote detailed reports during the course of the 
Makassar War which made it possible to reconstruct much of what 
occurred. F. W. Stapel used these reports to write a thesis on the war but 
did not go beyond the signing of the Bungaya treaty in 1667 (Stapel 
1922). Stapel's work, Het Bongaais Verdrag, is cited frequently in this 
book for the early period of the Makassar War since both he and the 
present author had consulted the same Company documents. Any addi-
tional points left unmentioned by Stapel are provided with the full 
archival reference. Af ter Speelman's departure from Sulawesi in 
October 1669, the reports from his successors never attained the same 
depth of coverage and varied considerably in quality and length. The 
historian, therefore, is frequently at the mercy of his informants and 
must be particularly attuned to the different interests and styles of 
individual Company officials. A large, detailed report may not neces-
sarily indicate great and significant activity; by the same token, it cannot 
be assUl'ned that a terse note signifies that nothing of importance had 
occurred. Only af ter one has had the opportunity to examine a variety of 
documents over a fairly extensive period do some of these reports finally 
begin to shed light on events they describe. 
One other point about these contemporary Dutch records deserves to 
be reiterated. Among the masses of Company material dealing specifi-
cally with Company matters are the precious documents containing 
letters, speeches, and comments made by local rulers and nobles. Un-
fortunately, very rarely is the original provided and one has to remain 
content with translations. Even in translation these accounts are invalu-
abie since they are one of the few contemporary records which describe 
what and how the local leaders thought, said, and acted in different 
situations. While the other Company reports are useful in providing a 
chronological framework of developments in South Sulawesi, only by 
examining these special documents can one understand the tensions, the 
conflicts, and the concerns of the localleaders. 
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The second type of source material is the local South Sulawesi 
accounts, indispensable because of the variety of information they 
provide. Scholars who have studied Bugis and Makassar lontara' -
chronicIes, dairres and notebooks - have been struck by their frankness 
and accuracy (Kern 1948; Cense 1951; Noorduyn 1965; Zainal Abidin 
1971). In this present study the Diary of the Kings of Goa and Tal/o 
(Ligtvoet 1880) proved especially useful for dates and personal relations 
which were of ten confused or unmentioned in the Company reports. The 
Diary of Arung Palakka (L-31) was valuable if only in allowing the 
historian a rare and occasional glimpse into the personallife of the man. 
The chronicles of the Bugis and Makassar kingdoms provided a basis for 
reconstructing the early origins of the South Sulawesi states and their 
history prior to the arrival of the Dutch. But they we re equally useful in 
determining the concerns of the ruling classes. 
There are other written documents which appear to have been orig-
inally oral traditions. Folktales, folk etymology, local traditions, short 
historical episodes, observations on a specific event - all form a part of 
these documents. They, together with stories still remembered by the 
community, pravide vital clues for the understanding of obscure refer-
ences in Dutch records and the local chronicIes. More important, how-
ever, is their representation of how events affected a specific area or 
group. In general, therefore, the South Sulawesi sources imp art a depth 
of meaning to the mass of undifferentiated information contained in the 
contemporary records of the Dutch East India Company. 
In using these sources the historian should bear in mind several 
considerations. Firstly, the lontara' are sometimes written in indeci-
pherabie script and contain many obscure references and archaic words 
now known only to a mere handful of people, mostly elderly. Long 
periods of consultation and discussion are f~equently necessary in order 
to grasp the meaning of particular passages; yet the connotations may 
still remain elusive. Secondly, none of the existing documents dates from 
the 17th century and many have been recopied and edited several times 
since they were first compiled. In the absence of philological studies for 
many of these lontara' sources, it is difficult to establish dates of origin or 
interpolations. Fortunately, a few Portuguese accounts in the 16th 
century and the Company records of the 17th century can serve as some 
form of contra!. In comparing the European and South Sulawesi 
accounts, the general outlines of major developments appear similar in 
both. 
One striking feature of these indigenous sources is their general 
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agreement on what actually occurred in certain important events in 
Sou th Sulawesi. Although the documents are not identical, the inclusion 
of distinctive details about individual areas does not distort the essential 
line of the narrative. One could perhaps argue, as some local historians 
have done, that the few documents which survived the turmoil of the 
revolution and rebellion periods in South Sulawesi (1945-65) formed 
the basis of later copies. Yet copyists apparently did not seize this 
opportunity to emphasize the role of their own are as. Since the history of 
South Sulawesi is not the pres erve of any one group, only the most 
brazen individual would deliberately tamper with the known facts or 
gene rally accepted interpretation. 
Finally, one must emphasize th at the South Sulawesi sources are an 
integral part of the local culture. Simply to juxtapose them with Dutch 
accounts does scant justice to either. This study hopes to demonstrate 
that an understanding of the manner in which Bugis and Makassar 
people viewed their world is essential if the Company records are to be 
fully exploited. South Sulawesi accounts, for example, of ten explain and 
justify a deed in terms of a well-known concept in the society. It is only 
necessary to mention the concept to evoke a series of images in the minds 
of the society concerning the causes, the effects, and the traditionally 
sanctioned responses relating to this concept. Siri' was one such concept, 
meaning both "shame" and "self-worth". Without appreciating all the 
implications of the term, a straightforward Dutch translation of a Bugis 
or Makassar letter by a Company official can easily be misinterpreted or 
considered irrelevant. 
Another example of the manner in which a knowledge of South 
Sulawesi society or its sources could inform Dutch records are the 
conventions surrounding treaty-making. South Sulawesi treaty-making 
traditions have their corresponding codes of behaviour and accepted 
phraseology which deciare a kingdom's particular position in a hierarchy 
of states. The Dutch of ten received letters from local rulers stating that 
they had been "reminded" of a former treaty by another lord or that they 
were like a "child" to the Company. These were important declarations 
suggesting a recognition of shifts in political power in the area and 
requiring a specific response. But such vital cultural communication can 
go undetected by a historian with only a passing interest in or knowledge 
of Bugis-Makassar society. 
Since the history of the last half of the 17th century is dominated by and 
of ten revolves around Arung Palakka, he becomes the focus of the 
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present study. Chapter I attempts to explain certain political and cultural 
features in South Sulawesi society and the particular historical circum-
stances which help elucidate the principal events of this period. The 
culmination of the rivalry between Goa and Bone and the increasing 
tensions between the Dutch East India Company and Goa which con-
tributed directly to the Makassar War are the subjects of Chapter 11. In 
Chapter 111 the war is described in some detail for a specific reason. Even 
in our own time, this war continues to evoke an emotional response 
among the people of South Sulawesi and has consequently spawned a 
number of myths and misconceptions. Only by attempting to determine 
what the realities of the war were can many of these be discredited. 
Furthermore, the war underscored certain features which proved signifi-
cant in later years, such as the reckless bravery of Arung Palakka which 
came to characterize his fighting style and made him a legend in his own 
time; the serious rifts between the peace and war factions within the 
Goa-Tallo courts which led later to defections of some of the most 
prominent leaders of these kingdoms; and the complex alliances of Bugis 
and Makassar kingdoms on both sides which belie the later simplistic 
picture of a war fought between the Bugis people and the Dutch on one 
side, and the Makassar people on the other. By establishing as precisely 
as one can, given the limitations of the sources, what exactly happened in 
the Makassar War, one can at last begin to discuss its implications with 
less emotion and more rationality. 
In November 1667 the Treaty of Bungaya was signed by the major 
belligerents in a premature attempt to end the war. The treaty and its 
meaning and significance to the parties involved are discussed in 
Chapter IV. This discussion is essential to explain, in Chapter V, why 
and how in later years the treaty was seen as a justification for seemingly 
provocative acts by both the Company and South Sulawesi states. It also 
further accentuates the great care taken in th is society to observe the 
inviolability of all states, no matter how small and unimportant. 
Chapters VI and VII examine the manner in which Arung Palakka 
and the Company consolidated their power and arranged a mutually 
acceptable division of authority, with the former the dominant partner in 
the internal affairs and the latter in the extern al affairs of South 
Sulawesi. So successful was th is arrangement that the traditional 
avenues of protest within the society became ineffective and contributed 
to a major outflow of people from South Sulawesi. The story of these 
refugees is examined in Chapter VIII in order to understand the cause of 
their flight, their motivations abroad, and their significance in terms of 
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the political developments within South Sulawesi. Because of their 
numbers and their well-eamed reputations as warriors, these refugees 
posed a real threat, not only to vulnerable kingdoms in the archipelago, 
but also to the stability of South Sulawesi itself. Their defeat in Java in 
1679 ended the last real challenge from these enemies to the joint 
overlordship established by Arung Palakka and the Company. 
While this relationship in general appeared weil and flourishing, there 
were periods of tension between Arung Palakka and the various Dutch 
govemors and presidents based in Fort Rotterdam. Arung Palakka 
became prey to doubts about his status with the Company and therefore 
suspected any other local ruler who appeared to have its favour. This 
suspicion led to a tragic episode related in Chapter IX: the assassination 
on Arung Palakka's orders of one of his staunchest supporters, Arung 
Bakke Todani. Yet Arung Palakka was willing to take such a drastic 
step, not simply to protect his position, but also to assure that his heirs 
would be unopposed in bringing to fruition many of Arung Palakka's 
dreams. No South Sulawesi ruler ever again challenged Arung Palakka 's 
authority. Chapters X and XI describe how Arung Palakka proceeded to 
exercise almost total control over all other states in South Sulawesi. He 
was not beyond using cajolery, intimidation, and, ultimately, force to 
obtain his way. The culmination of his efforts was the remarkable display 
of unity and respect shown to him by the assembied armies of South 
Sulawesi in 1695, less than a year before his death. 
Chapter XII is a sequel to the story of Arung Palakka's monumental 
efforts to create a united South Sulawesi ruled by his family. A loose 
political unity of the. whole of South Sulawesi responsive to one lord had 
beén achieved by the time of his death in 1696. His successor, La Patau, 
continued to rule unchallenged as supreme overlord, thanks to the 
foresight and care exercised by Arung Palakka in establishing firmly the 
precedents of power and authority associated with th is position. AI-
though none of La Patau 's children was ever to exercise such widespread 
influence again, they and their descendants came to rule all the major 
kingdoms in South Sulawesi up into the 20th century. A political unity 
may not have been achieved by Arung Palakka's successors, but a 
precedent of united action had been established and reinforced by close 
blood links among the major royal families. Of all that Arung Palakka 
achieved in his long and eventful lifetime, this was perhaps his greatest 
accomplishment. It was a heritage worthy of the man. 
CHAPTERI 
STATE AND SOCIETY IN SOUTH SULAWESI 
IN mE 17th CENTURY 
Events in South Sulawesi (see Maps 1 and 2) in the 17th century can only 
be properly appreciated through an understanding of certain cultural 
features which determined the nature of political control. One of the 
most basic of these features is the existence of four major ethnic (suku) 
groups within South Sulawesi: the Bugis, Makassar, Toraja, and Mandar 
peoples (see Map 3). The largest group is the Bugis who occupy almost 
the entire eastern half and part of the western half of the southwest 
peninsuIa of Sulawesi. The Makassar people are the next largest in 
population and are found in the western and southern areas of the 
peninsuIa. Next in size numerically are the Sa'dan Toraja people who are 
found mainly in the mountain areas in the north bordering the Bugis 
state of Luwu in the east and Mandar in the west. 1 Finally, there are the 
Mandar people who oeeupy the eoastal and mountain areas of the north-
western part of the peninsuIa. They can be divided into two groups: 
those who live in the mountain settlements known collectively as the Pitu 
U/unna Sa/o', who are ethnically Toraja, and those who live on the coast 
under the title of their eonfederation, Pitu Babana Binanga. 
Since the Bugis and Makassar peoples from early times occupied the 
most fertile agrieulturallands on the peninsuIa and had aeeess to some of 
the most favourable harbour sites, they beeame numerically and politi-
eally the dominant suku. The Mandar and Toraja peoples were of ten the 
vietims of the ambitions of Bugis or Makassar rulers and were drawn 
mereilessly into the maelstrom of lowland polities. By the 17th century 
the struggle for hegemony between the Bugis kingdom of Bone and the 
Makassar kingdom of Goa grew in intensity and threatened to envelope 
the whole of South Sulawesi. As the various states responded to pres-
sures from both Bone and Goa and made their commitments, it beeame 
apparent that suku considerations had played only a minor part in their 
deeisions. For example, the Bugis states of Wajo, Luwu, Bulo-Bulo, 
Lamatti, and Raja beeame allies of Goa, while the Makassar area of 
Tura tea eame to support Arung Palakka in the Makassar War of 1666-9. 
The Pitu Babana Binanga of Mandar was one of the staunchest allies of 
10 The Heritage of Arung Palakka 
Goa in the war and proved a great asset in the fighting. It was able to 
avoid the harsh retribution of Arung Palakka af ter the war because of its 
ability to use its inhospitable mountainous terrain in the interior as a 
refuge against invading armies. The Toraja people played no active role 
in the war, except for some who may have been part ofthe Datu Luwu's 
armies. The fall of Sombaopu in 1669 ending the Makassar War was not, 
therefore, a victory of one suku over another, but of one alliance of states 
composed of different suku over another. 
There is another feature of South Sulawesi society which assumes 
prominence in 17th century events. It is the strength and cohesiveness of 
the local communities which form the basic political units in the land. 
Even though these communities may have become in time part of larger 
kingdoms, the confederative nature of these kingdoms refIects the 
enduring importance of the individual units. To explain the reason for 
the strength of these communities, one has to examine local traditions 
concerning their origins. 
The most elaborate and coherent representation of the beginnings of 
South Sulawesi society is found in the remarkable Bugis epic from Luwu 
known as the I La Galigo.2 In this epic gods rule in the Upper- and 
Underworld. One day the principal god, Patotoe, "The Determiner of 
Fate", convenes the Council of the gods and obtains approval to send 
Patotoe's son Batara Guru to rule the earth. We Nyilitimo', the daughter 
of the chief god of the Underworld, is sent to earth "rising up from the 
foam of the sea" to become Batara Guru's companion. They marry, and 
they and their offspring rule in Luwu. Then one day the last of this godly 
race return to their original homelands. There is a second coming of the 
godrulers but they too later return. With the disappearance of the second 
set of godrulers, the I La Galigo epic comes to an "end".3 
Nothing is said explicitly in the I La Galigo of how man kind ca me to 
populate the earth. Wh en the godrulers arrive, there are already people 
living on the earth. There is, however, an oral tradition which follows the 
universally known story of the flood and a new beginning. In this tale the 
world was once covered with water except for a few mountain peaks. On 
these peaks lived groups of people. As the water receded the people 
began to build rafts and eventually made contact with people on the 
other peaks. They soon built houses of atap (a type of palm frond) and 
wood and began living in communities. When Patotoe and his wife saw 
that the earth was populated but without anyone to govern it, they 
convened the Council of the gods to discuss the matter. It was agreed 
that the gods should send their offspring to the earth so that the people 
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would be able "to pay devotion to the Upperworld and respect to the 
Underworld". From this point onward until the disappearance of the 
godrulers from the earth, the story is similar to that in the I La Galigo 
(Makkaraka 1967:16-17; Borahima 1971:29).4 
Wh at this oral tale neglects to mention is the existence, according to 
prevailing traditions from both Bugis and Makassar are as, of objects 
known as gaukeng (Bugis)/gaukang (Makassar). This object was an 
important factor in the formation of early Bugis-Makassar settlements 
and was accorded great veneration as a guardian spirit of a particular 
community. The gaukeng was anything with an unusual shape or with 
peculiar characteristics; it could be a dried-out fruit-pit, a stump, or an 
old plough, but more of ten than not it was simply a stone. It was believed 
that some time in the distant past some member of the community 
discovered th is sacred object, and the people th en provided a dwelling, 
servants, fields, and ponds for the upkeep of both the gaukeng and its 
finder. The finder then became the spiritual and secular leader of the 
community as spokesman for the gaukeng. This was the beginning, 
according to these oral sources, of the leaders of the gaukeng com-
munities. 
Although there is al most no discussion of the origins of the gaukeng or 
of its significance, much can be learned from similar examples elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia. While the belief in tutelary deities immanent in stones 
is found throughout Southeast Asia, India, and China, one ofthe clearest 
expositions of this was made by a French scholar, Paul Mus, describing 
these sacred stones in Champa in present-day Central Vietnam. Champa 
is the name of a kingdom peopled by an Indonesian race who developed 
an impressive civilization between the 9th and 14th centuries. According 
to Mus the Chams believed that the Lord of the Soil, embodying the 
life-giving energies of the earth, was present in these stones. These 
stones were not representations, but the actual Lord of the Soil made 
manifest to mankind. Since the Lord of the Soil was incapable of com-
municating with mankind in this form, it was nec~sary to have an 
intermediary between mankind and the god. The individual who became 
the intermediary was elevated by his fellowmen to become spiritual and 
temporal head of the community because of his role as spokesman for 
the Lord of the Soil. These sacred stones in Champa appear to have 
similar origins, functions and significance as the gaukeng in Sou th 
Sulawesi. It is very likely that they are part of the same phenomenon 
mentioned by Mus as being present throughout Monsoon Asia (Mus 
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1975:7-15).5 
The aral traditions in South Sulawesi appear to be even more explicit 
than those in Champa conceming the role of these sacred stones in the 
evolution of organized settlements. According to these traditions, the 
original gaukeng communities in South Sulawesi in time began to 
expand. The area originally within the spiritual domain of the gaukeng, 
which then defined th at community's boundaries, became no longer 
sufficient to provide for the needs of the group. Offshoots from the 
mother communities we re established, each with its own gaukeng. These 
new communities were considered to be the "children" of the original 
"mother" gaukeng community, and their gaukeng were considered 
"helpers" of the original gaukeng. There were many of these gaukeng 
community complexes throughout South Sulawesi, and before long they 
began to impinge upon each other and disputes began arising, especially 
over land and water rights. Force was of ten used to solve a dispute 
because there was no other mediating mechanism available to settle 
inter-gaukeng community quarreis. According to oral tradition, at this 
stage of the development of South Sulawesi communities appeared the 
Tomanurung (Bugis)/Tumanurung (Makassar), i.e. "He/She who 
descended [from the Upperworld]". 
Without referring specifically to the I La Galigo, the later Bugis-, 
Makassar oral and written traditions link the last known episode of this 
epic with the coming of the Tomanurung. Once the second set of 
godrulers disappears from the earth, as described in the "final" episode 
of the I La Galigo, there follows a period of seven (some say seventy-
seven) generations when mankind is without a ruler. This period is 
characterized in tradition by an especially graphic description of man 
being like fish, with the larger and stronger consuming the smaller and 
weaker.6 In desperation the people appeal to the gods to send a ruler to 
earth once again so peace and order can be restored. Their pleas are 
answered and a Tomanurung appears among the people in some isolated 
spot. According to traditions from various kingdoms, at first the 
Tomanurung hesitates in accepting the people's offer to be their ruler. 
Only when certain guarantees are made acknowledging his special 
position does the Tomanurung finally relent. The position of the people 
is safeguarded by the retention of the leaders of the communities in a 
special council to advise the ruler in the affairs of state and to maintain 
the customs of the land. The council, therefore, becomes the repository 
of the community's traditions and customs which precede in time and 
importance the later Tomanurung figure. 7 
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The organization of the communities into mini-states with a mier and 
an advisory council to assure the smooth functioning of society was 
merely the first step toward larger state units. Soon different states 
combined wiIIingly or through force to form targeT units for a variety of 
reasons but mainly for defence. The loose nature of these confederations 
was retained even when they expanded into powerful kingdoms. The 
aiternative was a forced centralization which required greater expertise, 
enforcement capability, and wealth than any of the aspiring overlords in 
South Sulawesi possessed until the coming to power in the late 17th 
century of Amng Palakka La Tenritatta, the focus of th is present study. 
What one found instead in kingdoms such as Luwu, Bone, Wajo, and 
Goa, was an administrative superstmcture with an overlord dominating 
a host of substmctures under "sub" miers. There was minimal inter-
ference of the "supra" state in the internal affairs ofthe "sub" states. But 
the ability of the overlord to enfore his will if necessary because of the 
easy accessibility of these "subkingdoms" made such a union possible. 
The confederation of these substates into "kingdoms" was never con-
ceived as a permanent arrangement and was characterized by a fluidity 
of political allegiances. If a subkingdom believed that its seIf-interests 
were not served by remaining with its present confederation, it cO}lld try 
to establish a new arrangement with another confederation. Such 
options were available especially to the more powerful of the sub-
kingdoms, as was demonstrated by the frequent changes of allegiance of 
the areas between Wajo and Bone in the wars of these two kingdoms in 
the 16th and 17th centuries (Noorduyn 1955:216; Andaya 1978:285). 
While the geographical accessibility of the Bugis-Makassar areas 
made confederation easier and perhaps necessary, the natural barriers 
separating the groups in the Mandar and Toraja lands made the forma-
tion of large kingdoms there difficuit to justify and maintain. The two 
major Mandar confederations fought as of ten against one another as 
with each other against a common enemy. The state of Balannipa was 
the most powerful in the coastal confederation and frequently succeeded 
in enforcing its will on the others in the 17th century. As aresuit the 
Dutch and the Bugis and Makassar kingdoms of ten spoke ofBalannipa's 
mier as the Maradia (mier of) Mandar, even though he was really the 
primus inter pares and merely the Maradia Balannipa. Little is known 
about the mountain states of Mandar since they rarely impinged on the 
general stream of South Sulawesi affairs. Dutch, Bugis, and Makassar 
sources simply refer to withdrawal of the Downriver Mandar population 
to the mountains in times of invasion. But there is no mention of any 
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active participation of the Upriver Mandar Confederation in any histori-
ca! incidents. Downriver Mandar sources claim that in the 16th century 
there was a defensive alliance between these two Mandar Confedera-
tions (Abdu! Rauf 1974: 13). So little is known about the history of the 
Upriver Mandar states that there is even disagreement as to which seven 
states be!onged to the confederation (Mangoli 1973:30-1).8 
The Toraja communities in genera! had the most difficulty in eking out 
a living in their mountainous region. Every available flat land was 
utilized and some of the hills were terraced to grow rice. Nevertheless, 
there was never enough food to support a large population. 9 Travel 
between the communities was slowand cumbersome because of the 
rugged terrain. The physical isolation of the individual communities and 
the small concentrations of population lessened the necessity or the 
desire for permanent political confederations as occurred in the Bugis 
and Makassar lands. Instead, what evolved in the Toraja areas was a 
loose union of individu al communities as in Mandar which acted jointly 
wh en this was necessary but which never submitted to an overarching 
authority. There was one relatively powerful Toraja confederation 
called the Tallulembangna, "The Three Boats", consisting of Sangalla, 
Makka!e, and Mengkendek. It had a common ancestor, and each 
member of the confederation was ruled by a puang (lord). But th is 
confederation was clearly an exception with a more complex adat struc-
ture than most other Toraja communities (Nooy-Palm 1975:64). In the 
17th and early 18th centuries the Sa 'dan Toraja communities acted as 
one people to fight the Bugis invasions. But once the threat was over 
they returned to their individual areas and dissolved the union. The 
Toraja traditions do not talk of any attempt by a Toraja leader to try to 
unite all of the Toraja communities politically.lO It must have been 
obvious to all Toraja leaders th at to attempt to rule as one kingdom the 
various scattered communities, some in most inaccessible areas, was 
unrealistic and impractical. 
The difference between the political organization which evolved in the 
Mandar-Toraja areas and those in the Bugis-Makassar areas was prin-
cipally one of degree. The individual communities among the Mandar-
Toraja never became so closely confederated that they consented to 
acknowledge a single overlord as the principal political authority. 
Among the Bugis and Makassar, on the other hand, the gaukeng com-
munities developed into political unions, or kingdoms, with an acknowl-
edged overlord. This overlord became the principal ruler among a host 
of petty lords who were leaders of their respective extended gaukeng 
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communities or principalities. Once these principalities had been 
peaceably or forcibly incorporated into a confederation or kingdom, 
they relinquished to it their rights to make war and to conduct extemal 
affairs with another state. What they did retain, however, were their 
rights to choose their own miers and to preserve their traditional 
customs (adat) and processes of law (bicara). Yet they did not have the 
freedom of action as did their Toraja and Mandar counterparts, and the 
difference was highlighted by a rigid code of interstate relationships 
which was valid both for the principalities vis à vis their confedera-
tion/kingdom as between kingdoms. 
The unique practice in the past of allowing all principalities the right to 
preserve the most basic and necessary ingredients which make up a state 
arose because of the respect for the original guardian spirit of the 
community, the gaukeng. Since the local prince was considered to be a 
Tomanurung and hence "white-blooded"l1 or of the race of gods, and 
since he was believed to be goveming on behalf of the gaukeng, it was 
generally feared that any attempt by an outsider to replace him would 
cause a calamity in the land. Insofar as adat and the bicara were con-
cerned, they were customary practices evolved over time in the relation-
ship of the gaukeng and the community, and so any outside interference 
with these gaukeng-based institutions was courting the wrath of the local 
Lord of the Soi!. This belief helped to preserve the basic political units 
which developed from the gaukeng communities. It was the sacred 
origins of these individual political units ruled by an arung (Bugis), 
karaeng (Makassar), maradia, etc., which accounted for their cohesive-
ness, their unique identity, and hence their strength in South Sulawesi 
society. Only by being aware of the nature of these states, can one 
properly appraise Arung Palakka's efforts to forge a unity throughout 
South Sulawesi of all these fiercely independent and diverse groups. 
One particular cultural feature assumes great importance in the history 
of South Sulawesi in the latter half of the 17th century: the concepts of 
siri' and pesse (Bugis)/pacce (Makassar). Siri' is a concept which 
embraces the idea of self-worth and shame. There is no contradiction in 
these terms, for a sense of shame implies a conception by an individual of 
his own self-worth from which arises his dignity. There are, however, 
two different ways of referring to siri'. It is used in one sense to indicate 
that someone had been made siri', ashamed. The act of making someone 
feel shame is the act of denying that person his own conception of his 
self-worth and self-respect. In such circumstances the person who has 
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been made siri' is expected to take measures to restore his sullied 
self-image by seeking satisfaction from the offending party. The stigma 
attached to a person who is without siri', self-worth or dignity, is so great 
that a person will sacrifice his own life in the attempt to re move the 
shame and restore his self-respect. There is a saying in Bugis th at it is 
better to die in defence of siri' (mate ri siri'na) than to be with no siri' at 
all (mate siri'). Society's prescriptions of proper responses open to one 
who is made siri' compelled individuals such as Arung Palakka to under-
take acts which appeared to an outsider to be irrational, fooihardy, and 
even suicidal. 
Pesse/pacce refers specifically to the belief in the spiritual unity of all 
individuals within a particular community. The origin of this concept and 
the basis of its strength may be traced to the gaukeng. Every community 
was identified with a gaukeng whose spiritual authority extended over a 
specific, circumscribed area. From the very beginning of the formation 
of a community, therefore, a spiritual bond existed among the members 
based upon their identification with a particular gaukeng and their 
shared belief of its protective powers over the community. 
The concept of pesse/pacce bears a number of similarities with the idea 
of siri'. Pesse/pacce on the ordinary level means "a pain", but it also has 
another definition of "commiseration, empathy with one's fellow men". 
In pesse/pacce, as with siri', the apparent contradictory meanings for one 
term are mere illusions which in reality subtly convey a who Ie, unified 
idea. 12 The empathy one feels for a compatriot in distress is expressed as 
an emotion of pain because one shares the problem in spirit. It is th is 
emotion of pesse/pacce which binds a Bugis or a Makassar individual to 
his homeland even af ter long exile and which serves as a stimulus for him 
to return to his original spiritual community. An individual can also 
express pesse/pacce for his community which is suffe ring aIthough he 
himself is not directly affected. As with siri' the emotions of empathy 
and commiseration or pesse/pacce require act ion to remove the cause of 
distress. 
These two concepts are indeed cIosely related. It is the act of siri' 
against a person which creates the situation of pesse/pacce. The pressure 
of the community's pesse/pacce for an individual who has been made 
siri', or ashamed, forces that person to take steps which the community 
has established as proper procedure in such situations. One finds con-
firmation of such social pressure in sayings such as "to die a death of siri' 
is to die a death of sugar and cocon ut milk" (mate rigo/lai, mate risan-
tannge).13 This attitude is noted in the records of the Dutch East India 
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Company where the South Sulawesi allies of the Company demanded 
satisfaction from Goa for some "shame" it had caused them. "Without 
satisfaction", said these allies, "we would no longer be among the living 
but among the dead and would be considered to be people without 
feeling (ongevoelige menschen)". 14 From the context it is likely that the 
Dutch words ongevoelige menschen were intended as a translation of the 
Bugis-Makassar idea of people without siri', without self-respect, and 
hence without feeling. The recognition by the Bugis and Makassar 
people of the essential unity of these two concepts is seen in the following 
sayings: 
"If it is not siri' which makes us, the Makassar people, one, then it is 
pacce (Ikambe mangkasaraka, punna tasiri', pacceseng nipabbulo siba-
tanngang)." , 
"If there is no longer siri' among us, Bugis, at least there is certain to be 
pesse (ia sempugikku, rekkua de'na siri'na engka messa pessena)." 
Wh at these sayings express is the belief that, if it is not siri', it will be 
pesse/pacce, or vice-versa, which will remind the individual ofhis place in 
the community for they are basically part of a single idea. 
These cultural features, then, are essential for an understanding of 
events in Sou th Sulawesi in the 17th century. But as vital is a knowledge 
of the character of the major South Sulawesi kingdoms and the historical 
circumstances which led to a change in the traditional pattems of 
control. The most profitable way to attempt to understand this back-
ground is to begin with Luwu, the first major historical kingdom known 
in South Sulawesi and regarded by most as the cradle of Bugis civiliza-
tion. 
There is still some controversy concerning the precise period of 
Luwu's dominance. One source speculates that Luwu's heyday began in 
the lOth century (Braam-Morris 1889:546), and alocal scholar claims 
that the great Bugis epic poem, I La Galigo, was created in Luwu at its 
height of power sometime in the 9th century. 15 Although the beginning 
of Luwu's supremacy is still in dispute, Luwu was considered to be a 
major power by the beginning of the 16th century. Why Luwu should 
have been the first of the confederations/kingdoms to evolve in Sulawesi 
is difficult to explain. The centre of ancient Luwu is said to have been the 
coastal reg ion between Wotu and Malili (Esser 1961 :385). Local histo-
rians, strongly infIuenced by the tales of the I La Galigo, tend to place 
the earliest capitals of Luwu in the vicinity of the Cerekang River. Again 
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following the I La Galigo traditions, these historians speak of an "iron 
moUntain" in this area, which at present is also the site of a large nickel 
deposit centred in Malili. From ancient times iron was obtained near 
Lake Matano in the southeast of Centra! Sulawesi which at one time 
belonged to Luwu. The Cerekang is the second largest of numerous 
rivers which dissect the mountainous Luwu region. Although the 
Cerekang has silted up considerably over the centuries, even in the 19th 
century large perahu were still capable of sailing upriver for several days 
without difficulty. The only flatlands in Luwu are encountered along the 
north and northwest coasts on the Gulf of Bone where they extend a few 
kilometres inland. Much of the land along the coast is marshy and is 
submerged at high tide (Braam-Morris 1889:501-2). 
The site of an early Luwu capital ne ar the Cerekang River would have 
not only exploited the scarce flatlands in Luwu but would also have 
availed itself of a natural waterway to the interior. If local traditions are 
accurate with regard to an "iron mountain", perhaps in the vicinity of 
Lake Matano, the Cerekang River would have provided an ideal way to 
transport any heavy load downriver to the capitaion the coast. In an 
earlier period the possession of th is metal would have been a significant 
factor in warfare and in the development of trade between Luwu and the 
outside areas. The iron from the Luwu and Toraja areas is said to be 
heavily mixed with nickel, a mixture considered by Javanese to be ideal 
for the making of their krisses. Java itself produces no iron and would 
have been dependent on imports of that met al for the manufacture of 
krisses, weapons regarded with great reverence among many Malay-
Indonesian groups in the archipelago. In the Nägarakertägama, a 13th 
century text from the kingdom of Majapahit, Luwu is mentioned as one 
of Majapahit's dependencies. While there is no unanimity among 
schólars whether Majapahit did exercise overlordship over the terri-
tories c1aimed to be its vassals in the Nägarakertägama, the fact that 
Luwu is among the "vassals" mentioned indicates th at Java was aware of 
this area of South Sulawesi (Pigeaud 1960, lIl: 17). It would not be 
difficult to assume, therefore, that Luwu would have found a ready 
market for its iron in Majapahit. The wealth from this iron trade and the 
access to ideas from the advanced civilization of Majapahit may have 
provided the basis for Luwu's early ascendancy in South Sulawesi. 
Luwu's ties with the outside world were not limited to Java. Saweri-
gading, the most famous of Luwu's godrulers ofthe I La Galigo, is said to 
have travelled extensively to areas which have been identified with 
Ternate, Bima, Java, and the Coromandel Coast in India (Eerdmans 
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n.d.:51; Kern 1954). A maritime code of the kingdom of Melaka dating 
from about the middle of the 15th century mentions traders from South 
Sulawesi sailing to Sumbawa, Singapore, Johor, Melaka, Perak, Aceh, 
and Timor (Patunru 1969: 10; Winstedt 1945:25-26). 
Whatever may have been the cause of its rise as a kingdom, Luwu is 
gene rally acknowledged as the first of the Bugis-Makassar civilizations 
to emerge in Sou th Sulawesi. 16 Unfortunately, little is known about early 
Luwu history. Any reconstruction of Luwu's distant past rests almost 
solely upon the evidence of the I La Galigo, and th is evidence itself is 
spotty and difficult to corroborate. The epic ends with the return of the 
last godrulers, Simpurutoja and Lette Pareppa, to the Underworld. 
Af ter a period of chaos following the disappearance of the godrulers in 
Luwu, a Tomanurung named Simpurusiang descends to earth and re-
establishes order. He marries Patiangjala, and begets a son called 
Anakaji, who becomes the progenitor of the kings of Luwu (Eerdmans 
n.d. (a):53-56; Matthes 1864:527-530). 
During Luwu's period of ascendancy in Sou th Sulawesi, from perhaps 
the 10th to the 16th centuries, there was another major kingdom in the 
west coast of the peninsuia known as Siang. Siang first appears in 
European sources in a Portuguese map dating from about 1540. 
Mamuju (Mandar), Siang, Tallo, and Garassi on the west coast of 
Sulawesi we re also known to Portuguese cartographers. According to a 
16th century Portuguese account, Goa had been subjugated by Tallo, 
and Tallo in turn recognized Siang as "Iarger" and more powerful than 
itself. Apparently local oral traditions from the area which was formerly 
known as Siang (Pangkajene Kepulauan) retain this viewpoint. The 
valuable archaeological finds in the area of Siang seem to be further 
evidence that it may have been an important kingdom on the west coast 
of South Sulawesi prior to the rise of Tallo and Goa (Pelras 1973 :54). In 
1542 a Portuguese trader, Antonio de Paiva, first came to Siang before 
proceeding northward to central Sulawesi to obtain sandalwood. When 
he returned in 1544, he stopped in three places: Suppa, Siang, and Goa 
(Pelras 1973:41). Paiva commented that Goa was a large city "which 
had once been a vassal of Siang, but not any longer" (Pelras 1973:47). 
Another Portuguese observer, Manoei Pinto, estimated in 1545 that 
Siang had a population of about 40,000. lts ruler was so supremely 
confident of the resources of his state that he offered to supply the entire 
food requirements of the kingdom of Melaka (Pelras 1973:53). 
Pelras has suggested from a preliminary investigation of both 
European and local sources that Siang was an important commercial and 
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most likely political centre between the 14th and 16th centuries. lts 
infIuence may have extended over the whole west coast from the area of 
present-day LimaeAjattappareng all the way to the south to the borders 
of the Makassar kingdoms of Goa and Tallo. But by the middle of the 
16th century Siang was eclipsed by the new rising power on the west 
coast, the kingdom of Goa. An alliance between Goa and Tallo against 
Siang finally brought about its demise and oblivion sometime in the late 
16th century (Pelras 1977:252-5). 
An interesting picture emerges concerning the exercise of political 
power from early times in South Sulawesi. During the period of the 
formation of the confederations among the Bugis-Makassar people, 
there were apparently two parallel and separate political developments. 
Siang dominated the west coast while Luwu remained supreme on the 
east coast of South Sulawesi. These developments were governed prin-
cipally by geographic factors. The east and west coasts of the southwest 
peninsuia area of Sulawesi are effectively cut off from one another by 
mountain ranges with an average elevation of over 1,500 metres. The 
only sizeable opening in this mountain barrier is a central depression 
from the area of Sinjai on the southeast coast to the mouth of the Sa'dan 
River on the northwest coast. The southern part is mainly a relatively 
narrow corridor ofthe Walennae valley, but to the north the fIoor widens 
and is occupied by marshes and shallow lak es, the largest being Lake 
Tempe and Lake Sidenreng. The Walennae Rivet empties into Lake 
Tempe from the south, and another branch, the Cenrana River, follows a 
narrow valley through the hills and out the sea in the Gulf of Bone. North 
of the lakes is a low watershed area between the lake basin and the 
Rappang River and other streams fIowing west, which then gives way to 
a marshy coastal plain extending northward from Pare-Pare. From Pare-
Pare southward is the western range of mountains which runs parallel to 
the west coast for about 192 kilometres to the southern tip of the 
peninsuia (Allied 1943:No. 80, 78-80). 
Luwu, in its southward expansion, simply followed the most accessible 
route. It went south along the coastline to the mouth of the Cenrana 
River, then moved to the interior of Wajo and Soppeng via the 
Walennae, and finally turned south again along the coast to Bone. Wajo 
and Soppeng openly acknowledge in their tradition their earlier depend-
enee on Luwu. A tale widely known in Wajo is that of a Luwu princess 
and Bone prince who become the ancestors of the people of Wajo 
(Noorduyn 1955:32-33). In Soppeng it is said th at some time in the past 
a representative of the Luwu rulers used to come periodically to see that 
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the country was governed weIl (Ghalib, n.d.: unpag.). Only later wh en 
these areas had acknowledged Luwu's suzerainty did Luwu then con-
template extending its conquest westward to the lands of the Limae 
Ajattappareng. 
The mountain chain had proved to be somewhat of a barrier to both 
Luwu's and Siang's political ambitions. But perhaps a more crucial 
reason for the peaceful co-existence of these two overlords in this early 
period was the fact that the peninsuia still allowed for expansion into two 
natural spheres of infIuence. This state of affairs, however, could not 
last since it was merely a stage in the yet uncompleted process of 
incorporation of smaller and weaker states into larger confederations. 
Political expansion had at first followed geographical lines of least 
resistance. But it was only a matter of time before the two competing 
powers began to encroach into each other's spheres of infIuence because 
of the rapidly shrinking frontiers of South Sulawesi. 
The power balance on the east coast began changing during the reign 
of Datu (Ruier of) Luwu, Rajadewa or Dewaraja Datu Kelali' Tosanger-
reng, who ruled sometime in the late 15th and early 16th centuries. This 
was refIected in Luwu's changing attitude toward Wajo. Rajadewa gave 
Larompong, Malluse and Salo to Wajo to increase the latter's territories 
and make possible a more equitable alliance between the two kingdoms. 
Nevertheless, the true status of both kingdoms was never in doubt since 
in all matters Luwu was to be considered the elder brother and Wajo the 
younger (Noorduyn 1955:68; Zainal Abidin 1979:81-2). Previously 
treaties between Luwu and Wajo had been specifically worded to 
indicate a relationship of aparent to a child, hence demonstrating Wajo's 
vassal status to Luwu. The new alliance was phrased in terms of one 
between "brothers", a significant difference in status which refIected 
both Wajo's growing power vis à vis Luwu, as weIl as Luwu's recognition 
of its need for allies to maintain its position as the acknowledged power 
in the area. Luwu was aware ofWajo's potential power through trade via 
the Cenrana River, which fIows through the heartland ofWajo and into 
the Bay of Bone. Luwu's rulers later established one of their residences 
on the Cenrana River with the intention, one suspecls, of monitoring and 
benefitting from the growing trade between Wajo and the outside world. 
Rajadewa's hitherto elusive wish of making Sidt'nreng a vassal of 
Luwu encouraged him to make these concessions to Wajo. Sidenreng 
was on the border of the spheres of infIuence of Luwu and Siang, lying 
within the central depression which is the only major natura I opening 
between the mountain ranges separating the east from the west coasts. In 
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the 16th century a Portuguese described Sidenreng as Ha large and 
famous city at a well-navigated lake, which is surrounded on all sides by 
populous places" (Tiele 1880, IV:423). It is not surprising, therefore, to 
note that in the late 15th and early 16th centuries, Sidenreng became a 
target for,Luwu's ambitious rulers whose primary field of conquest had 
been previously limited to their southeastern Bugis neighbours. 
According to a Wajo chronicIe, Luwu had attacked Sidenreng twice but 
had been unsuccessful both times. In a third campaign Sidenreng was 
finally forced to surrender to a combined attack of Wajo by land and 
Luwu by sea. Luwu had had long experience on the sea through its trade 
with the outside world, while Wajo in this period was still a predomi-
nantly in land principality whose trade was hand led by its Luwu overlord. 
Wajo's later reputation as a seafaring kingdom had to await the demise 
of its overlord. 
A year af ter defeating Sidenreng, Rajadewa attacked Bone over a 
quarrel he had with the Arumpone (Lord of Bone) La Tenrisukki'. He 
landed his troops to the south of Cellu where he established his base. In 
thc battle which ensued, Rajadewa and the Luwu forces were put to 
flight. The Arumpone ordered that Rajadewa not be killed, and so he 
was allowed to escape with twenty of his men. In the battle the red 
payung (umbrella), the royal standard of Luwu, was captured by Bone. 
The defeat was followed by a treaty called Polo Malelae di Unnyi', or 
"The Breaking of Weapons (i.e. the "Peace") at Unnyi" (Noorduyn 
1955:69-70; Zainal Abidin Ibid., 85). This victory, which occurred 
sometime toward the end of the 15th or the beginning of the 16th 
century, ushered in a period when Bone replaced Luwu as the foremost 
power in the eastern half of the peninsuia. 
The kingdom of Bone had developed from a central core of seven 
communities. They were Ujung, Tibojong, Ta, Tanete Riattang, Tanete 
Riawang, Ponceng, and Macege, which originally formed a union called 
Kawerrang, a term used in Bugis to designate a bundie of rice staiks tied 
together. Each of the communities retained its leader, a Matoa, Daeng 
Kaluia, or Mado, and continued to maintain control over its own affairs. 
All of the heads formed a general council called the Matoa Pitu, the 
"Seven Elders" which served as a deliberative body for the general 
welfare of the Kawerrang. When other communities later joined the 
original seven communities to form the kingdom of Bone, the appella-
tion Kawerrang to refer to the core area was changed to the now more 
appropriate Watampone, literally the "trunk or body of Bone", indica-
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ting the centre of Bone (Abu Hamid 1974:17-19; Matthes 1874: 
628-9). 
The Bone Chronicle begins the story of the kingdom at the point 
where the I La Galigo ends. It describes the period before the coming of 
the Tomanurung as a time of chaos which lasted for seven generations. 
Only af ter the descent of the Tomanurung, who is asked to be mier in 
Bone, is order finally restored. The establishing of the Tomanurung 
mier in Bone is accompanied by the formation of an Advisory Council, 
the Aruppitu ("The Seven Lords"), composed of the principalleaders of 
the seven original communities. Land regulation and inheritance laws 
are promulgated at the same time to ensure the stability of relations 
within the community (Matthes 1864, vol. 1 :465-68).17 Subsequent 
miers are said to have laid the foundations for a prosperous economy. 
The third mier of Bone, La Waliwu Karampelua, is praised for his 
industry in increasing the lands under cultivation and for his knowledge 
of affairs in his kingdom (Matthes 1864, vol. 1:471-2; Bakkers 1866: 
176-7). 
The first Bone king mentioned in the ChronicIe who had any relations 
with the other major Sou th Sulawesi kingdoms was La Tenrisukki'. He 
mled sometime toward the end of the 15th or the beginning of the 16th 
century. As mentioned earlier, it was he who successfully repulsed an 
invasion by Luwu under Rajadewa Datu Kelali'. During the reign of La 
Tenrisukki's son and successor La Wulio Botee, Luwu again invaded 
Bone and was once more defeated. Bone th en obtained Goa's help 
against Luwu's principal ally, Wajo, but the alliance was an un-
accustomed interference by Goa in the stmggle for hegemony in the 
eastern half of the peninsuia, and Goa later withdrew to con temp late its 
own hopes for dominanee in the west (Matthes 1864:478; Bakkers 
1866:180-2). 
The Makassar kingdom of Goa developed in a similar fashion to Bone. 
In the beginning there were nine communities, known as the Bate 
Salapang (Nine Banners), which later became the centre of the Goa 
kingdom: Tombolo, Lakiung, Parang-parang, Data, Agangjene, 
Saumata, Bissei, Sero, and Kalli. 18 Through various forceful and peace-
ful measures other communities joined the nine to form the kingdom of 
Goa. Although the Goa ChronicIe itself begins with a Tumanurung as 
founder of Goa's royal house, other Makassar traditions mention four 
men who preceded the coming of the Tumanurung, the first two being 
Batara Gum and his brother (Abdurrazak 1969b: 1). Even among the 
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Makassar people the fame of the I La Galigo and the prestige attached to 
the legendary period of Luwu's history were sufficiently great to merit an 
attempt to demonstrate their links to th at kingdom. Little else but the 
names of these legendary figures is known. Af ter their disappearance, 
the nine core communities chose a leader known as the Pacealla to 
regulate the affairs of the various communities. Conflicts within the 
communities and threats from neighbouring are as finally convinced the 
nine communities and the Pacealla to seek a ruler. According to the Goa 
traditions, a female Tumanurung descended to earth after a period of 
confusion and restored order to the land (Abdurrazak 1969b:I-2). She 
and her husband, Karaeng Bayo, came to rule Goa. In subsequent years 
Tallo became so c10sely associated with Goa th at it was said th at these 
two kingdoms had "two rulers but one people (rua karaeng nase're ata)" 
(Abdurrazak 1969b:2-9; Abdurrahim 1974:11). 
There is little about the early kings in the Goa ChronicIe until the 
ascension of the nineth Karaeng (Lord of) Goa, Tumapa'risi' Kallonna, 
who ruled sometime in the early 16th century. At this time one of the 
Portuguese vi si tors to South Sulawesi commented that "the region 
which particularly bears the name Makassar is very smalI" (Tiele 1880, 
IV :424). Through a drastic reorganization of the kingdom, Tumapa'risi' 
Kallonna transformed the Makassar area from a loose confederation of 
communities into the well-knit and unified state of Goa. He arranged the 
union of Goa and Tallo and sealed it with an oath which declared that 
whosoever attempted to make one oppose the other (ampasiewai) would 
be punished by god (Dewata). A code of law and regulations for warfare 
were promulgated, and a system of colIection of taxes and customs 
instituted under a Syahbandar to finance the kingdom. So warmly was 
this king remembered in the Goa ChronicIe that his reign is praised as a 
time when the harvests were good and the fish-catch plentiful, the 
conventional ChronicIe description to indicate a successful ruler 
(Abdurrahim n.d.:19-21; Abdurrazak 1969b:ll). In a number of 
successful military campaigns, this Goa ruler subdued his neighbouring 
states, including Siang, and created a pattern of imperial ambitions 
which were emulated by subsequent Goa rulers in the 16th and 17th 
centuries (Abdurrahim n.d.:22). The laconic almost disinterested 
account of Goa's significant victory over Siang which altered the power 
relationships on the west coast of the peninsuia is typical of the style of 
this ChronicIe. Although Bone is also listed among the conquests of 
Tumapa'risi' Kallonna, a later entry attributes his successor Tunipa-
langga (? 1546-1565) with th is feat. 19 
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Tunipalangga is remembered for a number of remarkable achieve-
ments. They are listed in the Goa ChronicIe in the following order: 
(1) He conquered or made vassals of Bajeng, Lengkese, Polombang-
keng, Lamuru, Soppeng, various small states on Bone's border, 
Bulo-Bulo, Raja, Lamatti, the mountain states behind Maros, 
Wajo, Suppa, Sawitto, Alitta, Ouri, Panaikang, Bulukumba and 
other southern states, and the mountain provinces in the south. 
(2) He was the first to bring the people of Sawitto, Suppa, and 
Bacukiki to Goa. 
(3) He created the office of Tumakkajananngang. 
(4) He created the post of Tumailalang to handle the intern al adminis-
tration of the kingdom, leaving the Syahbandar free to deal exclu-
siveJy with Goa's external trade. 
(5) He established an official system ofweights and measures. 
(6) He was first to have cannons arranged in the large fortress. 
(7) He was the first of the Makassar people to manufacture bullets, 
mix gold alloy, and make bricks. 
(8) He was the first to build a brick wall around the settlements of Goa 
and Sombaopu. 
(9) He was the ruler to whom foreigners (Malays) under the Ana-
khoda Bonang came to seek residence in Makassar. 
(10) He was the first to make the large shield smaller, shorten the staff 
of the spear (batakang), and make Palembang bullets. 
(11) He was the first ruler to demand heavy corvée labour from his 
people. 
(12) He was a brilliant st ra tegi st in war, a hard worker, resourceful, rich 
and very brave (Abdurrahim n.d.:23-30). 
It is generally believed by local historians that innovations in Goa's 
entire governmental structure sometime in the 16th century enabled 
that kingdom to subdue its neighbours and become the dominant power 
iniSouth Sulawesi. But a close reading of the Goa ChronicIe raises an 
equally, if not more, plausible explanation for Goa's superiority. Goa's 
conquests, especially of Siang and Suppa, provided the manpower, 
expertise, and motivation to transform Goa into the most efficient and 
highly organized kingdom in the area. Since there is no reason to believe 
that the citing of Tunipalangga 's achievements followed a precise 
chronological sequence, a slight rearranging of their order may suggest 
the manner in which Goa became pre-eminent in South Sulawesi. 
One of Tunipalangga's accomplishments was to make the traditional 
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large shield smaller and to shorten the staff of the long Makassar spear. 
These changes replaced the old, unwieldy weapons and greatly increased 
the manoeuvrability of the Goa warrior. Since Tunipalangga is also 
praised for being a brilliant strategist and an exceptionally brave warrior, 
the combination of better and more manoeuvrable weapons with a 
feqrless and intelligent commander would have given Goa the necessary 
advantage to overcome its rivals. Af ter the conquest of Suppa, Sawitto, 
and the port of Bacukiki, which were once part of or subject to Siang, 
people from these areas were brought to Goa. Why only these people are 
mentioned specifically as having been brought back to Goa of all the 
subjugated areas may be explained by the importance of Bacukiki as the 
port city in the 15th and 16th centuries serving the rich agricultural 
hinterland of Suppa and Sidenreng. The Portuguese missionaries who 
arrived in the early 16th century were sufficiently aware of the impor-
tance of the ruler of Suppa to seek his conversion to Christianity. As a 
trading port it attracted many of the Malays who left Melaka af ter its 
conquest by the Portuguese in 1511. Tunipalangga's wars against Suppa, 
Sawitto, and Bacukiki may have been the final stages of the i9corpora-
ti on of areas formerly dominated by Siang. Many of those brought to 
Makassar by Tunipalangga could very weil have been the Malay traders 
who were established principally at the port of Bacukiki. This would 
explain the reference in the Goa ChronicIe to large numbers of Malays 
being allowed to settle in Makassar during the reign of Tunipalangga. 
The importance which the Goa rulers attached to the Malay community 
because of their long experience and well-established international 
trading ties can be seen in Tunijallo's decision to build a mosque for the 
Malay traders "'so that they would stay permanently" (Abdurrahim 
n.d.:50). 
Goa was still a minor state during the heyday of the Melaka kingdom 
in the IS th and early 16th centuries. The latter kingdom had developed a 
sophisticated international entrepot with facilities for the repairing and 
refitting of ships and the storage of trade goods, a fixed system of weights 
and measures, fixed cu stoms duties, coinage, a specific administration to 
handle quarreis and complaints of the various trading groups at Melaka, 
and a regular goveming body with a good judicial system to provide legal 
security. All of these factors contributed to the enhancement of trade at 
this world-famous city (Meilink 1962:40). A hallmark of Melaka's 
status as an entrepot, and indeed an essential prerequisite of all ports 
seeking th is distinction, was its ability to guarantee the security of trade 
within its borders (Andaya 1975: passim). Af ter Melaka was captured 
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by the Portuguese in 1511, many Malay traders at first followed their 
ruler in his peregrinations in search of a capital. But the continual 
harassment and depradations of the Portuguese made any trade difficult 
and of ten precarious, and sa many Malay traders dispersed to other 
kingdoms where trade could be conducted peacefully and profitably, 
where the traders could again be assured of protection by the host ruler. 
Many Malays went east to Sulawesi and appeared to have settled in the 
major west coast kingdom at that time, i.e. Siang - with its close 
dependency or ally, Suppa - before moving to Makassar. 
When the Malays arrived in Makassar they asked four guarantees 
from Tunipalangga: 
(1) Their land would not be trespassed upon arbitrarily. 
(2) Their homes would be inviolable from arbitrary entry. 
(3) Their homes would not be nigayang (a Makassar practice whereby 
in dividing the family, the freedom of an uneven numbered child was 
bought for a certain sum of money to prevent him or her from being 
absorbed into the royal household). 
(4) They would be exempt from nirappung (a Makassar practice 
whereby the ruler claimed the right to seize all the property of a 
criminai). 
Tunipalangga not only guaranted these rights but further assured the 
Malays with the words: "When my waterbuffalo is tired, I bring it down 
to play in a waterhole; when its laad is heavy, I lighten it. How much 
more would I do the same for my fellowman. I ask only that you commit 
na murder in my kingdom without my knowiedge" (Abdurrahim n.d.: 
27). Thus began a long history of profitable cooperation between the 
Malay community in Makassar and the rulers of Goa. 
When' one examines Tunipalangga's achievements as mentioned in 
the Goa ChronicIe, one can see certain practices which had already 
become commonplace in the western half of (he Indonesian archipelago. 
Their appearance in South Sulawesi may have been a result of the 
growing influence of Malays and Portuguese in Makassar. Tunipalangga 
established an official system ofweights and measures and created a new 
post of Tumailalang to deal with internal affairs. The Syahbandar was 
th us freed to devote himself entirely to the rapidly expanding foreign 
trade in the port of Makassar. The demands of the burgeoning inter-
national trading community, from the creation of new areas of settle-
ment within Makassar for the different groups to the establishment of an 
efficient network of goods and services necessary to support thi-s trade, 
required a radical restructuring of government. Here again one suspects 
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that the experience and expertise of the newly-arrived Malays and local 
officials who had served the kingdoms of Siang and Suppa may have 
been used. For the first time a Tumakkajananngang Ana'bura'ne is 
appointed whose principal responsibility was to oversee some forty 
different local groups fulfilling specific duties. Among these groups we re 
those in charge of building merchant ships and warships, others to make 
weapons of war, a third to handle woven goods, another to make all 
types of ornaments, including those from gold and silver, and a fifth to 
build houses (Abdurrahim 1974:33). To carry out these functions, as 
weil as to increase the quantities of rice, fish, and other comestibles to 
support this population growth in the port city, there was a greater 
demand on the labour of the local people. As the Goa ChronicIe itself 
admits: "Only af ter he [Tunipalangga] became ruler did the people 
begin to do very heavy corvée labour" (Abdurrahim n.d.:30). 
From Tunipalangga's reign onward Goa harnessed its whole society to 
take full advantage of the international trade which had been diverted 
from ports north of Makassar. As the Malay kingdoms on either side of 
the Straits of Melaka had demonstrated in earlier centuries, inter-
national trade could only be attracted to a particular port because of the 
advantages it offered over others (Wolters 1967:247-9). To retain the 
trade these advantages had to be maintained and force used to prevent 
the rise of rival ports. Makassar became the source of wealth and 
strength of the Goa kingdom, and all other activity in the kingdom was 
organized to uphold its position as an important international entrepot. 
Tunipalangga had envisioned very early on that it was international 
tmde which would make Goa great, and it was this vision which con-
tinued to motivate Goa 's rulers and guide their responses to events in the 
following centuries. 
By the middle of the 16th century, Bone in the east and Goa in the west 
had slowly replaced the two older kingdoms as major powers in their 
respective spheres. South Sulawesi had grown rapidly, and the mountain 
chain separating the eastern and western halves was no longer an effec-
tive barrier to any ambitious kingdom. The limits of political expansion 
on either side of the mountains had been reached, and now rulers of both 
major kingdoms cast their sights upon the whole of South Sulawesi as a 
possible field of conquest. Thus began a series of wars between Goa and 
Bone to determine which was the superior power. But the traditions of 
three centuries of the existence of two separate overlords on the two 
halves of the peninsuia served for a time to moderate ambitions. Despite 
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intermittent warfare between Goa and Bone in the 16th century, neither 
went so far as to incorporate the other into its own kingdom. 
Under Tunipalangga, Goa's conquests eventually reached the 
amorphous borderline between Goa's and Bone's respective spheres of 
influence. When the states of Bulo-BuIo, Lamatti, and Raja in present-
day Sinjai decided to switch their allegiance from Goa to Bone, a 
collision between these latter two kingdoms was unavoidable. In the war 
that soon followed, Bone preserved its sovereignty but was forced to 
relinquish these disputed are as to Goa and to recognize the Tangka 
River as its southem boundary. But the ambitious Tunipalangga 
remained unsatisfied with this triumph, and in 1563 he invaded Bone 
with the aid of Luwu, Soppeng, Wajo, and Sidenreng. In the battle of 
Cellu, Tunipalangga was wounded and forced to abandon the campaign. 
Two years later he resumed the war with Bone, but af ter seven days he 
returned to Goa and died shortly thereafter in 1565 (Eerdmans n.d. (b): 
10-11; Abdurrahim n.d. :29). His successor, Tunibatta, marched to 
Bone to continue the war only twenty-three days af ter being installed. 
His troops were routed at Bukaka, and he was later captured and 
beheaded at Campa (Noorduyn 1955:81). 
The ignominious defeat of Goa in 1565 halted for a time its rapid ri se 
to power. Bone under its ruler La Tenrirawe had proven more than a 
match for Goa, and now Bone hoped to re-establish the traditional 
demarcation between an eastem and western overlord in South 
Sulawesi. A few days af ter Tunibatta's death, Bone forced Goa to agree 
to a renewal of the Treaty of Caleppa to which Bone added the following 
demands: 
(1) All areas between Walennae River to the west andUlaweng to the 
north were to be surrendered by Goa to Bone as conquests. 
(2) The Tangka River was to serve as the boundary between Bone and 
Goa, with the area north of the river to'be included in Bone and that 
to the south to Goa. 
(3) Cenrana was to become part of Bone since it had been conquered by 
Bone under La Tenrisukki' from Rajadewa of Luwu. 
These dictated terms known in the Goa ChronicIe as the "Treaty in 
tbe North of Bone" (Kana-kanaya iwarakanna Bone) were accepted by 
Karaeng Tallo, who was Tuma'bicara-butta (Chief Ministerof) Goa, and 
by the new Karaeng Goa, Tunijallo', nephew of Tunibatta (Abdurrahim 
n.d.:39-40; Abdurrazak 1969b:15). 
Tunijallo' was not unknown to Bone. As a young man he had com-
mitted some indiscretion and had fled to Bone to escape the anger of his 
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father-in-law, Tunipalangga. During the two years th at Tunijallo' Iived 
in Bone, he became a favourite of Arumpone La Tenrirawe. It is said 
that while in exile he was twice wounded by poison darts, which indi-
cated that he had participated in wars on the side of Bone (Abdurrahim 
n.d. :40-1). Although Tunijallo' may have been at first grateful to Bone 
and may even have owed his position as Karaeng Goa to La Tenrirawe, it 
slowly became apparent to him that it would be difficult to reconcile his 
gratitude to Bone with the duties toward his own kingdom. In the 
beginning he avoided any confrontation with Bone by concentrating on 
strengthening Goa's links with the outside world. Through his Moslem 
Malay trading contacts, Tunijallo' established diplomatie ties with the 
miers of Johor, Patani, Balambangan, Banjar, and the Moluccas 
(Abdurrahim n.d.:50-1). In 1580 Sultan Baabullah of Ternate reputedly 
visited Tunijallo' and offered him an alliance "against his enemies" if 
he would adopt Islam, but Tunijallo' refused (De Clercq 1890:154; 
Valentijn 1724, I:208).The rejection of Sultan Baabullah's offer was 
probably prompted by Tunijallo's fear that Ternate would use religion as 
a way of exerting undue influence over Goa since Ternate's empire now 
extended as far west as the island of Selayar which was literally on Goa's 
doorsteps. 
Although Tunijallo' may not have feit strong enough to confront Bone 
militarily, Goa's growing strength caused Bone grave concern even af ter 
the Treaty of Caleppa. Bone encouraged Wajo and Soppeng to enter 
into a defensive alliance to deter any aggression from Goa.. As in an 
eariier agreement between Luwu and Wajo, the parties involved made 
th.e traditional symbolic gesture of creating equality by the redistribution 
of land from the larger to the smaller ally. In this way each party could 
willingly subscribe without loss of face to an agreement among 
"brothers", th at is one based on equality. Nevertheless, the relative 
strengths of the three kingdoms could not be ignored, and asatisfactory 
formula was evolved in which Bone was to be considered the elder, Wajo 
the middle and Soppeng the younger brother. This alliance came to be 
known as the Tellumpocco, or "The Three Powers" (Noorduyn 1955: 
251-2).20 
At the time of the Tellumpocco agreement in 1582, both Wajo and 
Soppeng acknowledged a form of subordinate relationship to Goa. Af ter 
Luwu's defeat on the battlefield against Goa under Tumapa'risi' 
Kallonna, it was forced to relinquish its overlordship over Wajo to its 
victor. Wajo later rose against Goa, but was easily defeated and imme-
diately punished by being degraded to a status of "slave" of Goa 
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(Noorduyn 1955:73-6). Soppeng, too, feIl victim to Goa's might. At 
Lamogo in Soppeng La Pawiseang Petta Puang ri Samang, Datu (ruIer 
of) Soppeng, and Tunipalangga, Karaeng Goa, entered into an agree-
ment which clearly proclaimed Goa's superiority. With Goa's renewal of 
the Treaty of Caleppa, however, Wajo and Soppeng were freed of Goa's 
overlordship and placed under Bone 's rightful sphere of influence. In the 
new Treaty of Timurung of 1582 which created the Tellumpocco, Bone 
was ready to raise these vassal kingdoms to the status of equal partners in 
order to obtain their full support against any further Goa aggression. 
Goa was provoked rather than intimidated by this development, and 
Wajo became a victim of another Goa invasion in 1583. This time, 
however, Wajo succeeded in repulsing the invaders with the help of 
Bone and Soppeng. It was obvious to Tunijallo' and his nobles that the 
principal obstacle to Goa's expansion was Bone, and th at without Bone 
none of the other states in the eastern half of the peninsuia would dare 
resist Goa. And so in 1585 Goa sent an army against Bone, but for some 
reason left unexplained in Goa's ChronicIe, the army withdrew before 
crossing the border. Another Goa invasion in 1588 was repulsed af ter 
seven months of warfare. Unsuccessful against Bone, Tunijallo' sent an 
army against Wajo in 1590, but while en route he was murdered by one 
of his own subjects. 21 The Tellumpocco had succeeded for the time being 
in removing the danger from Goa. 
The death of Arumpone La Tenrirawe in 1584 and Tunijallo' in 1590 
ended the Bone-Goa wars for the remainder of the 16th century. Both 
Bone and Goa were too occupied with internal dissension arising from 
the cruel and arbitrary practices of the new Arumpone La Ica and the 
new Karaeng Goa Tunipassulu'. So oppressive was La Ica's rule that his 
own relatives and nobles plotted his murder, though the enormity of the 
crime of regicide against the white-blooded descendants of the Toma-
nurung was not lost on the conspirators. One of them offered to posterity 
the explanation that "in our present situation the best course is to 
dethrone the ruler of Bone, even though to do so is to contravene 
customary laws and practices (adat)". After eleven years on the throne, 
La Ica was murdered on the stairs of his residence and became known as 
Matinroe ri Adenenna, or "He who passed away on the stairs" (Sejarah 
Bone n.d.:67; Eerdmans n.d. (b): 13-14). Goa fared little better with 
Tunipassulu' who came to the throne in 1590. He proved to be such an 
arbitrary ruler that his people and many foreigners fled the land. Af ter 
only three years as ruIer, he was forced to abdicate (Abdurrazak 1969b: 
18-9). 
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The respite which the smaller kingdoms in South Sulawesi enjoyed 
free from the depredations of the two overlords Bone and Goa soon 
ended as order was gradually restored in both lands. In the beginning of 
the 17th century Bone was ruled by a queen, We Tenrituppu. Her 
presence on the throne reflected the will of Bone's principal nob les to 
avoid yet another overly-ambitious and headstrong king. We Tenri-
tuppu was aware of the difficulty of being a femaIe ruler and was 
therefore quick to remind her advisory council that mutual dependence 
was essential for a successful kingdom. "Most importantly", she told her 
councillors, "remember that I am a queen". She now raised the status of 
her councillors by changing their original appellation from Matoa Pi/u 
(The Seven Elders) to the Aruppitu (The Seven Lords) and then 
entmsted them with the task of increasing the land under cultivation and 
to conduct themselves in a way which would not cause people to belittle 
Bone (Sejarah Bone n.d.: 106). 
Bone's nobles may have been able to appoint a queen as a remedy for 
the recent turmoil within the kingdom, but they could do nothing to 
prevent an upheaval caused externally by ambitious Goa aI]d Tallo 
miers. When Tunipassulu' was dethroned in Goa, he was replaced in 
1593 by his seven-year old brother I Manga'rangi Daeng Manrabbia 
who later became the first Moslem ruler of Goa with the title of Sultan 
Alauddin (Tumenanga ri Gaukanna 1593-1639). I Mallingkaang, better 
known as Karaeng Matoaya, "the old Karaeng", of Tallo served as 
regent to the young Goa ru Ier. 22 He was only eighteen years old when he 
was given the task of administering the affairs of Goa for its new seven 
year old ruler. But at eighteen he was already an experienced com-
mander and an accomplished administrator. At twelve years of age he 
was entrusted with the command of a part of the Goa army, and by the 
time he was sixteen he bore the responsibility of organizing the kingdom 
for corvée duties. Af ter having served as regent and Tuma'bicara-butta 
for two years, he then succeeded his brother as Karaeng Tallo (Ab dur-
rahim 1974:15; Abdurrahim n.d.:56). He was by then recognized as a 
senior statesman and the effective ruler of the kingdoms of Goa and 
Tallo. His becoming a Moslem in 1605 soon led to the conversion to 
Islam of Karaeng Goa I Manga'rangi and th at of the Makassar people of 
Goa and Tallo two years later (Noorduyn 1955:93; Abdurrahim 
n.d.:56-7). 
Karaeng Matoaya's decision to embrace Islam had inportant repercus-
sions not only on the personallives of the people but also on the nature of 
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future political alignments in South Sulawesi. Islam provided Goa with 
the extra impetus and force necessary to overcome Bone and make Goa 
the undisputed overlord in South Sulawesi.23 According to certain 
sources, which appear suspiciously to have been inserted af ter the 
successful IslamÏzation of South Sulawesi, Goa made the following 
agreement with the other mIers prior to the introduction of Islam: 
"Whoever finds a better way is required to inform the other mIers who 
have entered into this agreement" (Sejarah Bone n.d.: 104; Abdurrazak 
1969b:20). The Arabic (arïq and (arïqa [pI. (uruq], meaning "a way", is 
the term used for the Sufi path or a mystica I method or school of 
guidance for traversing this path (Trimingham 1971:312). While it 
appears certain that wh at both Bone and Goa were discussing was a 
better "religious" way, the 17th century chronicler(s) may have also 
wanted to indicate subtly th at Sufism was wh at was being debated. Goa's 
subsequent wars against its neighbours we re therefore justified in terms 
of attempting to inform the other mIers that Islam, especially Sufi Islam, 
was "a better way". 
Goa at first called upon Bone and Sopping to embrace Islam, but they 
both refused. According to one source Soppeng replied by sending back 
a spool of cotton and a spinning wheel (Noorduyn 1955:94-5), a tradi-
tional taunt to one's masculinity. Goa then attacked Soppeng through 
Sawitto in 1608 beginning what became known as the "Islamic Wars" 
(musu' asellennge in Bugis, bundu' kasallannga in Makassar). At Pakenya 
the Goa troops were defeated by the Tellumpocco af ter a three day 
battle and forced to withdraw. Three months later Goa launched a 
second attack, this time against Wajo. As had happened in the past, some 
of Wajo's vassals (palili'), such as Akkotengeng, Kera, and Sakuli, 
abandoned Wajo for wh at they believed to be the stronger power. But 
once again the Tellumpocco held firm and defeated the Goa forces 
(Noorduyn 1955:95). 
As the first Moslem kingdom in South Sulawesi, Luwu became allied 
with Goa for religious as weIl as political reasons. 24 Luwu besieged 
Peneki in Wajo but was repulsed af ter five days. Despite the TeIlum-
pocco's initial successes, however, Goa was reIentIess in its new role as 
the defender of Islam and finally succeeded in 1609 in forcing Sidenreng 
to embrace th is new religion. Af ter this victory the other Bugis kingdoms 
followed in relatively quick order: Soppeng also in 1609, Wajo in 1610, 
and finally Bone in 1611. Bone's mIer La Tenrima had urged his people 
to avoid war with Goa and to accept Islam, but so unfavourably was his 
suggestion received that the Bone people not only rejected it but the 
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Arumpone as weil. The new Arumpone, the Arung Timurung La Tenri-
pale, led Bone's forces against Goa but was forced to surrender. In 
accordance with South Sulawesi treaty traditions, Goa made no attempt 
to reinstate La Tenrirua as Arumpone even though he had wanted to 
make peace, but retained Bone's choice La Tenripale (Abdurrazak 
1969:20-1; Abdurrahim 1974:15-6; Noorduyn 1955:95-8). 
Islam added a new dimension in traditional politics in Sou th Sulawesi. 
It helped the Goa-Tallo rulers transform the old rivalry with their Bugis 
neighbours into crusades against the kal ir (unbelievers). In addition to 
believing in the rectitude of their cause, they now had the further 
advantage of being able to appeal for assistance from powerful Moslem 
rulers both in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago and beyond. Ternate 
had been quick to give military assistance to the Sultans of Magindanao, 
Buayan, and Sulu in the southern Philippines, and in 1580 it had pur-
portedly offered aid to Goa against its enemies if it were to embrace 
Islam (Majul 1973:115-7; Morga 1868:59, 190-1, 225-6; Valentijn 
1724,1:208). It is likely that the Moslem rulers from nearby lands would 
have heeded a request from Goa for military aid in the same way that 
Goa extended its assistance a few decades later to Moslem Sulu in the 
latter's fight against the Spaniards (Majul 1973:85). But military assist-
ance was merely one of the benefits which Goa now enjoyed as part of 
the Moslem world. It became a part of the community of Islam (ummat) 
and thereby associated spiritually with the prestigious and fabulous 
Moslem courts of Rum (Turkey) and Mogul India, and nearer to home, 
to Aceh, the rising power in western Indonesia. In material terms 
Goa prospered by becoming yet another link in an impressive trading 
network consisting of the Moslem kingdoms throughout the Malay-
Indonesian archipelago, India, and the Middle East. While Goa rulers 
had always been sympathetic to the Moslem traders, only now were they 
to become an active and accepted part of the system in which the port of 
Makassar was to play an important role. 
Other changes also ensued throughout South Sulawesi with the adop-
tion of Islam. The traditional advisory council of nobles, such as the 
Aruppitu in Bone and the Bate Sa/apang in Goa, was now to be balanced 
by a religious council called sarat. The kali, who was chief Islamic official 
in the kingdom and adviser to the ruler in Islamic matters, occupied a 
position and status in religious affairs equivalent to that held by the 
Tumaila/ang in Goa and the Tomari/a/eng in Bone as principal advisers 
to their respective rulers in secular affairs. An important contribution of 
Islam to the traditional political structure in South Sulawesi was the 
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overt recognition of the ruler as the religious leader of the kingdom. 
Although the South Sulawesi rulers had always been associated with the 
gods and were thus believed to have "white blood", only with Islam was 
there an open avowal, instead of merely a tacit recognition, of the ruler 
as the religious leader of his people, the "Shadow of God upon Earth" 
(Bagley 1964:45-6). Through the official network of Islam, which 
extended from the Sultan and the kali in the court to the guru or teacher 
in the smallest hamIet, the basic tenets of Islam were propagated 
throughout the land along with the belief in the ruler as God's represen-
tative on earth (Makarausu Amansjah 1969:38-40; Bakkers 1866:99). 
The existing ties between ruler and subject we re considerably strength-
ened by Islam which stressed the primacy of the rul er as religious leader 
of the land and his role in defending the Islamic faith. The new Moslem 
Sultan could now appeal to his people on the basis of both his secular and 
religious status in the society. 
Karaeng Matoaya assiduously ful filled his role as defender of the faith 
by forcing neighbouring kingdoms to embrace Islam. The Tallo Chron-
iele describes him as "the very first ruler who swore on the Koran and the 
Sudang [Goa's state sword and a part of Goa's regalia]". In this typically 
succinct South Sulawesi style, the chronieler captures the essence of 
Karaeng Matoaya's policy of using all available resources to achieve 
superiority in South Sulawesi, from Islamic spiritual forces to the pre-
Islamic powers immanent in the state regalia. After subduing a kingdom 
in these Islamic Wars, continues the ChronicIe, he did not take booty, 
seiztl the warflags, nor ask· for the sabbu kali. 25 Political conquest had 
ridden on the back of Islam, and once Islamization had been accom-
plished Karaeng Matoaya was reluctant, for reasons of religious convic-
tion or political sagacity, to apply the old formula which provided certain 
"rights" to a conqueror, such as reaping the rewards of conquest. 
That Islam may not have been the only motivation for Karaeng 
Matoaya's Islamic Wars in South Sulawesi seems plausible because his 
conquests did not end here. Under his and Karaeng Goa I Manga'rangi's 
rule, Goa quickly became an extensive and greatly feared empire in 
Eastern Indonesia. In the first three decades of the 17th century, Goa's 
conquests extended throughout most of Sulawesi, east coast Borneo, as 
far west as Lombok and as far east as the Aru-Kei islands. Only Luwu 
retained its independence, having arranged a successful royal marriage 
alliance with Goa and having perspicaciously sided with Goa as a fellow 
Moslem kingdom in the Islamic Wars of the early 17th century (Noor-
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~uyn 1955: 113). 
Signs of Goa's power were evident everywhere. Walls were built 
around Ujung Pandang, Pa'nakkukang and Ujung Tana, and carved 
gates installed at Sombaopu, the fortified town which contained the 
residence of the Karaeng Goa. According to the Tallo ChronicIe, 
Karaeng Matoaya was the first ruler to encourage the building of forts 
from bricks, the digging of canals, the reinforcing of the masts of the 
banawa 26 with planks, the construction of warships known as bilu' and 
galleys with large iron spikes, and the manufacture of small guns, 
cannons, and gunpowder. During his reign both gold and tin money were 
minted to deal with the increased commerce which Goa now enjoyed. In 
addition to the continuing presence of the Portuguese in Makassar, the 
English, the Danes, the Dutch, and the French soon arrived to establish 
trading posts in Makassar. So prosperous did Goa and Tallo become that 
the Tallo ChronicIe honoured Karaeng Matoaya with the greatest praise 
in the conventional chronicIe fashion: "During Karaeng Matoaya's rule 
the rice harvests, the fish-catch, and production of ballo' 27 were all 
successful, and the young which were nurtured grew fruitful." He is said 
to have been liked by traders, his vassallords, his siblings, his relatives, 
the princes (anakkaraeng),28 the Tumailalang,29 and the people. His 
achievements are meticulously enumerated ranging from his skill in 
carving to that of performing Moluccan dances. Intelligence, bravery, 
honesty, and friendliness are but a few of a long list of qualities attributed 
to his ruIer. But the decisive factor which established his virtue in the 
eyes of the chronicIer was his faithful performance of his religious duties. 
As if in substantiation of all the virtuous qualities previously mentioned, 
the chronicler ends triumphantly with the words: "It is also this ruler 
who on ce dreamed seeing himself drinking the water of Syurga 
[Heaven]" (Abdurrahim 1974:17-9). 
Due to the long reigns of Karaeng Matoaya and Sultan Alauddin, 
measures they adopted to deal with specific problems acquired the force 
of established practice within Goa and its dependencies. When Karaeng 
Matoaya was asked to settIe a personal dispute between Arung Matoa 
Wajo 30 and his brother, he was reluctant to arbitrate for fear of inter-
fering in questions of customary law in Wajo. But af ter he had made a 
decision on this matter, others with rival claims to thrones or complaints 
against another ruler began to wend their way to his court in Bontoala to 
seek a final judgement (Noorduyn 1955:108, 114). Those who had 
become Arung Matoa by the grace of the Goa rulers came to show their 
gratitude by open and sometimes flamboyant demonstrations of loyalty. 
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Five months after Topassaunnge (? 1627 -8) was chosen as Arung Matoa 
Wajo, he heard that Sultan Alauddin was preparing for a punitive 
expedition against Butung. To demonstrate his loyalty he hurried to 
Makassar and offered to guard Goa in the absence of its ruler. Sultan 
Alauddin at first protested saying th at there was no provision for: such 
action in their treaty. While admitting that this was so, Topassaunnge 
nevertheless persisted saying that his request should be regarded as a 
service from one who is considered to be a "relative". By employing a 
well-known term in interstate relations to indicate an alliance. Topas-
saunnge wished to demonstrate his faithfulness to such an agreement. 
Sultan Alauddin finally relented and assigned him Pa'nakkukang as his 
temporary residence, where he remained until the Goa farces returned 
thrèe months later (Noorduyn 1955: 10). Dating from th is period Wajo 
remained fiercely loyal to Goa. In 1669 Arung Matoa Wajo La Tenrilai 
Tosenngeng (1658-1670) and his men stubbornly refused to surrender 
to the Dutch and the Bugis and continued to swear their allegiance to 
Sultan Hasanuddin despite the latter's own announcement of the im-
minent fall of Sombaopu (L-4: unpag.). 
It was Karaeng Matoaya and Sultan Alauddin's ability to appease 
their Bugis neighbours and acquire their confidence that was a major 
factor in the absence of any major conflicts within South Sulawesi far the 
remaining period of their rule. They meticulously observed the proprie-
ties of traditional interstate relations. Instead of ravaging the conquered 
lands and collecting the sabbu kali, Karaeng Matoaya and Sultan 
Alauddin left everything untouched. In 1624 Sultan Alauddin urged the 
Tellumpocco kingdoms to preserve their unity (masseua-tauenngi), to 
leave to Goa any enemies from overseas, and to take up arms only 
against those who wished to destroy Islam (Noorduyn 1955: 110). What 
was being encouraged was not the disbandment but the continuance of a 
Bugis alliance which, af ter all, was created specifically to oppose Goa. In 
return for th is concession Goa hoped to obtain the Tellumpocco's 
agreement to allow Goa to deal with any external threat, or, in other 
words, to be fully responsible for fareign relations. Since Goa was in 
con trol of the port city of Makassar and had inherited a th ri ving inter-
national trade from Suppa and Siang, it was understandable that Sultan 
Alauddin considered any relations with the outside world to be more 
relevant to Goa than to the three Bugis kingdoms. Furthermore, Goa 
feit confident in being able to manage any external threat as long as the 
Bugis were quiescent. and not attempting to undermine Goa. The 
Téllumpocco, in agreeing to surrender its rights over external affairs to 
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Goa ostensibly in exchange for a guarantee of its continuing existence, 
was in fact acknowledging Goa's overlordship. But this traditional form 
of acknowledgement was solicited in such a way that the Téllumpocco's 
pride was preserved. Nevertheless, Goa had now introduced a state of 
affairs which henceforth became the norm: the recognition of one over-
lord for both the eastern and western halves of South Sulawesi. It was a 
new idea which was fostered in the first four decades of the 17th century 
through the cautious and prudent policies of these two Goa-Tallo rulers. 
In the minds of the Makassar people the lives of Karaeng Matoaya and 
Sultan Alauddin are so intertwined that it is not surprising that the Goa 
Chroniele mentions their death in the very same sentence: "986 days 
af ter Karaeng Matoaya left us, we were also left by Tumenanga ri 
Gaukanna [Karaeng Goa I Manga'rangi Sultan Alauddin]" (Rahim 
n.d.:65). At the time of the death of Sultan Alauddin in 1639 Goa had 
achieved a feat of conquest unmatched by any previous kingdom in 
Sulawesi. Wishing to demonstrate Goa's superior position in the 
Indonesian world, the chronieler lists only Aceh and Mataram, the two 
most powerful kingdoms in the western half of the Indonesian archipel-
ago in the 17th century, as "friends" (ma'bela-bela) of Goa; all others 
are specificaJly noted as conquests (Abdurrahim n.d.:65). The chron-
ieler attributes to Sultan Alauddin the honour and prestige of being the 
first Goa ruler to enter into a relationship of friendship with these two 
powerful kingdoms. 
The twin-kingdoms of Goa and Tallo were blessed by another dy-
namic pair of rulers who consolidated the gains of their predecessors and 
led their kingdoms successfully through a difficult period of external 
relations: Karaeng Goa I Mannuntungi Sultan Malikkusaid and 
Karaeng Pattinngaloang of Tallo. The former is described in the Goa 
Chroniele as a ruler "who never experienced plague, a serious war, or a 
major disaster". No greater praise could have been lavished on a ruler, 
for the absence of any major disaster was, af ter all, a sign of the approval 
of the gods. In speaking of Goa's external affairs, the Chroniele asserts 
th at Sultan Malikkusaid was "friendly" with the [Spanish] Governor of 
Manila, the [Portuguese] Viceroy of Goa [on the Indian subcontinent], 
the [English] President of Kling, the Maharaja of Masulipatnam, the 
monarchs of England, Portugal, and Spain, and the Mufti of Mekka. Goa 
no longer considered itself a minor insular klOgdom but one whose 
horizons extended throughout the world as a result of Islam and inter-
national trade. Only a selected few rulers were considered to be of equal 
status to merit "friendship" with the now proud and self-confident 
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Goa.31 The ChronicIe continues Karaeng Goa's list of virtues by saying 
that though he was powerful, he treated the people with humanity and 
was greatly loved by them. But the chronici er also adds the interesting 
comment th at " ... the princes [anakkaraeng], for example the Tumai-
lalang, loved the Tumenanga ri Gaukanna [Karaeng Goa I Manga'rangi 
Sultan Alauddin] more". He was also praised for being able to write the 
Arabic and Makassar languages weil (Abdurrahim n.d.:69-70). 
Sultan Malikkusaid's intellectual skilIs, however, were far surpassed 
by Karaeng Matoaya's son, Karaeng Pattinngaloang. He was said to be 
not only fluent in Portuguese, Spanish, Latin, English, French, and 
Arabic, but also conversant with the Iiterature of these languages (La 
Side 1968:27). A Jesuit vi si tor to Makassar, Alexandre de Rhodes, 
spoke of Karaeng Pattinngaloang as 
... a very wise and rational man ... He has read with great interest all 
the histories of oor kings of Europe. He always has our books in his hand, 
and particularly those dealing with mathematics, of which he is weil 
versed. He also has such a great pass ion for every aspect of this science 
that he works at it day and night ... To hear him speak without seeing 
him one would have taken him to be a native Portuguese because he 
spe aks this language with as much fluency as those in Lisbon ... 
Karaeng Pattinngaloang's library of European books was considered to 
be of an excellent standard, and he also had a collection of maps and 
globes (Rhodes 1653, III:34-8). He exhibited an insatiable desire to 
Jeam more about the new exciting world into which Goa had entered in 
order to satisfy his own curiosity and, one suspects, to uncover the key 
which would make Goa the equal of these European nations. To achieve 
the latter goal, Goa could no longer tolerate the seemingly chronic 
warfare within South Sulawesi. Any conflict jeopardized Goa's ability to 
hamess its resources in the attempt to attain the status and strength of 
European kingdoms. This may have been one of the principal motiva-
tions underlying Goa's decision to assume the role of sole overlord in 
South Sulawesi with the greatest vigour. The first major test of Goa's 
assumption of its new role arose in Bone. 
In 1640 Arumpone La Ma'daremmeng, who had succeeded La 
Tenripale in 1630, enforced a stricter version of Islam in his kingdom 
than had previously been known (Eerdmans n.d. (b): 18). He issued an 
edict forbidding anyone in his kingdom to keep or use slaves who were 
not bom into slavery. All non-hereditary slaves were ordered freed or 
given wages for their labour. There was great opposition from the nobles 
led by La Ma'daremmeng's own mother, Datu Pattiro We Tenrisolo-
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reng. She openly rejected her son's brand of Islam as being too strict and 
difficult and expressed a preference for the kind of Islam favoured by the 
royal families of Goa and Tallo (Speelman 1670:728r). The type of 
Islam popular in the Makassar courts was the mystical Sufi doctrine. The 
esoteric doctrines of Sufism had a congenial reception in South Sulawesi 
because of their basic compatibility with the local pre-Islamic belief 
structure. No excessive or unfamiliar demands were made by this 
doctrine which tolerated many differing routes on the path to salvation 
(Trimingham 1971:2-3). Although the new sect introduced by La 
Ma'daremmeng is nowhere mentioned in any of the local sources, any 
one of the more orthodox branches of Islam would have made much 
more rigorous demands on the people's religious beliefs than Sufism.32 
Datu Pattiro and many of the Bone nobles finally fled Bone to seek 
red re ss from the rulers in Goa. Goa's prestige as the kingdom which 
brought Islam to the other South Sulawesi kingdoms, ex cept for Luwu, 
and its indisputable position as the most powerful kingdom in South 
Sulawesi made it a logical choice as a protector. At first Goa's leaders 
simply followed these developments with mild concern, but this concern 
quickly turned to alarm when La Ma'daremmeng sought to export his 
specific brand of Islam by force to Wajo, Soppeng, Massepe, Sawitto, 
and Bacukiki. It was no longer merely a question of religion but that of 
political hegemony which finally spurred Goa to act. One of the principal 
chronicles of Wajo openly attributes a secular motivation to La 
Ma'daremmeng's attack on Wajo. According to this source, La 
Ma'daremmeng first accused the people of Peneki in Wajo of commit-
ting many arbitrary acts against Bone before he proceeded to burn and 
pillage Pene ki with the permission of Wajo's Arung Matoa. The latter, 
however, complained that he had approved punishing, not pillaging, of 
Peneki and demanded that all goods seized from Peneki be returned. La 
Ma'daremmeng's justification was that only goods from those who had 
borne arms against him and the Arung Matoa had been seized. The 
Arung Matoa rejected this excuse and so war began between Wajo and 
Bone (L-3 :281-2). 
As was the case during the Islamic Wars a few decades earlier, this 
conflict between Wajo and Bone had both religious and temporal over-
tones. While religious zeal may have been La Ma'daremmeng's principal 
motivatlOn, Bone's neighbours interpreted these moves in terms of 
traditional political rivalries. Karaeng Goa Sultan Malikkusaid 
responded quickly to theseevents and sent an envoy with a letter to La 
Ma'daremmeng. In it La Ma'daremmeng was asked to explain whether 
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his acts were based on the commands of the Prophet Muhammad, on an 
oid adat, or on his own whim. If either of the first two reasons was the 
basis for his actions, then Goa would like to be informed of this. But if he 
had acted solely on whim, then it was c1early unacceptable (Noorduyn 
1955: 116-7; Abdurrazak 1969b:32-3). When La Ma'daremmengfailed 
to reply, Goa made preparations for war (Eerdmans n.d. (b):19). On 8 
October 1643 Goa, assisted by Wajo and Soppeng, attacked Bone at 
Passempe and forced La Ma'daremmeng and his brother La Tenriaji 
Tosenrima to f1ee to Larompong in Luwu. According to a recent study, 
the reasons which Goa presented for attacking Bone were "to defend a 
mother against her child (i.e., the Datu Pattiro against her son La 
Ma'daremmeng) and to preserve public order which had been disturbed 
by La Ma'daremmeng in his act of freeing the slaves" (Sejarah Bone 
n.d.:122). 
Following the defeat of Bone, Karaeng Pattinngaloang asked the 
Aruppitu to choose a ruler to replace La Ma'daremmeng. Af ter five days 
of deliberation the Aruppitu reported: "We have searched for someone 
among the descendants of the rulers of Bone whom we consider capable 
ofreviving th is landofBone, but there is no one. Therefore, we would be 
grateful (kiparapa'maiki) if we could have the Karaeng [Goa] as ruler of 
Bone." Both Karaeng Goa and later Karaeng Pattinngaloang refused 
the Aruppitu's offer to become Arumpone. In refusing, Karaeng 
Pattinngaloang explained: "The adat is that if we choose a ruler, the 
people of Bone may not interfere. If the people of Bone choose a ruler, 
we too, may not interfere ... " Therefore, a Bone nobie, Tobala', was 
made the leader in Bone in November 1643 and responsible to a 
Makassar lord, Karaeng Sumanna (Abdurrahim n.d.:71). 
There is disagreement between the Makassar and Bugis sources as to 
the position to which Tobala' was appointed. According to the two 
principal Makassar language sources of this period, Tobala' was ap-
pointed as kali, or the principal Islamic figure in a kingdom (Abdurrahim 
n.d.:71; Ligtvoet 1880:16). But all the Bugis sources state specifically 
that Tobala' was made a jennang or regent. According to a recent study 
by a team of Bugis local historians, Karaeng Sumanna was made a 
viceroy (Raja Muda) of Bone while [Tobala'] Arung Tanete Riawang [a 
member of the Aruppitu] was made a jennang (Sejarah Bone n.d.: 123). 
The difference is more apparent than reaJ. The Sultan and the kali 
were of ten closely related in Bugis-Makassar kingdoms because of the 
mutually reinforcing role which these two offices played. The Islamic 
Sultan was considered to be "The Shadow of God upon Earth", and 
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therefore his greatness and pOSItIon were exalted by the religious 
officials throughout the land to the smallest hamiet. The kali, being the 
spiritual head of the Islamic organization in a kingdom, became a valued 
ally of the Sultan. In return for the kali's loyalty, the Sultan lent his 
military and political strength to defend the religion. From early on the 
value of a faithful kali was considered as important to a successful 
kingdom as a good Sultan. It may very weil be that Goa's ruler appointed 
Tobala' as a kali because it was the adat th at Goa and Bone not interfere 
in the selection of each other's rulers. By appointing a religious head 
Goa avoided transgressing adat while forcing the new kali by virtue of his 
duties to support the secular head of Bone, who was the Makassar lord, 
Karaeng Sumanna. Since Tobala' was one of the Aruppitu, the Arum-
pone's "secular" advisory council, the people and leaders of Bone 
viewed him simply as a regent, a political head, appointed by the Goa 
ruler (as must have surely been intended), hence the Bugis references to 
his being appointed a "regent". 
When the defeated Arumpone La Ma'daremmeng was forcibly 
brought to Goa from his exile in Luwu, his brother La Tenriaji 
Tosenrima returned secretly to Bone and quickly raised an army against 
Goa. Upon receiving word of th is development, Karaeng Goa again 
assembied his troops and called upon Datu Soppeng, Arung Matoa 
Wajo, and Datu Luwu to participate in subduing Bone. Karaeng 
Cenrana was placed at the head of the expedition which went by sea to 
Salangketo and then marched overland against Bone. In this second 
battle of Passempe in 1644, Bone was once again vanquished by a vastly 
supenor army. The principal Bone leaders, La Te nriaj i Tosenrima, 
Arung Kung, and Daeng Pabila, were all taken prisoner and brought 
back to Goa. Since Tobala' had remained neutral in the war, he was 
allowed to retain his position in Bone. Goa reasserted its overlordship 
over Bone and reduced its "vassal" to the status of "slave" of Goa. All 
privileges which Bone had hitherto enjoyed were withdrawn and the 
entire country placed at the service of Goa. To prevent any further 
rebellion in Bone, all the nobles were forcibly exiled to Goa (Speelman 
1670:728v; Sejarah Bone n.d.:124). 
Af ter this victory, Karaeng Goa, Arung Matoa Wajo, and Datu Luwu 
met at the Baruga Buliya and renewed the Treaty of Topaceddo, which is 
known in Bugis as the "Singkerru' Patolae". The Bone prisoners were 
divided equally among the three, but Wajo refused its share saying that 
Bone and Wajo were one land (L-18:47).33 Nevertheless, Wajo did not 
forego the opportunity of recovering areas from Bone which it con-
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sidered its own, such as Timurung, Amali, Mampu, Sailong, Bunne, and 
Pammana (L-13:285-6). 
The sadness and apprehension accompanying Bone's defeat at 
Passempe in 1644 is captured in the few shocked phrases used by a Bugis 
chronider to introduce this tragic event: "Now will be related the defeat 
of Passempe, the complete smashing of the incense-holder, the total 
enslavement of the land of Bone by Goa." For the next two decades 
Bone was ruled by a regent appointed by Karaeng Goa. This single 
factor, explains this chronider, accounts for the pitiable condition of the 
people of Bone, many of wh om came to perform services for the people 
of Wajo without compensation (L-3 :285-6). Without a ruler the govem-
ment in Bone could no longer ensure the people's livelihood nor protect 
them from oppressive acts by neighbouring lands. Goa's decision to 
appoint a kali/regent instead of retaining the vanquished ruler or 
another member of the local royal family as a vassal lord as was 
customary, created a bittemess toward Goa which surfaced in a dramatic 
way some twenty years later. 
It was in these times that a remarkable individual, Arung Palakka La 
Tenritatta, arose to become the champion of the oppressed Bugis of 
Bone and Soppeng. When or where he was bom is still a matter of 
debate, though it is generally accepted that he was bom about 1635 in 
the village of Lamatta in the area of Mario ri Wawo in Soppeng. As a 
child he was known as La Tenritatta, "He who cannot be struck". A 
variant version of his name which is sometimes advanced is La Tenritata, 
"He who is not govemed [by anyone]" (Sultan 1968:104). He received 
the titie Oatu Mario ri Wawo from his mother and was generally known 
by this name until his later youth. Wh en he was growing up as a youth in 
the Goa court, he acquired the name Oaeng Serang. As a young man 
having brought his people safely back home from their forced labour in 
Makassar, he was presented with the ti tie Arung Palakka, "Lord of 
Palakka", which later ca me to indicate the heir-designate of the 
kingdom of Bone. It is by this name that he is referred to throughout this 
book since it is the name by which he is best known in Western sources 
and among the Sou th Sulawesi people today. Because of his well-known 
oath uttered in exile to leave his hair uncut until he had freed his people 
from Goa's yoke, he also acquirect the nickname Petta Malampee 
Gemme'na, the "Long-Haired Prince". Ouring the Makassar War and 
thereafter he was provided with yet another appellation to accord with 
his accomplishments, Tounru' or Toappatunru', "The Conquerer". In 
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1672 he became Arumpone, Lord of Bone, and took the Arabic title, 
Sultan Sa'aduddin. Finally, at his death he was given the posthumous 
name, Matinroe ri Bontoala' , or "He who passed away at Bontoala" . 
Arung Palakka was more than just another brave leader. He repre-
sented the essence of the struggle of the vast majority of the Bone and 
Soppeng people against the oppression they were suffe ring at the hands 
of Goa. His siri' and pesse became those of his people and provided the 
principal motivation in the struggle against Goa. Of equal importance 
was Arung Palakka's personal magnetism which became identified with 
upe', good fortune. Therefore, not only his leadership but his very 
person came to be formidable weapons available to Bone, the stronger 
of the two Bugis kingdoms, in its struggle against Goa for political 
hegemony in South Sulawesi. 
But in the first half of the 17th century, little of this challenge from 
Bone was yet evident. Goa's remarkable rulers ofthe previous fifty years 
had laid the foundations for astrong and prosperous Goa. In the 16th 
century, innovations in traditional weaponry had greatly strengthened 
Goa and helped make it a major power in the area. lts supremacy was 
soon estabIished with its conquest of Siang and Suppa (with its port of 
Bacukiki), the major trading and political centres on the west coast. 
Rather than destroying these een tres, the Goa leaders used their 
expertise and man power in developing the port of Makassar into an 
international entrepot. The determination with which Goa's leaders 
undertook th is task is underlined by their decision to restructure the 
economy and administration of the kingdom to cater to the needs of 
international trade at Makassar. 
By the middle of the 17th century the thrivingportcity of Makassar 
had become a brilliant testimony to the foresight of Goa's rulers. The 
wealth from international trade was instrumental in assuring Goa the 
reputation of being the indisputable overlord in South Sulawesi and in 
many are as beyond its shores. Goa appeared invincible as ships carrying 
trade goods and emissaries appeared in Makassar bearing witness to the 
greatness of Goa. If its leaders at th at time had been warned of the 
dangers of the growing number of European ships in the Eastem waters, 
they probably would have pointed out how the Europeans, too, brought 
wealth to Goa. But Goa's success had to be achieved at the price of 
earning the antagonism of the Bugis people of Bone and Soppeng and 
acquiring the jealousy of economie competitors in the region. The 
combination of these two factors were uItimately to bring about the 
downfall of the proud kingdom of Goa. 
CHAPTER 11 
ROAD TO CONFLICT 
When Sultan Hasanuddin became Karaeng Goa in 1653 and Karaeng 
Karunrung Tuma'bicara-butta a year later, they inherited a mighty 
kingdom with a flourishing international trade at Makassar. This was the 
legacy of their grandfathers, Sultan Alauddin Tumenanga ri Gaukanna 
and Karaeng Matoaya Tumammalianga ri Timoro', and their fathers, 
Sultan Malikkusaid Tumenanga ri Papambatuna and Karaeng Pattin-
ngaloang Tumenanga ri Bontobiraeng. By the third generation of this 
highly effective combination of Goa-Tallo rulers, the struggle for politi-
cal ascendancy in South Sulawesi had ended with Goa triumphant. 
There seemed nothing on the horizon which could threaten the position 
of Goa as the leading political and economie power in the eastern half of 
the Indonesian archipelago. So invincible did Goa appear to any outside 
observer th at wh en a large Dutch fleet with an arrny of several thousand 
men appeared a little over a decade and a half later to attack Makassar, 
neither the Dutch nor anyone in the Eastern Indonesian area believed 
that their success was assured. But Goa's days of supremacy were 
coming to an end as a result of an unforeseen alliance of the Dutch East 
India Company and Arung Palakka and most of the Bone and Soppeng 
Bugis. 
In the early days of the Company in Indonesian waters, more curiosity 
than enmity characterized its relations with Goa. But when the Compa-
ny learned that the port of Makassar was "a very well-situated place to 
sail to and from the Moluccas", it quickly realized the importanee ofthe 
area in terms of the Company's then primary interest in spices. At the 
invitation of Sultan Alauddin of Goa, a Dutch factor wasstationed in 
Makassar in 1601 principally to serve Dutch ships putting in to Makassar 
for fresh supplies and other requirements on the way to the Spice 
Islands. From early on the Company attempted to enlist Goa's help in 
attacking the Company's enemies in Makassar, but Sultan Alauddin 
refused to be involved. He eXplained simply: "My land is open to all 
nations." Throughout the first half of the 17th century, the Company 
continually attempted to convince various Karaeng Goa to restriet trade, 
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but each time it was rebuked with homilies, such as: "God has made the 
earth and the sea and has divided the earth among men and given the sea 
in common to all" (Stapel 1922:9-14). Sultan Hasanuddin, too, bristled 
at the Dutch suggestion that Goa limit its trade. He told the Dutch th at 
God created the world "so that all mankind could have the enjoyment 
thereof, or are you of the opinion th at God has reserved these islands, so 
removed from your nation, for your trade alone" (Stapel 1922:62). The 
opposing stances of Goa's rulers and the Company were maintained 
despite the change of actors throughout the 17th century. 
The tendency of both Western and Indonesian schol ars has been to 
accept the statements of Goa's rul ers at face value and deciare that there 
were two conflicting views of trade between Goa and the Company. Yet 
the theory of a mare liberum, freedom of the seas, espoused by the Goa 
ruIers and many other Asian nations in the 16th and 17th centuries, did 
not exclude the practice of the strongest power in the region imposing its 
wil! on those we aker states which had "free" access and use of the sea. 
Where these two powers did fundamentally differ was in the significance 
of this "monopoly" in their separate frames of reference. The Company 
was invested with quasi-sovereign powers by the government of the 
United Provinces ofThe Netherlands, but it remained a basically econo-
mic body whose primary reason for existence was to increase the profit 
of its shareholders. To monopolize any product was an acknowledged 
economic manoeuver which was in this period considered to be a favour-
abIe means of maximizing profit. Monopoly was an economic measure 
pure and simpie. The kingdom of Goa, on the other hand, was not 
principally an economic organization but viewed its economic activities 
as subordinate to the more important politica I considerations. Once a 
political arrangement had been reached with regard to the status of one 
state to another, then all else, including all economic arrangements, had 
to be adjusted to reflect this status. 
The Karaeng Goa seriously believed in a mare liberum, but one which 
would properly reflect the political status of those lands bordering the 
sea. Fleets from Goa were sent way beyond the shores of Sulawesi as far 
east as the Aru Islands and west to Selaparang in Lombok in order to 
reinforce Goa's political overlordship. As part of th is overlord-vassal 
relationship, Goa received the right to one-tenth of whatever products 
were produced by these vassal states (palili'). In accordance with tradi-
tions in South Sulawesi, by the first half of the 17th century Goa had the 
right to demand tribute in the form of local products from any of its 
vassal areas. Any other state which attempted to abtain these products 
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could be regarded as achallenge to Goa's own political status. Retaining 
the products of vassal areas in the Moluccas was seen not as a "monopo-
listic" economic practice, but as a natural concomitant of apolitical 
relationship. Any challenge to this economic right could only be inter-
preted as achallenge to its politica I status. When the Company con-
tinued to in sist on a monopoly in the Moluccas, Goa had little option but 
to see it as apolitical threat and prepare to deal with it as such. 
Relations between Goa and the Company since the beginning of the 
17th century had been adumbrated by their rivalry for con trol of the 
spice trade. Various unfortunate incidents involving shipwrecked Dutch 
ships on Makassar's shores had led to a further deterioration of the 
situation. When the Company presented a draft treaty for the perusal of 
the Goa court, Sultan Hasanuddin was outraged at the effrontery of the 
clauses. Through his envoy, Karaeng Popo and Karaeng Bantaeng, he 
presented the following reply: 
... With regard to your request [to Goa] not to war with Ternate, Bacan, 
and Tidore without your knowiedge, they have their own people; let 
them send them here with their requests ... You forbid me to sail my 
ships to these lands [enumerated here] ... Do you mean th at God had 
reserved for your trade alo ne those islands located so far away from your 
nation? ... I only request that you leave unmolested and in peace the 
inhabitants of Ceram and Buru, as weIl as my ships which be ar my flag 
and pass in whatever waters you come across them ... Insofar as your 
building on Menado is concerned, you have shown by th is how much 
belief and trust one can place on your nation. Since we are at peace and 
you have placed your fortifications on my land, all the more reason why 
you should demolish them ... if we were to accept peace on the condi-
tions which have been previously read, it would be more fitting to have 
war (KA 119b:838r-840r). 
The unusually strong words contained in this reply reflected Goa's 
determination to pres erve the life-blood of the kingdom: the inter-
national trade at the port of Makassar. Once Tunipalangga (c. 1546-
1565) had made the conscious decision to create an international entre-
pot at Makassar with the help of Malays, Portuguese, and experienced 
traders from Bacukiki, Goa was set on a course which profoundly 
affected its entire way of life. To create the conditions for a successful 
entrepot, Goa's government and society were transformed to foster this 
new creation. Tunipalangga's vision was rewarded by the growth of 
Makassar as a major trading port in the Indonesian archipelago by the 
late 16th century. Concomitant with th is new status we re lofty ambitions 
and a we al th from international trade to make them possible. Goa could 
48 The Heritage of Arung Palakka 
now maintain its position within Sulawesi and even obtain vassal states 
abroad, a feat which would have been unthinkable had it continued with 
a basically agricultural subsistence economy insulated from the outside 
world. Sultan Hasanuddin, as his predecessors had done before him, 
harshly rejected any Dutch propos al which threatened to undermine 
Goa's new position of respect. lts court entertained vassal envoys from 
neighbouring areas, and its armies received into their ranks soldiers from 
such far-off lands as Temate and Banda (KA 1123d:400v). And with 
aplomb the Goa govemment welcomed as appropriate a request from 
the powerful Susuhunan of Mataram that "one or two daughters" of the 
Goa royal house become his wife (KA 1119a:778v-778r). 
The exhilarating sense of power enjoyed by Goa provided littIe hope 
that the Company could obtain many of the commercial advantages it 
sought from Goa, short of war. Sultan Hasanuddin, too, was aware that 
his reply had left the Dutch with few alternatives. One evening in 
February 1660 upon leaving the mosque he summoned to his side the 
regent appointed to rule in Bone, Tobala'. He told Tobala' that he 
should prove Bone a worthy nat ion and go with 1,000 men to keep a 
good watch in those areas behind Makassar lands to report any attempts 
by the Dutch to unite with the Bugis (KA 1122a:230r). Vassal kingdoms 
were also orde red to send men to Makassar to prepare for the expected 
armed confrontation between the Company and Goa. On 4 March 1660 
some 3,200 Bugis and Turatea men arrived in Makassar under various 
Makassar leaders: Karaeng Katapang with 900 Bugis; Karaeng Cenrana 
with 700 Bugis from Bone; Karaeng Sumanna with 500 men (area 
unspecified); Karaeng Kutenga with 500 men from Turatea; 159 Bugis 
from Wajo; and 200 Bugis from Luwu under Datu Luwu (KA 1122b: 
245r). Among those summoned to Makassar in June 1660 to help build 
fortifications were the Bugis from Wajo, Soppeng, and Bone (Stapel 
1922:65-6). 
The Company had earlier feared that an alliance among three of the 
most powerful kingdoms in the archipelago at the time - Banten, Mata-
ram, and Goa - would be tumed against the Dutch. But the revolts in 
Bone and Mandar in 1659 made the Company confident that Goa would 
not undertake any grandiose plans which would add the Company to its 
enemies (KA 111ge:809r). Also encouraging were correspondence re-
ceived in Menado from the Mandar rebels and a report from a Company 
envoy to the Goa court. The envoy, Willem Bastingh, mentioned that 
some of the Goa nob les had complained of the brutality of their mIer, 
Sultan Hasanuddin. Some were ready to be tray him if Goa we re attacked 
11 Road to Conflict 49 
(KA 1119d:822v-823v). The Company was further heartened by news 
that Goa's mercenary Banda troops were ready to assist the Company in 
any attack on Makassar (KA 1123a:380v). With such favourable reports 
the Company believed its chances of success had greatly improved, and it 
was right. The Company expedition of 1660 against Goa proved a 
resounding success. The Dutch forces occupied the Goa fort Pa'nakku-
kang, stocked it with supplies for five months, and left four heavily-
arrned ships and two sloops in Makassar harbour to guard it (Stapel 
1922:65-6). 
According to Speelman's Notitie, Sultan Hasanuddin blamed Karaeng 
Sumanna for Goa's defeat at the hands of the Dutch. As punishment for 
this humiliation, Sultan Hasanuddin transferred Karaeng Sumanna's 
authority over Bone to Karaeng Karunrung. In his new official capacity 
Karaeng Karunrung summoned 10,000 Bugis to dig a large canal cutting 
off the Dutch in Fort Pa'nakkukang from the Goa mainland. The Bugis, 
under their leaders Tobala', Daeng Pabila, Arung Kaju, Arung Palakka, 
Arung Maruangen and others, refused to do this labour and fted back to 
their homeland (Speelman 1670:730v). Tbe date of their flight is re-
corded in the Diary of the Kings of Goa and Tallo as having occurred on 
7 August 1660 (Ligtvoet 1880: 118). On ce safely in their homelands the 
Bugis obtained the much needed time to organize and arm themselves 
because of Goa's concern with the continuing presence of the Dutch in 
Fort Pa'nakkukang. According to "Binsje" Ali, a spy of the Dutch, a 
Goa army under Karaeng Popo was sent ostensibly to put down the 
rebellion, but in fact to go only as far as Bantaeng and then return. 
Karaeng Popo, Sultan Hasanuddin, Karaeng Karunrung, and some of 
the Bate Salapang with several thousand men would then attempt to 
retake Pa'nakkukang from the Dutch. But when one ofthe Dutch ships 
unexpectedly returned to Makassar for repairs, Sultan Hasanuddin 
quickly abandoned these plans. He orde red Karaeng Popo to go to 
Batavia and postponed any further punitive expeditions against the 
Bugis until November or December (KA 1123b:387r-389r). In the 
meantime Sultan Hasanuddin took the precaution of isolating the Dutch 
forces in Pa'nakkukang and strengthening his own defences. Along the 
shore beginning from the northern corner of the bay to the Garassi 
River, the Makassar forces planted mantraps, breastworks, and some 
sixty-six cannons. All the houses between the ruler's fortress at 
Sombaopu to the Garassi River were pulled down and a strong fort with 
fifteen cannons erected directly opposite the Dutch guardpost. Further 
pressure was applied against the occupation by Dutch forces when 
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Sultan Hasanuddin fined anyone who sold rice to the Dutch. The lack of 
ri ce and the outbreak of serious illness among the Dutch caused by 
contaminated drinking water slowly sapped the strength of the 520 
Europeans in Pa'nakkukang (ibid.:387v-390r). 
The only relief which came to the beleaguered garrison was news of 
the continuing rebellion of Goa's vassals, especially the Bugis. Sultan 
Hasanuddin was forced to send another expedition of Makassar and 
Banda troops under Karaeng Tallo, Karaeng Karunrung, and Karaeng 
Sumanna to deal with the rebellion in Bone (KA 1123c:394v). Although 
the outcome of this expedition is nowhere mentioned in either Dutch or 
Bugis-Makassar records, the Bugis who had fled from Makassar to their 
homelands had now assem bied a sufficiently large army to eau se Goa 
grave concern. In the beginning of October the fighting between the 
Makassar and Bugis armies had led to heavy casualties on both sides. 
Karaeng Karunrung, Karaeng Sumanna, and Kaicili' Kalimata con-
tinued operations in Bone, while Karaeng Tallo retumed to Goa on 29 
September 1660 to report progress of the campaign to Sultan Hasa-
nuddin. It was said that Kaicili' Kalimata had deported himself weil, and 
if it had not been for his bravery, Karaeng Karunrung would have fallen 
into the hands of the Bugis. Despite the high Bugis casualties, the 
outcome of the battle was still uncertain, and two of the Company's spies 
reported that the Bugis had fought bravely despite their relatively sm all 
numbers. At three different times Sultan Hasanuddin was forced to send 
more men into battle. These reinforcements were composed mainly of 
troops from Mandar, which had only recently been pacified by Goa, 
augmented by those from Temate, Banda, and the Makassar Malays 
(KA 1123d:400r-v). The Bugis fought bravely·against great odds, but 
they were finally defeated. Sometime on the 6th or 7th of October, the 
Dutch in Pa'nakkukang heard the firing of muskets and cannons by the 
returning Makassar troops to announce their victory over the Bugis (KA 
1123e:406r-v). 
Litde did the Dutch realize th at this event would be later cited by local 
historians as marking the beginning of a new era dominated by one of the 
most remarkable figures in the history of South Sulawesi, Arung 
Palakka. So spectacular was hi~ reversal of fortune from a vanquished 
rebel Bugis leader to overlord of South Sulawesi within a space of ten 
years that he became a legend in his own day. This legend has made it 
difficult to distinguish fact from myth, especially in the early years of his 
life. According to local sources, Arung Palakka arose from the tradi-
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tional elite but was not of a particularly important family. His father was 
La Pottobune Arung Tana Tenga, a lord of a tiny principality in 
Soppeng, and his mother was Datu Mario ri Wawo We Tenrisui, grand-
daughter of Arumpone La Tenrirua Sultan Adam who in 1611 became 
the first Moslem ruler of Bone. According to Bugis folk tradition, Arung 
Palakka was eleven years old when he and his family were brought as 
hostages to live in Goa af ter the second battle of Passempe in 1644. They 
had the great fortune of being made to serve the Tuma'bicara-butta Goa 
Karaeng Pattinngaloang who was a kind master. The latter took an 
immediate liking to Arung Palakka and taught him all that was proper in 
the upbringing of a prince. Arung Palakka was also honoured with the 
post of bearer of the betelbox for Karaeng Pattinngaloang. Since Arung 
Palakka's presence was required at all important ceremonial occasions, 
he became familiar with and greatly impressed by the sight of large 
numbers of foreign envoys coming to pay their respects to the powerful 
Karaeng Goa. As he grew up he became a favourite among his peers and 
elders because of his superior skill in the use of arms and in raga, a game 
once regarded with the greatest of respect by participants and onlookers 
alike. 1 The fact that Arung Palakka's skill in the raga was so exceptional 
(even supematural when recited by village story tellers) demonstrated to 
any South Su la we si observer his superior spiritual strength and purity of 
intentions. 
Despite his increasing involvement with the Goa court and his friend-
ships with the Makassar youths, siri' and pesse would not let him forget 
th at he was a son of an exiled Bugis prince and that many of his people 
we re suffering under Goa's overlordship. There were many like himself 
who had been brought to Goa as prisoners ofwar and divided among the 
victorious Goa nob les. In 1660 there was an order from Karaeng 
Karunrung, who replaced his father Karaeng Pattinngaloang as 
Tuma 'bicarabutta Goa in 1654, to the regent of Bone, Tobala', to bring 
10,000 men from Bone by July to help dig ditches along a defence 
perimeter on the coastline of Makassar harbour from the southernmost 
fortress of Barombong to the northernmost fortress of Ujung Tana. To 
meet the quota, young and old alike we re dragged along and forced-
marched across rugged terrain and high mountains to Makassar. Upon 
arrival they were divided into groups and made to shift for themselves as 
best they could. The combination of harsh deprivation at the labour 
camps and cruelty of the guards led to a rapid depletion of the ranks of 
workers either through illness or desertions. So serious was the problem 
of desertion that Karaeng Karunrung in exasperation finally orçiered all 
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the Bone and Soppeng princes to work alongside the common people 
and be held responsible for desertions in their groups. For the ordinary 
Bugis their sense of siri' was now doubly offended by the ignominy of 
having their lords made to do menial tasks on the same level as them-
selves. It was no longer merely a question of individual siri' brought 
about through the humiliation of being forced to labour for the Makassar 
people, but the siri' of the whole Bugis nation of which the Bugis lords 
we re the tangible symbols. A welling of the emotion of pesse among the 
Bugis corvée labourers greeted the presence of their leaders in their 
midst and transformed a difficult situation into an unbearable outrage. 
In addition to creating a focus for Bugis sympathy and action, the Goa 
overlords unwittingly provided the hitherto docile Bugis workers with 
leaders, thus combining the necessary ingredients for arevolt which soon 
followed. 
Among the Bugis lords who we re summoned to perform these duties 
was Arung Palakka. He suffered the cruelty of the guards toward his 
people until one day a Bugis labourer tried to escape but was caught and 
beaten before Arung Palakka's very eyes. This incident finally encour-
aged him to plot actively with the other leaders to help the Bugis escape 
to their homeland. The day chosen for the revolt was a harvest festival 
holiday when most of the Makassar people and guards had gone to Tallo 
for the celebrations. On a prescribed signal the Bugis workers overcame 
the few remaining guards and fled back to the safety of the Bugis lands. 
The principal leaders of the rebellion which followed were Arung 
Palakka and the Bone regent appointed by Goa, Tobala'. When the Goa 
leaders heard of the rebellion, they pursued the Bugis but explained that 
they we re principally seeking Tobala', "who had risen in revolt against 
Goa" (La Side 1971:1,75-99). The Goa leaders held Tobala' respon-
sible for all the Bugis because he had been installed by Goa as their 
regent and now he had failed in his duty. For this he, more than any other 
Bugis leader, was to pay the consequences for the rebellion. 
Tobala' and the other Bugis leaders invited Datu Soppeng and some 
of his principal officials to a meeting in Mampu to discuss a possible 
alliance between Bone and Soppeng. During the talks Arung Mampu 
urged his son Datu Soppeng La Tenribali not to be overhasty in allying 
with Bone, for Goa had never forced its adat nor its laws upon Soppeng. 
Ever since the Agreement at Lamogo between Soppeng and Goa, the 
latter had adhered to its terms which guaranteed that "each would have 
his own regalia and each would rule his own land without one being 
subject to the other" (L-l: 11). Despite this warning, Datu Soppeng was 
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persuaded to ally with Bone by the most prominent of his nobles, Arung 
Bila and Arung Palakka. Both these men believed that only by honour-
ing the Treaty of Timurung of 1582 and by "tying our sarung up to our 
knees" 2 would Bone and Soppeng be ab Ie to defeat Goa. Despite Arung 
Mampu's protestations, Datu Soppeng and Arung Bila agreed on behalf 
of Soppeng to an alliance with Bone in 1660 which became known as the 
Pincara Lopie ri Atappang (The Treaty of "The Raft at Atappang") 
(L-l: 11-15).3 Datu Soppeng had some reservations about the treaty and 
warned that there may yet be friction in the future between Bone and 
Soppeng if the following occurred: (1) Bone and Soppeng were given the 
victory by God and the two lands became free, and then Bone became so 
strang th at it could disregard the agreement and act in defiance of 
Soppeng's adat and traditions; (2) Bone and Soppeng we re unable "to 
lift themselves up" and make themselves free (L-3:289-290). 
The nature of political relationships within South Sulawesi kingdoms 
precluded the possibility of a ruler representing the wishes of the whole 
kingdom without the consent of a powerful balancing force, the Advi-
sory Council. When Datu Soppeng returned to his kingdoms and an-
nounced the treaty with Bone, there were many among his nob les who 
opposed it saying, "How can we renounce our treaty with Goa when it 
has never braken the treaty [of Lamogo] nor forced Soppeng to accept 
another's adat". They advised against angering Goa, "for if Goa can 
subjugate Bone, which is st rang, how much easier can it do the same to 
those who are weak". By agreeing with Bone, they pointed out, Soppeng 
had braken the Treaty of Lamogo with Goa (L-l: 16). They warned that 
failure to adhere to the treaty would be breaking the terms made by their 
ancestors Petta Puang ri Samang at Lamogo and later renewed by Puatta 
Polepue. Equally fearsome was the oath by Matinroe ri Tanana who 
swore, "Let no seed of rulers arise if we break the treaty." Dne of the 
nobles who favoured allying with Bone confidently declared, "It will be 
an easy matter, gentlemen (tautongeng - men of good birth). We will veil 
ourselves with our shields, spears, and daggers and beat them back with 
no concern for our own safety." Angrily one of the tautongeng replied: 
"What is this about veiling ourselves with our shields, and this about 
separating our heads from our shoulders, and of fighting with no care for 
one's safety, and of having God direct spears at our breasts - Soppeng 
would be destrayed! First Soppeng, then Tobala'. Bone is asking us to 
open our coffins and still you say it is good to get into them by breaking 
our agreement with Karaeng Goa!" 
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With this argument the nob les and tautongeng rejected the Pincara 
Lopie ri Atappang. 
Arung Bila and Arung Palakka were unable to persuade the ot hers to 
consent to the treaty, and so two different policies we re adopted by 
Soppeng toward the impending conflict between Bone and Goa. Part of 
Soppeng, led by Datu Soppeng, Arung Bila, and Arung Palakka, 
renounced any pr"evious alliances with Goa and pledged themselves to 
help Bone on the basis of the Tellumpocco alliance concluded at 
Timurung. The other half of Soppeng rejected all pleas of an alliance 
with Bone. Instead, they decided to honour Soppeng's treaty with Goa at 
Lamogo because Goa had never violated it and Soppeng was in no 
position "to be the first to abandon the treaty with the Karaeng [Goa]" 
(L-3:290). 
Both Soppeng factions had justified their actions in terms of a former 
treaty without attempting to deciare that one superseded the other. 
Wh at mattered was the ability of both groups to rely upon the spiritual 
sanction of their ancestors in their adherence to one or the other of these 
treaties. Soppeng, being the smalle st of the major Bugis-Makassar king-
.doms, was of ten caught in the middle of some war between its larger 
neighbours. lts very smallness is highlighted in the Timurung treaty 
forming the Tellumpocco when both Wajo and Bone contributed terri-
tory to Soppeng so it could stand with the others on the level of 
"brothers", though still a "younger brother". In 1660 it was again faced 
with a now familiar situation of being squeezed by the two most powerful 
kingdoms in the area. The pressure from both Bone and Goa would have 
been intense and would have made compromise between the two groups 
in Soppeng difficult. But in view of the long experience which Soppeng 
had had in such delicate diploma tic situations, the decision to support 
both Bone and Goa was perhaps the most satisfactory formula to assure 
its continuing survival no matter what the outcome of the struggle 
between those two riyal kingdoms. 
Once Tobala' and the Bone nobles and Datu Soppeng La Tenribali 
and his Soppeng lords had agreed to the Pin cara Lopie ri Atappang, they 
invited Wajo to join once again in reviving the moribund Tellumpocco. 
Arung Matoa Wajo La Tenrilai Tosenngeng declined the invitation by 
saying th at while it was true th at all three had agreed to be one at 
Timurung, Wajo could not abandon its treaty with Goa because Wajo 
was truly "a slave of the Karaeng". For La Tënrilai and the people of 
Wajo, their more recent experiences with Goa were far better than those 
with her powerful neighbour Bone. Not only had there been continuous 
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trouble with Bone over territorial boundaries, but both kingdoms had 
of ten been embroiled in disputes arising from an accepted but never-
theless frustrating practice of vassal states frequently switching alle-
giance from a weaker to a stronger kingdom. Furtherrnore, in the most 
recent memory of the Wajo people, it was Bone under Arumpone La 
Ma'daremmeng, not Goa, which had invaded its land. Relations with 
Goa, on the ot her hand, had been comparatively friendly, with La 
Tenrilai even being honoured with marriage to the daughter of Sultan 
Hasanuddin (L-4:Section 23, unpag.). Although Wajo had also suffered 
the wrath of Goa and had once been subjected to a "slave" to "master" 
relationship with Goa, it had long since earned its new status of "ally" of 
Goa by participating faithfully in Goa's wars and by assuming responsi-
bilities reserved only for the most trusted vassal. For Wajo it was a choice 
between an alliance with Bone, at the moment a somewhat disorganized 
and harried kingdom with whom it had had fairly stormy relations in the 
recent past, and with Goa, still the most powerful force in East Indonesia 
with whom Wajo had enjoyed most favourable treatment. La Tenrilai's 
decision to reject the TeIlumpocco and to support Goa was a foregone 
conclusion. 
When Bone's leaders learned that Goa was preparing to invade Bone, 
they immediateiy despatched the bila-bila musu'4 to Soppeng directing 
it to bring its men to Matango in seven days. From Matango the Soppeng 
troops marched to Lamuru. After they had set up camp, a messenger 
arrived with a letter from Karaeng Goa Sultan Hasanuddin to Arung 
Bila, although its contents were clearly intended for the ears of Datu 
Soppeng and his troops. The message read: 
... Return to your village. Eat your good food and drink water which 
you savour. You are standing on the summit. Let only the leeches drink 
your blood and God possess your soul wh en the time is due, for there is 
no quarrei between us. lam pursuing the fugitive Tobala' because he has 
defied Goa. 5 I wil! pursue him and destroy him. 
In reply Arung Bila informed Karaeng Goa that Soppeng's troops 
we re already at the border and ready to help their ally Bone in accord-
ance with their agreement at Timurung, for " ... our friendship. with 
Bone is as strong as that" (L-3:294; L-1: 18-9). 
The first battle occurred on the plains of Suling, which lies between 
Cenrana and Lamuru, the second in the vicinity of Matango naar Bengo 
in Bone, and the third around Labai in the mountains near Lamuru. 6 Tbe 
first two battles ended with heavy Bugis losses, and all but two of 
Soppeng's warflags we re captured by the Makassar troops. Tbe third 
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battle appeared indecisive as both sides withdrew from the battlefield. 
But before the end of the day the Bugis somehow succeeded in besieging 
the Makassar forces and placing them in great danger. Meanwhile 
Daeng Ago had gone with a considerable Makassar army and 200 Malay 
riflemen to Padang-Padang, Massepe, and finally to Pammana in Wajo. 
Acting on Goa's orders, Wajo and the second Goa army attacked and 
bumed Soppeng, thus succeeding in Goa's intentions of drawing away 
Soppeng's troops from the bulk of the Bugis forces. Datu Soppeng and 
his army retumed to save their homeland, but they arrived exhausted 
and were easily defeated by the fresh Wajo and Goa troops. The Bone 
warriors fought on alone but we re soon overwhelmed near Ulaweng and 
forced to flee to the mountains in Mampu. At the foot of the mountains 
the Bugis were again defeated and retreated first to Jaling and finally to 
Watampone. At Watampone the Bugis forces were decisively beaten, 
and Arung Palakka fled to safety with a few of his followers to a 
mountain called Macinni, some four kilometres from Watampone. Af ter 
holding out for twenty days, Arung Palakka approached Karaeng 
Sumanna, presented the sompa-waranF and said: "Our war with the 
Karaeng [Goa] is over. Go home, and I will follow later. I am not yet 
finished with the war with my seajing ["brother" or "ally", i.e. W~jo]" 
(L-l:21). 
Karaeng Sumanna's reply is not given in the sources, but it must have 
been one of peace since the fighting ceased. Arung Palakka gathered a 
Bone-Soppeng force to attack Wajo without the help, according to one 
Bugis source, of a single Soppeng lord (L-3:297).8 With this hastily 
assembied army, Arung Palakka attacked and defeated the Wajo forces 
under Arung Matoa La Tenrilai Tosenngeng at Sarasa and again in 
Wajo's capita!. Many surrendered to Arung Palakka, and the remainder 
under their Arung Matoa sought refuge in Kera and Maiwa. Makassar 
reinforcements for Wajo were also put to flight ne ar Paria. From Wajo 
Arung Palakka marched his men through Massepe to Bacukiki and 
camped in the neighbourhood of Lisu, east of Tanete. . 
It was at the time that Arung Palakka and his men were at Lisu that the 
important negotiations between Goa and the Dutch East India 
Company were being concluded. According to Speelman's Notitie, the 
negotiations ended in mid-August 1660, and were followed by the 
evacuation of Fort Pa'nakkukang by the Dutch forces. Speelman claims 
that at Lisu Arung Palakka's army grew to a formidable 10,000 men 
from Bone, 7,000 men from Soppeng, plus others from Wajo (Speelman 
1669:731 v). But even this army was no match for the forces which Goa 
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was now able to send against it. The Bugis records present a detailed 
account of the Goa campaign against Arung Palakka. Part of Goa's army 
came through Bulo-Bulo and Lamatti to attack Bone from the south, 
while the rest went to Tanete to enter Soppeng through Lamuru. The 
Wajo troops who had fled to Maiwa with Arung Matoa La Tenrilai 
Tosenngeng went sou th to Sidenreng so they could attack Soppeng from 
the north. To meet this threat Arung Palakka divided his forces with one 
moving to Bone's southern borders and the other under his command 
remaining in Lisu to meet the Goa army coming from Tanete. At Lisu 
the Wajo forces arrived from the north at a critical juncture and swung 
the battle in Goa's favour. On the other front Goa brought its forces 
through Sinjai and forced the Bone troops to retreat to Salomekko. The 
latter made a stand at Bulu Cina fighting three long days and nights in an 
attempt to prevent an invasion of Bone. Astalemate seemed to have 
been reached when word arrived th at Arung Palakka's situation in Lisu 
was serious. As soon as this news was known, many of the troops from 
Palakka and elsewhere in Bone abandoned the fight at Bulu Cina and 
went west to help Arung Palakka. When they arrived the battle and the 
rebellion had al ready been lost. Arung Palakka gathered the remnants 
of his men and told them: 
... My parents and my family are in Bone. Go and seek th at which is 
good for the country because I cannot see a way to better the welfare of 
the land of Bone on this island. There is no hope in opposing Goa now 
that we are defeated and Goa's troops are everywhere (L-l :22; L-3: 
295). 
Arung Palakka fled Lisu with a handful of followers and hid among 
the large boulders 9 at Maruala, south of Lisu. The people of Tanete kept 
Arung Palakka's hiding place a secret and brought him and his followers 
food and water at night "because they remembered the agreement once 
made between Karaeng Tanete La Mammula Daeng Lempa' and Datu 
Mario La Makkaterru" (L-l:23-5; L-3:295).10 But soon the Pabbicara 
Tanete sent word to Arung Palakka that he had to leave that very night 
since Goa's troops had already arrived in Lisu. With the help of the 
Topaluda 11 and a stormy night, they escaped and arrived at Uwaem-
pelleng. At this spot Arung Palakka's uncle, Babae, urged his nephew to 
flee Umpungeng while he and seven others delayed the pursuing 
Makassar troops. All seven of them, including Arung Palakka's foster 
father (patarana) , 12 agreed to sacrifice their lives to allow Arung 
Palakka time to re ach the safety of the hills in Umpungeng. This nob Ie 
gesture was the supreme expression of pesse toward one 's fellow man. In 
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a parting salute of loyalty to their lord Arung Palakka Datu Mario, one 
of the men performed the aru, the oath of allegiance, 13 saying: "We will 
run amok among them. Let the people of Goa know that the people of 
Mario are also men 110 Ie ss than they" (Sejarah Bone n.d.: 135). 
At the foot of a banyan tree (ajuara) in PoleIoIo to the east of 
Umpungeng, a vow was made by Arung Palakka, Arung Bila Daeng 
Mabela, Arung Appanang, and Datu Citta that they would not lay down 
their task of freeing their lands from Goa oppression and that they would 
sail away together to JavaY Having escaped his pursuers at 
Umpungeng, Arung Palakka continued onward and went to see Datu 
Soppeng La Tenribali to inform him of his decision to Ie ave Sulawesi. 
Arung Palakka explained that "there was no place for him in the land of 
the Bugis and both Bone and Soppeng had been defeated and could no 
longer carry on the fight". He then revealed his decision to "look for 
someone who could better the welfare of Bone and Soppeng" (L-l: 
24 ).15 Arung Palakka explained that he was taking with him the Arung 
Appanang, his nephew the Arung Bila, and his brother-in-Iaw the Datu 
Citta. For bis joumey Arung Palakka received 100 catties (or about 60 
kilos) of gold from La Tenribali and from West Soppeng, but only two 
catties from his home district of Mario ri Wawo. There was no gold from 
East Soppeng becaus~ it had been stripped bare by the marauding 
Makassar troops (L-l : 24; L-3: 2 98). 
Af ter Arung Palakka departed, Arung Bila, Arung Appanang, and 
Datu Citta arrived in the evening to pay their respects and to take leave 
of Datu Soppeng. 16 Arung Bila informed Datu Soppeng that they could 
only find 100 people from Soppeng to take with them into exile because 
the rest had gone with Arung Belo Ama'na We Dima to Leta. As a final 
word of advice to the three princes, Datu Soppeng said: "No matter what 
happens, do not become separated from one another nor leave Arung 
Palakka. Even if you should go to the ends of the earth (Iiterally, "bump 
your head on the edge of the heavens"), do not return to the land of the 
Bugis until you have found someone who can oppose Karaeng Goa." 
The three then took some gold and departed (L-l:25; L-3:299). 
Ten days later Goa and Wajo attacked Soppeng in search of the 
fugitive princes. Datu Soppeng hurriedly gathered his wives and children 
and waited in the royal residence, La Mangile. When Arung Berru' ri 
Lau' heard that Karaeng Goa intended to have Datu Soppeng beheaded, 
he quickly brought 400 of his men to Soppeng and placed them at the 
foot of the palace stairs. At first Karaeng Katapang wanted to force his 
way despite the presence of the men from Berru' ri Lau', but Karaeng 
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Karunrung urged caution. The latter suggested instead that Datu 
Soppeng give himself up peaceably and go with them to Makassar. 
Only if this offer were refused were they to use force. Datu Soppeng 
surrendered, but before he could be brought to Goa, news arrived that 
Arung Palakka was in Bone at Palette preparing to sail away. An army 
consisting of men from Goa, Wajo, and Lamuru was sent immediately to 
Bone to try to prevent Arung Palakka's departure. With the help of 
some of the people of Bone, a number of Arung Palakka's followers 
were captured at Cempalagi. Arung Palakka, however, managed to 
escape and sail safely away to Butung. Having failed to capture their 
principal prey, the Goa forces returned to Soppeng to escort Datu 
Soppeng, his family, Soppeng's flags (Bakka' and La Pianyarang) and 
regalia to Goa and exile in Sanrangang (L-I :25; L-3 :299-300; L-4: 
unpag.; Sejarah Bone n.d.: 136). 
According to Bugis oral traditions, before Arung Palakka embarked 
at Palette he made a vow that if he should return safely to his home land 
and succeed in freeing his people from bondage, he would offer as 
thanksgiving: (1) sokko' (cooked glutinous ri ce wrapped with coconut 
leaves in small squares) stacked as high as the hili in Cempalagi; (2) 100 
water buffaloes with gold-tipped horns; and (3) the heart of a royal 
person from Goa. He then tied a knot (singkerru) with the tendrils of a 
tree growing by the seashore to signify the making of the vow and said 
th at only when he had completed his vow would he untie the knot. With 
these words he stepped onto the sand and into his boat which carried him 
away from his homeland to an unknown future. According to Dutch and 
Makassar sources, the flight of Arung Palakka, his family, and a few 
followers to the island of Butung occurred sometime at the end of 1660 
or the beginning of 1661. 17 
With the departure of the last rebel Bugis leaders, Goa turned its 
attention to its problems with the Dutch East India Company. Treaty 
negotiations were in progress in Batavia, and the Goa court waited with 
some anxiety for news oftheir outcome. On 13 October 1660 the Dutch 
ship Postillion arrived in Makassar from Batavia carrying the Company 
Commissioners Zacharias Wagenaer and Jacob Cauw. They brought the 
treaty signed by representatives of the Company in Batavia and by 
Karaeng Po po on behalf of Karaeng Goa Sultan Hasanuddin (KA 
1123c:402r). When the Commissioncrs asked when they could bring 
their letters to Sultan Hasanuddin in Sombaopu, they were told: "The 
king sends these gifts [two young buffaloes, some rice, and coconuts ] in 
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welcome and wishes to ask when you wil! be returning his fort [Pa'nak-
kukang]" (KA 1123f:416r). 
While th is cool reception was not totally unexpected, evidence of a 
renewal of Goa's defences so soon af ter the recent hostilities was dis-
turbing to the Dutch envoys. Everyday they could see the Makassar 
people and their vassals busily erecting more and more defensive walls, 
as weIl as large palisades, along the Garassi River between the English 
lodge and the Portuguese quarters. There we re new defences con-
structed near Pa'nakkukang, all along Sombaopu and the Portuguese 
quarters, and between the Portuguese quarters and Goa's northernmost 
fort, Ujung Tana (KA 1126a:527r). Although in Article 12 ofthe treaty 
signed between Goa and the Company on 2 December 1660 Goa had 
agreed to force the Portuguese to leave and forbid others of their 
compatriots from settling within its borders (Heeres 1931c: 173), there 
was little indication by September 1661 that any such move was being 
undertaken (KA 1126c:577). By the end of 1661 no progress had been 
made in implementing the 1660 treaty, and instead more and more 
fortifications were being built. It was said th at the entire harbour area 
had been fortified and that great quantities of gunpowder we re being 
prepared throughout the kingdom. In addition some 12-1500 boats 
were said to be in readiness in various areas. There seemed little doubt in 
the minds of the Dutch officials in Makassar th at sometime in the near 
future war again would break out between Goa and the Company (KA 
1130:280). 
The rumour that Sultan Hasanuddin had summoned all of his vassals 
and allies to Makassar seemed to be substantiated by the great numbers 
of people coming to Makassar every day from all sides. In early 
November a large force composed of men from Goa's vassal kingdoms 
of Bima, Sumbawa, and Butung arrived in Makassar. Although the 
Dutch were told that they had been summoned to help quell the Bugis 
rebellion, the presence of such large numbers of armed men in Makassar 
did little to allay Dutch fears (KA 1 123f:416r). What caused the Dutch 
even greater anxiety was a council held by Sultan Hasanuddin and all of 
his nobles on 31 October 1660. Af ter the nobles had given their oath of 
allegiance, Sultan Hasanuddin had presented each one of the nob les a 
banner with his seal (KA 1123e:408v). Fear that this ceremony was a 
prelude to a renewal of the war preyed upon the al ready uneasy minds of 
the Dutch. It was widely-known that Karaeng Karunrung favoured war 
with the Dutch, and it was rumoured that Karaeng Sumanna, formerly a 
friend of the Company, was similarly inclined (KA 1123f:416r). Both of 
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these men were among the most powerful figures in Goa whose advice 
carried considerable weight in the kingdom. 
What the Dutch were unaware of was the fact that Goa's defences 
were being erected as much as a precaution against a rumoured Butung-
Bugis-Temate invasion as against a possible renewal of hostilities with 
the Dutch. Goa, once considered invincible by neighbouring lands, had 
been humiliated by its recent set-back against the Company. Under 
these circumstances, Goa's govemment accepted as highly credible the 
news that its enemies were planning to take advantage of Goa's tem-
porary weakness to launch a joint attack. Pressures on the Goa govem-
ment resulted in open rifts which first came to the notice of the Dutch in 
August 1661. It was said that Tuma'bicara-butta Karaeng Sumanna 
threatened to step down from his office. Immediately upon his an-
nouncement four of the Bate Salapang - the Gallarang Manngasa, 
Tombong, Bontomanang, and Saumata - also threatened to go with him 
(KA 1126b:551r-v). Except for th is brief observation the Dutch sources 
are silent about this trouble until three years later when the lines of 
division in the Goa government again became apparent. In May 1664 
the Dutch reported that a large dispute had erupted between two of the 
most powerful individuals in the kingdom, Karaeng Karunrung and 
Karaeng Tallo. It was even reported that fighting had taken place 
between the two parties (Stapel 1922:78). In th is dispute Karaeng Tallo 
was supported by Karaeng Sumanna who, according to a Dutch envoy to 
the Goa court in 1663, deeply hated Karaeng Karunrung (KA 1137: 
957 -8). Although Sultan Hasanuddin favoured Karaeng Karunrung, the 
other two karaeng, supported by all the other nob les, succeeded in 
having Karaeng Karunrung exiled on 26 May 1664 and all of his goods 
confiscated, much to the disrepute of the ruler. The forced exile did not 
end the division in the kingdom because Karaeng Karunrung later 
returned and many of the old wounds were reopened. This was a dan-
gerous situation which later proved fatal in Goa's war against the 
Company in 1666-9 (KA 1137:960-1; Ligtvoet 1880:122). 
The Company was glad to see the demise of Karaeng Karunrung, 
although it held itself completely neutral in the dispute. With the 
removal of Karaeng Karunrung from the stage, the Dutch hoped for an 
upsurge in trade. It used to be Karaeng Karunrung's practice to have all 
the goods delivered to him for less than the price for which they we re 
bought. No ship, no matter to whom it belonged, was allowed to leave 
without handing over at least one-third of its hold to him. Even if these 
traders did not find a good market in Makassar, they still had to supply 
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Karaeng Karunrung with whatever goods he desired and then pay the 
costs themselves. This made Karaeng Karunrung much disliked among 
the traders. But now Karunrung was abandoned by everyone inciuding 
his servants, and his considerable wealth stolen from all sides. Sultan 
Hasanuddin was still greatly inciined toward Karaeng Karunrung but 
could do nothing to help him since Karaeng Tallo had posted an armed 
guard around Karaeng Karunrung. But once the Goa leaders had 
decided to exile Karaeng Karunrung, they became obsessed with the 
fear that Karaeng Karunrung would settle in Batavia and join the 
refugee Bugis leaders to attack Goa (KA 1137:961-9). Toward the end 
of 1664 the Company wrote to Goa to reassure it that Karaeng 
Karunrung had not arrived in Batavia (Stapel 1922:80). 
With the crisis in the Goa government resolved for the time being, 
Sultan Hasanuddin sought to reassert Goa's authority which had been so 
severely shaken in the last years. He sent a large fleet to the Sula Islands 
to make them acknowledge Goa's suzerainty and not that of their 
traditionaloverlord, Ternate. In atidition the fleet was instructed to stop 
at Butung to punish the ruler there for harbouring Arung Palakka and 
the other refugee Bugis princes. Unbeknownst to Goa the Dutch East 
India Company had decided at about the same time to send its fleet to 
Makassar to demonstrate its power and authority in the area. While 
Goa, nicknamed "the Cock ofthe East" by the Dutch, and the Company 
struck defiant poses, they both hoped to avoid conflict. Unfortunately, 
misunderstanding over jurisdiction of shipwrecked property made war 
between these two powers seem more and more inevitable. 
In 1662 the Dutch ship De Walvis foundered in Makassar waters and 
sixteen of its cannons plus other goods were seized by the followers of 
Karaeng Tallo and Karaeng Sumanna. Later the Company demanded 
the return of the cannons, but th is request was refused by Karaeng 
Sumanna who rep lied that "since he had fished them out of the sea, they 
now belonged to him". Although Karaeng Sumanna later returned half 
of the cannons, this was only accomplished af ter long negotiations and 
important concessions by the Dutch. 18 More serious was the case of the 
Dutch ship Leeuwin which became shipwrecked on one of the Don 
Duango Islands off the coast of Makassar on the night of 24 December 
1664. Wh at angered the Dutch was Sultan Hasanuddin's refusal to all ow 
them to send a boat to the wreck. Instead, so it was rumoured, he himself 
sent his people to rescue the moneychest and bring it back to Makassar 
(KA 1143b: 159). The rumour proved true, and Dutch black daalders 
which had been kept in the chest began circulating (KA 1143c:653). 
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Such practices we re perfectly acceptable according to South Sulawesi 
custom. A common saying was "The remains of the waves belong to the 
portion of the sword of the finder" (Bugis: "Sisana bombang, tawana 
Sinangke") (Eerdmans: n.d.(a): 10). For the Dutch, however, the 
seizure of their shipwrecked property was nothing less than piracy. 
Verspreet, the head of the Dutch post in Makassar, failed to gain 
permission to go to the wreck. In desperation he sent the Assistant 
Merchant Cornelis Kuyff and fourteen men to the island to investigate 
without obtaining a stamp of approval from the Goa ruler. Kuyff and all 
his men were murdered on the island. When news of the murder reached 
Makassar, Verspreet placed all the Company's goods and money on two 
Dutch ships for safekeeping. He then went to Karaeng Sumanna to 
inquire about this affair. Karaeng Sumanna promised to investigate the 
matter and a week later sent 528 rijksdaalders to Verspreet in payment 
for the murders (Stapel 1922:82-3). While this may have been an 
acceptable local way of appeasing the aggrieved party, to the Dutch it 
was an appaIling gesture, and Verspreet flatly refused to accept the 
money. Karaeng Sumanna was weil aware of the dangerous game which 
the Goa government was playing with the Dutch, and so he hoped to 
ease the ten sion by bringing the supposed perpetrators of the deed to 
Verspreet and by promising to put them to death. Verspreet remained 
unrnoved by this letter and demanded th at Karaeng Sumanna himself 
come and make a public announcement of these intentions. When this 
demand was ignored, Verspreet and the entire Dutch post in Makassar 
sailed away to Batavia on 23 June 1665 (Stapel 1922:83). Af ter the 
departure of the Dutch, Sultan Hasanuddin told a Dutch burger from 
Ambon that he did not want war, but "ifthe Dutch wish to be the first to 
stárt one, then let them do as they please" (Stapel 1922:84 ). 
Despite the deteriorating relations between Goa and the Company, 
the latter was not yet ready for a confrontation in 1665. The Governor-
General and Council of the Indies in Batavia decided on 20 November 
1665 to send amission to Goa "in order to remove the impression that 
we are coming to war with her again" (Stapel 1922:84-5; Dagh-Register 
1665:351,441). But Gerwits, the special Company envoy from Batavia, 
was not even allowed into Makassar and had to continue on to Ambon. 
What may have prompted such an ignominious treatment of the envoy 
was credence given by Goa leaders to rumours circulating in Makassar. 
According to these rumours, most likely spread by English merchants 
whose nation was at war with The Netherlands in Europe, the English 
had seized seventy to eighty of the Company's ships; Batavia was 
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suffe ring from a serious lack of provisions; the Company had lost a lot of 
people through the plague and other illnesses and consequently had to 
recruit natives into its service; Banda had fallen to the English and 
Batavia was soon to follow; and The Netherlands was tightly blockaded 
by the English and so no help could be sent to The Indies (KA 1148a: 
504). 
Perhaps it was these rumours which convinced Goa that the time was 
ripe to reassert its authority in Eastern Indonesia. In April 1666 the 
Syahbandar Daeng Makkule of Goa returned home af ter two months 
away on amission to Butung. He was part of a fleet which was sent to the 
Sula Islands to force them to accept Goa's suzerainty (KA 1148b:511). 
The Sula Islands, Banggai, and Tambuku were the targets of the first 
Goa fleet. It was mmoured that a second fleet of 300 boats was now 
being prepared for another expedition aimed this time principally at 
Butung and Ternate (Stapel 1922:86). The English, Portuguese, and 
Indian Moslem traders in Makassar told Commissioner Johan van 
Wesenhagen, who had arrived in Makassar on April 1666, that the 
reason for the first expedition was to assert Goa's suzerainty over lands 
which were being contested by the mIer of Ternate. Among these were 
Muna, Banggai, Lampute, and Gorontalo. On this expedition the fleet 
had also attacked Ambon and Butung but had been unable to conquer 
them. This was the reason another expedition was now being planned 
(KA 1148b: 514). Many of these areas had been seized from Ternate by 
the powerful Goa mIers in the fitst half of the 17th century, and now 
Sultan Hasanuddin wanted to reaffirm Goa's overlordship over the 
lands which he had inherited from his forebears. 
Despite Goa's increasing military activities aimed at re-establishing its 
superiority over all others in East Indonesia, the Company remained 
committed to preserving the peace with Goa. Commissioner van 
Wesenhagen was sent to Makassar to "seek satisfaction" from Goa for 
the Dutch murders. From the beginning his task proved difficult because 
of express order from the Goa government th at none of its subjects was 
to speak to him without its approval. It was a common practice for Dutch 
missions to gather information in the street or marketplace while formal 
negotiations we re in progress in the court. This unusual measure 
reflected the Goa government's concern for security and protocol. To 
have divulged any information to the enemy could prove costly, and so 
warning one's populace against speaking to any foreigner was an under-
standabie move. A stronger motivation for this measure than the Dutch 
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realized was the concern for protocol. They had angered Sultan Hasa-
nuddin by their precipitate departure in June 1665 without the custom-
ary court eo us leave-taking, and so this was a way of registering his 
displeasure toward the Dutch. Nevertheless, the mission was received 
with the treatment accorded a major ruler. A small boy seated on a 
throne received the letter from Batavia and was then borne away to 
Sultan Hasanuddin accompanied by much singing and shouting. Sultan 
Hasanuddin was seated in the reception room, and at his side were 
Karaeng Lengkese, Katappa, Popo, and Karunrung, plus the two Syah-
bandar. 19 The Dutch envoys were shown to their seats, and then the 
letter was opened and re ad aloud. They then presented the ruler with 
four small cases of rosewater, which he distributed among his nobles. In 
return Sultan Hasanuddin gave the envoys on their departure ten to 
twelve coconuts and two bundies of sugar ca ne (KA 1148b:518-9). 
In this mission van Wesenhagen learned from a Makassar source that 
Sultan Hasanuddin would be inclined toward peace with the Dutch if the 
latter would condone his occupation of the lands under dispute with the 
Sultan of Ternate and return the rebel Bugis leaders who had fled from 
Butung to Batavia. Sultan Hasanuddin explained th at he would never 
have had to maintain his rights to these lands in question if Ternate had 
not attacked the "Makassar" territory of Pancana [Muna J. Insofar as the 
Bugis we re concerned, he would be pleased if they were sent to exile in 
Ceylon but he would never condone their presence in Batavia (KA 
1148b:521). 
Goa's enmity toward Ternate was of a recent date. In the first half of 
the 17th century, Goa's energetic rulers had extended their conquests 
through much of the territory in Eastern Indonesia which had once 
recognized the overlordship ofTernate. In the treaty signed between the 
Company and Goa in Batavia on 19 August 1660, Goa was forced to 
acknowledge that Butung (Article 1) and Menado (Article 2) belonged 
to Sultan Mandar Syah of Ternate (Heeres 1931b: 171). This treaty, as 
was shown above, was subsequently ignored by Sultan Hasanuddin who 
continued to have pretensions over these lands. On 12 October 1665 a 
Goa fleet of 10,662 boats was sent to the Sula Islands and returned in 
triumph on 17th March the following year (Ligtvoet 1880:124). When 
van Wesenhagen spoke to the rulerof Butungon 1 April 1666, the latter 
told him that the Makassar fleet had seized some 5,000 Sula Islanders 
and was planning to attack Butung at the end of the Moslem fasting 
month. To meet this attack Butung was busily preparing its defences 
(KA 1148b:529). But Butung was not the only target. According to a 
66 The Heritage of Arung Palakka 
Makassar source, the bila-bila bundu', or war summons, were issued on 
4 July 1666 for an expedition to Ambon and the Moluccas (Ligtvoet 
1880: 125). Goa had also apparently contacted Sultan Syarifuddin of 
Tidore, to plot the defeat if his arch-enemy, Sultan Mandar Syah. 
Sometime in March 1666 a Makassar embassy headed by Kare Mangalle 
and Kare Njampa came with letters for the rulers of both Tidore and 
Ternate. In addition to th is formal embassy, Sultan Hasanuddin and 
Kaicili' Kalimata delivered a secret message to the ruler ofTidore, but its 
contents were not revealed to the Dutch (KA 1148b:531). Kaicili' 
Kalimata was an influential voice in the Goa court urging war with 
Ternate. Af ter an abortive attempt to topple his brother Sultan Mandar 
Syah from the Ternate throne, he now hoped to accomplish this with the 
help of Goa (Ligtvoet 1880: 115; Stapel 1922:86). 
Goa's other continuing concern was the Bugis. The Bugis rebel 
leaders under Arung Palakka had succeeded in escaping first to Butung 
and then, with Dutch help, to Batavia. The frequent correspondence 
between Goa and Batavia requesting the return of the Bugis to South 
Sulawesi or their exile to Ceylon reflected Goa's awareness of the danger 
these few Bugis leaders could pose in the future. Far from being an 
irrational fear, it was based on an accurate assessment ofthe situation in 
South Sulawesi. Even the Sultan of Butung was able to teil van Wesen-
hagen on the latter's visit to that island in April 1666 that " ... Arung 
Palakka was so greatly esteemed in the Makassar lands th at ... his 
assistance would be sufficient to cause most of the Bugis lands to fall 
away [from Goa]" (KA 1148b:534). Even an alliance between the Bugis 
and Ternate could not be dismissed. There were Bugis refugees who had 
fled to Ternate seeking assistance against Goa. When van Wesenhagen 
arrived in Ternate in the middle of 1666, two ofthe Bugis leaders, Daeng 
Pabila and Arung Maruangen, came and spoke to him. They told him 
that if the Company were to come to Makassar to war with Goa, the 
Bugis people would rise up and assist it. But if it did not come to their aid, 
then the Bugis would be totally destroyed. This is the reason, they 
explained, that the Bugis wanted to be completely certain of the 
Company's resolution to pursue such a war before they took any action 
(KA 1148b:532). 
The Bugis in Batavia, meanwhile, we re kept fit and in a state of 
readiness by Arung Palakka, as much for reasons of morale as to prepare 
them for the hoped for war against Goa. The first hazardous but exciting 
years of exile on Butung within easy reach of Goa's fleets gave way to a 
period of inactivity and desuetude of exile in Batavia. To preserve a 
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sense of purpose and unity among his foIlowers, now caIled "Toangke" 
or "People of Angke", af ter the Angke River which flowed through the 
Bugis settlement in Bat(!via, Arung Palakka enforced a rigid code of 
conduct. He discouraged his people from seeking wages elsewhere and 
forced them to farm and fish in order to be economicaIly self -sufficient. 
Yet even this strict discipline was allowed to lapse on occasion, such as 
when a Toangke hired himself out to a Dutchman so Daeng Talele, 
Arung Palakka's wife, would have enough food to eat (L-6:72). When 
the Company sought Arung Palakka's assistance in a military campaign 
against Minangkabau "rebels" in west coast Sumatra, he eagerly 
assented. For him this was an opportunity to provide a worthwhile goal 
for his restless Toangke. But the more important reason for Arung 
Palakka was to demonstrate Bugis fighting skiIls, for one of the vague 
promises made by the Company leaders was the possibility of a war 
against Goa if this mission proved successful. 
On 30 August 1666 six companies of soldiers arrived in Padang in 
west coast Sumatra from Batavia, of which two each were composed of 
Ambon soldiers under Captain Joncker and the Toangke under Arung 
Palakka. The Bugis troops we re in the vanguard in the attack on Pau in 
September. In the battle the Bugis cut off the enemy's escape route 
through the mountains, and some 200-300 Minangkabau were killed. 
Arung Palakka himself took some seven heads. When the Dutch troops 
arrived, they found that he and the Bugis had seized a mountain position 
and some 3,000 Minangkabau and their cattle. The Bugis soon 
abandoned their well-situated defences and descended singing and 
shouting. The seven Minangkabau heads taken by Arung Palakka were 
given to the Dutch who took and displayed them atop spikes in revenge 
for a mutilated Dutch body left on a stake in Pau. 
Arung Palakka continued to distinguish himself in this campaign, and 
the Bugis in general acquitted themselves weIl and accounted for at least 
200 of the 350 Minangkabau de ad in the battle for Pau. So valiant and 
well-known did Arung Palakka become in this campaign that af ter the 
victory in Ulakan, the people there made him "King of Ulakan (Raja 
Ulakan)". From Ulakan the battle against troops from Aceh, which was 
overlord over the west coast Minangkabau areas, continued along the 
coast to Pariaman, where again the Company's forces were victorious. 
This time Captain Joncker was made Lord of Pariaman (KA 1149: 
2186, 2192-9). With the successful conclusion of the campaign in west 
coast Sumatra, the Company's leaders were convinced that Arung 
Palakka and the Toangke would be useful if there were to be a war 
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against Goa. Arung Palakka had managed to create exactly the impres-
sion he had hoped, for he had made known that his intention in Sumatra 
was to "make his name blossom in this war" (KA 1149:2192). 
The Company seemed resigned to the fact that hostilities with Goa in the 
future were unavoidable. When commissioner van Wesenhagen's mis-
sion to the Goa court in April 1666 had failed to "obtain satisfaction" for 
the murder of the Dutchmen, the Company had as good reason as any to 
take some type of punitive action. Whatever the ostensible reason for 
such action, the true cause was the incompatibility of Goa 's political and 
the Company's economic interests. The question ofwhat should be done 
was discussed at great length by the Company's Council of the Indies on 
5 October 1666 amidst a feeling of euphoria over the victory in west 
coast Sumatra. It was finally decided to send astrong fleet under the 
command of Johan van Dam, who had led the successful attack on 
Makassar in 1660. When he excused himself because he was due for 
home leave, Governor-General Maetsuycker then personally nomi-
nated Cornelis Janszoon Speelman. Although the latter had been 
suspended from service by the Company for allegedly engaging in 
private trading some years back, the choice was approved unanimously 
by the Council (Stapel 1936:34-5). 
On 2 November 1666 the Council of the Indies in Batavia passed a 
resolution that the expedition to Makassar and to the Eastern Quarters 
should proceed in order to demonstrate how quickly they in Batavia 
could be in war-readiness, but also "to announce the war to the 
Makassar people" (Stapel 1922:89). This burst of enthusiasm fanned 
by the recent victory in Sumatra was later revised by a more sober 
reassessment of the situation. Judging by the Instructions presented to 
Speelman by the Governor-General and the Council of the Indies dated 
23 November 1666, it was apparent th at the Company's leaders in 
Batavia still hoped for a peaceful settlement of their quarrels with Goa. 
Upon arrival in Makassar, Speelman was instructed to be prepared to 
receive any messengers from Goa asking for peace, for "we are not 
willing to see it [the situation] go to extremes as long as it can be 
avoided". A brief letter was then to be sent with these messengers to the 
government of Goa. It would inform Goa that the Company intended 
"to seek revenge on the land and the subjects of Makassar" if no 
immediate reparations and satisfaction were given for the "evil and 
unfair" acts committed against the Company, the ruler of Ternate, and 
other allies. Should Goa not send anyone to the fleet, then Speelman was 
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to prepare to send this message with one or two of the Makassar 
prisoners (Stapel 1922:196-7). 
While hoping for a peaceful settlement in the Company's favour, the 
Governor-General and the Council we re not averse to using force to 
demonstrate the Company's might. Speelman was instructed to land the 
native soldiers under Arung Palakka and Captain Jonekers at various 
places on the way to Tanakeke. They were to cause as much havoc as 
possible among the Makassar people because "they are the most able in 
raids, not being as heavily-armed as our people". A group of Dutch 
soldiers with muskets was to remain in reserve behind the native troops 
to cover any retreat. That the authorities in Batavia only intended 
limited fighting is apparent from the precise orders to Speelman that no 
one was to proceed in land. If no mutually satisfactory agreement were 
reached, and the raids had already occurred, then Speelman was to 
proceed to Butung. Here he was to hold a general council to decide how 
best to fight the enemy both in and outside Sulawesi. On Arung 
Palakka's recommendation, some of the Bugis were to be allowed to 
remain on Butung to prepare their trip to Bugis country while Speelman 
continued eastward to Temate, Ambon, and elsewhere. If, af ter 
returning from his mission to the east, there was to be war with Goa, 
Speelman was to send the fleet to the city and forts of Makassar. The east 
monsoon would allow him to come close to the city and cause great 
damage with the guns of the fleet. He was to destroy any ship in the 
roadstead except those belonging to the Portuguese, Danish, and 
Prench, which would be allowed to sail away once any contraband goods 
on board had been confiscated. All of this should continue for three or 
four days to make the Makassar forces believe that the Company 
intended to land and storm the city, although such a step should be 
avoided. Instead, various parties on sm all boats we re to be sent at all 
hours of the night to cause havoc on land supported by the guns of the 
ships. In this way so much damage would be caused to the enemy that 
they would be forced to make peace. If, despite all, the enemy still 
remained unmoved and indisposed to negotiate, then Speelman was to 
return to Batavia with the entire fleet. Speelman was explicitly forbidden 
to land or attack the well-defended port city of Makassar since th is was 
regarded as too hazardous an undertaking (Stapel 1936:2-3, 10-1,25-6, 
32,34-6,197-8,214,216). 
These instructions were explicit and precise. With a Ie ss headstrong 
and ambitious leader than Speelman the expedition may have ended 
differently. Speelman had first come out to the Indies in the Company's 
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service when he was seventeen years old. In 1648 af ter only three years 
in the Company, he was promoted to Bookkeeper (Boekhouder) and the 
following year to Assistant Merchant (Onderkoopman ). He rose quickly 
to Merchant (Koopman), then to Bookkeeper General (Boekhouder-
Generaal). Finally in Januari 1663 he was appointed as Govemor of 
Coromandel, an important Company post in southern India. AIthough 
two years later he was dismissed from his post for allegedly participating 
in illicit private trading, in October 1666 he was given the important post 
as "Superintendent, Admiral, Commander and Commissioner to the 
Eastern Quarters [i.e., the Moluccas and Banda]" (Stapel 1936:35). He 
had proved to be a capable official and had risen in the ranks of the 
Company by his own merit. Despite his re-instatement by the Company 
af ter his dismissal from Coromandel, and the confidence shown in him 
by the Govemor-General and the Council of the Indies in this delicate 
mission to the Eastern Quarters, Speelman would have feIt the necessity 
of proving that th is trust was not misplaced. It was perhaps Speelman's 
desire to vindicate his name which led him to "reinterpret" his instruc-
tions and decide to launch an all-out war against Goa. If glory were to be 
gained, it had to be on this mission. 
Both Speelman and Arung Palakka had enormous personal stakes 
involved in the expedition. For Speelman nothing short of a brilliant 
victory would redeem his good name which had been so humiliatingly 
sullied over a minor incident. For Arung Palakka any victory would be 
sufficient to remove the heavy burden of knowing that his siri' - his sense 
of self-respect and honour - was dead, killed by the Makassar overlords 
of Goa. Only by restoring his and his people 's siri' would they once again 
be able to hold their heads high in South Sulawesi. The opportunity had 
arrived, and Arung Palakka and his people were willing to risk death to 
regain their siri'. They realized that it was better to die in defence of 
one's siri' (mate ri siri'na) than to live without it (mate siri'). Did not the 
words of the elders stress that to die in these circumstances would be "to 
die a death of sugar and coconut milk (mate rigollai, mate risantannge)?" 
And so Arung Palakka and his Bugis and Speelman began the journey 
which was to determine their fate and that of the whole of South 
Sulawesi. 
The year 1666 marked a turning point in the fortunes of the kingdom 
of Goa. Af ter a long struggle with its Bugis archrival Bone, Goa had 
finally achieved victory in the beginning of the 17th century and had 
rapidly consolidated its status as a major power in South Sulawesi and in 
neighbouring lands. But in the background of this period of consolida-
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tion loomed the increasingly menacing presence of the Dutch East India 
Company and the growing restiveness of the Bone and Soppeng Bugis 
under Goa's overlordship. These two forces, in their desire to undermine 
the power of the kingdom of Goa, were soon seeking each other's 
cooperation for what appeared a formidable undertaking. 
The Company was interested in South Sulawesi affairs only insofar as 
they impinged on its principal concern: the spi ces of the Moluccas. To 
obtain these spices, however, it was forced to contend with Goa's rapidly 
expanding empire which in the early 17th century had already made its 
presence feit in the Moluccas. While the Company's ultimate aim in the 
Moluccas was economic, to con trol the spices which were a valuable part 
of its trade, it c1ashed violently with Goa's political goal of being recog-
nized as overlord. Tbe conflict over the interpretation of the meaning of 
"freedom of the seas" demonstrated the essence of the struggle between 
the Company and Goa. To enforce an economic monopoly the Company 
had to control the sealanes; but for Goa to accept the Company's restric-
tions was tantamount to relinquishing its sovereign powers and its 
pretensions to overlordship in the area. By the middle of the 17th 
century th is basic irreconciliable difference between two ambitiol1~ 
powers boded ill for their future relations. 
Goa's position at home appeared secure, but there was already stir-
rings of discontent among the Bugis vassal states encouraged by the 
Company's cap tu re of the Makassar fort Pa'nakkukang in 1660. By the 
end of th at year the Bone and Soppeng Bugis led by some intrepid 
leaders, among whom was Arung Palakka, revolted against Goa's over-
lordship but were brutally quashed. There was an attempt by the Dutch 
to contact the Bugis, but this effort came too late. Although the Bugis 
we re subdued the successful flight of Arung Palakka and a few other 
Bugis leaders to Batavia posed a delicate problem for Goa. To all ow the 
rebellious Bugis leadership to maintain contact with their people was 
dangerous and a source of continuing umest in South Sulawesi. But to 
obtain their return Goa had to rely on the good graces of the Company. 
With the state of affairs between the Company and Goa being cool even 
in the best of times, there was little hope that the former would intercede 
on Goa's be half. On the contrary, the Company saw the presence of 
Arung Palakka and his Toangke as performing a useful role in case of 
war with Goa. The opportunity for an alliance with the Bugis had been 
lost in 1660, but the Company did not intend to repeat that oversight in 
1666. 
A major factor in Dutch favour in 1666 was the projection of the 
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private battles of Arung Palakka and Admiral Speelman into the conflict 
which enveloped the Company and the whole of South Sulawesi. Both of 
these proud and determined leaders had suffe red wh at they considered 
injustices and were willing to sacrifice much to redeem their good name. 
In Arung Palakka's case, moreover, the honour ofhis people was also at 
stake investing his efforts with the aura of a sacred task. Both these men 
had been thrust together by the Company's leaders in Batavia at a 
critical juncture in their lives. Tbeir cooperation proved crucial in 
shaping the circumstances of their mission and accelerating the con-
frontation between the Company, the Bone-Soppeng Bugis, and Goa 
which became known as the Makassar War. 
CHAPTERIII 
TUE MAKASSAR WAR 
On the moming of 24 November 1666 the Company expedition to 
Makassar and the Eastem Quarters set sail under the command of 
Admiral Comelis Janszoon Speelman. The fleet consisted of the 
admiralship Tertho/en, and twenty other vessels carrying some 1,870 
people, among whom were 818 Dutch sailors, 578 Dutch soldiers, and 
395 native troops. The principal native soldiers were from Ambon under 
Captain Joncker and the Bugis under Arung Palakka and Arung Belo 
Tosa'deng (Stapel 1922:97 -9).1 
The fleet arrived near Tanakeke on 17 December 1666 and appeared 
before Makassar on the 19th. The next day Speelman, in accordance 
with his instructions, sent a letter wrapped with white satin cloth and tied 
with a red silk cord to the Karaeng Goa in Makassar. It announced the 
Company's demands for "prompt reparation and satisfaction" as weU as 
its intentions "with the grace of God to wreak vengeance with violence" 
if the demands were refused. A captured Bajau 2 was entrusted with the 
delivery of the letter. On the way to shore with the messenger, the Dutch 
noticed a boat bearing a flag of truce approaching, and so they tumed 
back to see wh at message the envoys brought. The boat contained two 
important Goa noblemen and two interpreters, who were brought to 
Speelman on the Tertho/en. They brought 1,056 gold mas as payment for 
the murder of the Dutchmen on one of the Don Duango Islands and 
1,435 coprijksdaa/ders which had been fished out of the shipwrecked 
Leeuwin, but no other message. 3 Speelman immediately informed them 
that Dutch blood could only be repaid in blood and not in money. When 
Speelman then attempted to have these messengers deliver his letter, 
they refused, saying that on pain of death they were ordered to deliver 
the money and do nothing more (KA 1155a:21r). 
During the course of the meeting, Arung Palakka, his uncle Daeng 
Mattoana, and Arung Belo entered the cabin. Arung Palakka was 
dressed as a Dutch officer with a gold medallion around his neck given to 
him by the Company for his services in the west coast Sumatra campaign. 
The other two wore scarlet over their copper armour. AU three looked so 
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fierce that they caused the Goa envoys great fright. The reaction of the 
envoys was understandable since it had been generally believed in 
Makassar that Arung Palakka had been killed in Sumatra (Stapel 1922: 
101, n.2). But instead here he was, as though risen from the dead, 
"bringing" this vast Dutch armada to wreak vengeance on Goa. This 
image was soon to spread throughout South Sulawesi causing shock and 
dismay among the Goa people and great rejoicing among many Bone 
and Soppeng Bugis. So spectacular was his sudden appearance af ter so 
many years of exile that people began to believe in his upe', his fortune, 
or that peculiar quality inherent in those destined for greatness. The 
sight of his person or even the belief of his presence in an area was 
sufficient to create a great psychological uplift among his people. This 
factor was soon evident to Speelman who began to take specific steps to 
protect Arung Palakka and thus preserve perhaps the expedition's best 
guarantee of success. For the moment, however, Speelman bided his 
time. 
On 21 st December the Dutch envoy retumed from the Goa court with 
a reply from Sultan Hasanuddin. Because of the failure of the reply to 
explain satisfactorily a number of charges made by the Company against 
Goa, and because of the manner in which the letter was delivered 
(unexplained in the sources), Speelman and his council concluded that 
Goa had feit no compunction or humility regarding their deeds toward 
the Company. Af ter Goa's envoys had been allowed to return home, 
Speelman ordered the entire Dutch fleet to move within about 1112 
kilometres of the Makassar forts. The Tertho/en commenced the bom-
bardment of the city by thé fleet which was solely intended to intimidate 
the Goa government. 
While a bombardment of Makassar was in Speelman's Instructions, a 
land attack on the city was not. Shortly af ter the expedition had left 
Batavia and was lying off the coast of Java on 28th November, Speelman 
had made known to his officers that the aim of the expedition was to 
protect the Company's allies and to seek out the enemy and by raids and 
attacks "to cause him every possible damage and harm" (Macleod 
1900: 1270). Nevertheless, he firmly believed that an all-out war against 
Goa on this expedition was desirabie. First of all, he had evaluated 
reports coming from various quarters and was convineed, or ready to be 
convinced, th at "not only the king and the nob les, but also the common 
man [in Makassar] were so astounded by the unexpected arrival of this 
fleet that, in the opinion of the Bugis, if one could resolve to attack, 
without much doubt areasonabie amount of success could be expected". 
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Secondly, Speelman had received reassuring reports from his two most 
important native allies on the expedition, Arung Palakka and Captain 
Joncker, th at the Goa court and the surrounding areas we re incapabIe of 
resisting an attacking land or naval force. In addition Arung Palakka 
claimed that as soon as the Datu Soppeng realized that they were 
attacking, he and some 800 to 1,000 of his men would enter the conflict 
on their side. Captain Jonèker added his voice to those in favour of an 
attack by speculating that the exiled Ternate prince, Kaicili' Kalimata, 
and his Ternate followers would also abandon the Makassar forces as 
soon as the tide turned against the latter (KA 1159a:494v-495r). 
As the Dutch and their native allies would later discover to their 
dismay, the Makassar troops were firmly entrenched in a series of 
fortresses equipped with cannons all along the harbour. Insofar as the 
support from Datu Soppeng was concerned, his projected help was a 
chimera conjured up by Arung Palakka. Datu Soppeng was in exile and 
under surveillance by Makassar troops in the small village of San-
rangang. He was in no position to mount any attack nor had any sizeable 
numbers of men with him. There were Bugis who had fled from the 
enemy to join Arung Palakka, and so the latter would have known of the 
true state of affairs in South Sulawesi. It was to Arung Palakka's advan-
tage, however, to en courage Speelman to attack and involve the 
Company in the war which could prove highly advantageous for the 
Bugis. This was the opportunity for which Arung Palakka and his 
Toangke had waited six years, and Arung Palakka would have been 
foolish not to have used any means at his disposal to bring about the 
invasion. Arung Palakka need not have worried unduly, for Speelman 
was already convinced that he should attack Goa. In December 1666, 
even before his overwhelming victory over the Makassar forces on 
Butung, he had already prepared his case to Batavia for an all-out war 
against Goa (KA 1159a:494v-495r). 
Speelman postponed any immediate militaryaction since the west 
monsoon was about to begin and would make any land campaign 
hazardous against the well-entrenched and well-armed enemy forces. 
And so he ordered his fleet to proceed southward in accordance with his 
instructions (Stapel 1922: 101-2). As the fleet sailed down the coast, 
Speelman sent landing parties to burn and destroy villages and ricefields. 
There was some resistance, especially when the parties moved inland, 
but there were no major engagements until the fleet reached Bantaeng 
(Stapel 1922: 103-4; KA 1155a:21r). Bantaeng greatly impressed 
Speelman who described it as a large prosperous city no Ie ss striking than 
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Batavia with houses on the average larger and more attractive than those 
in Makassar. In a fierce battle for Bantaeng on 25 November the 
Makassar forces were put to flight and the entire region around 
Bantaeng, "being the hereditary lands of the king [of Goa] and one of 
the most important ricebowls of Makassar", laid waste. One thousand 
houses in the city of Bantaeng, thirty to forty villages, and about 100 
boats in the harbour carrying some 6,000 tons of riee were set aflame 
(Stapel 1936:36; Stapel 1922:104-5; Macleod 1900:1271). 
News of the destruction of Bantaeng spread quickly through South 
Sulawesi causing pan ic among Goa's allies and a guarded optimism 
among the Bone-Soppeng people. Secret messen gers from Arung 
Palakka arrived in Bone informing the people of the intentions of the 
fleet and the necessity of being prepared for some major enterprise. 
Arung Palakka urged the Bugis to be patient for a little while longer 
since the time was not right for an attack (Stapel 1922: 105). 
From Bantaeng the fleet sailed southward to Selayar, and then to 
Butung where it found a Goa army of 15,000 men under the command of 
Karaeng Bontomarannu besieging the island. A month before, a Goa 
fleet consisting of 450 ships with provisions for seven months had arrived 
on Butung's shores and had begun a protracted siege. With the Dutch 
fleet safely anchored off the southern end of the straits, Speelman went 
with a number of smaller boats to shore where he attacked the Makassar 
forces. He then directed some of the Dutch ships to areas where they 
could fire on enemy positions. On the way they came upon a Makassar 
camp which reacted in an unexpected fashion toward the ship. Three 
men approached and demanded that Arung Palakka show himself to 
them. When Arung Palakka appeared, these men, now joined by many 
others, began jumping up and down on the beach and some began to cry 
(Stapel 1922:106-7; Macleod 1900:1271). Arung Palakka was rowed 
ashore, and as soon as he landed, it was obvious that he knew many of the 
men on the beach. The first three men drew out their krisses and 
performed the aru before Arung Palakka. Others flocked to Arung 
Palakka so that by nightfall the number had grown to some 300 men. 
Since there was evidence th at more Bugis intended to come, Arung 
Palakka asked Speelman's permission to remain on shore overnight 
among his people so that his trust and confidence in them would encour-
age others to desert the Makassar forces. Speelman raised no objections 
because he had been impressed by the sincerity of those who had already 
joined Arung Palakka. By the morning of 2 January 1667 the number of 
Bugis with Arung Palakka had grown to 500, and many others were 
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reported on their way to join him (KA 1159b:496v-497r). The final 
count at the end of the day was 1,500 Bugis (Stapel 1922: 107). 
The most that the Company had hoped from Arung Palakka was 
success in creating confusion among the Makassar forces through 
sporadic and scattered Bugis opposition during the campaign. Neither 
the Company nor Speelman realized the depth of emotion involved in 
the Bone-Soppeng versus Goa-Tallo rivalry. Arung Palakka's spectacu-
lar "return from the dead" with a powerful armada was the stuff of which 
legends are made. From this early stage of the campaign Arung Palakka 
became transformed in the eyes of the Bugis people into a "special" 
person, someone who was blessed with upe'. As long as Arung Palakka 
was there to lead them, they believed their fight for freedom and self-
respect would end in victory. The person of Arung Palakka, therefore, 
became a talisman for the Bugis people in their war against Goa. Speel-
man was now firmly convineed of Arung Palakka's importance for the 
success of the expedition and assigned him a special bodyguard of Dutch 
soldiers. 
Signs that Makassar resistance was collapsing appeared by the be-
ginning of the new year 1667. On 2nd January one of the principal 
leaders of the Goa expedition against Butung, the Maradia Balailnipa, 
offered to place himself under Arung Palakka, which was followed the 
next day by a request for a ceasefire by the Commander-in-Chief of the 
entire Goa fleet, Karaeng Bontomarannu. On 4th January, Karaeng 
Bontomarannu, Sultan Bima and the Opu Cenning Luwu, on behalf of 
the Goa forces, surrendered to Speelman. Of the original Makassar 
expedition, some 5,000 forcefully-conscripted Bugis joined Arung 
Palakka, and another 5,500 Makassar and allied troops were disarmed 
and placed on a small island between Muna and Butung which Speelman 
re-christened, "Conqueror's Island". At first the Mandar soldiers were 
accorded special treatment because their leader, the Maradia Balannipa, 
had agreed to join Arung Palakka's forces. Speelman approved this 
arrangement since he understood that the Mandar fighting men were 
"truly some of the most fearsome troops among the Makassar forces, 
possessing many guns, perfect marksmen, and excellent [poison] darts-
men". In accordance with Arung Palakka's request, Speelman had all 
arms and flags of the Mandar troops seized and ordered half of the men 
sent to Gorontalo and the other half to join Arung Palakka (KA 1159c: 
501r-v). Despite all the signs and professions of loyalty. the Maradia 
Balannipa escaped one evening with two boats under the cover of 
darkness. Because of this treachery the remaining Mandar nobles and 
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their 800 men were condemned to the same fate as the Makassar 
prisoners. Of the 5,500 prisoners taken by the Dutch and Arung 
Palakka, 400 were made slaves and the rest were left to die on 
"Conqueror's Island". Among the war booty seized were 195 pennants, 
of which fifty were sent to Batavia, and a large quantity and variety of 
weapons. Of the boats captured, 200 were destroyed, thirty divided 
among the ruler of Butung and his nob les, ten of the best given to Arung 
Palakka and eighty-six, which were Bugis boats, attached to Arung 
Palakka's force. Also seized we re 800 tons of "very beautiful white rice" 
(Stapel 1922:109-112; KA 1155a:26r; Macleod 1900:1271-2). 
Speelman sent three copies of a letter announcing his victory on Butung 
to Batavia, for he hoped for a speedy approval of his request to attack 
Makassar itself. In the meantime Arung Palakka and the young fifteen 
year old Datu Luwu, who now decided to turn against Goa, 4 sent 
messages to their people to await the right moment to attack the 
Makassar troops. Speelman caIculated th at toward June 1667 when he 
returned from the Eastern Quarters, the Bugis should be psychologically 
and physically prepared for a war against Goa. For th is venture Speel-
man asked Batavia that the following be sent: all the soldiers that 
Batavia could spare, two or three capable sloops with good commanders, 
30,000 Ibs. of gunpowder, and some good skippers, surgeons, and con-
stables. He also proposed to bring back from the Eastern Quarters for 
the war against Goa a number of native troops from Ternate, Tidore, the 
Sula Islands, and Tahulandang. So real was Speelman's vision ofvictory 
in Makassar that he believed it to be especially "ordained" for him. He 
deliberately informed Batavia that the destruction of Bantaeng occurred 
on Christmas Day and the victory in Butung on New Years Day, though 
the latter event had in fact occurred on 4 January 1667. But to Speelman 
the coincidence of special days and these victories was meaningful and 
augured weil for his most important task: the defeat of Goa (Stapel 
1922:108-114). 
Batavia was unimpressed. On 15 April 1667 the Supreme Government 
sent a message instructing Speelman to do as much damage to the enemy 
as he could, bijt that "the Netherlands force shall not be jeopardized by 
being sent inland, and even less by attacking the cas ties and forts of the 
city, unless this task through favourable circumstances may be accom-
plished by the Bugis and other native auxiliaries" (Stapel 1922: 126-7). 
By the time this decision by Batavia had been reached, Speelman had 
already advanced his plans for the attack on the kingdom of Goa. 
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Speelman's miss ion, judging from his own reports, was proceeding 
smoothly. On 31 January 1667 he signed a treaty of friendship with the 
ruler of Butung and, af ter a short delay, sailed off with the fleet to the 
Eastern Quarters. The Bugis and Arung Palakka remained behind to 
assist in removing any pockets of Makassar resistance in Butung. More 
importantly for the mor ale of the Bugis, Arung Palakka was permitted in 
the meantime to send his specially-picked men to Bone to prepare the 
people for an armed uprising against Goa. The hope was for a Bugis 
revolt to coincide with a full-scale Dutch-Bugis attack on Goa af ter the 
return of the Dutch fleet from the Eastern Quarters. This hope was 
nurtured by the continuing arrival of boatloads of Bugis from Bone to 
join Arung Palakka at Butung or at Tibore on Muna. They confidently 
asserted th at possession of guns was the only advantage which the 
Makassar troops had over the Bugis (KA 1155c:58r). 
In Goa the report of the debacle in Butung at the hands of the 
Company and Arung Palakka greatly worried the court. Sultan 
Hasanuddin and various members of the Bate Salapang wanted imme-
diate peace, but they were over-ruled by others who declared themselves 
ready to defend Goa to the last. One of the most determined advocates 
of war was Karaeng Popo who was quoted as saying: "I have already 
once sworn a peace with the Dutch. Not as long as I live shall I again 
make and break a peace [with them)." And, "If it must be th at we 
become slaves of the Dutch, there will be time enough when we are na 
longer capable of offering any resistance." Once the court had decided 
to fight, the most illustrious of the Makassar leaders were entrusted with 
the defence of the kingdom (Stapel 1922: 134, 150; KA 1727:207v). 
Daeng Tuloio, Sultan Hasanuddin's brother, was given an army of 3,000 
men to strengthen Bantaeng; the Sultan himself and Karaeng Tallo we re 
to oversee the defences of the royal citadel of Sombaopu; Karaeng 
Lengkese was placed in charge of fortifications in the Portuguese 
quarters; Karaeng Bontosunggu, brother of the Tuma'bicara-butta 
Karaeng Karunrung, was made commander of the fort at Ujung 
Pandang; and Karaeng Popo assumed the task of defending Pa'nak-
kukang (Stapel 1922:125). All the Makassar women and children were 
brought to the interior of Goa, while the men remained behind and 
swore to defend their homes and forts or die in the attempt (KA 1159f: 
650v). 
Emotions were running high in both Goa and Bone, but Arung 
Palakka and his Bugis had been told by Speelman to wait until his return 
from the Eastern Quarters before beginning any major hostilities. Impa-
80 The Heritage of Arung Palakka 
tience and pressures from Bone and Soppeng to begin the campaign 
finally overcame all other considerations held by Arung Palakka. He 
therefore ordered Arung Belo and Arung Kaju to take 2,000 men to 
Bone. When this army landed in Sulawesi, it quickly learned that Goa 
had restored La Ma'daremmeng as Arumpone in February 1667 after 
twenty years in exile. In addition he had been showered with various 
titles of honour and informed that he would not be considered a subject 
but an equal, a "brother" . Once again he was provided with a state 
sword, a royal umbrella, and the other appurtenances of kingship. 
Although it was c1early Goa's intention to gain the support or at least 
neutralize Bone in the war with the Company and Arung Palakka, La 
Ma'daremmeng told Arung Belo and Arung Kaju that he would be rul er 
to his people until the return of Arung Palakka (KA 1155b:28r-v). 
The arrival of Arung Belo and Arung Kaju was greeted with a spon-
taneous outburst of joy among the Bugis of Bone and Soppeng. The 
harsh suppression of the 1660 revolt which had led to the flight of many 
of the Bugis leaders had left an indelible mark on the self-confidence and 
morale of the Bugis people. From the depths of depression they had 
been given cause for hope by the al most miraculous reappearance of 
their leaders, long thought dead in a foreign land.5 Whatever may have 
been the original intentions of Arung Belo and Arung Kaju, they soon 
found themselves leading a rebellion in May, much earlier than had been 
planned by either Speelman or Arung Pafakka. They succeeded in 
raising an army, but they we re opposed by a well-armed Makassar force 
under Karaeng Tallo and Karaeng Lengkese. It is believed that La 
Ma'dan!mmeng had tirst informed Karaeng Goa of the arrival of the 
secret Bugis force in Bone but was later persuaded by his son, Arung 
Timurung La Pakkokoe, to oppose Goa. In this battle the Goa army 
defeated the Bugis even though it suffered greater casualties. The 
remainder of Bone's army, the majority of its nobles, and its ruler then 
f1ed to safety in Luwu (Stapel 1922: 129-30; Ligtvoet 1880: 126-7). 
Speelman, meanwhile, concluded his mission to the Eastern Quarters, 
af ter having recruited the best soldiers from that region so that "arriving 
in Makassar well-equipped, they [i.e. the Dutch and the Bugis] would 
have the greatest chance of success". For this expedition Speelman also 
accepted Sultan Ternate's offer to contribute a number of his war canoes 
for the war against Goa. On 19 June 1667 Speelman returned to Butung 
accompanied by the ruIer of Ternate. A week later the f1eet set sail 
toward Su la we si and Makassar, toward an encounter which was to 
determine the destiny of Speelman, Arung Palakka, and the people of 
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South Sulawesi (Stapel 1922:120-1, 126-7; KA 1159d:511v). 
When the fleet reached the Sulawesi coast, Speelman received dis-
piriting news of the abortive Bugis uprising in Bone in May and of the 
disappearance of Arung Palakka during the crossing from the island of 
Kambaena. Arung Palakka and the Bugis fleet had set sail in the 
moming from Kambaena, two days before the departure of the Dutch 
fleet. They had barely left the island when they ran into a severe storm 
with heavy rain and high waves. Despite Arung Palakka's efforts to keep 
the boats together, they were scattered in all directions with each boat 
trying desperately to keep afloat. Captain Christian Poleman, who was 
accompanying Arung Palakka on a Dutch yacht, tried to stay within sight 
of Arung Palakka's boat which was dangerously overloaded with people. 
Finally, however, the winds and se as separated them, and Poleman 
landed ne ar the settlement of Kassi without a clue as to Arung Palakka's 
whereabouts. Poleman began cruising along the coast and eventually 
came ashore ne ar Bira where he saw a large number of boats. Some of 
the people on shore first began to approach Poleman menacingly with 
shields and swords but were called off by their leader. The latter then 
came forward to assure Poleman that his village had never had any 
enmities with anyone and th at it was favourably inclined to the 
Company. If Arung Palakka were to appear, they would march under his 
banner. He suggested that arms be given to them immediately so that 
they would be ready when Arung Palakka arrived. But Poleman wisely 
decIined with the explanation that such requests should be directed to 
Speelman himself. 
Poleman leamed from this self-appointed spokesman of the group 
th at he had been bom in this area but had been a slave of a Seiior 
"Craengeel" and had sailed with Vlaming in the Ambon wars. He also 
claimed to have participated in private trade in Batavia and elsewhere 
for his master, and that for his good services he had been made a 
freeman. Af ter gaining his freedom, he had retumed to settle at th is 
place with his father. He told Poleman that news had reached his village 
of Arung Kaju and Arung Belo's arrival in Bone in May and of their 
defeat by a Makassar army. While most of Bone's leaders, including 
Arumpone La Ma'daremmeng, had escaped to Luwu, some 200 of 
Bone's nobles had been killed and their wives and children forcibly 
brought to Goa. It was said th at various pregnant women who could not 
keep up the pace of the forced march were sliced open and left to die on 
the roadside. With the retreating army was Arung Palakka's uncle, 
"Raja Mapane",6 who led the buming of Wajo, Goa's principal ally, as 
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the army marched to Luwu's borders. Fearful of just such an event Goa 's 
leaders had taken the precaution of sending 3-400 men to Tosora. With 
these reinforcements Tosora withstood the Bugis attack and was able to 
escape destruction. The Bugis army then continued northward to Luwu 
where it was joined by men from Luwu, Bone, Kera, and Toraja to form 
a force estimated at about 18,000 men. They were now in Luwu awaiting 
orders from Arung Palakka. 
Although the story could not be verified, this informant stressed that 
the people in the area believed this to be true. What he himself had 
investigated and could mention confidently was the presence of astrong 
Makassar force of 1,500 men at Kalakongkong River and another large 
army of 5-6,000 men at Bantaeng. At the latter place the Makassar 
troops had built several forts knowing full weil that as long as Bantaeng, 
the largest and most prosperous city in the south, was unconquered, no 
local lord in the area would dare ally with the Company or Arung 
Palakka. Poleman then asked whether the people of Bone and other 
Bugis would support the Company even without Arung Palakka. The 
reply was cautious but indicated that it was unlikely. The reason was the 
fear that the Company would again conclude peace with Goa and 
abandon the Bugis to a more miserabIe and intolerable fate than ever 
before. On the other hand, he believed that if Arung Palakka were to 
appear with the Company fleets, he would be joined by sufficient 
numbers to defeat Goa no matter how formidable its armies. 
Poleman recalled that in Butung a similar sentiment was expressed by 
those Bugis who escaped from the Makassar expedition to join Arung 
Palakka. They, too, feared that the Company would abandon them to a 
horrible fate at the hands of the Makassar overlords despite all manner 
of assurance by Speelman. A victory without Arung Palakka was 
unthinkable to the Bugis because they feared that without a powerful 
leader a situation such as that in 1660 would once again prevail. Despite 
the Company's successes against Goa in 1660, it later abandoned its 
conquests and allowed Goa to regain everything it had temporarily lost. 
The Company had always appeared to the Bugis and Makassar people as 
an ephemeral presence in South Sulawesi. Unless there was a native 
leader and army capable of restraining a vengeful Goa, no Bugis WO\1ld 
dare ri se in rebellion in support of the Company. Poleman wrote to 
Speelman expressing his belief that Arung Palakka's presence was 
essential for any victory in the forthcoming campaign. His letter simply 
reinforced the view already long-held by Speelman himself (KA 1159k: 
640r-642v).7 
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Arung Pa lak ka, therefore, was a vital component in Speelman's strategy 
to hum bie the powerful kingdom of Goa. The decision to invade Goa 
was contrary to Batavia's orders, and so Speelman was all the more 
concerned that this expedition succeed and succeed brilliantly. Arung 
Palakka was no longer merely an informant on the state of affairs in 
South Sulawesi and a minor sideshow to keep Goa from concentrating its 
total force against the Company's expedition. With everyencounter 
Speelman became increasingly aware of Arung Palakka's role as a 
symbol of Bugis pride and resistance to Goa. If Arung Palakka were 
killed, Speelman feared that the entire Bugis resistance would crumble. 
The mere presence of this leader engendered such enthusiasm from 
among his people that Speelman admitted to Batavia that he would 
never have believed that "his [Arung Palakka's] esteem and power 
among the people would be so great" (KA 115ge:646r, 665r). What 
Arung Palakka presented to his people was a man who, in the Bugis or 
South Sulawesi cultural context, had risen from the dead by taking action 
to restore his siri'. It was his example which challenged the other Bone-
Soppeng Bugis to ri se and restore their siri' as a nation. 
To Speelman 's great relief Poleman found Arung Palakka alive and 
weil at Kassi. Despite being dispirited by their recent experiences, the 
Bugis quickly rallied at the sight of the Dutch. Attention was again 
devoted to their primary objective of obtaining an army from Bone. 
Since Arung Palakka was convinced that there would be no volunteers 
unless he appeared personally in Bone, Poleman decided to accompany 
him there to assure his safety. Speelman had already given Poleman 
prior instructions to take twenty Dutch soldiers and two fieldguns on the 
march to Bone (Macleod 1900: 1276). Before departing Arung Palakka 
informed Arung Arnali, who had been left in command of the Bugis 
troops in Speelman's camp, that he was going to Bone to raise an army. 
He also added that he would make certain that ArungAmali's wife was 
brought safely out of Bone. This personal note of concern was not 
unexpected, for Speelman had observed that Arung Amali was "a 
modest man of very great prestige and held in great respect by Arung 
Palakka" (Stapel 1922: 132-3). In view of these developments, Speel-
man consulted the Bugis leaders Arung Amali and Arung Cibalu and 
decided to go to Makassar and await Arung Palakka and the Bone troops 
there (KA 1159h:649r-650r). 
Except for the few letters by Poleman, who accompanied Arung 
Palakka on the march, the Dutch sources are silent about the movement 
of the Bugis in their homeland during the early stages of the war. The 
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Bugis lontara', on the other hand, supply an interesting commentary on 
the war with their own particular concerns. According to these /ontara', 
while Arung Palakka was in Bone assembling an army, three of the 
Soppeng nob les in th is group - Arung Bila, Arung Appanang, and 
Arung Belo - asked permission to go to Soppeng. They told Arung 
Palakka that they wanted to return home "to see who is still faithful and 
still honours him". Arung Palakka agreed to this mission and told them 
that he would await their return befare proceeding to attack Goa. The 
three Soppeng nobles spent the night at Goa-Goa, and the next morning 
were informed that the ruler of Sawitto and his soldiers had been burning 
and killing in Soppeng for the last five days and were now billetted in the 
main mosque. At daybreak the next day these three nobles with thirty 
hand-picked men entered the mosque by a ruse and began a great 
slaughter of the Sawitto men. The ruler of Sawitto managed to escape, 
but more than 100 heads were taken by the people of Soppeng. In an aru 
ceremony at the marketplace the people of Soppeng offered their oath of 
allegiance to their lords while dancing with the heads of the enemy in 
their hands. All available Soppeng men were then assem bied and 
prepared for the march to Pattiro to join Arung Palakka and the Bone 
arrny. 
On the way the Soppeng farces spent the night at Goa-Goa to allow 
time for others of their countrymen to join them. While they waited, the 
three Soppeng nob les agreed to send a message to Arung Palakka to ask 
him to speak to the leaders of Bone about their agreement at Attappang. 
According to Soppeng, Bone had broken its agreement when it assisted 
Goa in the 1660 Bugis revolt, and now Soppeng wanted an assurance 
that this would not happen again in any future war against Goa.8 When 
the message was brought to Arung Palakka, he sent Arung Cibalu9 to 
East Bone, West Bone, Central Bone, and to the care area of Bone. lo 
The messenger had been dispatched to the four natura I divisions which 
had later become part of the larger confederation of states known as the 
kingdom of Bone. Even in the 17th century the awareness of the 
separate groups within the confederation was strong. It was imperative 
for anyone hoping to gain the support of a kingdom to make separate 
overtures to the various groups, as happened here as weil as in the debate 
preceding the treaty of Attappang. These groups swore befare Arung 
Cibalu that they would uphold the Treaty of Attappang if Arung 
Palakka would lead them, and that they would do nothing which would 
cause Arung Palakka to flee his home land for the second time. The next 
day all of Bone and its vassals (Bone /i/i' passeajingeng) came with their 
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banners to Pattiro. Arung Palakka was there with Bone's royal standard, 
the "golden umbrella (pajumpulaweng)", and the Soppeng army with 
La Panyannya, the banner of West Soppeng. The two principal Soppeng 
flags, Bakka' and La Piannyarang, were absent because they were with 
the exiled Datu Soppeng La Tenribali in Goa (L-4: unpag., section 23). 
The Lords of Bone, Soppeng, and the Toangke then swore to uphold the 
Treaty of Attappang with the drinking of ballo'. 11 
It was agreed to di vide the Bugis forces, with the Soppeng army under 
Arung Bila, Arung Belo, and Arung Appanang going to Barru to attack 
Goa from the north, while Arung Palakka with the Bone forces struck 
from the south. Those who had been with Arung Palakka in Batavia now 
reaffirmed the agreement which they had made in Batavia on the banks 
of the Angke River: 
If, with the blessings of God (Dewata), we return to our Bugis homeland 
(tana ugi) to fight Goa, and if we should be given the victory by God, our 
firm friendship will not be undone. You, the people of Angke (Toangke) 
will be protected and favoured up to your third cousins (sappowek-
katellu') (L-l :33; L-4: unpag., section 23; L-7:28).12 
Then each important noble in order of importance began in turn to 
jump up and down with kris unsheathed to manngaru before Arung 
Palakka. The first to manngaru was Arung Bila who shouted: "Watch 
me later, Lord, a man who will not retreat nor be surrounded in the field 
of battle. If I should be struck down, then evil would befall the land, this 
is clear! ... " In similar fashion each of the nobles and Toangke swore 
their oath of allegiance to Arung Palakka (L-l: 33). 
Since Bulo-Bulo and Lamatti, two of Bone's vassal states to the south, 
had fought alongside Goa, it was decided to send Daeng Ma to "remind" 
(naingerrangi) them of their agreement with Bone. Daeng Ma told 
Arung Lamatti and the Gellareng Bulo-Bulo: "Remember your agree-
ment that when Arung Palakka comes you would quickly sit with us and 
follow him". Arung Lamatti replied: "We remember our agreement, but 
you were defeated by the people of Makassar. Now Karaeng Batu Pute 
and Karaeng Mawajang [Majawang in L-3 and I Mangkawe in L-4] are 
waiting at Binamu to attack Bone." In this brief exchange of words, the 
lontara' writer lucidly conveys to his reader/listener the constant 
changes of political alignments which were necessary to accord with the 
shifts in power. A highly formalized set of words and acts we re employed 
to determine what particular relationship was mutually satisfactory to 
two kingdoms. Once the formula was proclaimed and enacted, the result 
was plain to all involved. In this case the Soppeng Bugis on behalf of 
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Arung Palakka wished to re-establish a former lord-vassal relationship 
with Bulo-Bulo and Lamatti. But the latter states rejected this overture 
because they were not convinced that real power had shifted away from 
Goa to Arung Palakka. At this early stage of the war, it was a prudent 
move but one which invited an attack from Bone. 
When Bone's armies approached, they were met by the leader of the 
Lamatti bissu 13, who was a very old woman (makkunrai ridi') in red, 
borne on a palanquin followed by some 100 female bissu (core-core) 
swinging weaving "swords" or beaters (walida) and chanting (mem-
mang). As they moved in front of Bone's troops, they we re fired upon 
but seemingly no one was hurt. They then went east marching towards 
Soppeng's men who fired at them but found their weapons equally 
ineffectual against the bissu. The latter marched once more toward the 
Bone forces before returning to Lamatti (L-l:33-4; L-3:309; L-4: 
unpag., section 23). In the first major battle which took place south of 
Salomekko, fifty Soppeng and 100 Pattiro heads were taken by the 
Makassar forces. For three days the battle raged, but finally Soppeng 
and Bone were forced to return to Pattiro. Three days later the Bone and 
Soppeng troops again attacked Lamatti early in the morning. Ouring the 
fighting a Outch ship under Captain Poleman unexpectedly appeared in 
search of Arung Palakka bringing with it thirty soldiers and cannons. 14 
The Outch joined the Bone-Soppeng Bugis armies and cannonaded the 
Makassar positions. In a final battle on the banks of the Tangka River, 
the Makassar troops were defeated and forced to flee by boat to safety in 
Goa. All of their forts and armaments were seized by the victorious 
Bugis, and Bulo-Bulo, Lamatti, and the rest of the pattalimpoe 15 we re 
compelled to surrender. After this victory Arung Palakka ordered the 
Soppeng nobles to take their troops and go north to Barru as had been 
originally decided in council (L-l :35; L-3:31O; L-4: unpag., section 23). 
While the Bugis sources then describe the campaign in the north in great 
detail, it is the contemporary Outch accounts which provide information 
on the progress of the main body of the expedition under Speelman. On 
7th July the expedition landed in Bantaeng and seized it despit€ the 
muddy terrain and the well-defended fortifications. Speelman had 
estimated that there were about 7,000 Makassar troops in the battle for 
Bantaeng under the command of Karaeng Layo, Karaeng Bontoma-
nompo and Karaeng Bangkala. Karaeng Bangkala was decapitated in 
the fighting and one of the other three commanders was seriously 
wounded. The Makassar stockades in the vicinity of Bantaeng we re 
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taken one by one, and when the last was threatened, the Makassar troops 
simply abandoned the fight and fted back to Makassar. From Bantaeng 
the expedition proceeded to Turatea, where several raids took places, 
and then to the Makassar roadstead on 13th July, on the very same day 
that Arung Palakka and his army began their march to Bantaeng from 
Pattiro (Stapel 1922: 131-8). 
When Arung Palakka and his men set off, they we re joined by Arung 
Belo, Arung Kaju, and Daeng Mattoana with those of their following 
who had survived the abortive Bone uprising in May. Beside these, 
however, only a "rather sober" number of Bugis appeared, much to the 
disappointment of Captain Poleman. As the army marched forward to 
Bantaeng, it was fortunately swelled by recruits all along the route until 
it numbered some 6-7,000 men. When the army reached Bantaeng, 
there arrived the welcome news that another 4,000 Bugis had already 
crossed the Tangka River and were coming to join Arung Palakka. 
Poleman wanted to continue northward immediately, but Arung 
Palakka advised him to wait until there we re further instructions from 
Speelman. In any case, he argued, the men were too exhausted by their 
long difficult march to begin at once on another one. Poleman allowed 
himself to be persuaded because he considered Arung Palakka to be "an 
industrious and sensible person" (KA 1159:655v). 
A letter from Speelman soon arrived urging Arung Palakka and 
Poleman to proceed to Turatea. On the march the Bugis were inter-
cepted at the Binuang River by some 6,000 well-armed Makassar troops 
who we re later reinforced by another 1,000 men. Beleaguered on all sides 
and suffering from lack of food, water, and ammunition, the Bugis army 
appealed to Speelman for relief either through a diversionary attack on a 
Makassar stronghold or through a shipment of much-needed guns (KA 
1159:658r-660r; L-5:152). Help sent by boat was delayed by contrary 
winds and had to be diverted to abou t 3112 kilometres south of Galesong. 
At Galesong, much to everyone's surprise, appeared Arung Palakka, 
Poleman, and some Bugis who had left the main Bugis army of 8,000 
men at Turatea under Arung Belo and Arung Kaju to try to reach 
Speelman. The Dutch personally led by Speelman attacked the 
Makassar positions at Galesong, while the Bugis army confronted yet 
another large Makassar army at Turatea. With their ammunition quickly 
dwindling, the Bugis asked for aid, which was sent immediately by 
Speelman on a fast sloop. On board one of the ships was Arung Palakka 
who intended to bring the entire Bugis army from Turatea to Galesong. 
On their arrival Arung Palakka succeeded in reaching the principal 
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fortification being held by his men and the Dutch. That evening he led an 
attack to drive back the Makassar troops from the three fortifications 
dosest to the Bugis camp. The next day the boarding of the entire army 
of about 6,000 men took place only astone's throw from the Makassar 
encampment. The mission was a total success, and on 15th August, the 
last of the Bugis army arrived in Galesong. With these reinforcements 
the total native troops fighting with the Dutch now numbered 10,000 
men, of whom 7,000 we re Bugis. Opposing them were some 30,000 
troops, 10,000 ofwhom arrived from Turatea under Karaeng Lengkese, 
Karaeng Karunrung and Maradia Balanippa, and another 5,000 from 
Bulo-Hulo. 
Galesong was the last major fortified settlement blocking the advance 
toward Makassar itself. The outcome of the battle at Galesong, while not 
decisive in itself, was bound to have a significant psychological impact in 
the fight for the most important prize, Makassar. All ofthe principal Goa 
dignitaries, headed by Sultan Hasanuddin himself, were in Galesong. 
Arung Palakka once again proved to be an invaluable, if at times 
reckless, ally. A daring plan was devised for the capture of Galesong. 
Some 100 Bugis were to be shown a way into the enemy's stronghold by 
a deserter from the Makassar side. Outside, Arung Palakka and 1,500 
men were to wait for a sign from this "reconnaissance party"Iand then 
launch a full attack. That evening Speelman was informed that Arung 
Palakka himself had joined Arung Belo and Arung Kaju to lead the 
vanguard into Galesong. Fearful of the consequences of such a foolhardy 
risk, Speelman immediately went ashore to supervise the operations 
personally. Speelman was only too aware ofwhat Arung Palakka's death 
would mean to the morale of the Bugis and the fate of the entire 
expedition. Through illness the Dutch forces had been decimated so that 
barely 250 men were able to bear arms. Only if the war went weIl and 
Arung Palakka we re still there as their leader could Speelman ever hope 
to gain more vitally needed Bugis reinforcements in the final battle for 
Makassar. For this reason Speelman feit justified in risking his own life in 
leading the rescue party. At three in the moming singing arid shooting 
could be heard from within the fortified city, but not the agreed upon 
signal for attack. Only later did a messenger arrive saying that Arung 
Palakka needed help desperately. Reinforcements arrived just in time to 
beat back a Makassar attack. Fighting continued from six in the moming 
till midday, and resumed again at five in the aftemoon. Finally, the 
Makassar troops retired, and Arung Palakka and the Dutch c1armed 
victory. 
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Although Arung Palakka's oftentimes rash acts of bravery worried 
Speelman, he could not deny the great value of having Arung Palakka as 
an ally for psychological and military reasons. In the Galesong cam-
paign, for example, he proved an inexhaustible fighter, leading his Bugis 
in daytime assaults on the enemy's forts and night-time raids against 
their villages and encampments. The Makassar farces finally abandoned 
their fortifications in Galesong at the end of August to retire to Makassar 
far the final crucial battle ofthe war. A much more confident Speelman 
and Bugis army now marched northward to Barombong, the southern-
most of a series of heavily-armed and well-defended fortifications along 
the shoreline of Makassar harbour (Stapel 1922:140-150; L-5:152-6; 
Macleod 1900: 1278-1282). 
All along the coast a few hours travel north and south of Galesong 
where the two armies had fought, the picture was one of destruction. 
Houses and whole villages had been burned to the ground, and coconut, 
sago, and pinang trees had either been cut down or their crowns chopped 
off. But one policy which both the Bugis and Makassar forces followed 
strictly was the prevention of the wanton destruction of the paddy fields. 
To the victor belonged the rice harvest, as happened when Galesong feIl 
to the Bugis and Dutch armies. The importance of rice as the principal 
source of sustenance has produced a number of traditional practices 
which accord great reverence to the goddess of rice. The people of South 
Sulawesi have much too great a respect for the goddess to have dared to 
anger her by destroying rice crops. So violent is the temper of this 
goddess that special harvesting knives are made sm all enough to be 
concealed in the palm of the hands in order not to give offence to this 
deity. In a Makassar village tale about the Makassar War, the Sinrili'na 
Kappala' Tallumbatua (SKT), even the extreme gravity of the war does 
not over-ride the importance of maintaining the rice-fields: 
If there are three men in one household, one is to be sent to war and two 
are to plant rice. If there are two men in one household, one is to go to 
war and one is to plant rice. If there is but one man in the household, do 
not send him immediately to war. Only if it is absolutely necessary 
should he be sent (L-32: 123). 
The Makassar warriors echo a similar sentiment in this ta Ie by 
declaring that Bit is better to die by the shedding of blood than to die of 
starvation. " No matter how fierce the battle, they always return to camp 
at sundown where the women have cooked rice ready for them (L-32: 
144-5). Wars are won and lost, but life goes on, and life for the Bugis and 
Makassar people is rice. It was this belief which made it possible for the 
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victorious Bugis-Dutch forces at Galesong to harvest the ricefields and 
gather over a hundred waterbuffaloes to provide provisions for the 
who Ie arrny for about fifteen days (Macleod 1900: 1282). 
On 3 September 1667 the Dutch fleet arrived at the village of Batu-
Batu, about 500 metres sotlth of Barombong (see Map 4). Breastworks 
had been erected throughout the length of th is defence perimeter from 
Barombong in the south to Tallo in the north. The Dutch and Bugis were 
able to land a force to the south of the Aeng River under the cover of 
cannonfire from the ships. This force quickly established a fortified area 
for the other landings. As soon as a landing place had been secured and 
the ships safely anchored, the remaining troops at Galesong we re sent 
for and the last fortifications there destroyed. The main Makassar force 
was encarnped in the woods on the high ground overlooking the village. 
There were two forward posts, one on the low ground between the hili 
and the coast, and the other on the beach north of the Aeng riverrnouth. 
Arung Palakka led the assault on the post on the beach, and with the 
timely help of his Dutch bodyguards forced the withdrawal of the 
Makassar troops by the evening of 11 th September. The other forward 
post feil quickly, and work immediately began on an assault barricade 
for the battle against the main Makassar camp. Progress was slow 
because of the continual harassment of the Makassar warriors. 
But battle was finally joined on 17th September. The Bugis under 
Arung Palakka, strengthened by forty Ternate soldiers arrned with 
muskets, forrned the first line of assault followed by two Dutch com-
panies under Poleman. Speelman had also sent an ensign with two of the 
best Dutch bodyguards to protect Arung Palakka. As they moved 
forward, the Makassar troops sallied forth from their fortification to 
meet the attack. When the Makassar side began firing their cannons, the 
Butung and Ternate men broke and ran. The Dutch soldiers managed to 
hold the line and force the Makassar troops back. It was then the latter's 
turn to flee back to safety pursued by the Bugis. The battle was indeci-
sive, and the Makassar forces braced themselves for yet another attack. 
The Makassar defences proved very strong and withstood successfully 
several fierce attacks by the Dutch-Bugis forces. Astalemate seemed to 
have been reached with both sides safely ensconced behind their 
defences and unable to make much progress against the other. Mean-
while the approach of the west monsoon promised to hinder any cam-
paign along the west coast because of its strong winds and rains. It was 
therefore decided to abandon the fruitless battle for Batu-Batu and 
simply to leave a Bugis force to check the activities of the Makassar 
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defenders. But even this plan appeared in jeopardy when a spy arrived in 
the camp and created pandemonium among the Bugis by saying that 300 
perahu lay ready in the Tallo River to transport half the Makassar army 
to attack Bone. A large Makassar army was to go by sea to Pare-Pare, 
then overland to Alitta and Lake Tempe. From here it was to be divided, 
with a part going to Wajo to repel the invasion from Luwu and the other 
to attack Bone. Tbe Bugis under Arung Palakka began wailing at the 
thought of the fate awaiting their families. With great emotion they drew 
their krisses and swore that they would trust one another and never 
abandon each other until death. Tbe Bugis leaders suggested various 
desperate plans to prevent the invasion of their land, all of which were 
vetoed by Speelman. Tbe anxiety of the Bugis was allayed somewhat 
with reports that, though the Makassar expedition to Bone would pro-
ceed, it consisted of only 1,000 men under Karaeng Garassi. Further-
more, Speelman promised to station several Dutch ships at the mouth of 
the Tallo River to prevent the Makassar ships from sailing. Tbe Bugis, 
however, continued to harass Speelman for a firmer commitment to the 
Bugis, and so Speelman finally promised that if it were necessary he 
would send the entire expedition to Bone. With this statement, "all the 
Bugis wept with joy", and Bugis morale was restored (Stapel 1922: 
159-160, 166; KA 1156a:728v-729r). 
Shortly af ter this incident further bad news arrived, this time from 
Batavia. Because of the state of war existing between Tbe Netherlands 
and England, Batavia believed it too risky to send more than 250-300 of 
the 1,000 men reinforcements requested by Speelman. Tbe only favour-
able news reaching the Dutch-Bugis camp at this time was the arrival of a 
perahu sent from Arung Appanang who reported the arrival of his 5,000 
man army some thirty kilometres from Makassar. He requested guns 
and ammunition which were immediately sent. Three days later the 
same perahu retumed with further news that a 20,000 man army under 
the Bone prince Daeng Pabila had invaded from Luwu, and now Arung 
Appanang wished to know whether he should fiTSt return to the interior 
to aid the invasion and then return to Makassar or whether he should 
remain operating where he was. Although Arung Palakka thought the 
former suggestion the most feasible, Speelman and his council decided 
that it would be better for Arung Appanang to continue his activities in 
the north so that the enemy would have to deal with several fronts. 16 
While the Dutch sources mention little about the activities of Arung 
Appanang and his army, the Bugis lontara' treat their role in great detail. 
Upon arrival at Barru the three Soppeng nobles - Arung Bila, Arung 
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Appanang, and Arung Bel0 17 - "reminded" the Karaeng Tanete of 
their agreement th at "Tanete is on the inside and Soppeng on the 
outside" (Tanete pole Soppeng su'), indicating that the two kingdoms 
were one (Matthes 1874: 662). As one kingdom, therefore, they told 
Karaeng Tanete that it was only proper that Tanete co me to Soppeng's 
aid against Goa. Arung Palakka asked the three lords to convey this 
message to the Karaeng Tanete: "Even if you remain behind and do not 
participate [in this attack], I still consider you my brother because I am 
indebted to you." 18 Karaeng Tanete replied that he remembered Tanete 
pole Soppeng su', but he first wished to free himself from the agreement 
with Karaeng Goa. He then despatched two messen gers to Goa to 
explain his dilemma. When the messengers returned, they brought the 
message from Karaeng Karunrung that if Tanete joined the Bugis, it 
would be put to the torch and would be like a lesung. 19 Such a threat was 
not taken lightly in view of the fearful vengeance which Goa was known 
to wreak upon those stat es which had betrayed its trust. Moreover, the 
belief was still current in South Sulawesi that once peace was agreed 
upon, the Dutch would leave as they had in the past and abandon the 
native peoples to the mercy of Goa (Stapel 1922: 130). Caught between 
the demands of the Bugis and the Makassar leaders, Karaeng Tanete 
c1everly suggested that a mock battle take place in which the Soppeng 
princes would be victorious while Goa would be appeased by Tanete's 
resistance. In the mock battle some houses were burned and a few 
non-Sulawesi slaves killed, and so Tanete "surrendered". 
From Tanete the Soppeng troops moved to Balusu, MadeIlo, and then 
to Nepo where the three Soppeng princes uttered the familiar words to 
Arung Nepo to indicate Nepo's obligations as a vassal to Soppeng: 
"Remember your treaty with Soppeng at the time of Islamization. Child, 
remember your father and mother in Soppeng and join us in attacking 
Goa." Arung Nepo replied: "You go first and we will follow. I will also 
bring Suppa along with me." From Nepo the Soppeng troops proceeded 
southward and fought a battle with Arung Berru ri Aja' who saw no 
opportunity to abandon Goa. At sundown af ter the first day of battle, 
Berru ri Aja' received a message from Karaeng Goa saying: "0, Berru, 
look out for your own welfare because your mother, Goa, cannot 
provide you with protection. The Bone troops are now in Bantaeng." 
And so Berru ri Aja' surrendered. Arung Berru ri Aja' swore the oath of 
allegiance to the Bugis which was solemnized by his drinking bal/o' 
stirred with La Selatu, the state sword of Appanang. This treaty estab-
lishing the vassalage of Berru ri Aja' was announced with the words: 
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" ... the Bugis wind will blow the Ie af of the people of Berru ri Aja'." 
The Soppeng army then continued its triumphal march toward Makassar 
defeating Cilellang, Manggalung, Kaluku, Mara, Labakkang, Lombas-
sang, Bungoro, Barasa, Siang, and various other small areas. All of the 
defeated lords were made to swear their allegiance to the Bugis and 
drink ballo' stirred with the state sword of Appanang. At Siang a 
messenger arrived from Arung Palakka saying, "Do not leave the people 
of Siang and Barassa in their land but make them board the Dutch ships 
which will take them to Binamu." It was proclaimed th at those who 
remained and their descendants would become the hereditary slaves of 
the lords of Bone and Soppeng. With the war on the west coast over and 
negotiations with Barasa and Siang completed, the three Soppeng 
princes sailed to Binamu to join Arung Palakka (L-l : 34-41 ; L-3: 31 0-4; 
L-4: unpag.; L-6:24-6; L-7:24-8). 
Dutch contemporary reports indicate that the Bugis army in the north 
never did arrive at Binamu as mentioned in the Bugis sources. This 
discrepancy may be explained by the primary concern of the lontara' not 
in the accuracy of detail of the campaign but in the significance of the 
campaign in the realignment of the hierarchy of states in South Sulawesi. 
Each of the rulers of the kingdoms along the west coast is "reminded" of 
a prior relationship with Bone-Soppeng, which had lain in abeyance 
during Goa's period of strength, and now urged to re-establish it in view 
of the shift of power. Those who heeded the reminder escaped and 
confirmed their status of child to Bone-Soppeng's mot her and father; 
others which did not we re forced to accept a relationship of slave to 
master. Berru ri Aja' was unsure of the actual power claimed for Bone-
Soppeng by these three princes and therefore cautiously approached 
their overlord Goa. Only upon learning that Goa was no longer capable 
of affording it protection, which was a basic responsibility of an overlord, 
did Berru ri Aja' decide to accept the terms of its new overlord. 
Throughout the accounts what is mentioned is a catalogue of new 
interstate relationships which were being forged as a consequence of the 
general recognition by South Sulawesi states that a new overlord had 
now replaceq Goa. Even before the fall of Sombaopu, most states had 
already assessed the situation and made the necessary treaty adjust-
ments in acC'Ordance with the new era. The movement of the Bugis army 
in the northern front is thus regarded in the Bugis lontara', not as a 
narration of a war, but as a political-diplomatic campaign reaffirming the 
superioiity of the new Bone-Soppeng forces under Arung Palakka. 
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The weakened state of the Dutch contingent of the expedition through 
sickness, the fierce tenacity of the Makassar forces, and the reluctance 
and inability of Batavia to provide sufficient reinforcements, forced 
Speelman and his war council to consider the possibility of postponing 
the conquest of Makassar. They could enter immediately into peace 
negotiations with Goa, but the time seemed inappropriate and could be 
interpreteQ as weakness. Speelman believed that to make peace under 
these circumstances would only create an impression of weakness and 
result in a peace "ofsmaIl voice and sober trust". Arung Palakka argued 
th at the Bugis lands would be lost if the present campaign we re not 
pursued to a final victory. He urged that a show of force and determina-
tion be made by a Bugis attack, backed up by the Dutch, on one of the 
major Makassar fortifications at Pa'nakkukang or Ujung Pandang. But if 
Speelman and the Council were inclined toward peace, Arung Palakka 
requested permission to return to Bone. With Dutch support he hoped 
to maintain himself and his followers for one or two years until the 
Company was better prepared to pursue the war. Speelman and the 
Council were favourably disposed to Arung Palakka's suggestion of an 
attack on a major Makassar fortification since they had earlier received 
new orders from Batavia dated 6 September 1667 that the war must , 
continue. Batavia expressed concern that ... "the Bugis, or rather 
Bone's alljes (who on your [Speelman's] word and written assurance 
have taken up arms and risen in rebellion against the king of Makassar) 
should not be abandoned and thus doomed to utmost misery and 
slavery" (Stapel 1922:161-5). 
The conspicuous failure of the expedition to gain any conclusive 
victories in Makassar worried Speelman. But to the Bugis fighting men 
the fact th at they were now besieging the Makassar enemy in the very 
fortifications that they had been forced to build was a major triumph in 
itself. They we re unaware of the gloom in the commanders' camp, and all 
they could see was the stream of Bugis leaving the Makassar side to join 
their beloved Arung Palakka. One sign that they interpreted as highly 
auspicious was Arung Palakka's daring attempt to rescue Datu Soppeng 
La Tenribali. On the evening of 9 October 1667 Arung Palakka went 
with 500 specially-picked men to Sanrangang, a small village in the 
mountains of Goa where the Datu Soppeng, three of his wives, and a 
large retinue were living in exile under heavy guard. The surprise raid 
was not totally successful since Datu Soppeng himself was not among the 
387 men, women and children that Arung Palakka brought back with 
him (Stapel 1922: 166-7; Macleod 1900: 1285; KA 1156b:739v). 
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The boldness of Arung Palakka's rescue attempt so captured the 
imagination ofthe Bugis that this episode was commemorated in a florid 
poetie eulogy to Arung Palakka written in the court of Bone: 
... Thus spake the mier [Arung Palakka]: "I have just met and come to 
an agreement with the Noble [Arung] Belo th at it would be best to cause 
confusion among the enemy. We can then advance, push them back, and 
hence restore the land of the one great Lord of Soppeng [Bat ara Tung-
ké'na Soppeng]. Either he [the ruler of Goa] will dance with his [Datu 
Soppeng's ] he ad 20 or this able Datu [Soppeng] will be rescued and rule 
once again with each new day. We will then be able to proceed with this 
war to the death with the one great Lord of Goa [Batara Tungké'na 
Goa]." 
This was agreed upon by all the warriors on the battlefield. The sun 
had not yet set and was still visible in the west when all the troops of the 
one great Lord of Bone [Batara Tungké'na Bone, i.e. Arung Palakka] 
set forth together without turning back. The enemy did not leave their 
rows of forts in order to follow them through the countryside. They went 
directly toward the place inhabited by the one great Lord of Soppeng. 
Upon arrival they attacked in rows and those who were on the side and 
the young, adolescent noble Lords [of Soppeng], these jewels of the 
royal house, were taken. And with the blessings of the Creator 
[Toparampu-rampue, a pre-Islamic creator-figure], the guards grew 
weak and could not carry their spears. On grabbing their spe ars, they 
were astonished to see th at in a flash these young noble Lords had been 
spirited away by the [Bugis] bodyguards who placed them within ivory 
palanquins, shaded by the golden umbrella [of Bone], and whisked them 
away home to their noble land (L-3:83-4). 
Although th is incident is recounted in the Company archives as just 
one of many episodes of the war, to the Bugis it was a stirring account of 
the bravery of the Bugis, and especially of their lord Arung Palakka, in 
their war to restore their siri' and their freedom. 
A major breakthrough in the fighting came when two Dutch com-
panies defeated the Makassar forces in a great battle on 26th October 
and pursued them to the very walls of the royal citadel, Sombaopu. 
There was great consternation among the Makassar warriors and only 
darkness prevented any further pursuit by the Dutch. That same evening 
the Dutch discovered that the Makassar force in its flight had abandoned 
the last fortifieation south of Batu-Batu. Now that the Dutch had piereed 
what the Makassar defenders had once considered a near impenetrable 
defence system of fortifications, both Speelman and Arung Palakka 
considered this the right psychological moment to offer peace to Goa. 
On 29 October 1667 a letter was sent to Sultan Hasanuddin offering 
peace in return for "reasonable satisfaction" for the Company and its 
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allies. The letter, according to the Bugis envoys to the Goa court, 
"caused de ep reflection" among the assembied nobles. Finally a reply 
was formulated asking for a three-day ceasefire to consider peace, which 
was granted (Stapel 1922: 168-9; Macleod 1900: 1286). 
On lst November there arrived a strongly-worded letter from the Goa 
leaders. They professed ignorance of wh at was expected of them since 
they had punished the distriét responsible for the murder of the Dutch-
men and had, moreover, offered payment for the loss of lives. In addition 
they had returned all the coins found on the ship-wrecked Dutch sloop, 
the Leeuwin. They were bemused by Speelman's rejection of these 
concessions, for they genuinely believed that once t~e Company's 
honour had been restored the Dutch would go away as in 1666. Only 
now was it becoming apparent that the Company would not be satisfied 
with anything less than a complete and utter surrender of Goa's control 
over the international trade in the port of Makassar. Goa's fears were 
borne out by the reply from the Dutch War Councillisting its demand 
accompanied by a threat to resume fighting if no response were received 
from Go~ by six th at evening. This ultimatum was written with the 
knowledge that there was to be a major defection from the Goa camp. 
Arung Palakka had met with Karaeng Layo and Karaeng Bangkala of 
Turatea and had assured them of Speelman:s promise of the Company's 
"protection" in return for their allegiance. He had then presented each 
of them with a gold kris and a gold silk cloth (Stapel 1922: 170-1; 
Macleod 1900: 1287). 
In discussing this event the Dutch reports use such terms as "betrayal" , 
and "treachery" to characterise the action of these two karaeng. Yet 
wh at was occurring was another example of a South Sulawesi state 
reassessing the power situation and adjusting its interstate relationships. 
Onee it became obvious to Karaeng Layo and Karaeng Bangkala that 
real power had shifted from Goa to the Company and the Bugis, they 
came to offer fealty to the new overlords and request "protection". In 
return these vassal lords were honoured with krisses and cloths in the 
traditional fashion as confirmation of the new relationship and for 
services rende red to their new overlords. The presentation of the kris 
and the "robe of honour", therefore, was in reward for a faithful deed to 
the overlord and as an acknowledgement of a new interstate relationship 
and not, as it would appear by the bald description in Dutch sources, as a 
bribe to effect a treasonous act. 
According to the arrangements made between Arung Palakka and the 
two karaeng, an attack was to be made on the evening of 2nd November 
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on the fortification under the karaeng's command near Aeng. Once the 
attack began the two karaeng would flee with their men back to their 
home land in Turatea. The Dutch would then send a ship with envoys to 
gain the trust of the people and return within seven or eight days with 
some 5,000 armed men. The plan proceeded smoothly and the fort was 
captured by the Dutch and Bugis. When the news reached the Goa court, 
there was anger and dismay at the decision of the two karaeng to 
abandon Goa. At first there was a damour to send 3,000 Makassar 
troops to force Turatea to recognize Goa's overlordship, but wiser voices 
prevailed and it was decided to retain the men in Makassar. Unbe-
knownst to the court another prominent figure in Makassar, the exiled 
Ternate prince, Kaicili' Kalimata, had also communicated secretly with 
the enemy. He expressed regret at aiding Goa and asked for a reconcilia-
tion with his brother, Sultan Mandar Syah of Ternate, now allied with 
the Company. But af ter a brief correspondence between Speelman and 
Kaicili' Kalimata, nothing more was heard from the latter (Stapel 1922: 
171-2, 176; Madeod 1900:1287). 
The effort to bring the two sides to negotiate the peace proceeded by 
fits and starts. On the evening of 6th November Speelman and Arung 
Palakka both participated in a reconnaissance mission which accom-
plished little more than setting ablaze some of the are as dosest to the 
strong fortification of Barombong. The following day some Goa envoys 
brought seven bags of rials-of-eight amounting to 3,394 rials 21 and a 
letter asking for another three-day ceasefire. The reason for this 
request soon became dear. One of the men who came over to the Dutch 
side reported that Karaeng Layo and Bangkala had burned a district 
called Pallengu near the home area of Karaeng Lengkese. The latter 
was therefore planning to leave that very day with troops to deal 
with this threat. Accepting the veracity of this report Speelman sent 
help immediately to Turatea and at the same time lodged a protest to 
Goa saying Karaeng Lengkese's act ion was against the ceasefire. The 
next day more Makassar envoys arrived to explain that Karaeng 
Lengkese had not departed on the expedition as was reported but lay 
sick in bed. Now they requested a ten-day ceasefire covering the whole 
of Sulawesi, which was dearly intended to halt the fighting in Wajo, 
Goa's hard-pressed ally. In such a matter of importance, Speelman 
decided not only to convene the Dutch War Council, but also Arung 
Palakka and his most important men, as weil as the commanders of the 
Ternate and Butung forces. They discussed the request at great length 
and agreed only to a three-day ceasefire, which Goa's leaders reluctantly 
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accepted (Stapel 1922:174-6; Macleod 1900:1288; KA 1157:322r). 
Before the third day of the ceasefire had passed, Karaeng Lengkese 
and Karaeng Bontosunggu were given authority by Sultan Hasanuddin 
to approach the Dutch and offer to reaffirm the treaty signed between 
Goa and the Company in Batavia in 1660 and to ask for an extension of 
the ceasefire. At the same time they told Arung Palakka th at they 
wanted to "restore" the 1611 treaty of Tamalate between Goa and Bone 
and would like to have him live in Goa. As gifts they brought fifty 
bundIes of gold mas for Speelman and twenty for Arung Palakka, with 
each bundIe containing 160 gold pieces. Arung Palakka declined the 
request for a separate peace on the grounds th at he was now an ally and 
"under the protection" of the Company, hence indicating his sub ser-
vient status to the Company. Instead, he referred all negotiations to 
Speelman who recommended that Sultan Hasanuddin himself attend the 
negotiations so that a settlement could be arrived at more quickly.1t was 
suggested th at both parties come unarmed to a nearby village on 13th 
November (Stapel 1922:176-7; Macleod 1900:1288-99; KA 1157: 
322r-v). 
The Makassar offer of peace may have also been hastened by news 
that 6,000 men from Turatea under Karaeng Layo and Bangkala had 
arrived south of Batu-Batu on l1th November. To create a favourable 
impression and perhaps to hasten Goa's attendance at a peace confer-
ence, Speelman greeted the two karaeng with great ceremony. He went 
with a company of Dutch soldiers as bodyguards and all the Bugis nobles 
to meet them. Under a tree a treaty was signed and the oath of 
loyalty given with drawn krisses accompanied by the beating of drums. 
Speelman noted that there was great bitterness shown toward the 
Makassar people by these men from Turatea (Stapel 1922: 177 -8; 
Macleod 1900:1288; KA 1157:323r). But again this may have only 
been the traditional aru in which each person expressed anger and hate 
toward the enemy and loyalty and love toward his lord in a hyperbolic 
formula. These Turatea lords had seen the decline of Goa's strength and 
were now seeking protection with the new power. Areas all around Goa 
were now beginning to abandon Goa and cast their fortunes with the new 
lords. Even in the Makassar ranks defection was becoming more and 
more frequent. 
Negotiations for peace were begun on 13 November 1667 in a small 
village near Barombong called Bungaya. There was Iittle doubt in the 
Dutch-Bugis camp that the Goa government would agree to end the 
fighting. The war appeared to have been won through the sheer de ter-
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mination and magnetism of both Admiral Speelman and Arung Palakka. 
Both these men had embarked on a hazardous undertaking to vindicate 
their reputations among their people. Speelman's impressive rise to 
power from humbie circumstances had been threatened by a supposed 
lapse of good judgement. To regain his status, so difficult to attain had he 
remained in the home country, he had to achieve some spectacular 
success to please his superiors in the Company. It was this principal 
consideration which drove him to pursue the Goa enemy until victory 
was assured. His most important weapon was Arung Palakka, an exiled 
Bugis prince living in Batavia, whose inclusion in the expedition was 
intended mainly to harass the enemy. At the beginning of the expedition 
neither Speelman nor the Company leaders could have foreseen the 
value of Arung Palakka in the forthcoming campaign. But Arung 
Palakka's grievance was not only a personal one, but one shared by his 
people the Bugis from Bone and Soppeng. He became a symbol to his 
people in the fight to restore siri' and resuscitate the bond of pesse 
throughout the whole community. These factors proved decisive in the 
victories of the Dutch-Bugis forces over Goa and its allies in the war. 
What now remained was to establish a viabie peace through the Bungaya 
treaty. But it was on the treaty and its significance in general to both the 
Dutch and the South Sulawesi kingdoms th at the peace faltered. 
CHAPTERIV 
THETREATY 
On the morning of 13 November 1667, Speelman sent Dutch and native 
troops to the outer defenceworks, where he and a few other Dutchmen, 
Arung Palakka, Sultan Mandar Syah of Ternate and various other native 
lords we re gathered. A large open audience hall was being erected on 
one side of the village of Bungaya, but contrary to the agreement some 
Makassar troops under Karaeng Lengkese had occupied the field direct-
Iy behind it. Sultan Hasanuddin himself waited in front ringed with a 
sizeable group of armed men. Speelman refused to go to the hall until the 
Makassar troops were removed, and although some of the troops were 
then subsequently withdrawn, a sufficiently large number remained to 
cause Speelman to take the precaution of bringing with him two com-
panies of Dutch soldiers plus some Bugis. All the various lords, except 
Karaeng Tallo who was ill, we re there with Sultan Hasanuddin. The 
latter said something to his interpreter who then came over and brought 
the message to Speelman. Since this procedure promised to be time-
consuming and tedious, Speelman proposed that "since the entire [Goa] 
government understood Malay and a greater part also knew portuguese, 
th at one would understand the other better tête à tête and so cut the 
negotiating time by half'. Sultan Hasanuddin agreed, and so Karaeng 
Karunrung assumed the role as negotiator since he was the most capable 
in the use of the Portuguese language. And so it was in Portuguese that 
Speelman, on behalf of the Company, and Karaeng Karunrung, on 
behalf of the Makassar kingdoms of Goa-Tallo, negotiated the peace 
settlement (Stapel 1922: 179). 
Speelman began by making known the Company's twenty-six 
demands, which were in abbreviated form: 
1. Respect the two previous treaties [of 1660] made with Jacob Cau in 
Makassar and Karaeng Popo in Batavia. 
2. Return promptly all Dutchmen who in the past and recently had fled 
to Makassar. 
3. Return all the remaining cannons, equipment, etc., from the 
Leeuwin and Wa/visch still in Makassar. 
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4. Bring to justice those responsible for the murders occurring here and 
there. 
5. Give security for the debts still outstanding to the Company. 
6. Free and remove any overlordship over the lands of the Bugis, the 
Company's allies. 
7. Surrender to the Company and its allies all land won by the sword in 
this war. 
8. Free and remove Goa's overlordship over Turatea, etc. 
9. Pay restitution for the damage caused to the people and goods of the 
Sultan of Temate in Sula, evacuate all the land which His Highness had 
occupied for a long time, and also pay compensation for fifteen cannons 
and smaller arms taken from Sula. 
10. Pay compensation for the pillaging in the latest expedition to 
Butung. 
11. Relinquish control over Bima and place it at the disposal of the 
Company. 
12. Limit navigation of the Makassar people and their demands for 
ship's passes. 
13. Deny trade rights in Makassar to all European nationalities for now 
and all time. 
14. Reserve exclusively for the Company the trade in c10th and 
Chinese wares. 
15. Destroy all Makassar fortifications except for Sombaopu. 
16. Abandon jurisdiction over the northem fort, Ujung Pandang, to 
the Company and refrain from interfering any more with those who 
come to live there. 
17. Allow toll-free trade for the Company. 
18. Build no new fortifications without the approval of the Company. 
19. Pay compensation to the Company for damages to its property as a 
result of the war. 
20. Surrender the Sultan Bima and his "accomplices". 
21. Surrender Karaeng Bontomarannu. 
22. Make legal in Makassar both large and sm all Dutch coinage. 
23. Abandon without direct or indirect aid Wajo, Bulo-Bulo, and 
Mandar, whose lands have committed misdeeds against the Company. 
24. Pay the Company a fine of 1,500 slaves or their equivalent value. 
25. The Company would, for its part, demonstrate its aid and friend-
ship to the Makassar people and its allies. 
26. Goa should send prominent men from its govemment to Batavia 
with Speelman in order to request confirmation of this treaty from the 
Lord Govemor-General and, if he· should sa desire, these men are to 
reside in Batavia as hostages. 
Other less important matters were to be left for the act ua I negotiations 
(Stapel 1922: 179-181; KA 1157a:324v-325r). 
There was a noticeable stir among the Makassar envoys while these 
demands were being re ad aloud. When the murmurings died down, the 
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Makassar delegates asked for time, a few days, to consider these 
demands. Speelman was reluctant to add yet another delay to the 
proceedings, but he finally relented and allowed one day. Ouring the 
course of the negotiations Speelman noted how the Makassar delegation 
was uncommonly friendly toward Arung Palakka and Arung Kaju, while 
totally ignoring the Sultan Ternate and the nob les of Butung. 1 
An incident occurred toward the end of the meeting which could have 
had serious consequences. Some of the Makassar nob les wanted their 
men to move back and so orde red them to do so by hitting them with 
sticks. This caused a minor panic with some falling and others reaching 
for their weapons. According to Speelman, it was his and Sultan 
Hasanuddin's coolheadedness which saved the situation (Stapel 1922: 
181; KA 1157a:325r-v). But the author ofthe Sya'ir Perang Mengkasar 
accused Speelman of scurrying away to safety while Arung Palakka and 
Sultan Hasanuddin calmed the crowd (Skinner 1963: 178-9). 
On the evening of the 14th Goa's delegation reappeared saying th at it 
had been empowered to discuss some of the twenty-six points further. 
One of the points which it wanted to discuss was the Leeuwin. The 
delegates c1aimed that there were no more cannons to be found, and that 
all 4,000 rijksdaalders which had been recovered from that ship had 
already been returned. The ship's equipment had been given to Ver-
spreet, who had kept the best of it and sold or presented the rest as gifts 
to some of the Makassar nobles. With regard to the Walviseh, no more 
than sixteen cannons could be found. Half of these had been returned to 
the Company and the other half given to Sultan Hasanuddin for a price 
of 4,000 Spanish rials with the approval of Commissioner Cau. On the 
fourth demand, the delegates said th at th ree of the accused murderers 
had been delivered to Verspreet and the others would follow when 
found. Insofar as the fifth de mand was concerned, Sultan Hasanuddin 
would not be held responsible for any "bad debts" contracted by his 
subjects with the Company. Point nineteen, concerning the payment of 
war damages, was rejected outright as being contrary to any customs of 
war. Sultan Hasanuddin said he would be able to deliver 1,000 instead of 
the demanded 1,500 slaves, but at the earliest in the following monsoon 
and on the condition that payment be made also in money or cannon. In 
Makassar the average price for a slave was estimated to be about forty 
gold mas. The other points we re either unmentioned or only revised 
slightly (Stapel 1922: 181-2). 
While the negotiations we re in progress, a Makassar noble of great 
stature in the Goa kingdom (whose name was left unmentioned by 
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Speelman for security reasons), approached Arung Kaju to arrange a 
meeting with Arung Palakka. Thus on the night of the 14th this noble 
came as far as the outer defence perimeters of the Dutch camp to speak 
to Arung Palakka. He explained th at he wanted to be friends with the 
Company, and that he and all of his following intended to abandon 
Sultan Hasanuddin if the latter did not give full satisfaction to the 
Company. Speelman was especially pleased by this report because in this 
noble's following were two or three well-known people who were con-
sidered among the brave st of the Makassar leaders. A desertion of such 
magnitude was bound to demoralize the enemy camp and hasten their 
acceptance of the Company's peace terms (KA 1157a:329r). The Goa 
court had been divided from the beginning over whether to re sist the 
Dutch or to arrive at some accommodation. When the war began going 
badly for Goa, the "peace" faction reasserted itself and took a daring 
gamble in seeking an end to the war. Because of grave risks involved, 
Speelman took the extraordinary precaution of leaving these individuals 
unnamed in his missive to Batavia. Only during the second out break of 
fighting in 1668 did it become clear that one of those ready to join the 
Company was an influential member of the Goa court, the Tumailalang, 
Karaeng Lengkese, brother of Arung Palakka's wife, Daeng Talele. 
How unsuspecting the Goa government was of Karaeng Lengkese's 
intentions is seen by his selection with Karaeng Bontosunggu as envoys 
with full powers to conduct negotiations with the Company on the 
following morning. They asked pardon for Karaeng Bontomarannu and 
returned Speelman's kris and gun which Karaeng Bontomarannu had 
taken with him when he escaped from the Dutch at Galesong. As a fine 
for him Sultan Hasanuddin presented Speelman with 176 gold mas. 
Insofar as Sultan Bima was concerned, the dele gates informed Speelman 
that Goa was unable to surrender him because he had escaped and was 
still being sought. Speelman objected to granting a pardon for Karaeng 
Bontomarannu, and af ter long deliberations his view appeared to have 
been adopted. Later in the day news arrived that Sultan Bima and some 
of his followers had been apprehended and were staying with Karaeng 
Bontomarannu for safe-keeping. On departing the envoys asked to be 
pardoned for "having forgotten" to return the Dutch deserters. When 
Speelman brought up the question of the war indemnity, the envoys 
replied that payment of such a sum was out of the question. Speelman 
then moderated his demand saying that they should pay at least some of 
it. But no agreement was reached on this point (Stapel 1922: 182-3). 
This rather piece-meal and hasty Makassar process of satisfying the 
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Company's demands continued on 16th November when two Outch 
deserters were surrendered to the Company. On the 17th Sultan Bima 
and a few of his subjects were being delivered to the Outch, but much to 
the apparent distress of the Makassar envoys, the Bima prisoners and 
their guards disappeared. The envoys promised to recapture them and 
bring them de ad or alive to the Company. Then they asked that the 
treaty be signed that very day as they were empowered to do so and had 
brought the royal seals. However, the Outch were not at all indined to 
sign a treaty before all their demands we re met. Furthermore, they 
wanted Sultan Hasanuddin and his council to be present for the placing 
of the se al on the treaty document. An ultimatum was given to Goa that 
either all the demands were met by the following evening or negotiations 
would be discontinued (Stapel 1922:183-4). 
Early the next moming, on 18th November, a large number of Bugis 
men, women and children with all their belongings poured out from the 
Makassar side down to the Outch camps. But throughout the rest of the 
moming there was no sign of Sultan Hasanuddin or his nob les. Finally 
Speelman and one of his aides, Ou Pon, left their fortified camp and 
headed toward Sombaopu. They informed some Makassar nobles that 
Sultan Hasanuddin was being awaited for the negotiations. Hearing this, 
the nobles appeared upset and complained th at in Europe it was certain-
Iy not the custom to have the king himself do the negotiating. To spare 
Sultan Hasanuddin this task they proposed that all the nobles come on 
his behalf and Ie ave him the duty of later applying his seal to the treaty. 
But Speelman would not be persuaded, and he delegated Ou Pon to 
enter Sombaopu to teil the Goa govemment that without the mIer the 
negotiations would be terminated. In an attempt to make Speelman 
soften his attitude the nob les offered him a gold chain worth same 200 
rijksdaalders while making excuses for their mIer. Only then did they 
reveal Sultan Hasanuddin's fear of being made prisoner by the Outch for 
allowing Sultan Bima to escape. Speelman denied that this was his 
intention, and with th at returned with Ou Pon to the Outch camp (Stapel 
1922:184-5). 
Sometime between two and three o'dock in the aftemaan, Sultan 
Hasanuddin arrived in person to participate in the treaty talks and was 
given an appropriate welcome "in the official Makassar fashion". In 
view of the inability of the Goa govemment to fulfill same of the 
Company's demands, Speelman insisted on the indusion of three new 
articles. The first was to deal with the Company tmmpeter Willem 
Willemse who had f1ed to the English. The latter refused to reveal his 
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hiding-place, alleging th at he was an Englishman since he was born in 
Delft in The Netherlands of English parents. To punish the English, 
Speelman demanded a new article 27, in which they would be con-
sidered as ene mies in enemy territory and their goods confiscated. A 
new article 28 amplified articles 20 and 21 by requiring Sultan Hasanud-
din to deliver both Sultan Bima and Karaeng Bontomarannu to the 
Company within ten days or surrender their eldest sons as hostages. 
Article 19, which was the Company's demand for an indemnity esti-
mated by Speelman at 400,000 riais, was totally rejected by Goa. A 
compromise was finally reached in the form of article 29 which modified 
the amount of the war damages to 250,000 rijksdaalders, equivalent to 
100,000 riais, to be paid over a period of five silccessive monsoons. Once 
these last few difficulties were overcome, the drafting of the final version 
and the signing and sealing of the peace treaty took place, sworn on the 
Koran by the Moslem participants, and on the Bible by the Christians. 
Karaeng Tallo was ill and unable to participate in the ceremony, but on 
25th November he too set his name and seal to the treaty made on 18 
November 1667. The Goa government promised to have Fort Ujung 
Pandang evacuated the next day to prepare it for Dutch occupation 
(Stapel 1922:169, 182, 183, 185-6).2 
That evening Karaeng Lengkese and his sons paid a visit to Speelman 
to receive his assurances of support and favour for their secret commit-
ment to the Company. As a sign of appreciation Speelman presented 
each of them with a golden allegia3 and other gifts (KA 1157a:329r-v). 
This magnanimous gesture revealed Speelman's uncontained elation 
at the outcome of events. In a letter to Batavia he announced the 
great "Victory and Peace" which had been gained at the cost of only 
eighty Dutch dead (though many more perished through illness). He 
attributed this success to the fact that the naval and land forces were kept 
together in the campaign. The Makassar leaders themselves admitted 
later that they had not expected the Dutch and the Bugis to be able to 
prolong the war beyond the end of October (Stapel 1922:186). The 
approach of the west monsoon was expected to hinder the Dutch-
Bugis expedition already debilitated by sickness and sagging morale. But 
circumstances unexpectedly turned in their favour and the war appeared 
to be won. To Speelman it was a sweet victory which would help 
re-establish himself in the eyes of the Company leaders. It was indeed 
the beginning of a rapid rise in his care er which culminated in his 
becoming Governor-General of the Dutch East India Company 10 
November 1681 (van Rhede van der Kloot 1891 :65). 
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The day af ter the signing of the Treaty of Bungaya, Sultan Hasanud-
din prevented the English from fleeing and asked Speelman to post his 
own men to guard the English lodge. Tbus began the eonfiseation of 
English goods and the removal of the English and the Portuguese from 
Makassar. Although in the 1660 treaty with the Company Goa had 
agreed to prevent these nations from settling in the kingdom, there had 
been little attempt to enforee this provision. With the Duteh now 
ensconced in Makassar itself, they undertook to enforee this and all the 
articles of the new treaty. 
On the 20th Du Pon went to see Karaeng Karunrung concerning the 
takeover of the Makassar fortification Ujung Pandang, but Karaeng 
Karunrung was nowhere to be found. Instead Karaeng Lengkese had to 
give permission to the Dutch to oecupy it. The Dutch arrived in the fort 
the next day to find that every house within it had been removed, despite 
a stipulation in the treaty that the fort be surrendered in good order. To 
appease the Dutch Sultan Hasanuddin had two wooden houses built and 
brought into the fort. Tbe fortification Ujung Pandang was later offi-
cially renamed Fort Rotterdam in honour of Speelman's birthplace 
(Stapel 1922:187-9). 
Af ter the formal peace was signed, it was Speelman who began laying 
the foundations for permanent Dutch control, or at least an important 
influence, in the affairs of South Sulawesi. One of his most significant 
recommendations was to create a deterrent to Goa by providing Arung 
Palakka and his followers with guns and ammunition and eventually to 
make Arung Palakka the ruler of Bone. For the moment Bantaeng was 
to be given to him as his plaee of residence, "a place so weil situated for 
incoming and outgoing vessels to the East that it would be both an envy 
and an obstacIe to the Makassar folk". In this statement Speelman was 
fully cognizant of the basis of Goa 's wealth and power. If Arung Palakka 
were successful in attraeting the international trade away from Makassar 
to Bantaeng, the Company would have little cause to worry about a 
resurgenee of Goa as an economie riyal. Speelman's statem~nt further 
reveals the Company's chief objeetive in the Makassar war: to destroy 
Goa's ability to challenge the Company's trading hegemony in the area. 
South Sulawesi as an area of profitable trade was a minor eonsideration. 
With a dependable ally in Bantaeng undermining the basis of Goa's 
power, the Company would have considered its mission here to have 
been successful. 
WhiIe the plans to create a deterrent to Goa were laudabIe, they eould 
only be implemented onee all effeetive Makassar opposition had been 
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removed. In a missive to Batavia announcing the victory, Speelman 
warned, "Whether this solemnly sworn peace is sincerely meant by the 
Makassar people, we will suspend our judgement." (Stapel 1922: 189-
191; KA 1157a:339r-v, 1340r). Speelman's concern over the "sinceri-
ty" of the Makassar people in implementing the Bungaya treaty pre-
saged one of the most contentious issues which came to plague all future 
Dutch-South Sulawesi relations: the meaning and intent of the Bungaya 
treaty or any treaty signed between a Western power and a South 
Sulawesi kingdom. 
When the Dutch, the Bugis and the Makassar delegates first came to 
Bungaya to discuss terms of a peace treaty on 13 November 1667, each 
si de approached the negotiations with its own conception of what the 
"treaty" meant in terms of the total framework of interstate relations, as 
weil as the mutual rights and obligations incumbent on all parties 
involved. The Dutch party, under Cornelis Speelman, was governed by a 
so-called "international law" which had its origins in the Roman 
juridical system. It was only developed as a science in the 16th century 
and was dominated by the legal minds of Western Europe. Insofar as the 
relations between East and West prior to the 19th century were con-
cemed, the sovereignty of Asian rulers and communities was recognized 
and the law of reciprocity prevailed.4 The recognition of the law of 
reciprocity may have been acceptable as a form of diploma tic relations, 
but it proved inadequate to bridge the basic philosophical differences 
which governed treaty-making procedures between a Western 
European power and a South Sulawesi one. 
The importance of the treaty concept in South Sulawesi society is 
shown by the various words which may be used to signify the Western 
notion of a treaty.5 The very nature of these words indicates that the 
written treaty was basically an oral document transcribed on paper. 
Even af ter many of these treaties were copied on lontara' and later on 
paper, the ritual-like repetition of certain phrases was maintained 
evoking the atmosphere of a not too distant past when the öral word 
stood alone, pre-eminent. The introduction of the written treaty in no 
way undermined the oral agreement but was seen simply as an extension 
of the latter. Understandably, therefore, the word most commonly used 
for entering into a treaty arrangement is makkuluada (ma'ulukana in 
Makassar), which means "to give one's word of honour". The act of 
giving one's word of honour is equated with the word "treaty". Closely 
related to makkuluada are the words mattaroada. which again has the 
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connotation of giving one's word of honour or of agreeing to something, 
and ewai ada, "to uphold or support one's word". Another term widely 
used in the chronicles for an agreement or treaty is sitelli' (sitalli' in 
Makassar). This word literally means "to swear mutual oaths", and 
appears to be stronger than ma'janci (a'janji in Makassar), "to promise" , 
which is also used to signify a treaty agreement between two parties. 
Finally, there is the word ceppa (cappa in Makassar), which is only 
infrequently encountered in manuscripts but which is the term used for 
the famous Bungaya Treaty of 1667. It means literally "to take part in 
something" or "to participate in the doing of something". Only the word 
ceppa appears to have no element of obligation imposed on the con-
tracting parties who merely express a wish "to participate". The follow-
ing translation of a Bugis sentence in one of the chronicles nicely cap-
tures the fine distinctions in the various words which are often translated 
as "treaties": "We will not abandon our swom word of honour 
("akkuluadangemmeng") to participate in (ceppa) that which we have 
promised to one another ("assijancing")" (L-1: 14). 
The "treaty" is reinforced by a curse, tanro (tunra in Makassar). In 
situations where a mIer agrees voluntarily or through coercion to recog-
nize another as his over lord, the latter forces the vassal mIer to drink 
bal/o' stirred with the overlord's kris or sword of state. While the vassal 
drinks the ballo', the overlord utters the following curse: "If you should 
break your word, may your descendants never rise in the eye of the 
needie." The "needie" is an allusion to leadership, hence kingship, since 
it is the needie which "leads" the thread. In this curse, which is an 
excellent example of the South Sulawesi penchant for allusions, a vassal 
mIer is threatened with extinction of his dynasty if he should break his 
word. The stirring of the ballo' with a kris or sword belonging to the 
regalia of the overlord is believed to imbue the drink with the powers of 
this object. Anyone breaking his word is endangered by the supernatural 
forces immanent in these sacred instruments of state. Another curse 
which is of ten invoked by the Bugis mIers is: "May you be swept away 
like rubbish by the One God (Dewata seuae) if you break your word" 
(L-3: 289). 
An altemative form of swearing an oath as a sanctioning force in a 
treaty is the mallamumpatu, or the burying of the stone. Af ter the formal 
declaration of the terms of the treaty, a solemn oath is intoned at the end 
with the words: "If anyone should break this agreement, may the ground 
upon which he lives break into bits like porcelain and be smashed into 
pieces like an egg." Each mier than takes a stone and throws it to the 
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ground smashing an egg. The ceremony ends with the burying of the 
stone (Noorduyn 1955:252; Fihr 1947:12). 
The Dewata seuae, or the One God, is called upon to witness the 
swearing of oaths to punish those who break them (Noorduyn 1955: 
11 0-1). These oaths are greatly feared since they are made binding on 
present as weIl as future generations. Because of the great importance 
which the Bugis and Makassar people attach to the survival of their line 
(Andaya 1976: 16), oaths were regarded with the grave st respect. 
All treaties in South Sulawesi have a de fini te structure. They begin 
with a preamble which quickly establishes the relationship between the 
contracting states. It is followed by the actual terms of the treaty itself 
which are subdivided into a guarantee of sovereignty through non-inter-
ference in intemal affairs and an expression of mutual assistance and 
cooperation. The third part proclaims that the treaty will be up held not 
only by those present but by all future generations. All the proceedings 
th en end with the swearing of an oath. 
In the opening of every treaty, the precise relationship of the con-
tracting parties is declared in purely conventional terms. It is an easily 
recognizable formula which conveys to the parties involved the entire set 
of rights and obligations which are attached to their relationship. It was 
superfluous to mention particular details which were already implied in 
the conventional phrases and in the established relationship. A treaty of 
equality begins with the words: "We are brothers, equally great, with 
none above and none below. We are slaves only to the Dewata. We will 
not force one to submit to the other. We will walk together with arms 
swinging freely, equal in walking, equal in sitting." Only then are the 
more traditional terms of the treaty pronounced. In a treaty of in-
equality, the subordinate relationship of mother and child or master to 
slave is established by the words "I speak, you assent"; or, "I am the 
wind and you are the leaves"; or, "I am the needIe and you are the 
thread". Each of these phrases decIares the willingness of the child/slave 
to follow the mother/master in everything. 
After the proper relationship of the contracting parties is decided by 
these all-important prefatory formulas, there then follows a recitation of 
the ritual-like "terms". The most important aspect of the treaty is the 
guarantee of sovereignty and mutual respect through non-interference 
in the intemal affairs of the contracting states. This guarantee of sover-
eignty is expressed in the following way: neither will uproot the other's 
plants; neither will plant on the other's territory; neither will cut down 
the other's woods; neither will pass judgement on the other's traditional 
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laws; neither will interfere with the other's processes of law (bicara); 
neither will destroy the other's regalia; each will expand outward and not 
inward against the other; neither will take part in the other's di vis ion of 
children.6 Neither will make the other do what he does not want to do; 
and each will determine his own life without outside interference. 
Mutual respect is expressed in such phrases as: I will consider you large 
not smalI; fat not thin; good not evil; good of hearing not deaf; and good 
of sight not blind. 
The second principal element in a treaty is the expression of mutual 
assistance: neither will practice deception toward the other; each will 
trust the other in speech; each will remind the other when in error; 
neither will contrive wars against the other; whosoever brings a false 
message to the other will be tramp led to death by water buffaloes 
(tedong); if one should fall, the other would help him up; if one should be 
drowning, the other would save him; if one should be washed away, the 
other would bring him to shore; if one should covet the other's goods, he 
should be mindful; neither will hide the other's goods in his own house; 
neither will retain the other's refugees or wrong-doers; each wiU return 
the other's property found on the way; each will refrain from buying the 
other's slaves. Together they will cross the bridge and walk the narrow 
path, and together share fortune and misfortune, life and death. 
Once the traditional terms are recited, the treaty is made binding upon 
the present generation and up on all generations to come. The words 
recall perhaps some earlier now forgotten ritual which accompanied all 
oath-giving: "Fire will not burn it [i.e. the treaty] away, nor disaster in 
the land take it away. No dead person will be able to take it away with 
him [i.e., the death of those who agreed to the treaty will not dissolve it]. 
Even ifthe Heaven should fall and the Underworld sink away, the treaty 
will not be undone." The treaty is then solemnized with the swearing of 
an oath while drinking ballo' stirred with the sword or kris of state or 
while smashing an egg with a stone and then burying the stone. 7 
The treaties in South Sulawesi clearly classify the status of the partici-
pating parties with no possibility of ambiguity in the relationship. 
Among the Bugis the term asseajingeng, which may be translated as 
"brotherhood", refers generally to any alliance except th at which is 
characterized as being between master and slave. At the very top of the 
asseajingeng hierarchy is the alliance of full equality, or an alliance of 
brothers who are "equally great" (mappadaworoane senrajae). More 
common are the alliances of brothers of unequal rank, where the more 
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powerful is called the older brother (kaka') and the weaker member the 
younger brother (anri'). In the treaty concluded by the Bugis states of 
Bone, Wajo, and Soppeng at Timurung in the 16th century, Bone is 
considered to be the eldest, Wajo the middle, and Soppeng the younger 
brother (uluai Bone ana'-tenngai Wajo' paccucunngi Soppeng) (Noor-
duyn 1955: 190). Land was given to Soppeng by both Bone and Wajo to 
raise it to the status of "brother" to the others. A similar case occurred 
when another Bugis state Luwu gave land to Wajo so that the latter could 
properly be called a brother. In both instances the weakest or weaker 
member of the alliance had expressed reluctance in the beginning to 
agreeing to any brotherly relationship. Instead, it had requested that it 
be treated as a child to a mother since it feit that this was the relationship 
which was most appropriate and best mirrored their respective positions 
in the hierarchy of states (Noorduyn 1955: 190,250). 
Below the status of padaworoane, or brothers, is that of mother (ina) 
and favoured child (ana' makessing or ana' male'bi). In this relationship 
the overlord grants his vassal a more favourable status than the others in 
recognition of his performance of some unique service for the overlord. 
Sometimes special dress appropriate to weil-bom individuals (todeceng) 
is granted as a mark of favour. In 1667 Arung Palakka and Admiral 
Speelman presented the rulers of the Tellumpidange (Turatea) with fine 
raiments as a sign of special honour for their decision to jo in the Bugis-
Dutch forces against their former overlord, Goa (L-1 :48).8 When the 
ruler of Gilireng sacrificed his Iife for his overlord, the ruler of Wajo, the 
latter promoted Gilireng from a status of slave (ata) to that of favoured 
child of Wajo (Noorduyn 1955:238). According to Bugis sources, both 
Bone and Soppeng were taken as a child (ala ana') by the Company af ter 
the· Makassar war of 1666-9 and became favoured children (ana' 
male'bi) with a mother (akkeina) and afather (akkeama) in the 
Company (L-l :65). 
The status of mother to child is a vassal relationship created either 
through force or mutual consent. In the latter case a state seeks "protec-
tion" (ppa'daoi) from another and thereby gains a more favourable 
vassalage position than a conquered state. Nevertheless, the state which 
is granted protection is still below that of a favoured child. 
On the very bottom of the hierarchy of interstate relationship is that 
between a master (puang) and a slave (ata). A vassal state which wars 
against its overlord and is defeated loses its former status and is degraded 
to a position of slave to its overlord. While in this relationship the slave 
state is supposedly at the total mercy of the master, in reality it continues 
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to retain its own rulers, adat, and bicara. When the Toraja were defeated 
by Arung Palakka in the late 17th century, they were considered to be 
"slaves" of Bone. Nevertheless, the terms of the treaty guaranteed the 
basic sovereignty of the Toraja: "Keep the land which is your land, the 
rocks which are your rocks, the rivers which are your rivers, the grass 
which is your grass, the water which is your water, the water buffaloes 
which are your water buffaloes, the ip0 9 which is your ipo, the weapons 
which are your weapons, the adat which is your adat, and the bicara 
which is your bicara" (L-1: 125). Even a "slave" state in Sou th Sulawesi 
treaty traditions retains its identity and its self-esteem. 
The spiritual element of the treaties was once as important as the 
political to South Sulawesi states. Af ter a treaty was concluded between 
two powers, it was copied and preserved among the regalia (Cense 1951: 
47).10 The entire corpus of treaties became a kind of palladium of the 
state for it was the repository of sacred words solemnly swom by genera-
tions of rulers. In the same way that a ruler went to his ancestral altar 
(palakka attoriolong) to implore his ancestors to help cure his personal 
illness (Matthes 1943:510, 517-8), he consulted the treaties for 
guidance trom the ancestors on the proper conduct and preservation of 
the state. To swear to uphold or renew a treaty involved past, present, 
and future generations and was not a matter entered into lightly. He 
never rejected a treaty unless agreed upon by all parties since it would 
have meant repudiating his ancestors; he merely allowed it to be 
superseded by another or to fall into abeyance until circumstances again 
brought it into prominence. 
Local sources as weIl as contemporary Dutch reports show the intri-
cate arguments used by South Sulawesi rulers to demonstrate that there 
was no rejection of a former treaty despite a change of alliance. A cynical 
modern-day Western observer may be tempted to see everything in 
terms of Realpolitik, but then he is a product of his culture and of an age 
which encourages secularism and praises "rationality". A South 
Sulawesi ruler prior to the 20th century was also a product of his culture 
and his time, and while he was mindful of the secular world, he was 
equally if not more responsive to the spiritual one. The words and oaths 
of the ancestors contained in the treaties became a moral and super-
natural sanction which sustained all interstate relations and guaranteed a 
degree of stability in the affairs of the area. 
Once a treaty had been agreed upon, it remained a permanent agree-
ment which could be resurrected and renewed or allowed to recede into 
the background in face of other superior political and spiritual forces. 
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These enduring sacred documents we re made but once. All subsequent 
agreements are referred to in the records as "renewals" (ribarui) of the 
original treaty and are essentially a recognition and affirmation by one 
state of a new political and spiritual status of another. The treaties, oaths, 
and the whole treaty-making procedure were part of a continuing 
process of reassessment of political and spiritual affiliations to assure the 
establishment of a hierarchy of stat es which accurately reflected the 
power situation in South Sulawesi. 
The idea of treaties, not as an instrument of oppression but as a means 
of establishing proper and peaceful relations with other states in the 
diplomatie sphere, was comprehensible in South Sulawesi because it 
resembied the concept of siri' in the sp here of personal relations (see 
Chapter I). To possess siri' is to know oneself and one's ancestors, or in 
other words, to know one's status and place in one's society (Errington 
1976:3),11 As with siri', the treaty's efficacy lay in the universal accept-
anee in South Sulawesi of its legitimate function in preserving harmony 
in the society. With the establishment of a hierarchy of states through 
individu al treaties, a particular state could easily seek "protection" 
(ppa' daoi) and avoid unnecessary conflict. In one of the Bugis lontara', a 
ruler advises his troops "not to be excessive in fighting so that later 
negotiations would be easier" (L-l:51). Neither conquest of territory 
nor con trol of a substantial population was the primary aim of warfare 
among South Sulawesi states, but the search for recognition of one's 
proper pi ace in the interstate hierarchyY Treaties thus became the 
accepted form in which this hierarchy was expressed and understood by 
all participants. 
When a state believed that its treaty with another had been rejected, it 
regarded it as a rejection of the solemnly-sworn words of the ancestor 
who sponsored the original treaty. The status and self-respect of the 
state were considered to have been impugned, and the only course of 
action was to defend the treaty. If satisfaction were not forthcoming 
through peaceful means, that is through negotiation of a "renewal" of 
the treaty, then the other alternative was to fight to defend one's belief in 
one's status in the hierarchy of states. 
The constant alignment and realignment of vassal states from one 
overlord to another was an expected phenomenon which was a result of 
an on-going process by whieh each state sought its proper level within 
the interstate hierarchy. In an episode recounted in the chronides, one 
of the Bugis states realizes th at its ally has been defeated and sends the 
following message to its vanquished "elder brother": "We are like birds 
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sitting on a tree. When the tree falls, we leave it and go in search of a 
large tree where we can settIe" (Noorduyn 1955:216). When Goa was 
on the verge of defeat in 1667, it sent a message to its "child", the ruler of 
Barru, saying: "Go home and seek your own welfare because Goa is 
hardpressed and can no langer provide you the wings under which you 
can shelter" (L-1 :37). The responsibility of the "elder brother" or the 
"mother/master" is to spread her/his wings of protection over the 
"younger brother" or "child/slave". But when this protection can na 
longer be given, then the weaker is expected to look af ter his own 
welfare. On the other hand, the responsibility of a child or younger 
brother was relatively light and is described simply in the homilies: "No 
child would deceive his mother" , and "How could someone wish evil on 
his brother" (Noorduyn 1955:174,224). Oftentimes a rising power 
would begin the process of reassessment by sending envoys to erstwhile 
allies and vassals "reminding" (inngerrang) them of farmer treaties. This 
was the point at which each ruler was forced to make the decision which 
would determine his state's status in the areaY What may appear to an 
outsider to be an irreverent disregard of treaties and oaths among the 
South Sulawesi leaders in fact demonstrates their sub tie understanding 
of the function of both in assuring the political as well as spiritual welfare 
of their states. 
With the appearance of the Dutch in the 17th century, a new concept of 
treaties and treaty-making was introduced to South Sulawesi. As was 
common with the Portuguese befare them, the Dutch usually came 
armed with a draft treaty whenever negotiating with a native state. The 
draft provisions were carefully drawn up in the main Dutch East India 
Company headquarters in Batavia. It was the envoy's job to explain the 
draft treaty to the local ruler, who then orde red to have it translated into 
Malay or into one of the local languages. When the translation was 
made, the ruler went over the points with his chief advisers insisting on 
the inclusion or exclusion of certain articles. Bath parties later met and 
discussed their various points, and some accommodation was usually 
reached. The Company envoy and the native ruler then signed and 
sealed the Dutch and local language versions of the treaty. An oath 
sworn on the Bible and the Koran ended the treaty ceremonies. 
According to Western European treaty practices at the time, once a 
treaty text had been formulated in the language of the parties concerned 
and had been signed and sealed, the provisions contained therein were 
considered to be binding on all signatories. The written treaty with its 
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carefully worded articles became for the Company the legal weapon with 
which it justified its claims not only to the native rulers, but more 
importantly, to its European rivals in the Indonesian area. 
Although the Company did not send any trained jurists to Indonesia 
until the 18th century, two of its leading officials in the 17th century, 
Cornelius Speelman and E. Padtbrugge were sufficiently versed in the 
legal implications of a treaty to know what rights they were acquiring for 
the Company at the expense of the native state (Alders 1955: 111-2). 
The Company, furthermore, was not unaware of the existence of local 
treaty traditions in South Sulawesi, for it actually did become party to 
treaties which were formulated in the local fashion. On the few occasions 
that the Company submitted to the South Sulawesi treaty-making 
methods, it did so because of weakness or because the native states were 
too in significant to pose any danger to the Company's interests. 14 
Such instances, however, were exceptional and there is little indica-
tion that any effort was made to understand the whole intent of local 
treaties. Almost the entire corpus of treaties between the Company and 
South Sulawesi states was framed in the Western European tradition of 
treaty-making with little or no attempt to accommodate local practices. 
This fundamental difference in cultural attitudes toward the treaty ac-
counted for much of the misunderstanding and distrust which arose be-
tween the Company and the South Sulawesi states in the 17th and 18th 
centuries. Contrary to the Western European conception of treaties, 
the local states viewed the treaty not in its individual parts but as a 
total document. To them the treaty represented an open declaration of a 
shift in the spiritual and political power relationships in the area. When 
circumstances demanded it, the ruler feit free to re-examine his alter-
natives and to make the necessary realignments to reflect the new power 
situation and his state's position within it. Even those states which 
concluded what later scholars called "defensive" treaties were pre-
occupied first of all in establishing the proper relationship between 
themselves as "brothers". Once this relationship was determined, each 
party understood what its traditional rights and obligations were. Even 
to categorize a treaty as "defensive" was superfluous since all treaties 
contained within themselves the element of mutual assistance and 
cooperation. 
The treaties between the Company and the native states were, 
furthermore, almost always basically commercial with the foremost aim 
being the acquisition and protection of trading advantages for the Com-
pany. Such a treaty whose central concern was trade was totally alien to 
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the concept of treaties in South Sulawesi. While certain phrases within 
the native treaty formula contained references to economie practices, 
these were clearly subordinate and incidental to the primary interest of 
agreeing upon one's proper place in the hierarchy of states. When a 
South Sulawesi mIer was presented with a typical Dutch draft treaty full 
of intricate details about conditions of trade, he would often raise 
objections to those which were particularly outrageous but regarded the 
commercial aspect of the treaty as redundant. He entered into a treaty 
believing that once the diplomatie relationship between the two con-
tracting parties had been established, all things would find their proper 
place according to well-known traditional practices. It was considered 
unnecessary to pore painstakingly over the commercial items in the 
treaty since it was expected that both parties would seek economie 
measures which would be of mutual benefit and which would not com-
promise each other's sovereign rights. Wh at was deemed all important 
was sovereignty with the inalienable rights of a state to its own mIer, adat 
and bicara. But to the Company the commercial aspects of the treaty 
received priority in any negotiations, and it was willing to concede much 
to acquire certain economie advantages. 
The "treaty" became a barometer of the state of relations existing 
between the Company and a South Sulawesi kingdom. Each could justify 
its activities based on its own conception of the treaty sanctioned either 
by international law or by custom. The inability or disinclination of 
either party to acknowledge the other's understanding of the treaty was 
of ten symptomatic of a deeper dissatisfaction with the relationship in 
general. As soon as one party began citing the treaty against the other, it 
was a sign to both th at a re-examination of attitudes was clearly overdue. 
When the Bungaya Treaty was signed on 18 November 1667, both the 
Company and Goa did so based on their own unique treaty conceptions. 
The subsequent continuing demands made by the Company were con-
sidered to be excessive and inappropriate by Goa. When the Company 
refused to moderate its demands, the Goa leaders felt justified in 
resuming a war which they in any case believed to have been terminated 
prematurely through treachery. 
CHAPTERV 
TUE UNFINISHED WAR 
Even at the time of the signing of the Bungaya treaty on 18 November 
1667, Speelman expressed his reservations about the efficacy of such a 
document to maintain the peace: " ... we still have so little trust in the 
Makassar goverment; it is as if we we re still at war, although outwardly 
they show .us every courtesy and affection" (Stapel 1922:191). When a 
copy of the treaty in Malay was shown to the Sultan of Banten, he 
remarked th at those in Makassar had promised more than could and 
would be fulfilled (Macleod 1900: 1290). A portent of things to come 
was the appointment of Karaeng Karunrung to replace Karaeng Suman-
na as Tuma'bicara-butta some three days before the convening of the 
Bungaya negotiations. 
Karaeng Karunrung was characterized by Speelman as "someone who 
could be little trusted, long disinclined toward the Company, inordinate-
ly proud and aggressive ... " Speelman, therefore, treated as pure 
deception Karaeng Karunrung's complaint to Arung Palakka that he 
had fallen out of favour with Sultan Hasanuddin (KA 1157a:330v). Yet 
later events did prove the existence of grave rifts within the Goa court as 
accusations and counter-accusations flowed freely from the pro- and 
anti-war factions in the aftermath of the fighting. The defeat of the once 
mighty kingdom of Goa, however, had one positive outcome: it united 
both factions in their anger and despair at the despoiling of their land. 
Their authority had been undermined, and they remained powerless to 
prevent the recently-freed captive peoples from joining the victorious 
Bugis, Turatea, Butung and Ternate troops in the general pillage (KA 
1157a:327v, 330r, 339v). With anguish the Goa leaders also witnessed 
the seizure of areas traditionally under Makassar con trol. The fortifi-
cation ·of Ujung Pandang was surrendered to the Dutch, as weil as 
Galesong, the west coast from Po po in the south to Barombong in the 
north, and Bantaeng with all its rich ricefields (KA 1157a:340r). Even 
the hope that the Dutch would leave af ter the treaty soon faded as signs 
of a permanent occupation of the Ujung Pandang fort by the Dutch 
became evident. 
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But despite the gloom pervading the Goa government, Karaeng 
Karunrung refused to accept the situation and began to re-establish ties 
with Goa's wartime allies. Goa's principal support continued to be the 
Makassar Malays whose livelihood was now threatened by the Dutch 
presence in Makassar. Appeals were also made directly to the people of 
Bangkala and Layo, whose rulers had joined Arung Palakka and the 
Company during the war, to the other lords of Turatea, and to the rulers 
of Bantaeng, Bulukumba, "Badjiuy" (?), and Luwu. Outside Sulawesi, 
the kingdoms of Bima and Sumbawa indicated that they were strongly in 
favour of an alliance with Goa. Even Arumpone La Ma'daremmeng 
appeared to have been swayed by promises that if Bone came to Goa's 
help, it would be considered a "brother" of Goa. Both the Company and 
Arung Palakka suspected that La Ma'daremmeng was planning to with-
hold any declaration of support for either side until he was certain how 
the war was progressing (KA 1157b: 359r-360v; KA 1157c:387r-v; KA 
1157d:397r; Macleod 1900:1291). 
Neither the Company nor Arung Palakka viewed any renewal of 
hostilities with Goa with any great trepidation. On the contrary they had 
been enheartened by friendly overtures from both Karaeng Tallo and 
Karaeng Lengkese which demonstrated the grave rifts withirl the enemy 
camp (KA 1157a:332r; KA 1157b:359r, 360r). In view of these de-
velopments Speelman found it "more desirabie to have an outbreak [of 
fighting] than to maintain a peace which has been so sinfully transgressed 
by the evil deeds and machinations of [Karaeng] Karunrung" (KA 
1157b:359r). On the night of 13 April 1668 the English lodge was set on 
fire and the Dutch ships began to shell Sombaopu. At the same time 
Arung Palakka led a Bugis attack on Kampong Melayu, the Malay 
Quarter between Sombaopu and Fort Rotterdam. In this fresh round of 
fighting the Bugis exhibited an uncharacteristic lack of courage which 
almost cost Arung Palakka his Iife. While Arung Palakka was trying to 
make his way out under cover of darkness, the light from a burning house 
revealed him to the enemy and he was shot in the arm. Hd fell and was 
immediately deserted by all his men except for his bodyguards who 
dragged him away to safety (KA 1157b:362v; Macleod 1900: 1291). 
There were a few more battles in April which the Dutch claimed as 
victories, but the reality was more astalemate. The Makassar forces 
began raising defence works opposite Fort Rotterdam, and Speelman 
was obliged to keep his now greatly diminished Dutch garrison of 503 
men, of whom 175 were incapacitated as a result of sickness or wounds. 
safely within the .fort until the requested reinforcements of 500 men 
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arrived from Batavia (Macleod 1900:1291). To the north of Makassar, 
Bugis and Makassar forces met in battle with no decisive encounters. On 
4th May some Makassar troops poured out in a fierce and furious attack 
against the Bugis and Dutch camp. The fighting continued throughout 
the day and night with the Makassar troops receiving constant rein-
forcements from the rear. Finally the attack subsided with the Makassar 
side suffering some forty de ad and 100 wounded in the fighting. The 
Dutch lost one dead and five wounded, and the Bugis three dead and 
forty-five wounded. Af ter this spate of fighting, quiet descended on the 
battlefront for the next four or five days (KA 1157e:373v). 
What the Dutch considered to be even more effective against Goa's 
forces than the actual pitched battles was the bombardment of the 
enemy's positions and blockade of Makassar harbour. Goa's supply of 
rice and salt was affected, and no fish could be caught since no fishing 
boats dared venture out. Only buffalo meat was still available. The 
Dutch and the Bugis knew that Sombaopu was filled with people, 
including women and children and Portuguese, and that their blockade 
and bombardments were surely wreaking havoc among the defenders. 
Both the Sultan 's residence and the mosque had holes made by the rough 
cannonballs of the ships' guns (KA 1157e:374r). A Makassar tale, the 
Sinrili'na Kappa/a' Tallumbatua (SKT), has a description of the bIock-
ade and the cannonading which perhaps reflects an early folk memory of 
the event. 1 This tale emphasizes the unceasing falling of cannonballs into 
the Makassar warriors' position and the rapidly dwindling supplies of 
food. Finally the situation becomes so critical that the warriors declare: 
"It is better to die by the shedding of blood than by hunger" (L-32: 145). 
The picture presented is of fewer ricefields being planted, the inability of 
the fishing boats to go to sea, and finally the great hunger feit by the 
Makassar warriors. These were the main reasons, according to the SKT, 
for the defeat of the Makassar people (L-32: 144-5, passim). 
In this war Speelman re lied almost wholly upon native troops, espe-
cially the Bugis, and only allowed the twenty-three Dutch bodyguards 
assigned to Arung Palakka to do any fighting. To protect Arung Palakka 
another 100 experienced Temate soldiers with guns accompanied him in 
all of his battles (KA 1157e:381 v). Since the Bugis believed that Arung 
Palakka possessed upe'. Speelman considered Arung Palakka 's safety to 
be strategically vital for continued effective Bugis participation in the 
war. His very defiance of all danger in battle, though considered fool-
hardy by the Dutch, served to accentuate his 'invulnerability' to his 
followers. In a fierce two hour battle on 17 May 1668 between the Bugis 
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and the Makassar troops, Arung Palakka was discovered in the thick of 
the fighting, which again drew Speelman's criticism th at he was exposing 
himself needlessly. And yet Speelman conceded that his presence con-
tributed greatly to the courage of the Bugis (KA 1157f:381r). A legend 
had already sprung up around Arung Palakka, and as long as he was 
there among the Bugis warriors, seemingly oblivious and invulnerable to 
the enemy's guns and krisses, the Bugis could believe in their own 
invincibility. He was already accorded greater respect than any other 
Bugis leader because of his support from the Company and his bravery 
which far outshone any other Bugis lord (KA 1157f:386v).2 
But even with Arung Palakka, the performance of the Bugis in the 
battlefield tried Speelman's patience. Unlike the unreserved praise he 
lavished on the Bugis in the fighting before the Bungaya Treaty, he now 
wrote to Batavia that "we do not consider it advisable nor trust our Bugis 
to undertake anything of importance without some Dutch support". In 
describing a two-hour battle between Bugis and Makassar forces in the 
middle of May, Speelman, while expressing disapproval of Arung Pa-
lakka's taking unnecessary risks, praised his bravery. Speelman recogni-
zed that it was his daring feats in battle which boosted the courage of the 
Bugis, "which, to our sorrow, is very smalI" (KA 1157c:381r). This 
criticism of the Bugis contribution to the war was again reflected in 
Speelman's decision to ask the Sultan of Butung to send 800 to 1,000 
labourers immediately since "no work can be expected from the Bugis" 
(KA 1157c:388v, 391r). "The Bugis" that Speelman referred to were 
the.motley, oftentimes undisciplined troops who se obvious de sire for the 
fruits of war contrasted sharply with the singular purpose motivating 
Arung Palakka and the Toangke. As long as Arung Palakka or his 
trusted lieutenants led the fighting, some semblance of order was main-
tained. On most occasions, however, af ter the battle the Bugis cooduct-
ed their own personal campaign of pillage aod harassment of the Makas-
sar people. These relentless forays ioto Makassar lands were seen by the 
Makassar people as a foretaste of the fate which awaited them if they lost 
the war. They thus became even more determined to re sist. The fortifi-
cations of Sombaopu and Tallo were streogtheoed and the defenders of 
Tallo reinforced by another 100 Makassar and 300 Wajo warriors (KA 
1157e:392r). 
The war took an unexpeeted turn with the outbreak of an epidemie in 
Makassar between April and July 1668. While ooe later Dutch souree 
mentions a "terrible fever epidemie" (Macleod 1900: 1292), both the 
Diary of the Kings of Goa and Tallo (Ligtvoet 1880: 127) and contempo-
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rary Dutch sources (KA 1157g:431r-v) speak unmistakeably of a 
"plague". The disease took a particularly heavy toll among the al ready 
weakened Dutch garrison. In May 100 Dutchmen died, in June 125, and 
in July 135. Speelman himself contracted the fever, but he recovered by 
going out to sea to escape the epidemic on land. The Bugis forces within 
Makassar itself also suffered severely with some 2,000 out of a total of 
4,000 men ill at the end of July. Among the Makassar people, too, the 
losses caused by the epidemic became apparent. In Sombaopu the Dutch 
counted about seventy-three people being buried in one day, and in 
Tallo the death toll was about twenty a day. But by 16th July no new 
sickness was reported among the Dutch, and it was felt that the epidemic 
was over (Macleod 1900: 1292-3; KA 1157h:424r). 
Because of the debilitating effects of the disease in both camps, 
fighting was limited in the months of May and J une to a few skirmishes in 
the ricefields. But the struggle within the Goa court between the "war" 
and "peace" factions continued unabated, the epidemic notwith-
standing. On 25th Mayamessenger with a retinue of twelve men 
appeared in the Dutch camp with a message for Arung Palakka from 
their lord, Karaeng Lengkese. The letter was written on behalf of 
Karaeng Tallo: 
... I have not committed any misdeed against the Admiral [Speelman], 
nor have I been in the least harmed by him. I have not been ab Ie to keep 
Karaeng Popo out of it [i.e., out of becoming involved in the war] 
because I am powerless. But we who are brothers, since there has been a 
brotherhood for many years between the two lands of Bone and Makas-
sar, let us set aside all hate and live once again as brothers (KA 1157c: 
385v). 
Karaeng Lengkese framed his message in the traditional South 
Sulawesi fashion in seeking reconciliation and a "renewal" of former 
treaty ties of "brotherhood". Being Arung Palakka's brother-in-Iaw, 
Karaeng Lengkese's stand for peace was naturally suspect in the Goa 
court. He finally fled Goa and sought protection with Karaeng Tallo 
(KA 1157h:409v). Although the ties between Goa and Tallo were very 
close and could indeed be characterized as a twin-kingdom, there were 
nevertheless still two principal and natural centres of power: one with 
Karaeng Goa and the other with Karaeng Tallo. 
Arung Palakka consulted with his nobles and then sent this reply to 
Karaeng Lengkese. They would all be very happy to have peace and 
calm in the land. Insofar as the old treaty between Bone and Goa was 
concemed, it had been broken and "forgotten" by both sides. But ifthey 
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faithfully upheld the treaty recently concluded at Bungaya, then there 
would no longer be any problems between the two (KA 1157c:386r). 
This reply was also couched in traditional terms and clarified the rela-
tionships between Bone and Goa. The blame was not laid at the foot-
steps of either kingdom, but instead together they had "broken" and 
"forgotten" the treaty. What was stressed was the fact that the abandon-
ment of the treaty was a joint decision, thereby avoiding mutual recrimi-
nations and spiritual retribution which usually accompanied a "broken" 
treaty. In place of the old treaty they urged the Makassar leaders to 
adopt the Bungaya treaty in the same manner as other previous South 
Sulawesi treaties. 
When Arung Palakka brought Karaeng Lengkese's letter to Speel-
man, the latter immediately suspected a plot by Karaeng Karunrung to 
drive a wedge between Arung Palakka and the Dutch (KA 1157c:386r). 
Speelman ignored, or possibly found incredulous, rumours of secret 
meetings between certain Makassar nob les and Arung Palakka during 
the war. While he reported to Batavia all talk of factions and power 
struggles within the Goa court, he himself appeared to have discounted 
the possibility of one of the factions secretly approaching Arung Palak-
ka. But the bittemess within the Goa court which increased with each 
setback in the battlefield severely strained relations between the 
factions. In peacetime divergent opinions were tolerated; in war such 
opinions bred suspicion and even open conflict. The tension in the Goa 
court had become so intolerable that the faction led by Karaeng Tallo 
had decided to approach Arung Palakka directly in hopes of ending the 
war quickly before the Makassar kingdoms were irreparably destroyed. 
Karaeng Tallo's peaceful intentions were later confirmed by his sister, 
wife of Kaicili' Kalimata. She told the Dutch that at about 14th June 
Sultan Hasanuddin and Karaeng Karunrung had come personally to 
confer with Karaeng Tallo about making peace with the Company. 
According to her account, Karaeng Tallo had told them that he wanted 
to have peace in the land again. Sultan Hasanuddin then was reported to 
have said that if a reconciliation we re to be effected with the Company, 
he would consider it sacred and unbreakable (KA 1157d:398v-399r). 
However, no agreement appeared to have been reached by the two 
factions, and Karaeng Tallo, Lengkese, and Agangnionjo (Tanete) soon 
declared their neutrality in the fighting. Karaeng Tallo's fear of reprisals 
made him seek Dutch protection which ca me in the form of a personal 
bodyguard of five Europeans and sixty Ternate soldiers and two ships 
to guard the mouth of the Tallo River (Macleod 1900: 1291). 
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The Dutch-Bugis forces were further buoyed by news of reinforce-
ments being sent from Batavia and by the arrival of the long-awaited 
Bone allies at Segeri. The Bone troops had burned Segeri, which had 
remained loyal to Goa, killing 100 defenders and taking another forty 
prisoner. Tosa'deng, son of Datu Soppeng, was sent with 230 of his 
trusted men, of which 120 we re equipped with muskets, lead and gun-
powder, on Dutch ships to join this Bone force. Three days prior to their 
departure, Goa sent reinforcements to Segeri and burned Lipukasi. The 
ships which had brought the Bone troops withdrew for fear that some of 
the areas which had been recently taken would again support Goa. With 
the opportune arrival of Tosa'deng and Bugis reinforcements, the 
various areas which had been vacillating finally joined the Bugis despite 
the presence of the Makassar troops with their 100 musketeers. AI-
though Karaeng Tanete came to side with Amng Palakka, his son joined 
Goa with his father's knowledge and perhaps even with his blessings. 3 
When the Dutch ships returned to Makassar, they brought a message 
from Tosa'deng th at on 20th June the allies had seized three Makassar 
forts under the command of Karaeng Paranggi and had taken sixty 
heads. They were now planning to cross over the mountains to attack 
Bulo-Bulo. Af ter the victory Karaeng Tanete presented Tosa'deng with 
thirty taels or 980 gold mas which had been sent to him by Sultan 
Hasanuddin to gain his loyalty. But fear of the Bugis had convinced him 
to reject this offer and present it instead to Tosa'deng. Signs of Goa's 
attempts to prop up its sagging alliances with riches now th at it could no 
longer do it with force were evident also in Selayar. Various Makassar 
envoys had been sent to the island with gifts and promises to the Selayar 
lords to prevent them from joining the Bugis and the Dutch (KA 1157d: 
398r; Macleod 1900: 1293). But the obvious superiority of the Bugis-
Dutch alliance provided a much more convincing argument to mIers that 
Goa no longer had the military, political, or spiritual support to maintain 
its position of supremacy in South Sulawesi. There were signs of its 
decline, and many of the kingdoms began readjusting their positions in 
the local hierarchy of states in relation to the rise of this new power. 
The arrival of Bone troops and their victories in Segeri, so close to 
Goa's borders, had a sobering effect on the Goa government. At its 
request a three-day ceasefire was arranged on 14 July 1668 so that it 
could consult its allies about a general peace. When the time expired, it 
again asked and was granted another four to five days extension. The 
lack of any sign of progress annoyed the Dutch who finally decided in 
council on the 20th to reject all further Makassar "frivolous pretexts" for 
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continuing the ceasefire and to refuse to receive any more letters from 
the Goa government. Although the ceasefire had begun on a hopeful 
note, the Dutch became aware of a growing intransigence among Goa's 
leaders. Speelman attributed much of this change of attitude to the 
influence of Karaeng Karunrung. He even believed a rumour that Ka-
raeng Karunrung had once said Makassar would never be right again 
until the Christians had been removed (KA 1157h:409r). 
On the 18th two messengers arrived from Timurung bringing letters 
from Arumpone La Ma'daremmeng and his son Daeng Pabila. The 
contents of these letters revealed one of the principal reasons for Goa's 
new hostile attitude. La Ma'daremmeng had sent two or three separate 
missions to Arung Matoa Wajo La Tenrilai Tosenngeng asking him to 
observe their mutual treaty. These approaches were rejected by La 
Tenrilai in favour of the appeals made by Sultan Hasanuddin through 
two separate missions. In these letters from Goa, Sultan Hasanuddin 
explained that without Wajo's help his kingdom would be in a lamenta-
bie state. He urged Wajo to attack Soppeng in order to draw the Bone 
troops away from Segeri and surrounding areas and hence relieve the 
pressure on Goa's troops. Faced with two rival powers urging Wajo to 
remember its treaty obligations to each of them, La Tenrilai made his 
assessment and decided that Wajo's welfare lay with Goa. De~pite his 
decision to support Goa, he was unable to prevent two of Wajo's areas, 
Timurung and Pammana, from joining Bone (KA 1157h:415v-416r). 
But when Goa farces came to support Wajo, Pammana once again 
reverted to its former relationship with Wajo (KA 1157g:435r). Same of 
the more powerful political units or principalities had disagreed with 
the kingdom's assessment of where the true political power lay and 
had decided to take an independent course of act ion to preserve their 
own interests. 
In addition to Wajo's continuing loyalty to Goa, Bulo-Bulo sent 1,000 
men to Makassar, and Mandar promised to carry on the war in the north. 
At about 20th July news reached Makassar that the Mandar farces had 
arrived by ship at Pare-Pare and were planning to build a fort there. The 
local Bugis succeeded in frustrating this attempt, and so the Mandar 
forces of about 1,000 men, among whom was Karaeng Bontomarannu, 
went to Lero, on the tip of the peninsulajutting into the bay, to continue 
their harassment (KA 1157h:416r-v). 
The Mandar venture typified the sporadic nature of the fighting which 
occurred in the early months af ter the resumption of the war. The first 
major confrontation came on 5th August when Makassar troops feigned 
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a movement to Tallo and then turned toward Arung Palakka's st rong-
hold at Bontoala. Some twenty-five to thirty "banners", indicating units 
under a particular karaeng, besieged Bontoala and established them-
selves in a hamiet to the east of it. An advanced guard of 300 to 400 men 
coming from Tallo engaged the Bugis and Dutch, and the battle went on 
with varying intensity until midday. Karaeng Layo informed the Dutch 
that the Makassar troops were planning a massive attack that same day 
and so the Dutch passed the information on to Arung Palakka with 
instructions that he should do nothing until he received further word 
from Fort Rotterdam. Unable to countenance the presence of Makassar 
units in the woods so dose to Bontoala, Arung Palakka ignored his 
instruction and sortied out with some hand-picked man. The Makassar 
troops offered little resistance and retreated, pursued by Arung Palakka 
and his men for about half the distance of the field before the latter 
returned to their fortification. Some time later Arung Palakka and his 
men again attacked some Makassar groups in the open fields, but this 
time they found themselves in the woods surrounded by the enemy. 
From all sides came the Makassar warriors, including the various units 
which had previously been on the other side of Bontoala. It had been a 
well-planned ambush, and if it had not been for some 300 reinforce-
ments sent from Fort Rotterdam to distract the Makassar attack, Arung 
Palakka would have been killed. The Ternate musketeers who had been 
assigned by Speelman to protect Arung Palakka maintained a steady 
stream of fire into the Makassar ranks and succeeded in extricating 
Arung Palakka and his men from the woods. Later when Speelman re-
proached Arung Palakka for having taken such a risk, the latter replied 
that he had not suspected such tactics from the enemy and that in the 
future he would not contravene orders. But Speelman was not all con-
vinced that Arung Palakka would become more manageable despite 
these words. In a letter to Batavia he characterized Arung Palakka as 
someone who was too much his own boss and most cunning when he 
acted compulsively upon seeing anyone he loved wounded or in danger 
(KA 1157g:431r-432r; Macleod 1900: 1293). 
Throughout the day the Makassar forces spread out into the areas 
east, north, and south of Fort Rotterdam. Only the sea to the west was 
open to the Dutch. To Speelman's annoyance the Makassar troops 
re-occupied many of the fortified positions which should have been 
destroyed in compliance with the provisions ofthe Bungaya Treaty. The 
expected attack finally came, and it was an ambitious one aimed at Fort 
Rotterdam itself. Some 1,000 men were involved in the first assault, 
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mainly Malays and men from Wajo. Eventually they were forced to 
retreat, dragging their wounded away with them. They we re heard to 
complain bitterly about the cowardice of the Makassar warriors who had 
not participated in the fighting and had no wish to do so (KA 1157g: 
431 v). Although the Makassar fighting men we re admired by the Outch 
and greatly feared by the Bugis, the deep division in the Goa government 
conceming not only the conduct but also the continuance of the war 
affected the resolve of the fighting men. Unlike in the beginning of the 
war when differences of opinion had not been allowed to hamper the war 
effort, now the differences had been too great to ignore. The Makassar 
Malays had fought loyally for the ruler of Goa, and they expected as 
much from the Makassar people. They were understandably bitter when 
they believed that the Makassar leaders we re contemplating surrender-
ing to the enemy. This bittemess, mentioned in Company reports at the 
time, is reflected in a Makassar manuscript of unknown provenance 
written by Makassar Malays concerning their history in South Sulawesi 
(L-24:4). The Wajo people, too, recall the brave and loyal response of 
their Arung Matoa La Tenrilai Tosenngeng. When he was informed by 
Sultan Hasanuddin that Sombaopu had fallen and th at Wajo should now 
look af ter its own welfare, " ... tears came into La Tenrilai's eyes, his 
upper arm became tense as he pressed down upon the handle of his keris 
and said: 'Ten thousand men from Wajo accompanied me here [to 
Makassar]. Let them all die before Goa is taken (L-4: unpag., section 
23)'." These sentiments of loyalty from both the people of Wajo and 
from the Malays we re so deeply feit at the time that they were com-
memorated in later reconstructions of th is war. 
Goa's successful campaigns in the interior were a marked contrast to the 
difficulties it faced against Arung Palakka and the Outch in the west. The 
Makassar forces under Syahbandar Oaeng Makkulle4 , joined by a thou-
sand men from Wajo and Lamuru, marched through Soppeng burning as 
they went. There was no Bugis army in Soppeng and so the people fled to 
Tanete and Segeri where the Bugis troops we re gathered under Arung 
Belo Tosa'deng. The latter had under his command an estimated 2,000 
men from Soppeng with 180 guns plus another 1,000 men from Bone 
with eighty muskets. He urged the Ou tch to send a ship to lie off the coast 
as a deterrent against any Makassar attack from the rear while he 
brought his men into battle. Without this ship he was afraid to leave 
behind the women and children since the Mandar forces still present at 
Lero could come by sea and attack their position. He complained of the 
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faint-heartedness of Daeng Memang, commander of the Bone troops at 
Soppeng's border, whose timidity had resulted in so much bloodshed 
among the people of Soppeng. In view of this he requested that a new 
commander be placed over the Bone troops. One of thé princes from 
Soppeng who was among the refugees reported that the Wajo troops had 
not touched a single area in Bone, and that Daeng Pabila had remained 
at Timurung and had in no way "inconvenienced" his Bone troops to 
protect Soppeng. Confirmation of this report came from Karaeng 
Tanete and Datu Soppeng who had fled to safety to Palakka in Bone. 
They described the destruction of all the lowlands of Soppeng to the very 
foot of the mountains (KA 1157 g: 434r-v). 5 Relations between Soppeng 
and Bone were becoming strained, but the sheer magnetism of Arung 
Palakka, who could fortunately claim origins from both Bone and 
Soppeng, was sufficient to convince these two Bugis allies to bury their 
differences and reunite for their important task of humbling Goa. 
The Dutch acted immediately upon Tosa'deng's request for a ship. 
The very next morning the Meliskerk was sent to Tanete to remain 
offshore and later to transport the Soppeng troops to a specified place in 
Maros. Maros had earlier warmly welcomed a Bugis "delegation and 
expressed its readiness to join the allies against its overlord Goa. In a 
meeting with five of the most important men in Maros, the delegation 
was assured that if the Bugis were to land at a designated place, the 
Maros forces would join them. Their only request was that the Bugis 
refrain from plundering their land (KA 1157g:433v-435v). 
On 11 th and 12th August, Goa troops in Makassar came out of their 
fortifications mainly to taunt the Bugis and the Dutch. Meanwhile they 
had despatched a sizeable army northward where it was divided with one 
half proceeding to Maros and the other to Siang. So vital was Maros 
considered by the Goa government that the elite bodyguard of Sultan 
Hasanuddin, one of the Sultan's sons, and the best part of the Malays 
were included in th is expedition. At Siang the Makassar forces attacked 
with great fury on 12th August with cannons and smaller guns but were 
defeated with a loss of sixty-five heads "plus the bodies on the battlefield 
with their heads still on". In Maros the Makassar forces were also forced 
to retreat by 14th August. Some 5,000 Bugis then marched on to Goa 
while another 2,000 remained behind to safeguard their victory in 
Maros. Arung Palakka was justifiably pleased with the performance of 
his Bugis. He told Speelman that "this was what made soldiers out of 
men and once a Bugis became a soldier he scorns all enernies and 
danger". To encourage similar efforts among their allies, the Dutch 
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praised and rewarded the Bugis leaders involved in the victories (KA 
1157 g:435r-436v; Macleod 1900: 1294). 
The Bugis success in Siang and Maros made astrong impression on 
Turatea, which now promised to side with the allies. But when only 
about 150 men came to join the Dutch and their allies by mid-October, 
there arose a general scepticism about Turatea's sincerity. Sultan 
Hasanuddin, meanwhile, sent Karaeng Ballo and Karaeng Laikang to 
Turatea to bring Goa's vacillating erstwhile ally back to its camp. But 
such efforts proved futile since it was generally acknowledged that the 
war was going badly for Goa, and rumours were rife that the Makassar 
forces were already considering either fighting and dying at their posts or 
fleeing to the mountains. Sultan Hasanuddin, so it was rumoured, 
wanted peace, but Karaeng Karunrung supported by the Malays urged 
continued resistance. The Malays we re to have said quite bluntly: 
"When we can no longer do anymore nor defend ourselves then is it time 
enough to seek peace" (KA 1157i:440v-443v). 
On 12 October 1668 the Dutch-Bugis forces defeated the Goa army 
in a large battle in Makassar. This victory, which Speelman believed 
could have been the decisive engagement of the war if the Dutch-Bugis 
side had pursued their advantage, was marred by the death in battle of 
Arung Belo Tosa'deng. He was the eldest and the most beloved son of 
Datu Soppeng La Tenribali and a close companion of Arung Palakka. 
Speelman paid tribute to his bravery in his inimitable fashion: "This 
prince was among the most valiant among the Bugis, but careless, 
negligent, and undisciplined" (KA 1157i:442r). Tosa'deng's death was 
a severe blow to Bugis morale, but its political impact in South Sulawesi 
was not to surface until two decades later when the question of the 
succession to the Soppeng throne arose. On th is occasion even in death 
Tosa'deng was to render his services to Arung Palakka. 
Arung Belo' Tosa'deng captured the imagination of the Bugis and 
Makassar people because of his daring exploits and his faithfulness to 
Arung Palakka. In the Sinrili'na Kappa/a' Tallumbatua, Arung Belo is 
depicted as the younger brother of Arung Palakka, both of whom are 
made to be Goa princes. Toward the end of this tale, Arung Belo is killed 
by the Makassar warriors because of his role in aiding Arung Palakka in 
a war against their father, the ruler of Goa (L-32: 148). In the Bugis 
communities to this day, tales abound of Arung Palakka and the faithful 
Arung Belo. 
To add to the gloom pervading the allied camps, by the end of October 
265 of a tot al of 557 Dutch soldiers lay ill in Fort Rotterdam. Without 
V The Unfinished War 129 
further substantial Dutch troops to bolster the Bugis units, Speelman 
was not at all confident that they could maintain their positions. The 
Makassar forces burned all boats and houses up to the square fronting 
onto the Dutch lodge and were using the Chinese stone houses during 
the day to harass the Dutch and the Bugis. Speelman now requested 
more "force and power" from Batavia so he could bring the war to a 
successful end. Only with more aid did he believe it possible to dislodge 
the Malays "who with their firearms, have forcefully maintained the 
devotion of the people". With the removal of the Malays and Karaeng 
Karunrung, Speelman predicted that peace would finally come to 
Makassar. Batavia, meanwhile., strongly urged Speelman to resume 
negotiations for peace with Goa. (KA 1157i:440v-441v, 445v-446r; 
Macleod 1900:1294). 
Speelman's assessment of the situation appeared to be borne out by 
reports from people fleeing from the Goa court. They c1aimed that 
Karaeng Karunrung had prevented any attempts by Sultan Hasanuddin 
and other leaders in the government to make peace. Affairs in Goa had 
reached such a state, so they said, that Karaeng Karunrung was now the 
sole power governing the kingdom with the title of "Raja Tua" (Iit., old 
king; viceroy).6 He no longer consulted anyone and did whatsoever he 
pleased. Violently opposed to Karaeng Karunrung was Karaeng Tallo 
who wanted peace but now had little influence in the government. He 
himself was being watched and controlled by Daeng "Marouppa", a 
supporter of Karaeng Karunrung. Despite earl ier reports of the fierce 
antagonism of the Malays toward the Dutch, Speelman attempted to 
drive a wedge between the Malays and the Makassar leaders but dis-
covered not with any great surprise that the Malays were "even more 
bitter ene mies of the Company than the Makassar people themselves" 
(KA 1157j:450r, 455r-v). 
Speelman reluctantly implemented orders from Batavia to resume 
peace negotiations on 6 November 1668. Goa however, used the period 
of the negotiations to reaffirm its ties with its former allies. On 16th 
November it unilaterally terminated the talks and four days later 
launched a sUccessful offensive north of Makassar, recapturing from the 
Bugis the areas of Maros, Labakkang, Siang, Barru, Segeri, and some 
other territories lost earlier in the war. The Dutch did not credit th is 
victory to the cunning or bravery of the Makassar forces but preferred to 
comfort Batavia that "the negligence and accursed timidityofthe Bugis" 
were responsible for the debacle. Dutch reinforcements to Maros and 
Turatea succeeded in helping the Bugis regain the lost territory, but 
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Labakkang remained in Makassar hands (KA 1161a:618v-619r). 
The changing fortunes of the war highlighted one crucial point that, 
while Sombaopu remained as a symbol of Goa's greatness, the Makassar 
forces would not surrender. The presence of Sultan Hasanuddin and the 
court within Sombaopu's walls served as a focus of loyalty to the widely-
scattered Makassar forces. As long as it remained unviolated, the people 
believed all was right in the kingdom. It is significant that when the Bugis 
lontara' talk about the defeat of Goa, they speak of the fall of Som-
baopu. 7 With full awareness of the significance of Sombaopu, Speelman 
had prepared for the final assault on that royal citadel. He moved his 
ma in headquarters from Fort Rotterdam to a new fortification called 
Majennang on the shore, and later in May 1669 to another newly-
constructed fort named Jacatra on the banks of the Garassi River 
(Macleod 1900: 1294). 
With the end of the west monsoon, the Dutch-Bugis forces launched 
several successful attacks on 14 and 15 April 1669 and drove off all 
Makassar resistance north of Sombaopu. The Bugis sensed the impend-
ing defeat of Goa and carried on nightly raids for plunder with impunity 
into Makassar territory. By the end of April some 150 people, mostly 
women and children, had been seized from Goa, along with about 400 
buffaloes. The Makassar people taken by the Bugis were starving and in 
a miserabie state with only animal hide to clothe their naked bodies. The 
Dutch blockade at sea, the conquest of many of the Makassar rice-
growing areas, and the continual Bugis raids into Goa we re having a 
serious effect on food supplies to Goa and its allies. On Selayar half the 
population of that island had already succumbed to hunger. The people 
were reduced to eating leaves, banana trunks, mango pits, and rice chaff. 
Those who still had some strength cut down sago palms to make sago. 
The same situation prevailed in many of the Makassar-held areas. From 
prisoners and fugitives came reports th at large numbers of the Makassar 
people had been ki lied by gunfire, but an even greater number had died 
of hunger and sickness. Believing that the end of the war was near, many 
of the Makassar Malays had already fled to Mandar, Pasir, Bima, and 
elsewhere (KA 1157:452v; KA 1161a:620r-622r). The time had come, 
and both sides were now poised for the final battle of Sombaopu. 
In preparation for the assault on the heavily-fortified citadel, Speel-
man had a tunnel dug secretly under one of the wa lis where the attack 
was to take place. When the tunnel was completed, Speelman had a great 
feast prepared to which he invited all the friendly lords and nob les with 
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their families. The feast began on 11 th June and lasted till the moming of 
the 13th. On that day with great secrecy the tunnel was filled with 
gunpowder and then sealed until the attack was sounded. The night 
before, the traditional South Sulawesi oath-giving ceremonies were held 
as was customary before a major battle. All the Bugis warriors had risen 
separately and in groups as large as a hundred to manngaru. They sprang 
up and shouted their allegiance to their leader and the Dutch: "With 
tears in their eyes and with krisses unsheathed ... they swore to defeat 
Sombaopu or die." For the battle of Sombaopu it was originally estima-
ted that there would be 1,200 to 1,500 Bugis, 461 men from Temate, 
Tidore, Bacan, Butung, and Pampanga (from northem Luzon in the 
Philippines), and 111 Dutchmen. A close count later showed that there 
were more like 2,000 Bugis and 572 others, including eighty-three 
Dutch soldiers and eleven Dutch sailors. The Bugis were divided by 
Speelman into six separate companies. Among those who were with 
Arung Palakka were Arung Kaju, Arung Mampu, Daeng Malewa, and 
some Makassar nob les. The Bugis under Arung Palakka were instructed 
to go with a strong force to clear the eastem side of Sombaopu from all 
Makassar defenders and to attack and bum Tana-Tana and Bontokeke.8 
The others, meanwhile, were to attempt to breach Sombaopu's walls. 
Three small Dutch ships and a sloop were to sail up the Garassi River 
and attack Sombaopu from the south (KA 1161b:633v-638v; Macleod 
1900: 1294-5). 
The assault began at about 6 p.m. on 14 June 1669 with the igniting of 
the explosives placed in the secret tunnel. The blast created a breach 
about 27% metres wide in one of Sombaopu's 31/2 metres thick red brick 
walls. As soon as the Makassar defenders realized what had happened, 
some twenty-five warriors jumped through the breach to beat back the 
first attackers, while others began erecting wooden stakes to shut off the 
hole. At first the Dutch fortification Jacatra aimed its guns at th is 
activity, but Speelman soon had it stopped so th at the attack could be 
resumed. While Speelman gathered his forces,Sombaopu was reinforced 
by Makassar troops arriving from Goa under Karaeng Karunrung. 
The next evening battle was joined with even greater fury than the day 
before, as is graphically related in one of Speelman's reports: 
They [the Sombaopu defenders] fought with fire and stones; they de-
fended themselves with spears; they surged forward strongly pushing 
against one another, and with bamboos they seized the muzzles of the 
guns and muskets so that these had to be freed by using swords and 
daggers. There was no lack of arrows and poison darts; firepots flew 
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unceasingly back and forth, and many of our own were heaved back by 
the enemy not without causing damage. It hailed musketballs on both 
sides, and the cannons directed their thunderous fire continually into the 
breach. Grenades from heavy mortars were also fired and made as 
favourable an impression as could be desired. All of this brought forth 
such wonderful music that it was difficuIt to know, to believe, that it had 
been such a terrible night, whose sounds even old soldiers perhaps in 
Europe itself could not of ten have heard. From our side there we re no 
less than 5-6,000 pounds of gunpowder used on land alone, and some 
30,000 musketballs fired, in addition to 200 firepots and sixty to seventy 
grenades. There had not been the least break, and only between 2 and 3 
a.m. did the enemy, who had gathered a strong force within, take a short 
breathing spel!. But not a quarter-hour had gone by when it began again 
with even greater ferocity than before ... at a.bout 4 o'clock they 
stormed out in a great wrath, and notwithstanding the continuous can-
non fire into the breach, a· group came out from the flanks ... and the 
battle continued until morning but Sombaopu remained in the hands of 
the Makassar forces (KA 1161b:639r-v). 
Although Speelman was convinced that Sombaopu would fall, he 
declared that nothing like this had ever happened before in the Makassar 
lands, and he had never believed that the enemy would offer as much 
opposition as it did. He called it "the heaviest encounter we have ever 
had during the entire existence of his commission". By midday of 17th 
June the attackers had suffered fifty dead and sixty-eight wounded, 
among whom were several Dutch and native officers. On the 19th it 
began to rain, and it rained for six whole days. By the evening of the 
22nd, Arung Palakka grew restless and decided to take action. He led his 
Bugis plus some Bacan and Ambon soldiers under Arung Bakke to enter 
the breach in the wall, which had been barricaded by the Makassar 
defenders. Af ter some fierce fighting the Makassar warriors abandoned 
the breach, and in streamed the Bugis and their allies. Despite the rain 
the Bugis set aflame as much as they could, thereby forcing the Makassar 
forces to retreat from the eastern and western bastions of the citadel and 
to re-establish their defences at the southern half of Sombaopu. One of 
the cannons named Anak Mangkasar (Child of Makassar), which was 
the pride of the defenders, was heaved over the side of the northwestern 
bastion during the retreat. As the Dutch-Bugis army advanced from the 
west, word arrived th at Sombaopu had been abandoned, and the Makas-
sar forces had fled to Goa and to the Garassi River. Sultan Hasanuddin 
had not wanted to Ie ave so quickly but the flames, fanned by astrong 
northwesterly wind, had finally persuaded him to go. Though many of 
the Makassar forces escaped when the Bugis entered the breach, 
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Karaeng Karunrung remained in the palace surrounded by his followers 
who, with drawn krisses, defied anyone to enter. All those in the mosque 
had been driven out, and only the Malay wife of Oatu Soppeng, all of her 
children, and some eighty of her retinue remained. Among her children 
was the eldest boy who had of ten boasted th at Sultan Hasanuddin had 
promised to make him ruler of Soppeng when the war was won. He had 
even sworn that he would bring his father's (Oatu Soppeng's) and Arung 
Palakka's heads to Sultan Hasanuddin's feet or die in the attempt (KA 
1161 b:664r-645v; Macleod 1900: 1295-6). 
Confusion reigned af ter the fall of Sombaopu, and pillaging was 
rampant. Speelman estimated th at no less than 7-8,000 Bugis we re on 
the move seizing booty, and he was convinced that the only authority 
they responded to was threats from their own leaders. By the time 
Speelman and Arung Palakka arrived at the Sultan's residence it had 
already been stripped bare. There were two Bugis sitting in the court-
yard examining their booty. When they saw Arung Palakka, they im-
mediately offered him what they had assembied. Arung Palakka refused 
and the men resumed their division of the spoils (KA 116Ib:648v). 
Although Speelman was quick to condemn what appeared to him to be 
wanton, even frenetic, pillaging by the Bugis, he did note that the Bugis 
continued to respond to their leaders. The two Bugis dividing the spoils 
in the Sultan's court yard had not lost all sense of discipline but were 
merely conducting themselves in an acceptable manner in South Sula-
wesi warfare. They understood that the first choice of any booty was 
reserved to their lord, and so when Arung Palakka appeared they 
offered him what they had assembied. Arung Palakka's concern th at his 
men receive what was entitled to them in warfare was made evident to 
Speelman from early on. Af ter the signing of the Bungaya Treaty in 
November 1667, Arung Palakka was rewarded by a number ofvaluable 
gifts by the Company. Ouring the celebrations that evening he divided 
these gifts among his nob les and then distributed some 800 rijksdaalders 
borrowed from the Company among his best people (KA 1157a:323v). 
Arung Palakka's ability to fulfil his obligations to those serving him 
would have been a contributing factor to his rapidly growing army and 
steadily rising fame as a leader with upe'. 
Speelman, however, viewed the plundering with great distaste and 
orde red all the booty to be gathered in one spot and guarded with armed 
men. Since Speelman was acknowledged as the Supreme Commander of 
the allies, Arung Palakka reluctantly agreed to this unexpected develop-
ment. Later he approached Speelman to ask permission for his people to 
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continue looting since it was his responsibility as leader to allow his men 
to reap the benefits of warfare, as would have been expected of the 
enemy had he been victorious. There was no moral judgement imp lied in 
the act of looting af ter or even during a battle, for this was an expected 
norm. The hope for booty was a st rong immediate incentive for native 
troops in warfare and a major reason for the tendency of native battles to 
transform quickly into individual raiding parties. Each leader was 
expected to provide his men with the opportunity for material rewards in 
the fighting, and even more so if these rewards were in the form of enemy 
property. Speelman, however, was unwilling to subscribe to this tradi-
tional South Sulawesi practice, and he remarked that '"his [Arung paak­
ka's] discretion in such things is very smalI" (KA 1161 b:649r). 
The amount of goods seized was enormous. Every Bugis appeared to 
be weighted down with booty, with the most sought-after items being 
porcelain and copperwork. Even a ware house full of goods guarded by 
Daeng Manompo', a trusted follower of Arung Palakka, was pillaged. 
To keep his word with Speelman, Arung Palakka sent Arung Kaju with 
some of the Toangke to recover the goods. They returned the plundered 
items which were immediately placed under the personal supervision of 
these loyal Toangke. Only a fire prevented the Bugis from seiting more 
booty, but throughout it all Speelman noted that no one had as little as 
Arung Palakka (KA 1161b:649r-652r). 
Af ter the conquest of Sombaopu the Dutch made certain that it would 
never again be used as a major fortification. All the guns found on the 
ramparts were thrown down and the wa lis facing northward and seaward 
and the sea bastions were destroyed. The amount of weapons captured 
by the Dutch gives some not ion of Goa's arsenal. There were thirty-
three cannons weighing about 46,000 Ibs and eleven weighing about 
24,000 Ibs, 145 small guns, eighty-three gun chambers, two stone-
throwers, sixty muskets, twenty-three arquebuses, 127 barrels of mus-
kets, and some 8,483 bullets (Macleod 1900: 1296-7). It was this impres-
sive array of Sombaopu's firepower so effectively employed which made 
the conquest of this citadel one of the most difficult campaigns the 
Company had ever undertaken in the East. 
Five days before the fall of Sombaopu, Sultan Hasanuddin abdicated in 
favour of his son I Mappasomba ("to conquer") because it was believed 
that the new ruler with his propitious name would change the course of 
the war (KA 1161 b:658v). Others, however, c1aimed that since Sultan 
Hasanuddin realized that the defcat ofthe kingdom was unavoidable, he 
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decided to remove himself from the government and th us be dissociated 
from the defeat (KA 1161b:660r). Sultan Hasanuddin had ruled Goa 
when it was still the most powerful and widely-respected kingdom in all 
of Eastern Indonesia. Having reigned in the time of Goa's greatness, he 
refused to be remembered as the rul er who also presided over its 
destruction. 
With the economie and political demise of Goa, Bone emerged as the 
leading kingdom in South Sulawesi. Tbe Makassar War is therefore 
treated in Bugis sourees as a high point in Bone's history when the 
kingdom regained its honour. These sources recall the humiliation of the 
years from 1643 to 1667 when Bone was without a ruler, a situation not 
lightly forgotten by these historically-conscious Bugis-Makassar 
peoples. The word translated as "chronicle" in English means literally 
"Tbe Story of the Ancestors" (in Bugis attoriolong and in Makassar 
patturioloang) , the ancestors being the former rulers of the kingdom. 
One reason for the writing of these stories, says one Makassar chroni-
cler, is so that others may not despise them for having no rulers (Abdur-
rahim & Wolhoff n.d.:9). It is, therefore, with pride that the Bone 
sources describe how their people won a great victory over Goa with the 
help of the Dutch and regained their rulers and their siri'. The Dutch 
appear as secondary players in the rivalry between Bone and Goa which 
extended over a century and culminated in the Makassar Warof 1666-9. 
Those Bone-Soppeng leaders most responsible for the victory entered 
a pantheon of heroes whose names and exploits were preserved by 
village story tellers and whose attributed sayings became enshrined 
among those of the sages of old in court documents. The Toangke, the 
faithful followers of Arung Palakka who had shared his long exile, were 
honoured by the community with a special status which persisted into the 
20th century.9 Arung Belo Tosa'deng, the close st companion of Arung 
Palakka, is recalled with fondness in Bone-Soppeng sourees and is made 
a son of Karaeng Goa and brothcr of Arung Palakka in a Makassar 
village ta Ie (L-32: 15). But the greatest praise is reserved for Arung 
Palakka who is apotheosized by thc Bone-Soppeng people for what was 
considered a miraculous deed. So powerful had Goa been in the 17th 
century that many in South Sulawesi scoffed at the idea of a Dutch 
military expedition pitted against that mighty kingdom. Yet the Dutch 
dared to test their strength against Goa, the "fighting cock of the East", 
and emerged victorious. The shock and incomprehension among the 
South Sulawesi peoples which accompanied the successes of the Dutch 
were cushioned by a comforting explanation that the victory was attri-
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butable to one man and his upe'. That man was Arung Palakka. And so 
the legend grew even during Arung Palakka's lifetime, thus contributing 
to the effieacy of his overlordship in Sou th Sulawesi. 
But Arung Palakka did not reign alone; he shared both honour and 
authority with the Dutch East India Company. The latter added a new 
element and greater complexity to the affairs of the island. With the 
Company now established as a permanent power in Sou th Sulawesi, the 
polities of the area became ineluctably entwined in the Company's wider 
strategie considerations beyond Sulawesi's shores. In the past a Sou th 
Sulawesi ruler with pretensions to overlordship could perhaps contem-
plate an alliance with the rulers of Mataram, Banten, or Aceh. Now th at 
the Company had become a potential ally, such considerations as wars in 
Europe or wars in the Asian countries where the major Company 
factories were located, had also become relevant. It was soon apparent 
that, he who was best able to assess the Company's concerns and to avail 
himseJf of the Company's good wishes and even military power when 
necessary, would be able to rise above all others. The Makassar War had 
made the Company a power in, but not of, South Sulawesi. It was this 
subtIe difference which Arung Palakka recognized and manipulated to 
create one of the most successful overlordships in the history of the area. 
CHAPTERVI 
TUE NEW OVERLORDS 
The fall of Sombaopu on 24 June 1669 symbolized to many people in 
South Sulawesi the beginning of a new era in the affairs of the peninsuia. 
Goa, once considered invincible by Christians and Moslems alike, lay 
shattered and powerless before its new conquerers: the Dutch East India 
Company and Arung Palakka. The unexpected overwhelming support 
which Arung Palakka received from the Bone and Soppeng people 
combined with the firepower of the Dutch proved too strong even for the 
mighty Goa armies. It was readily conceded by both the Dutch and the 
Bugis leaders that without the other, neither would have been able to 
achieve such startling success. Even after the fall of Sombaopu the new 
overlords relied heavily upon one another, believing that any weakness 
in one would have disastrous consequences on the other. It was this 
concern which helped preserve the alliance through some difficult 
periods in the 17th century and enabled Arung Palakka to become the 
most powerful prince in South Sulawesi. 
For both the Company and Arung Palakka the highest priority now 
that the fighting had ended was the reaffirmation of the Bungaya Treaty. 
For the Company the treaty was a legal document, according to 
European "International" Law, which would justify its newly acquired 
privileges in the area to powers both within and outside South Sulawesi. 
But for Arung Palakka the treaty was a symbolic document which, 
according to South Su la we si treaty practices, confirmed the new 
hierarchy of power on the island. The first of the defeated kingdoms to 
reaffirm the treaty was Tallo on 15 July 1669, followed by Goa on 
27 July 1669. There had been a delay in Goa because ofthe illness ofthe 
new Karaeng Goa I Mappasomba Sultan Amir Hamzah. But finallyon 
27th July he arrived in Fort Rotterdam accompanied by Karaeng Popo, 
Karaeng Bisei, Karaeng Galesong, Karaeng Ballo, Karaeng Mandalle, 
Karaeng Laikang, Gallarang Manngasa Kare Tumpa, Karaeng Sanra-
bone, as well as five gallarang from Sanrabone. As with other previous 
delegations from different South Sulawesi states, they lay down their 
weapons, swore on the Koran, and made an oath which was solemnized 
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by the drinking of water stirred with a kris (KA 1161c:693v). 
The formal submission of Goa and Tallo was an important, though 
merely the first, step in re-establishing the authority of the new over-
lords. There still remained the defiant aIlies of Goa and Tallo who were 
theoretically still at war with the Company and Arung Palakka. On 
1 August 1669, a little over a month af ter the fall of Sombaopu, Wajo 
and Lamuru went into battle against the Dutch and Arung Palakka at 
Tanete and were decisively defeated. Speelman, believing that th is 
battle would have convinced all former allies of the futility of further 
resistance, sent an envoy with a letter on 29th August offering Wajo 
pardon for its role in the war. But the envoy was barred from crossing the 
Cenrana River into Wajo (KA 1161c:695r-v). Only after several 
months did Wajo finally agree to accept a letter from the Company (KA 
1166b: 1043v). The situation, however, remained unchanged. It was 
reported that the young Karaeng Goa, Sultan Amir Hamzah, had sent 
Karaeng Jarannika to Wajo to encourage its people to continue to re sist 
and to prevent any movement of Bone Bugis through Wajo. Despite its 
recent reaffirmation of the Bungaya Treaty, Goa was said to have even 
offered assistance to Wajo (KA 1166c: 1047r-v). 
Throughout the first half of 1670 Wajo continued to ignore or defy 
any demands by the Company and Arung Palakka to surrender. Finally, 
on 7th August Arung Palakka led his Bugis army from Bontoala north-
ward to Tanete, then overland eastward to Bone. He had chosen this 
new route, instead of following the traditional one northward to 
Bacukiki and Pare-Pare and then eastward to Wajo, because he believed 
it to be quicker and easier. A rendezvous had been arranged with the 
Bugis forces from Bone and Luwu before the planned coordinated 
invasion of Wajo. But before undertaking the formidable task of be-
sieging the walled capital city of Tosora in Wajo, the army proceeded to 
the principality of Lamuru to punish it for its former support of Goa. 
Lamuru was typical of a number of principalities large and small in 
South Sulawesi in aligning itselfwith whichever kingdom it considered to 
be most powerful. It had assessed the political situation and had become 
an ally of Goa in the 17th century. The unexpected arrival of the 
Company fleet in 1666, and the even more unforeseen explosion of 
fervour exhibited by the Company's Bugis allies flocking to Arung 
Palakka's banners, had drastically changed the political situation almost 
overnight. Lamuru had had little time to make the necessary assessment 
and adjustment to the new situation. Now it was too late as the trium-
phant Bugis armies under Arung Palakka marched to Lamuru seeking as 
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much enrichment from, as punishment of, a vanquished foe. At the 
approach of the invading army, Datu Lamuru fled to safety to the 
mountains where he remained while his land was stripped and burned. 
Eventually he abandoned his mountain redoubt and surrendered to 
Arung Palakka. Af ter swearing allegiance to Arung Palakka, Datu 
Lamuru brought his 3,000 man army to join the military expedition 
against Wajo. While Lamuru's voluntary surrender saved it from being 
levied the traditional fine (sebbu kati) by the conquering army, it did not 
prevent looting and the forcible seizure of the inhabitants. What pre-
vented a total devastation of the countryside was Lamuru's decision to 
make Arung Palakka the Datu Lamuru on the death ofthe present aged 
Datu. Such an arrangement was not contrary to the customs of Lamuru, 
for there existed an old agreement among the principalities of Bengo, 
Mario, and Lamuru in Soppeng that if there were no qualified candidates 
for ruler in any of these states, they would be sought from the other two. 
Since Arung Palakka was also Datu Mario, he became theoretically 
eligible to rule in Lamuru if there we re no qualified successors to the 
Lamuru throne (KA 1171a:738r). Arung Palakka was later able to 
arrange matters to show that there was no one fit to succeed in Lamuru 
and therefore prepare the way for his election. 
When news of the victory in Lamuru and the approach of a large Bugis 
army reached Wajo, the principalities of Pammana and Peneki quickly 
changed allegiances. They abandoned their overlord Wajo and joined 
Arung Palakka, swelling his army still further to about 40,000 men. As 
the army marched through Wajo, it met Iittle resistance since many of 
the people had already fled to take refuge in Tosora. What remained of 
the settlements was pillaged and set to the torch. The march had been 
uneventful, but the real task was soon apparent when the army arrived at 
the well-fortified and well-supplied town of Tosora. A direct assault on 
the high walls was quickly rejected for the more practical and safer siege, 
even though it was reliably reported that there we re sufficient supplies 
and weapons stockpiled in Tosora to last for some time. In the beginning 
there was sporadic fighting whenever there was a sally from Tosora, but 
otherwise there were no pitched battles. The siege, however, began to 
have an effect as the defenders, with no relief in sight, were subject to 
constant pressure from the besieging forces. On 2nd October five outèr 
fortifications of Tosora had to be abandoned. Twice when Wajo troops 
ventured out into the battlefield they were soundly beaten and sent 
scattering back to the fortress. Arung Palakka now appeared confident 
that Wajo's leaders would ask for peace sin ce he was aware th at food was 
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now becoming scarce in Tosora. His forces, on the other hand, were 
being supplied by Dutch ships laden with rice from Bone and appeared 
capable of maintaining the siege indefinitely (KA 1166d: 1052r-v; KA 
1l66e: lO77r). 
One explanation for Wajo's continued defiance came to light when 
several letters from Karaeng Karunrung to Wajo's leaders were in-
tercepted. In these letters Karaeng Karunrung had urged Wajo to 
maintain its resistance to Arung Palakka and the Dutch. Similar profes-
sions of support came from Mandar which promised to come down from 
the north and attack Alitta, Bacukiki, and other areas under Arung 
Bakke Todani, a leader held in great esteem by Arung Palakka. The 
attack was intended to divert men from the Wajo campaign and thereby 
weaken the siege of Tosora. To discourage such a plan, the Dutch sent 
ships to lie oft Bacukiki ready to assist in repelling any attack from 
Mandar (KA 1171a:736v). While these letters from Goa and Mandar 
may have encouraged those besieged in Tosora, what had perhaps 
stiffened their resolve even more was fear of retribution from Arung 
Palakka. Wajo had rejected the traditional offer from Bone and Soppeng 
for a renewal of the Tellumpocco treaty and had instead favoured their 
treaty with Goa. The fierce, al most fanatic, resistance of the Wajo 
defenders is noted in both the contemporary Dutch reports and in later 
Bugis chronicles from Wajo and Soppeng (L-l :66; L-3:323). 
On 1 December 1670 aft er a three-month siege Arung Palakka and 
his army succeeded in capturing Tosora. During this period there were 
times when Arung Palakka despaired of ever being able to storm 
Tosora's heavily-defended walls. Regular arrivals of Dutch boats 
bringing both food and arms helped maintain the morale of the Bugis 
army throughout the long siege. What finally broke the stalemate were 
the Dutch cannons which slowly wore down the walls and the resolve of 
the defenders. Tosora's fall marked the end of alilarge-scaie organized 
resistance in Wajo. On 23 December 1670 the whole government of 
Wajo, composed of the new Arung Matoa La Palili Tomalu Puanna 
Gella,l Ranreng Tua, Ranreng Talotenreng, Arung Bettempola, plus 
other lesser lords, arrived in Fort Rotterdam. In a formal ceremony of 
surrender, the Wajo lords delivered their weapons to the Company's 
representative in Fort Rotterdam, President Maximilian de Jong. They 
then signed the Bungaya Treaty, and swore on the Koran to uphold it, 
and finally drank water stirred with a kris to demonstrate the seriousness 
with which the oath was made (KA 1171e:736v-737r). 
According to the Dutch version of the treaty, the principal articles were: 
VI The New Overlords 141 
1. The Wajo people, in accordance with the customs of the land, had 
fallen as prizes to the Company as a re sult of war. They, however, would 
be allowed to remain on the land, which was now a fief (leen)2 of the 
Company. 
2. On the death of an Arung Matoa, no new one would be chosen by the 
three electors [the Tellulimpo, i.e., the lords of Tua, Talotenreng, and 
Bettempola] and the people of Wajo without the approval and agree-
ment ofthe Company. 
3. All fortifications and fortified are as would be destroyed and new 
ones built only with the permission of the Company. 
4. Wajo would not admit any Europeans or Indian nations (including 
Malays), nor receive any envoys or missions from them. 
5. The people of Wajo would not be permitted to sail anywhere except 
to Bali, along the Java co ast to Batavia, and Kalimantan, without ob-
taining a pass from the Company's representative in Fort Rotterdam. If 
any Wajo boats should be found at sea or anywhere outside the harbours 
without a pass they would be treated as enemies. 
6. If any European official or subject of the Company should flee to 
Wajo, he should be returned immediately to the Chief Merchant of the 
Company in Fort Rotterdam. 
7. Wajo is bound by everything to which the Makassar people agreed 
af ter the conquest of Sombaopu [See Chapter IV]. 
8. The Wajo people are to pay 52,000 rijksdaalders to the Company 
over four monsoon periods in gold, silver, or jewels (Heeres 1931d:426-
430). 
Wajo was made to pay a war indemnity of 52,000 rijksdaalders or 
104,000 mas. In partial payment Wajo presented Arung Palakka with 
some gold and slaves amounting to 7,800 mas which Arung Palakka then 
delivered to the Company (KA 1171a:737v). When a Dutch envoy 
Laurens Vosch went to Wajo on 4 June 1671 to collect more of the 
indemnity, he was given only 700 rijksdaalders. The Wajo government 
claimed that it was unable to obtain any more from the impoverished 
people who had been plundered during the war and were even now daily 
harassed and robbed by outsiders (KA 1171b:737v). Wajo's lontara' 
describe this period as one of great suffering for the people. When the 
Bugis army began its invasion, all of Wajo's palili' north ofthe Walennae 
River went over to Bone, and only half of Gilireng and half of Belawa 
remained faithful to Wajo (Noorduyn 1955:277).3 
The fall of Tosora left many areas of Wajo vulnerable to the rapacity 
of Bone's armies. Examples cited by lontara' sources convey the humi-
liation and oppression suffered by the defeated people of Wajo. If a 
person from Bone took a fancy to anything belonging to someone from 
Wajo, he would simply seize it without compensation. If a Wajo man 
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were fishing and were ordered by someone from Bone to take him across 
Lake Tempe to Sidenreng, he had to do so without delay. If the former 
were to ask permission first to obtain food from home for the journey, he 
would be boxed in the ears. If he were to resist, he would be bound, and if 
he were to fight back, he would be killed. No one in Wajo was permitted 
to have metal implements of any kind, and so hoes (sube) were made 
from bon es of the water buffalo (tedong). So intolerable did the situation 
become and so difficult to obtain redress from any source that many 
people of Wajo fled to Ujung Pandang, Sumbawa, Donggala (Central 
Sulawesi), Pasir (East Kalimantan), Johor, and elsewhere in the Malay-
Indonesian archipelago (L-3:334-5, 343). Finally, in desperation Wajo 
appealed to its erstwhile enemy, the Dutch East India Company. The 
Company had successfully waged war against Goa and its allies, but once 
victory was attained, it had appeared content to oversee its affairs in the 
area from Fort Rotterdam. Unlike the Bone Bugis or Arung Palakka, 
the Company seemed unconcerned with the actual intemal affairs of 
South Sulawesi kingdoms as long as there were no major upheavals to 
disrupt Company trade. This disinterested element of the new foreign 
overlord appeared at least a hope of more impartiality than would have 
been:expected from Arung Palakka. An appeal, therefore, was made by 
WaJo to the Company leaders in Fort Rotterdam to restrain the excesses 
committed by Bone against its people. But it soon became apparent to 
the putch that winning a war was far less complex and difficult than 
establishing the peace. Despite Dutch admonitions to Arumpone and 
other Bone leaders to restrain their people, there was little change in the 
situation. The Dutch were finally forced to ask Arung Palakka to use his 
considerable influence among the Bugis to prevent further harassment 
of thè Wajo people (KA 1171 b:775r). 
This was to be a recurrent pattern in the effective dual overlordship of 
the Company and Arung Palakka for the next quarter-century. The 
Company was principally occupied with the port of Makassar and its 
environs since it was here that international trade occurred and here that 
Fort Rotterdam maintained its links with the rest of the vast Asian 
trading network of the Company. lts field of vision was outward toward 
the sea, and it was content to relinquish con trol on land to Arung 
Palakka. The latter, on the other hand, while openly acknowledging the 
authority of the Company as "Lord of the Sea and Navigation" (Con-
sideratien 1708:2), regarded Makassar, the international trade, and the 
Company, as simply means toward establishing a respected and enduring 
overlordship within South Sulawesi. The complementary aims of these 
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two new overlords, plus the special expertise which each brought to his 
specific area of con trol, usually proved to be an effective and workable 
combination. 
The discretionary powers allowed to either overlord in his special area 
of interest became apparent in the case of Wajo's complaint. Tbe 
Company had conveyed this problem to Bone, but when nothing was 
accomplished it simply delegated the task to Arung Palakka. While the 
Company may have hoped for some solution, it refrained from dictating 
what course of action Arung Palakka should follow. Tbe latter viewed 
the situation differently from the Company and therefore took steps 
which he believed most appropriate within the framework of asserting 
an effective overlordship within Sou th Sulawesi. He, as much as the 
other victorious Bugis leaders, feit that Wajo had rejected all avenues to 
peace and now had to suffer the consequences. Arung Palakka himself 
was making certain that Wajo would never regain its former wealth 
through trade. He seized the mouth of the Cenrana River, which was 
Wajo's only access to the sea, and he made Timurung and Pitumpanua, 
the two areas bounded by tbis river, part of Bone (Staden ten Brink 
1884: 116). It was a period remembered with great bitterness by the 
Wajo people and made later "emancipation" in the early 18th century 
by Arung Sengkang all the more exciting and glorious. An almost 
identical situation existed in Wajo at that time as prevailed in Bone and 
Soppeng in the mid-17th century. The basic similarity of the reasons for 
Arung Palakka's and Arung Sengkang's flight from South Sulawesi and 
their role in the Iiberation of their homeland is striking and explains why 
they are both still considered to be legends in South Sulawesi (Noorduyn 
1953: 144-152; Zainal Abidin bin Farid 1975: 1-31). 
The one remaining ally of Goa left unpunished was Mandar. Many of 
the leading members of the Malay and Makassar community had fled 
northward to Mandar seeking what they realized could only be 
temporary refuge (KA 1171b:776r). Fortunately, international trade 
and Islam had increased contact and provided a commonality of interests 
in thc whole Malay-Indonesian world, thus facilitating the movement 
and adaptation of people from one part of the archipelago to another. 
These refugees could therefore leave Sulawesi, seek protection from 
another Moslem lord, and adapt quite readily to a foreign but hospitabie 
land. The Dutch began to fear that the continuing stream of people 
fleeing abroad from Mandar could in time prove amenace. Their large 
numbers were a threat to the weak coastal kingdoms in the archipelago 
and were an ever-ready source of manpower for those preying on 
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inter-island shipping for personal profit, adventure, or political revenge. 
While this concern may have been the Company's principal reason for 
advocating act ion against Mandar, for Arung Palakka it was Mandar's 
defiance of his authority as overlord in South Sulawesi. 
On 6 October 1671 a combined Dutch-Bugis military expedition left 
Makassar for Mandar. In the two months prior to the expedition, Arung 
Palakka had gone to Bone and succeeded in obtaining its promise to 
dispatch troops to meet the contingent from Makassar at Bacukiki at a 
prearranged date. Earlier Arung Palakka had confidently boasted to 
President de Jong that his appearance in Bone, Wajo, and the Ajattap-
pareng states would be sufficient to assure their loyalty in the war against 
Mandar. As it happened there was little need for such widespread 
support since the campaign was short and mostly unopposed. All the 
settlements and orchards in Balannipa, Majene, Bukko, Campalagian, 
and Binuang were burned or destroyed, but the people had already fled 
to safety in the mountains. These were tactics traditionally employed by 
the Mandar kingdoms to assure survival against a superior invading 
force, and survival in the eyes of the Mandar people was success. 
Although the Mandar lords agreed to make peace, it was a vulnerable 
peace subject to the whims of the Mandar rulers. When the Dutch -B ugis 
forces returned to Makassar from Mandar on 16 November 1671, they 
were greeted as conquerors. Conquerers they were, but only for the 
moment and at the sufferance of the fickle Mandar lords (KA 1171b: 
775r-776r; KA 1171c:793r; KA 1177a: 1167r-v). 
With Goa's principal allies subdued the two overlords indulged in 
ceremonies to profess their steadfast loyalty and friendship to one 
another. Theirs had proved a formidable alliance and for this fact alone 
there was cause for rejoicing in both camps. On 20 May 1672 Arung 
Palakka and his most trusted lieutenant, Arung Bakke Todani, were 
presented with letters and various tokens of honour from the Company 
leaders in Batavia. Among the gifts which we re delivered to Arung 
Palakka amidst great pomp and ceremony was a gold medallion on 
which were engraved the words: "A token of honour for the high-bom 
courageous king of Palakka, Pattiro, Mario, Bantaeng, and Lamuru sent 
to him in Makassar in commemoration of the War of Tondio and 
Mandar in the year past 1672." As soon as President de Jong had 
delivered the message from Batavia praising Arung Palakka and Arung 
Bakke Todani for their fidelity to the Company, both of these men arose 
and with drawn krisses manngaru before the huge crowd gathered in 
Bontoala, swearing allegiance to the Company. So impressed was de 
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Jong by th is spontaneous display of loyalty th at he assured Batavia in his 
next missive th at there was every reason to believe in the sincerity of the 
oath. Letters and gifts from the Company were also sent to Bone to those 
who had participated in the Mandar campaign (KA 1177b: 1197v-
1198v; Bakkers 1866:191-2). 
The new overIords were able to demonstrate not only their readiness to 
reward loyalty but also their ability to punish opposition. Goa was 
warned that any flouting of the Company's regulations governing trade 
and navigation would be dealt with severely. Any Makassar boat found 
on the high seas without a Company pass would be attacked and its 
occupants enslaved (KA 1177b: 1198v). Goa and its allies we re further 
required to contribute manpower and supplies for the rebuilding and 
remodelling of Fort Rotterdam (see Maps 5 and 6). Although the 
Makassar people were to work alongside the B ugis and other allies of the 
Company in th is project, the mortification of these former overlords was 
apparent to all in South Sulawesi. Arung Palakka would have been weil 
aware of the significance of this arrangement when he suggested it to the 
Company (KA 1177c: 1208r-v). The recent memory of Goa's overseers 
directing Bugis forced labour to erect defence fortifications along 
Makassar's shoreline and of the proud Makassar fortress of Ujung 
Pandang now being converted to Fort Rotterdam by the Dutch would 
have made th is demand for Makassar labour an especially painful and 
humiliating one for Goa. 
The renovations of Fort Rotterdam were, in fact, the first formal test 
of the new authority of Arung Palakka and the Company. All the rulers 
of South Sulawesi, except for the Toraja, were summoned by Arung 
Palakka to bring men and provisions to Makassar for the renovations. 
Eager to prove their loyalty, these rulers responded with an enthusiasm 
which sent streams of men and supplies into Makassar. Despite Arung 
Palakka's protests that he was merely in the service ofthe Company, the 
local rulers were all too aware that it was he who interpreted the affairs in 
South Sulawesi for the Company. Since he had the Company's trust, he 
could decide the fate of any of the kingdoms. Such a message would not 
have been lost to the princes sensitively attuned to the most delicate 
shifts of political power. This was part of South Sulawesi statecraft, and 
they responded to the new power situation as confidently as they had 
done in the past to guarantee survival of their kingdoms. 
There was one conspicuous absence in Fort Rotterdam. When Dutch 
envoys went to Bone and requested Arumpone La Ma'daremmeng's 
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presence in Makassar, he pleaded illness and promised to send in his 
place his sons Daeng Memang and Daeng Tojeng. He was quick to 
assure the envoys, however, that he simply wanted to conduct himself in 
a manner which would meet with the approval of Arung Palakka and 
Datu Soppeng La Tenribali (KA I 177c: 1203v-1204r). This assurance 
revealed La Ma'daremmeng's fears that his equivocal stance in the 
Makassar War and the reluctance with which he had despatched a small 
token force in the Mandar campaign would have prejudiced Arung 
Palakka and Datu Soppeng against him. These latter two Bugis rulers 
had remained steadfast throughout in their opposition against Goa, and 
now they stood in judgement of all those who were less than totally 
committed to the Dutch-Bugis side in the war. As worrisome to La 
Ma'daremmeng was the real possibility that Arung Palakka, with the 
backing of the Company, would seize the throne of Bone. Arung 
Palakka 's mother was We Tenrisui, daughter of Arumpone La Tenrirua 
Sultan Adam Matinroe ri Bantaeng (1607-1608), and so he had some 
claim to the throne (L-26: 19). Although Arung Palakka was lord of 
Pattiro, Palette, and Palakka in Bone, Mario in Soppeng, as weil as lord 
of the Company's lands of Bantaeng and Bontoala, he lacked any real 
power base in any of the major kingdoms in South Sulawesi. He had been 
ab Ie to harness the explosive energies of the Bugis people in a vengeful 
war against Goa, but victory had ironically weakened his appeal as the 
people returned to their respective homes and lords. It was no secret th at 
Arung Palakka desired, indeed required, a base upon which he could 
exercise an independent and respected authority. Without such a base 
Arung Palakka was rootless, but even more damaging, merely existing 
on the largesse and sufferance of the Company. Arung Palakka as 
Arumpone would have been welcome to the Dutch, for a powerful and 
friendly Bone would be useful in maintaining the peace in South 
Sulawesi. All of these considerations may have convinced La 
Ma'daremmeng that his failure to appear in Makassar, while damaging 
to his standing with the new overlords, at least postponed for a time any 
attempt to re move him from the throne in his absence. 
Even before the work on Fort Rotterdam had been completed, the 
authority of the new overlords was again put on trial. On the morning of 
2 July 1672 Arung Palakka informed the Dutch that three of his court 
maidens (dayang) were missing. He had immediately suspected a Goa 
plot and had sent some of his men to see if they were being held against 
their wishes. Although there was no trace of the missing dayang, it was 
rumoured that they had been brought first to Karaeng Karunrung and 
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then spirited away to Mandar. Even before the rumours could be 
verified, Arung Palakka seized upon this incident to remonstrate with 
the Company. He claimed that this was the second such outrage 
perpetrated by Karaeng Karunrung in the latte r's efforts to discredit 
Arung Palakka and hence undermine his authority among the people of 
Sou th Sulawesi. In a visit to Bone sometime in the first half of 1672, two 
of Arung Palakka's secondary wives had been molested and then carried 
off by Karaeng Massepe, supposedly at the instigation of Karaeng 
Karunrung. Until now Arung Palakka had held his tongue but could no 
longer remain silent in face of this further humiliation. He informed the 
Dutch that he preferred death to a life of shame (KA 1177b: 1204v-
1205r). The humiliation would have been even more searing because the 
attack on Arung Palakka's wives and court maidens were a taunt to 
Arung Palakka's manhood. It would not have been difficult for an,Y0ne 
in South Sulawesi to detect the subtIe insult to Arung Palakka's virility 
since it was common knowledge that he was childless. To a society where 
the quantity of children was regarded both as a guarantee of security in 
one's old age and a measure of one's manliness, such an insult even if 
only imagined by Arung Palakka was an intolerable situation .• To have 
accepted this humiliation, which would have meant existence in the 
community without siri' or self-respect, would have been tantamount to 
ostracism and ridicule by his fellowmen. The only reasçm Arung Palakka 
had refrained from seeking immediate act ion to remove his shame when 
the first heinous crime had been committed in Bone was because he was 
then a guest of the Arumpone. When the second insult occurred there 
was now little reason not to respond to the challenge. Once among his 
own supporters in Makassar, Arung Palakka could proceed in planning 
revenge knowing full weil that the Dutch would now be receptive to a 
request for assistance to re-establish Arung Palakka's credibil~ty among 
the people ofSouth Sulawesi. Arung Palakka had served the Dutch weIl, 
and it was to the latte r's benefit to see that his authority remained 
undiminished. At the moment, however, Fort Rotterdam was reluctant 
to take any firm action because of Batavia's instructions to avoid any 
other costly wars in South Sulawesi (KA 1177c: 1206r-1207v). It simply 
issued a stern message to Goa to account for Arung Palakka's missing 
women. So serious was the situation that Karaeng Goa Sultan Amir 
Hamzah and Karaeng Karunrung themselves led the Goa delegation to 
Fort Rotterdam to discuss the affair with the Dutch. They thanked the 
Dutch for their "fatherly advice oo and promised to send a message 
immediately to Mandar to seek the whereabouts of Arung Palakka's 
148 The Heritage of Arung Palakka 
women. When the Goa messenger returned, however, he brought no 
word of the women (KA 1177c: 1205v, 1207v). 
Arung Palakka was cJearly upset by Fort Rotterdam's failure to take 
any action against Goa. To show his displeasure, which became 
customary in later years, he left Bontoala to go to Bone in September 
1672. While in Bone he fulfilled a vow which he and his Toangke had 
made while in exile. Together they had swom never to cut their hair until 
they had succeeded in freeing their compatriots from Goa's tyranny. 
Since that vow was made, Arung Palakka's hair remained uncut thus 
earning him the nickname by which he is most widely-known among the 
Bugis and Makassar people: Petta Malampee Gemme'na or "The Long-
Haired Prince". The prestige and intluence which Arung Palakka now 
wielded were apparent by the presence at the hair-cutting ceremony of 
large numbers of people of all ranks and suku (KA 1177d: 1226r). 
It was during Arung Palakka's presence in Bone that he was chosen to 
be Arumpone in preference to La Ma'daremmeng's own son, Arung 
Timurung La Pakkokoe. The latter was understandably upset by the 
decision and attempted to nullify Arung Palakka's election with the 
connivance of a number of important nobles from Bone and Goa. When 
he failed to have the election reversed, he knew that his life was in danger 
and so he tled to Wajo and then to Mandar. At Mandar he was joined by 
Karaeng Massepe with 2,000 men, and together they marched to 
Enrekang hoping to find safety in the mountains. While ensconced in his 
mountain refuge, Arung Timurung despatched.envoys to Bone, Tanete, 
Bacukiki, Sawitto, and a number of other areas on the west co ast to seek 
allies. In an intercepted letter addressed to the Bone nob les, Arung 
Timurung had written: 
Warm greetings to all of you who are bound to me! On the 22nd day of 
Haji (9 April) I will go with Karaeng Massepe to Rappang and there 
unite with our friends from Ajattappareng and Toraja. My request to 
you is that we begin this enterprise together. If I begin and you do not, 
you will then be cutting my throat ... Our work will begin on 22 Haji ... 
If you will not join us, then you wiJl be our enemy. I earnestly beseech 
you to make every effort to become involved so that it would contribute 
to the welfare of your land, and by your compassion4 for us, we would be 
able to live (KA 1184e:300v-302v). 
Much to the anger of Arung Palakka and the Company, La 
Ma'daremmeng had also apparently condoned, if not encouraged, his 
sons Arung Timurung and Daeng Pabila, Bone's Punggawa (Comman-
der-in-Chief of Bone's armies in wartime), in this hazardous enterprise. 
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In a letter to his son Arung Timurung, La Ma'daremmeng had advised: 
Do not be hasty in overthrowing [Arung Palakka) because those in Bone 
wish no ill and also would not be happy to see any ill befall the land. 
Furtherrnore, there is no one here who wishes to heed them [i.e. those in 
favour of Arung Timurung) and therefore they await your coming. It 
would be best if you come to a firrn agreement with your friends there [in 
Ajattappareng and Toraja), and you and all of our friends there 
strengthen yourselves and go to unite with the mier of Goa ... You can 
also go to Wajo and Luwu, and if you are united with them all, you can 
then all begin to work together. I and all those who are with me advise 
and hope that, when you leave there and go to Barru, you secure it by 
force so that it would willingly join us. If you should find Datu Soppeng 
there, you could announce to him that it would be best that he be mindful 
of the fact that what one has, the other would not take away, but that 
each would maintain and keep that which belongs to him. 5 It would be 
best if you went to borrow gold from the mier of Goa, as weil as from the 
ruler of Lamuru and the ruler of Luwu so that with it you can give the 
nob les [of Bone) a taste of it ... 1 have but three sons: the ruler of Luwu, 
the ruler of Wajo, and Tounru' [i.e. Arung Palakka). The last has 
forgotten the treaty, and th is is the reason that he bothers us. And this is 
the reason, my son, for my desire to love and be loved by Luwu since he 
[Datu Luwu] has not neglected, in this time of our inconvenience, to 
come and visit me. He is still mindful of the oaths which we had both 
made when we both buried the stone [i.e. entered into a treaty arrange-
ment] (KA 1184f:297r-298r).6 
Letters had also been sent by Karaeng Goa Sultan Amir Hamzah and 
Karaeng Karunrung. Through gifts and promises they had not only 
incited Karaeng Massepe Daeng Mannabe but had also subomed Daeng 
Pabila of Bone (KA 1184c:232r-v). The most incriminating evidence of 
Goa's encouragement of Karaeng Massepe was a letter written to him by 
Karaeng Karunrung dated 11 Shawall083 (31 January 1673): 
Should God give you the strength, it would be good for you to begin first 
so that we thereby may gain praise. These enemies have become weak, 
and all of their friends (so I hear) have become embittered toward them 
(KA 1184d:296v). 
To deal with this threat, which had the active encouragement of the 
leaders of Goa and Bone, Arung Palakka ordered his most trusted 
Toangke, Arung Bakke Todani, to send an army against Arung 
Timurung. What appeared to be a relatively simple campaign ended in 
disaster for Arung Bakke's army, and he was forced to ask help from 
Arung Palakka. This defeat could not be ignored because Arung 
Timurung's challenge to Arung Palakka's authority was being closely 
watched by the people of South Sulawesi. Failure or even a sign of 
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weakness could result in further outbreaks of trouble, and sa Arung 
Palakka decided to take command of a new expedition against the 
combined forces of Arung Timurung and Karaeng Massepe. Bila-bila 
musu' were sent to Bone, Wajo, and Pammana to assembie on 27th 
April for the expedition to Enrekang. Men we re then ordered to Sawitto 
and to Enrekang to seize the mountain passes. To assist in th is campaign, 
the Dutch sent a ship with ammunition for the Bugis army and ten Dutch 
soldiers under the command of a sergeant as requested by Arung 
Palakka (KA 1184b:218v; KA 1184a:192v-194r). On 5 May 1673 
news reached Fort Rotterdam that Arung Palakka had arrived in 
Sawitto from Tanete and Soppeng and had taken command of an army 
of 20,000 men. With this large army Arung Palakka easily defeated 
Arung Timurung and his Mander allies at Massepe. 
Karaeng Massepe and the survivors of his army fted to Maiwa on a 
mountain with good natural defences to await any further attacks. There 
were occasion al skirmishes between the two sides, but there appeared 
little hope for the besieged who had only a limited supply of food and 
water. To draw away men from the siege Mandar sent forty large ships to 
raid along the west coast in the vicinity of Bacukiki and Tanete. Despite 
these diversionary tactics, the defending forces at Maiwa were over-
whelmed. Karaeng Massepe, Arung Timurung, and the ruler of Maiwa 
managed to escape, but the ruler of Maiwa was later taken prisoner. The 
area which had rebelled against the authority of Arung Bakke was fined 
5,500 gold pieces, of which Arung Palakka kept 3,500. He distributed 
this amount to all those who had fought weil and to same others who had 
participated in the fighting. The other 2,000 he gave to the Company. 
Arung Tirnurung soon surrendered and sent a gold kris and three gold 
armlets as sign of his submission. 7 Only Karaeng Massepe and his 
brothers eluded capture for a while and attempted to escape into the 
Toraja lands. They gave the ruler of Duri varia us gifts in hopes of a safe 
passage through his land. Af ter receiving the gifts, the ruler of Duri then 
refused the request for fear of antagonizing Arung Palakka and the 
Company. With these hopes of escape to Toraja dashed, Karaeng 
Massepe and his followers remained in the forests but were eventually 
killed or taken prisoner. The heads of Karaeng Massepe and his brother 
were sent to Arung Palakka, together with two of Arung Palakka's 
kidnapped wives (KA 1184c:231r-232r). By Arung Palakka's and Datu 
Soppeng's orders the Punggawa Daeng Pabila was put to death. Arung 
Timurung was brought to Ujung Pandang and placed under Arung 
Palakka's supervision. His marriage to Arung Palakka's sister We 
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Mappolobombang Da Upi may have played a part in his relatively light 
punishment. Only La Ma'daremmeng remained untouched in Bone 
despite his role in the whole affair (KA 1184c:232r-v; KA 1184g:234v-
235r). Although La Ma'daremmeng had abdicated, his former position 
as Arumpone was sufficient to pro vide him with the sanctity of kingship 
among his people. Any harsh measures taken against him would have 
aroused hostility and jeopardized Arung Palakka's already insecure 
position in th at kingdom. Finally, Arung Palakka strongly recom-
mended to the Goa government that Karaeng Karunrung, Karaeng 
Jarannika, and Gallarang Manngasa be removed from any positions of 
authority. As in the case of La Ma'daremmeng, however, nothing was 
done about Karaeng Goa Sultan Amir Hamzah. The Goa plotters had 
merely encouraged but had not actively participated in the rebellion, and 
so Arung Palakka and the Company were content merely to recommend 
punishment and to leave its implementation to the Goa government 
itself (KA 1184g:235r). 
With the rebellion over and with no further sign of opposition to the new 
overlords, Arung Palakka was free to devote himself again to the task of 
re-establishing order in the land. He resumed the task begun earlier of 
rebuilding dikes and restoring the ricefields which had been destroyed or 
neglected during the long years of warfare. Since the fighting had 
occurred mainly on the plains where the ricefields were located, there 
had been wide-scale destruction of the dikes, the grain, and the water 
buffaloes used for ploughing. In the years 1670-2 Arung Palakka was 
principally concerned with the ricefields in Maros and Bantaeng, the two 
territories which had been presented to him by the Company as "fiefs" 
for his loyalty (KA 1177d: 1226r, passim). It was at this time, according 
to Bugis sources, th at some ofthe Toangke were given land in Maros and 
Segeri, areas originally settled by the Makassar people(L-6:71-2; L-
21:121-2). 
While seeking to restore rice-growing, Arung Palakka was equally 
diligent in confirming the new hierarchy of states which arose in the 
aftermath of the war. The rebellion by Arung Timurung and Karaeng 
Massepe had demonstrated once again the fluidity of alliances in South 
Sulawesi. It was now Arung Palakka's task to establish the new hierarchy 
of power in the area and to resto re harmony, especially in Bone which 
had been badly shaken by the conflict of loyalties during the rebellion. 
His friendship with Datu Soppeng La Tenribali was reaffirmed by his 
marriage in Barru to the latter's daughter, We Adda Matinroe ri 
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MadeIlo. 8 At the wedding ceremony in Barru, envoys from Duri and 
Toraja were present to offer their respects to Arung Palakka. Special 
treatment was accorded to the representatives of the Langi' Toraja, who 
controlled the most important mountains above Mandar, because they 
had steadfastly refused all attempts by Mandar to enlist their help 
against Arung Palakka. But their refusal to bow to Mandar pressure had 
been achieved at a price, and they now sought Arung Palakka's help to 
avenge their rul er killed by the Mandar folk for alleged collaboration 
with Arung Palakka. To prove their loyalty, the Langi' Toraja pledged to 
send their children to Arung Palakka as hostages. The Mandar states, 
secure in the belief th at their mountains would always provide refuge, 
remained openly defiant to both Arung Palakka and the Company. They 
refused to surrender anyone fleeing from Arung Palakka and the Dutch, 
and they ignored Dutch demands that Mandar navigation be restricted. 
In view of these circumstances Governor Harthouwer in Fort Rotterdam 
feit it necessary to have Arung Palakka and the other South Sulawesi 
allies send yet another punitive expedition against Mandar. For the first 
time Arung Palakka believed that such a campaign had a chance of 
success. In the past the Mandar people had simply melted into the 
mountains without a trace at the approach of an enemy force. But now 
that the Langi' Toraja had openly declared their enmity toward Mandar, 
the traditional escape route seemed in jeopardy. Arung Palakka urged 
the Company to take this opportunity to strike and end Mandar's con-
tinuing belligerence (KA 1184h:260r-261r; KA 1191 a:'652r-653r). 
On 31 October 1673 the various South Sulawesi lords and nob les led 
by Arung Palakka assembied at Fort Rotterdam and performed the aru, 
swearing allegiance to one another and to the Company. They then 
boarded the Dutch ships which brought them on 3rd November at an 
agreed rendezvous at the Sa'dan River where the troops which travelled 
overland had already gathered. Rain and bad weather hampered opera-
tions, but on the 19th the invading army inflicted a decisive defeat on the 
smaller Mandar forces. Another Mandar stand in the foothills again 
resulted in a rout, and now all Mandar survivors vanished into the high 
mountains. The expected Langi' Toraja assistance never materialized, 
and so this campaign, like others before it, had to be content with victory 
on the battlefield and the destruction of the Mandar countryside without 
submission of the Mandar people or their leaders. As in previous cam-
paigns against Mandar, the orchards, animais, and villages were 
destroyed. Mandar also suffered the loss of four or five of their most 
important princes, induding Daeng Rioie, the brother of the Maradia 
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Balannipa. The systematic destruction of the fields, orchards, and the 
animals in Mandar caused severe hardship and famine throughout the 
land. Bugis and Makassar refugees who had fled to Mandar now moved 
north to Mamuju and Kaili to escape the hunger and the long arm of 
Arung Palakka (KA 1191a:652r-655r). 
Unlike Arung Palakka's relations with Mandar, those with Goa grad-
ually improved af ter the Arung Timurung-Karaeng Massepe rebellion. 
On 1 February 1674 Karaeng Goa Sultan Amir Hamzah informed 
Arung Palakka that the latte r's kidnapped court maidens were being 
held by a certain Makassar bandit chief in the mountains behind Goa and 
Galesong. To demonstrate his good intentions, Sultan Amir Hamzah 
himself volunteered to head a Makassar force to join those of Arung 
Palakka to attack the bandit's hideaway in the hills. The expedition was 
successful and all three of Arung Palakka's court maidens we re rescued. 
The bandit leader escaped, but 150 of his band, including women and 
children, were captured and retumed to their former homes (KA 1191a: 
657v-659v).9 The satisfactory conclusion of the dayang affair served to 
draw Arung Palakka and Sultan Amir Hamzah even closer together. 
The Dutch noted with misgivings the frequent visits to Bontoala by 
Sultan Amir Hamzah, although they were somewhat reassured by 
Arung Palakka's negligence in retuming the courtesy. Fort Rotterdam 
assured Batavia that they would attempt to prevent too strong a friend-
ship developing between these two powerful rulers. Wh at concemed the 
Company was a possible link between the growing reconciliation 
between Arung Palakka and the Goa leaders and the failure of Sultan 
Amir Hamzah to make the customary visit to Fort Rotterdam. As in the 
past the Company lay the blame for these developments on the now old, 
sickly, and practically immobile Karaeng Karunrung. So powerful an 
influence did Karaeng Karunrung exert in the past th at it was difficult for 
the Company to imagine anyone else as cunning and as motivated as he 
in removing all influence of the Company in South Sulawesi. 
There was, nevertheless, an increasing distrust of Arung Palakka's 
motives since he wielded enormous power in the area. When Goa was 
clearly the enemy, the Company had whole-heartedly supported Arung 
Palakka. In the Makassar War of 1666-9, the strong comradeship 
between Arung Palakka and Admiral Speelman had sustained the 
alliance. With Speelman's departure at the end of 1669, his successor 
Maximiliaan de Jong grew increasingly dependent upon Arung 
Palakka's advice on South Sulawesi affairs because of his own inexperi-
ence in the area. Arung Pa lak ka was therefore ab Ie to consolidate his 
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already strong position with Fort Rotterdam as its principal adviser and 
confidant in South Sulawesi. He became the intermediary between Fort 
Rotterdam and the locallords and used his role to determine who should 
bl. favoured with an audience. Furthermore, in the beginning he was 
of ten asked by the Dutch to serve as interpreter since he could speak 
both Bugis and Makassar and could then translate into Malay for the 
Dutch. These two important functions gave Arung Palakka access to any 
information which passed between the Dutch and a locallord. But more 
important, this position of confidence with the Dutch enhanced Arung 
Palakka's stature and hence influence among the rulers and people of 
South Sulawesi. 
So successful had Arung Palakka been in acquiring power that by late 
1672 he was chosen as Arumpone to replace La Ma'daremmeng who 
had abdicated. lronically, it was Arung Palakka's new power base in 
Bone, at first welcomed by Fort Rotterdam as strengthening a most 
dependable ally, which came to arouse fears conceming Arung 
Palakka's ambitions. A powerful Bone kingdom under Arung Palakka 
was se en as much a potential danger to the Company as a resurrected 
Goa. There we re some in Fort Rotterdam who recommended actively 
forestalling any attempts by the Bone and Goa kingdoms to form an 
alliance (KA 1177c:1208r; KA 1184a:192v-193r; KA 1191a:695v-
668v). 
Fort Rotterdam's cautious attitude revealed a basic lack of under-
standing of wh at the victory in the Makassar. War meant to Arung 
Palakka. In Bugis and Makassar sources the story of Arung Palakka's 
flight from Sulawesi is explained in a poignant fashion in terms of siri'. In 
the Makassar tale, Sinrili'na Kappa/a' Tallumbatua, Arung Palakka is 
depicted as a prince of Goa who is wronged by his father, the ruler, and 
hence seeks power which would remove his shame and restore his 
self-respect. The Bugis /antam' and folktales emphasize Arung 
Palakka's intense distress which grows into shame upon seeing the 
suffering of his people working as slaves for the Makassar overlords. His 
act of rebellion against the Makassar oppressors, therefore, is seen as 
being motivated by his desire to free his people and re move their shame. 
In both the Bugis and Makassar accounts, it is the "Kompani", i.e. the 
Dutch East India Company, which helps Arung Palakka in removing his 
and his people's shame and in restoring their self-respect (L. Y. Andaya 
1980). Contemporary Dutch reports comment on Arung Palakka's 
emotional expressions of loyalty to the Company with an undertone of 
suspicion regarding their sincerity. Yet Arung Palakka was behaving like 
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any other respectable member of his society toward the person or 
persons responsible for restoring his siri'. So intense is the sense of 
obligation in South Sulawesi that it was this theme which was retained by 
both the Makassar and Bugis people when reciting the story of Arung 
Palakka who conquered Goa with the help of the "Kompani" . 
Despite the Company's misgivings about Arung Palakka's growing 
power, it recognized the value of maintaining his friendship. Together 
they had subdued Goa and all of its allies by the middle of the 1670s. The 
acts leading to their joint overlordship had been grand, culminating in 
the spectacular victories over Sombaopu and Tosora. An understanding 
had even been reached in which the Company assumed control over 
decisions on trade and external affairs, while Arung patakka ~uaranteed 
the smooth functioning of internal affairs. This arrangement suited both 
overlords admirably, but it had yet to be put to the test in the bleak, 
somewhat unglamourous task of dealing with the day to day problems of 
South Sulawesi. 
CHAPTER VII 
TRIALS OF OVERLORDSHIP 
By 1674 peace finally seemed to have been achieved in South Sulawesi. 
Goa had been so thoroughly ravaged by the victorious army of the Bugis 
and their allies that its inhabitants had been reduced to great poverty 
and suffering. The Goa leaders pleaded with the Dutch for assistance 
since they no longer had any source of income. Since the time of 
Tunipalangga (1546?-1565) the Goa rulers had reorganized the king-
dom to cater to the demands of international trade. The greatly 
increased revenue which began to fill the coffers of the royal treasury in 
subsequent years vindicated Tunipalangga's vision of transforming 
Makassar into a truly international entrepot and Goa into the foremost 
power in South Sulawesi. When the Company seized Makassar and 
declared it its own territory by right of conquest, they dealt an almost 
fatal blow to this international trade and principal source of revenue for 
Goa. At first the latter attempted to persuade the Dutch to restore its 
international trade so that its leaders could regain lost revenues. The 
Company, however, refused to soften its policies since it was the wealth 
from this trade which had transformed Goa into a power so dangerous to 
the Company's interests in Eastern Indonesia. The Company replied 
simply: "Return and till your lands" (KA 1191a:661r). The Company's 
advice, simple and forthright, was to Goa the death-knell to its ambitions 
and aregression to an earlier period of anonymity in the area. This was a 
demoralizing time for the Goa court, and any opposition to the Com-
pany and Arung Palakka from this quarter seemed remote indeed. 
No major conflicts loomed in the horizon for the new overlords, but 
there were the minor intra-kingdom squabbles which could provide the 
spark to ignite yet another destructive war. In Luwu the nobles had 
deposed their ruler, Daeng Massuro Matinroe ri Tompotikka', and 
replaced him with Daeng Mattuju, whose mother was Karaeng Tama-
songo, daughter of Karaeng Sumanna, the former Tuma'bicara-butta 
Goa. Daeng Massuro had fled to Duri and then to Bone, from which 
place he sent a letter to Arung Palakka requesting that his grievances be 
heard at Fort Rotterdam. He expressed his belief that Arung Palakka 
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and the Company would find a satisfactory resolution to this problem in 
Luwu (KA 1191b:661v-662r). 
The Council (Hadat) of Luwu accused the deposed ruler of being 
insincere and a false ally and friend of the Company for the following 
reasons: 
(1) He had not implemented the Bungaya treaty. 
(2) He had let his unde, the former Opu Cenning, escape to Java 
instead of delivering him to the Dutch. 
(3) During his reign he had never once come to Fort Rotterdam. 
(4) He had no consideration for the government of Luwu, and through 
negligence had allowed the kingdom to deteriorate (KA 1191c:680v-
681r). 
The first three reasons were simply a preamble to demonstrate the 
guilt of the former Datu Luwu toward the Company. Only in the fourth 
reason was the source of the conflict revealed. The Hadat, however, was 
realistic enough to realize that the Company and Arung Palakka would 
most likely condone the Hadat'sfait accompli ifit could be shown to be in 
their best interests. Since the present state of affairs in Luwu was not 
displeasing to either Arung Palakka or the Company, no immediate 
act ion was taken. The exiled Datu Luwu, who was characterized as 
having a mild disposition, remained in Makassar mainly in the company 
of Arung Palakka. Reprieved for the moment, the new Datu Luwu 
Daeng Mattuju was eager to gain the favour of the new powers and thus 
brought his army to join Arung Palakka in yet another campaign against 
Mandar (KA 1191d:727v). 
Mandar had never been totally pacified, and its periodic outbursts of 
defiance were more an irritant than a real threat to the overlords. 
Nevertheless, Mandar at its worst could provide an alternative port for 
international trade and a refuge for the Company's and Arung Palakka's 
enemies. It was therefore necessary to mount an expedition from time to 
time to prevent the situation in Mandar from becoming too uncom-
fortable for either overlord. In this new campaign the Company would 
have been content to leave weil enough alone, but it was Arung Palakka 
who urged another attack on Mandar. The most that the Dutch in Fort 
Rotterdam could do was to persuade Arung Palakka to post po ne the 
campaign until September, so that an investigation could be made on 
Arung Palakka's complaint (KA 119Ie:702v-703r). 
Unwilling to sit idly by until the Company made its decision, Arung 
Palakka decided to take matters into his own hands. On 21 August 1674 
he returned from a trip to Bone and Soppeng bringing word that these 
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two allies were prepared to come with a large force to attack Mandar. 
The Company now could find few real objections to the campaign, and 
so a resolution was passed by the Council in Fort Rotterdam on 29th 
August to send one ship and two sloops to carry ammunition and other 
supplies to Arung Palakka and the allies. On lOth September, just 
before the expedition set sail, envoys from the Mandar states of 
Binuang, Kaluwa, and Parampuang appeared in Makassar. In the pre-
sence of Arung Palakka, the various local allies, and the Company 
officials, the envoys conveyed the message th at their rulers and nob les 
wanted to ask forgiveness. They also reported the imminent arrival of 
envoys from the other Mandar states of Sendana, Balannipa, and 
Majene bearing a similar message.! It was agreed that in twelve dàys 
time all the Mandar rulers and nobles were to meet at an agreed spot on 
the Sa'dan River to announce their formal surrender (KA 119lf:714r-
715r). Arung Palakka was to represent the allies in accepting the surren-
der and in persuading Mandar's leaders to come to Makassar to decIare 
their loyalty (KA 1191g:712r). On 23rd September all the Mandar 
rulers appeared at the location agreed upon, except for the ruler of 
Sendana who was ill and had sent a representative in his place. In a brief 
but emotional ceremony the Mandar leaders swore before Arung 
Palakka, Arung Bakke, and the Company's representative Nicholas 
Pleun, to maintain a firm and unbreakable peace wi~h Arung Palakka 
and the Company. Arung Palakka rose and in reply asked that these 
rulers truly demonstrate their good intentions hy going to Fort Rotter-
dam and swearing to uphold the Bungaya treaty. There was no objection 
to this proposal, and so the Mandar leaders proceeded to Makassar. On 
II Octoher 1674 they swore on the Koran in the presence of Arung 
Palakka, Arung Bakke, and all the allies, to uphold all the articIes of the 
Bungaya treaty (KA 119Ih:719v-720r). 
The signing of the B ungaya treaty by the Mandar rulers was a personal 
triumph for Arung Palakka. While the Company was willing to tolerate 
Mandar's activities rather than expend yet more funds on another war. 
Mandar's open defiance was a jarring reminder to Arung Palakka that 
his war with Goa's principal allies was not yet over. Furthermore, 
Mandar's increasing independence posed a threat to Arung Palakka's 
future plans. As long as there remained one kingdom or confederation of 
kingdoms which could defy his wishes, it would be difficult to prevent 
others from doing the same. Any attempt to weid all the disparate 
kingdoms of South Sulawesi into one unit responsive to his wishes was 
impossible as long as· Mandar remained outside the Bungaya treaty. It 
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was for these reasons that Arung Palakka had insisted, des pi te the 
Company's reluctance, to send an expedition against Mandar. Much to 
his credit, the news of the impending invasion was sufficient to compel 
obedience from Mandar. Although Arung Palakka realized that a per-
manent state of peace with Mandar would not be achieved merely by 
swearing to uphold the Bungaya treaty, he considered it important to 
demonstrate his power and authority while he was still being appraised 
as an overlord by the South Sulawesi states. Had he failed to subdue the 
Mandar leaders or even failed to convince them to come to Makassar, he 
would have found his prestige diminished and his ability to con trol 
affairs in the area considerably weakened. But he had succeeded, and his 
overlordship seemed secure. Ironically, it was not his ene mies but his 
allies, the Dutch, who came to pose the most serious threat to his 
position. 
In late October 1674 President Harthouwer had written to Batavia 
from Fort Rotterdam that affairs in South Sulawesi were peaceful (KA 
1191d:727v). Little did he realize that events were then unfolding which 
would severely test the alliance between Arung Palakka and the Com-
pany. On 24 October 1674 three Dutch soldiers were walking in the 
Bugis Quarter (Kampong Bugis) in Makassar when they found the tunic 
and a loek of hair belonging to a missing comrade. They immediately 
concluded that he had been murdered and went to question his native 
concubine who, it was rumoured, belonged to the interpreter of Datu 
Soppeng La Tenribali. When they questioned her, she admitted having 
spoken to the missing soldier some months before. She also volunteered 
the information that a boyservant had told her that their master, the 
interpreter Syarif, had killed the soldier. Both Syarif and his boyservant 
were then summoned by a Dutch official to report everything they knew 
of the missing Dutchman. The boy explained how one morning in July he 
had gone with his master to the shore and met this Dutchman who was 
having an affair with the woman who belonged to his master. He had 
watched the two men go into the woods, and a few moments later he had 
seen the Dutchman fall to the ground. His master had then returned with 
a bloody kris and made him swear not to mention the incident to anyone. 
Arung Palakka was disturbed to learn of the whole affair because the 
interpreter Syarif was held in high regard by his father-in-law, the Datu 
Soppeng. Eager to learn the circumstances of the incident in greater 
detail, Arung Palakka had asked Harthouwer to send Syarif to him at 
Bontoala. But Harthouwer refused to release Syariffrom Dutch custody 
and instead asked Arung Palakka 10 come to Fort Rotterdam to question 
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the accused. Arung Amali, Karaeng Lengkese, and various other impor-
tant nob les were delegated by Arung Palakka to go to Fort Rotterdam to 
conduct an investigation. When they were told the above story, they 
requested forgiveness for Syarif but Harthouwer was adamant in his 
decision to try the accused according to Dutch law. Somewhat taken 
aback by the vehemence of Harthouwer's stance, the delegation remind-
ed him that the Company had not been especially rigorous in pursuing 
justice when it released the Dutch Captain Jan Fransen even though he 
had killed three Bugis in Maros for no apparent reason. In that case the 
Bugis leaders had allowed th is travesty of justice to pass without 
demanding satisfaction. These arguments and further entreaties failed to 
move Harthouwer, and so the delegation returned to Bontoala. On 12 
November 1674 Arung Palakka left Bontoala and went to Bone, un-
willing to tolerate any further indignities at the hands of Harthouwer. 
Relations between Arung Palakka and Harthouwer reached a breaking 
point when news reached Bone in February 1675 that Syarif had ad-
mitted to the crime under torture and had been executed. Arung 
Palakka was now even more determined than ever to remain in Bone 
rather than be humiliated in Makassar (KA 1200a: 183v-185v). 
Arung Palakka's absence from Makassar was a worry to the Com-
pany. While he was in Bontoala it was possible to learn wh at he was 
planning and to consult him whenever any local crisis arose. Now that he 
was in Bone, he was safe from the eyes of the Company and could even 
be plotting against it. Furthermore, Arung Palakka had been relegated 
the task of maintaining peace and order in South Sulawesi because of his 
knowledge of local affairs. The Company feit ill-prepared to deal with 
local problems by itself, and moreover its own impact would have been 
lessened because of the news which would have quickly spread of the rift 
between the Company and Arung Palakka. Arung Palakka had become 
essential for the peace of South Sulawesi and the peace of mind of the 
Company, and so a special Dutch delegation was sent to Bone in April 
1675 to persuade Arung Palakka to return to Makassar and to discuss his 
grievances with Harthouwer. 
While in Bone the Company envoys were summoned to the residence 
of Daeng Talele, the Makassar wife of Arung Palakka and sister of 
Karaeng Lengkese. This was to be the first of many private interviews 
which Daeng Talele was to have over the years with Company officials. 
On numerous occasions in later years, they ca me to seek her help in 
healing a breach caused by either an overzealous Dutch governor or 
president in Fort Rotterdam and/or by a proud and sensitive Arung 
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Palakka. In 1675 Daeng TaIele was respected as Arung Palakka's prin-
cipal wife, but her value had yet to be discovered by the Company. When 
she told the Dutch envoys in Bone that Arung Palakka had been treated 
with discourtesy and should be shown civility and "royal kindness" by 
Harthouwer, they agreed to convey th is message. To emphasize her 
point, she described how distraught Arung Palakka had been on his 
arrival in Bone from Bontoala and how he had summoned his nob les and 
drawn up a list of grievances against Harthouwer. With this knowledge 
the Dutch envoys were ab Ie to assure Arung Palakka that they would 
speak to Harthouwer about his grievances. They also succeeded in 
dissuading Arung Palakka from going to Batavia to seek redress directly 
from the Supreme Government of the Company (KA 1200c:21Ov-
211r). 
On 23 May 1675 Arung Palakka returned to Makassar accompanied 
by a large retinue of princes and kings from Bone, Soppeng, and other 
kingdoms. But it was not until 28th May that he sent envoys to Hart-
houwer to ask for an audience. This unprecedented delay would not 
have escaped the notice of the Dutch nor those who understood the 
studied traditional signs of displeasure among Sulawesi rulers. Never-
theless, the audience was granted for 5 o'cIock that very same day. When 
the time drew near, Arung Palakka and his principal nobles arrived at 
Fort Rotterdam with a following of about a thousand men. The presence 
of so many rulers in Arung Palakka's entourage from Bone, and now the 
thousand-men retinue, bore eloquent witness to Arung Palakka's 
immense authority and prestige among his fellow rulers and the people 
of South Sulawesi. The days when Arung Palakka and his Toangke had 
been merely a useful contingent of a Company-Ied operation against 
Goa were long gone. He was now an equal partner in the overlordship of 
South Sulawesi created by the Makassar War, and it behove the Com-
pany to regard him as such. The meeting between Harthouwer and 
Arung Palakka was therefore observed with great interest by local rulers 
constantly alert to every subtie shift in political power. 
During the audience Arung Palakka presented Harthouwer with a list 
of promises which had been given to Bone and Soppeng by Speelman but 
subsequently ignored by his successors. They were in brief: 
( 1) They would be able to maintain their rights according to the laws of 
the land. 
(2) There would be no distinction made between themselves and those 
of Butung and Ternate. 
(3) The Company would have no rights over their slaves nor pawn them 
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without their knowIedge. 
(4) No slaves would appear against them in court since this practice 
contravenes the laws of the land (KA 1196a: 160v-161 v; KA 
1200a: 194r). 
These grievances could not be resolved immediately, and so in the 
next few days Harthouwer and other Company officials made several 
visits to Bontoala in an attempt to allay Arung Palakka's suspicions 
toward Harthouwer. Mollified by the courtesy shown him by these visits, 
Arung Palakka conceded that the Company " ... by right of conquest 
and treaty had obtained overlordship and supreme power [and] by right 
of sovereignty could properly dispose of internal and extern al navigation 
and levy tithes and tolls on the country's fruits and lands". What grieved 
Arung Palakka was the ignominy of a staunch ally of the Company 
having to request a pass to sail to certain destinations. Such a policy 
became even more intolerable when Arung Palakka learned that 
foreigners could trade in Makassar without passes. The Company had its 
wider interests to consider in seeking to establish order and predictabi-
lity in the trading lanes of the archipelago. But to Arung Palakka this 
policy was not only incomprehensible but also unjust (KA 1196a: 161 v-
165r). 
Harthouwer bore the brunt of Arung Palakka's displeasure because it 
was he who had to implement policies established in Batavia. He and his 
successors' principal misfortune was in being the representative of the 
Company attempting to maintain a dual overlordship with as powerful a 
personality as Arung Palakka. It is instructive that Arung Palakka's 
relations with every Dutch governor or president appointed to Fort 
Rotterdam began with great hopes for successful cooperation and then 
gra~ually deteriorated to a point where only the removal of the Com-
pany's representative could resolve the crisis. The difficulty was com-
pounded by Arung Palakka's conception of the "Company" as being 
virtually beyond reproach in Batavia. Whatever he, Arung Palakka, 
desired the Company would provide. Was it not the Company which had 
enabled him to regain his siri' and even a kindom? And was it not the 
Company which had sent him gifts of a golden umbrella, a gold chain, 
and golden medallions to show their love for him? To the Company he 
owed his life, and he remained faithful to th is belief till the day he died. 
There were times when he feIt betrayed by Batavia, but in the end he was 
always vindicated in his belief. The governor or president in Fort Rotter-
dam was merely an employee of the Company and as culpabIe as any 
man. The Company, however, was undefiled. It was this conceptual 
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dichotomy of the Company which allowed Arung Palakka in one breath 
to speak of a Dutch governor or president with great acerbity, and in 
another to extol the virtues of Batavia. Even at the height of his dispute 
with Harthouwer, Arung Palakka was therefore ab Ie to respond enthu-
siastically to a request from Batavia for aid in maintaining the peace on 
the island of Sumbawa. 
The Company was gravely concerned at the disorder created by large 
numbers of Makassar refugees roving through Sumbawa. To remove 
these refugees from the kingdoms of Bima and Sumbawa the Company 
needed at least 5-6,000 Bugis soldiers from Arung Palakka (KA 1200a: 
175r-177r). On 2 June 1675 Arung Palakka appeared in Fort Rotter-
dam to take Ie ave to organize his ships and men for the expedition. He 
had earlier explained that the expedition could not sail from Sulawesi 
before August or September because of the roonsoon winds. In June and 
July there was a very strong southeasterly which made any sailing in 
those waters hazardous. The expeditions would then have to leave 
Sumbawa before the heavy rainstorms and strong winds which began in 
December or January. Any delay would force the expedition to remain 
until February or the beginning of March before attempting the journey 
home. He further suggested th at if the Makassar refugees were not 
found in Sumbawa that the expedition be allowed to continue onward, 
even to the coast of Java, until they were found and destroyed (KA 
1l96a: 167r-168r; KA 1200d:211 r). 
These roving bands of Makassar, Bugis, and Mandar refugees had 
already terrorized areas of east coast Borneo and were now firmly 
ensconced in Sumbawa. What Arung Palakka feared most of all was that 
the success of these refugees would encourage the Makassar people 
either to join their brethren overseas and add to their menace, or, 
equally unpalatable, to make the Makassar people on Sulawesi more 
defiant and aggressive toward Arung Palakka and the Company. These 
fears spurred Arung Palakka to urge firm immediate act ion against the 
Makassar refugees before the situation became unmanageable. 
When the Assistant Merchant Paulus de Bocq was sent to investigate 
affairs on the island ofSumbawa, he reported on 18 June 1675 that there 
were no Makassar refugees in Bima. He had noted, however, large 
numbers of them under a Daeng Mamanga at Ende in Flores and under 
Daeng TuIoIo on the western part of the island of Sumbawa (see Map 7) 
at Alas, Utan, Cerang, and Taliwang (KA 1200e:213r). By October of 
that year the numbers of Makassar refugees in the kingdom of Sumbawa 
seemed to have increased dramatically, and they we re beginning to exert 
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an undue influence in its affairs. The former ruler of Sumbawa, Karaeng 
Mas Goa, had been forced to abdicate and flee into exile by his Council 
of Nobles in the beginning of 1675 (KA 1201a: 1851 v). In September of 
that same year rumours reached the Dutch that Makassar refugees 
under Daeng Tuioio had brought Karaeng Mas Goa's nephew from 
Banjarmasin to rule in Sumbawa (KA 1200f:223r). Arung Palakka had 
initially expressed a willingness to assist the Company in Sumbawa, but 
he soon became preoccupied with a matter of greater importance to him. 
Andries Bogaart, Govemor and Director of Banda, arrived in Makassar 
with specific instructions from Batavia to investigate the claims made by 
Arung Palakka on behalf of Bone and Soppeng in May 1675 (KA 
1208a: 516r). A meeting was arranged between Bogaart and Arung 
Palakka for Ist February. On the appointed day Arung Palakka, accom-
panied by the chief Bugis princes and Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad 
Ali, appeared in the gardens of Fort Rotterdam and was greeted by 
Bogaart himself. Af ter sirih 2 was served and mutual greetings 
exchanged, Arung Palakka arose and presented the same complaints to 
Bogaart th at he had made to Harthouwer the year before. Except for the 
difference in wording in Bogaart's report to Batavia, the points were the 
same: 
1. All those in South Sulawesi who had fought alongside the Dutch 
would continue to maintain their own laws and custdms. 
2. They would be shown the same high regard and esteem as those of 
Ternate and Butung. 
3. No one would have the right over their slaves without their know-
ledge. 
4. Their slaves would not be permitted to pawn themselves off to the 
Dutch without their knowledge and consent. 
5. Their slaves would not be allowed to appear in court against them. 
Bogaart had been well-briefed on the situation and had prepared a 
reply which covered each of the points raised by Arung Palakka. With 
regard to the first point, Bogaart denied that the Company had under-
mined the laws and customs of the Bugis. As for the second point 
Bogaart again rejected any suggestion that the Company had shown 
favouritism toward Butung and Ternate. Whatever differences which 
existed in the Company's restrictive navigational policy toward South 
Sulawesi and toward Butung and Ternate was a result not of favouritism 
but of varying local circumstances. The third, fourth, and fifth points 
were unchallenged, and Bogaart agreed on behalf of the Company to see 
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that they were implemented immediately (KA 1208a:518r-519r; KA 
1209a: 160r-161r). 
With this problem apparently settled to the satisfaction of both sides, 
Bogaart proceeded to confront Arung Palakka with certain disturbing 
rumours which had reached the ears of the Dutch. Arung Palakka 
confirmed the rumour that an envoy from Selayar had come to Bone. 
The purpose of the visit, however, was not to join Arung Pa lak ka in a 
campaign against the Company, as had been feared by the Dutch, but to 
ask Arung Palakka for permission for Selayar to re-establish its former 
vassal relationship with Goa. This request had been denied because 
Selayar was once under Ternate's suzerainty. Another rumour of a visit 
to Bone by Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali was also confirmed by 
Arung Palakka. The explanation for the visit revealed Arung Palakka's 
predicament in attempting to satisfy the demands of both siri' and 
overlordship: 
... the entertaining of Goa's ruler and nobles in Bone and the general 
fellowship with them had only occurred because of a great need and in 
order to cover a deep shame. Four years ago Goa nob les deceived me 
and kidnapped my wives, which was the greatest indignity that has ever 
been done to me. At the time I wanted to seek revenge on Goa, but the 
late [President] de Jong frustrated my intentions by advising th at I write 
to Batavia about this. I did just that humbly requesting from the Noble 
Lords [i.e. the Supreme Government in Batavia] that I be allowed to 
wreak vengeance on Goa in order th at my shame may be covered. To this 
day my request has not been granted. And so I must mix with those of 
Goa in apparent friendship because if the allies knew that I had not 
obtained approval from the Noble Lords to take revenge on Goa, my 
shame and scandal would be even greater. This is the reason that I must 
pretend to be friends with them ... But ifthe Noble Lords were to allow 
me to avenge myself, today at this very hour I would show wh at is in my 
heart for their [Makassar people 's] treachery is not unknown to me 
(Emphasis added). 
Nevertheless, Arung Palakka assured Bogaart that as long as he lived, he 
would not disturb the general peace and welfare in this land (KA 
1208a:520r-521 r). 
The Company had al ready anticipated Arung Palakka's complaints 
and for th is reason had despatched Bogaart, a skilled and highly-placed 
Company official, to find some solution to the slowly deteriorating 
relations between Arung Palakka and the Company. Furthermore, the 
usually parsimonious Company had adjudged the situation of sufficient 
gravity to warrant a somewhat extravagant display of generosity to 
demonstrate its esteem for Arung Palakka. Arung Palakka and Daeng 
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TaleIe were presented with the following gifts with a total value of 750 
guilders: 
1 large diamond ring weighing 7 carats, worth 400 guilders 
1 small diamond ring, worth 100 guilders 
1 diamond set in a gold brooch, worth 200 guilders 
1 Surat material with gold threads, worth 30 guilders 
other cloths, worth 20 guilders 
TOTAL WORTH: 750 GUILOERS (KA 1208a:521v). 
These gifts and the conciliatory approach of Batavia's special envoy did 
much to appease Arung Palakka. With all South Sulawesi, as weil as 
Butung and Ternate, witness to these gestures by the Company, Arung 
Palakka regained his lost prestige and strengthened his political 
influence in the area. There were few now who doubted that in any 
serious confrontation with Arung Palakka the latter would be able to 
enlist the full support of the Company. 
During the talks Bogaart attempted to uncover the underlying cause 
of Arung Palakka's discontent with the Company. It was then that the 
whole sordid affair involving the Soppeng interpreter Syarif was men-
tioned by Arung Palakka. When he had heard of Syarifs arrest for the 
alleged murder of a Dutchman, Arung Palakka had appealed to Presi-
dent Harthouwer to have Syarif sent to Bontoala for questioning or, 
failing that, have Arung Palakka himself visit Syarif in his cell in Fort 
Rotterdam. These appeaIs were rejected by Barthouwer, and Syarif was 
subjected to the contemporary European practice of acquiring evidence 
through torture. Syarifs death had caused Arung Palakka great grief 
and anger. From that day forward whenever Arung Palakka and his 
allies had business with Fort Rotterdam they consulted the second Chief 
Merchant Dubbeldekop rather than President Harthouwer. Enough had 
been said to convince Bogaart to forbid Harthouwer from interfering 
any more in Arung Palakka's affairs. Arung Palakka was too valuable an 
ally to be alienated because of personal differences with a Company 
official. Bogaart therefore recommended that Harthouwer be removed 
as quickly as possible so that real contact could again be re-established 
with Arung Palakka and the Bugis (KA 1209b:220v-222v). 
While Bogaart was ready to concede much on behalf of the Company 
in return for Arung Palakka's goodwill, he was nevertheless apprehen-
sive at the latte r's increasing political influence in South Sulawesi. The 
nob les of Tanete had recently deposed their ruler with prior knowledge 
of Arung Palakka and then quickly sought his protection once the act 
had been done. In the beginning of 1675 a war broke out between two 
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principalities in the north, Leta and Enrekang. The Dutch in Fort 
Rotterdam were told that Enrekang was being manipu1ated by Soppeng 
and Pammana as a way of indirect1y attacking Arung Bakke who had 
jurisdiction over Leta. Wh at troubled the Company was the suspicion, 
later substantiated, that Arung Palakka had suggested these measure to 
Soppeng and Pammana. The Company was not surprised when the ruler 
of Enrekang later fled to Bone to seek Arung Palakka's protection (KA 
1200b: 168r). The who Ie incident was resolved when Arung Palakka 
simply declared that his regents would govern Leta and Enrekang and 
forbade any further interference in their affairs by Arung Bakke. Arung 
Palakka was performing his peace-keeping activities so effectively that 
now Bogaart conveyed his dismay to Batavia that perhaps Arung Palak-
ka was becoming too successful for the well-being of the Company itself 
(KA 1209b:223v-224r). 
One matter raised by Arung Palakka in his talks with Bogaart was the 
interpretation of two articles of the Bungaya treaty. Having been reared 
in the local treaty-making traditions, Arung Palakka believed that the 
distinction between the conquered and the conquerors should be explicit 
in the terms of the document. Yet it appeared that Speelman had given 
rights to land to some of the enemy which did not rightfully belang to 
them. Arung Palakka requested an investigation to see whether other 
such injustiees were being committed against the victorious allies. The 
other ineomprehensible measure adopted by the Company through the 
vehicle of the treaty was the requirement of passes for native shipping, 
whether friend or foe. Nevertheless, Arung Palakka evinced a willing-
ness to comply with this demand were it not for the difficulty facing Bugis 
ships from Bone attempting to go to Makassar to receive passes during 
the west monsoon. To overcome this obstacle he suggested that he be 
empowered to issue these passes from Bone itself. Bogaart was sympa-
thetie to the problem of the passes, but he knew th at conceding this 
power to Arung Palakka would make the Company's task of regulating 
navigational activities in and around South Sulawesi waters doubly 
diffieult. Bogaart politely refused Arung Palakka's request and recom-
mended instead that he either send someone overland to obtain the 
passes or else allow a Dutch post to be established in Bone for that 
purpose. Arung Palakka quickly rejected the second alternative but 
agreed to consider the first. Nevertheless, he insisted that Bogaart write 
to Batavia regarding his suggestion of issuing his own passes in Bone 
(KA 1209b:225r-226v). 
Arung Palakka's rejection of the idea of a Dutch post in Bone was 
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inspired by fear of Dutch interference in his affairs. A permanent Dutch 
post in the heart of Bone would restriet his activities, and temporary 
separation had already proved to be an effective way of gaining Batavia's 
attention. In any open disagreement with the Dutch in Fort Rotterdam, 
he could retire to Bone and await their entreaties to return. The Dutch 
envoys invariably arrived with messages of conciliation since Arung 
Palakka had become indispensable for the maintenance of peace in 
Sou th Sulawesi. More importantly, however, was the refuge which Bone 
offered away from the eyes and ears of the Dutch where he could 
implement many of his plans for creating an empire which would be 
ruled by, or at least responsive to, himself and his descendants. 
The Dutch were aware of Arung Palakka's ambitions and had already 
concluded that Arung Palakka's request for his own stamp was part of 
his goal of acquiring control of all the native trade of South Sulawesi. 
Toward th is end, they contended, he had moved his official residence to 
Cenrana, a spot close to the mouth of the Cenrana River with a harbour 
whieh could accommodate large ships (see Map 8). The Dutch feared 
that from Cenrana the Bugis could sail undetected to Butung and else-
where, not only for ordinary trade but also for the precious spices from 
the Moluccas (KA 1209b:226v). With the building of a fortress on an 
island in the bend of the river, Arung Palakka was able to tax and control 
all traffie to and from the interior of Wajo and Soppeng. 
During Bogaart's stay in Makassar, he was told how some of Arung 
Palakka's women had been scandalized by three Makassar lords while in 
Bone. Upon Arung Palakka's return to Bontoala, he had sent a messen-
ger immediately to Karaeng Karunrung demanding that the perpetra-
tors of the crime be punished. To prevent their flight Arung Palakka had 
all boats on the Tallo River seized and brought to Bontoala, and all oars 
and masts removed from boats found in the Garassi and Sanrabone 
Rivers (KA 1208a:522r-v). According to the version of the incident 
recounted by Arung Palakka, the year previously he had been host in 
Bone to a Goa delegation when several of its members had abused their 
status as guests by having illicit sexual relations with his women. Heading 
the list of offenders was Sultan Mohammad Ali himself who had an affair 
with Daeng Talele's niece. The others were Karaeng Lambengi, son of 
Karaeng Lengkese, and Daeng Mamara, son of Karaeng Popo, hence 
two young nob les from prominent Goa families. So upsetting had this 
news been to Arung Palakka that he could neither rest nor have any 
pleasure in food or drink. Since these Goa lords had been his guests, 
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there was little that could be done at the time. Nevertheless, he was 
determined to seek vengeance and had brought back with him to Bon-
toala a large army composed of Bone and Soppeng warriors. This army 
was marched right up to the borders of Goa causing great consternation 
in that kingdom. Then Arung Palakka demanded the surrender of 
Karaeng Lambengi and Daeng Mamara as a condition for the with-
drawal of the Bugis army. As for Sultan Mohammad Ali, he was to 
deliver his wife either to Arung Palakka or to Fort Rotterdam for 
safekeeping while he was tried. If it were found that he had not commit-
ted any sexual offence, then his wife would be returned untouched. But if 
it were proved otherwise, then Arung Palakka would exchange his 
"soiled" woman for Sultan Mohammad Ali's wife (KA 1208a:522v-
523v). To Arung Palakka the enormity of the crime demanded a fitting 
punishment, and wh at could be more appropriate than to have a punish-
ment which not only "covered" his shame but also subjected the guilty 
party to the agonies which he himself had undergone. To the people of 
South Sulawesi, justice would have been done and Arung Palakka could 
justifiably occupy his former position of prestige and power. 
Twice in as many years Arung Palakka suffered the demeaning ex-
perience involving his women at the hands ofsome Goa nobles. In 1674 
his dayang, court ladies, had been kidnapped, and in 1675 his own wives 
molested by some of the highest personages in the kingdom of Goa. 
There were certainly many in South Sulawesi who sensed a conspiracy, a 
cruel and effective weapon with which to attack Arung Palakka where 
guns and spears had failed. It was well-known that Arung Palakka had 
no children, a fact which must have been a source of anguish to him, 
especially in a society where the size of a family is of ten equated with 
virility. Vet all Sulawesi recognized Arung Palakka's great bravery in thc 
battlefield. These "contradictory" features of Arung Palakka's charac-
ter were successfully reconciled in village folktales which may have been 
current during Arung Palakka's lifetime. According to these tales Arung 
Palakka's extraordinary manliness prevented any woman from with-
standing him long enough to receive his seed. 3 
Goa's oblique attack on Arung Palakka was readily recognizable by 
the people of South Sulawesi as a taunt to his manhood. To ignore it was 
to court ridicule and invite further challenge to his authority. Vet to 
resolve the problem through force would risk losing any Company 
support since it was averse to becoming embroiled in another costly war 
in South Sulawesi. Arung Palakka was therefore willing to offer Goa a 
way, albeit an unpleasant one, to avoid conflict. He made th is offer in a 
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personalletter to Karaeng Karunrung: 
... I beseech my older brother [KaraengKarunrung] and my father, the 
Gallarang Manngasa [one of the Bate Salapang], that you commiserate 
with me and seriously consider in what manner I should cover my shame 
without bringing destruction to Goa. I also pray to God Almighty that 
He may preserveme from bringing suffe ring to those innocent. I also am 
not inclined to shed the blood of the king [of Goa], unless he himself is 
inclined to this. The king has not sought to shed my blood but has solely 
caused me such shame which is unbearable. This is the reason that I have 
demanded his house and that which is in it, meaning by th at his wife, for 
it is weil known among the Bone people that the king of Bone's [i.e. 
Arung Palakka's] house and that within it [i.e. his women] have been 
violated by the king [of Goa]. It is because of this that these differences 
have arisen. And the reason I am demanding his house, as I have said, is 
so that when the allied brothers who commiserate with me arrive here, it 
can be such that I can say to them, the war, that is the quarrels, is ended 
because the king of Goa, having once violated my house, now sees his 
house, that is his women, under me. In this way my shame will be 
covered. This, then, is the way and the means by which Goa can remain 
unscathed (KA 1208a:572r-v). 
In this letter the essence of the quarrel between Arung Palakka and 
Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali is stated in a purely South Sulawesi 
idiom. The latter had brought siri', shame, upon Arung Palakjka by 
violating his women. Arung Palakka, therefore, appealed to two power-
ful Makassar leaders in terms of pesse/pacce, commiseration, in order to 
enlist their help in "covering" his shame. The only way tQis siri' could be 
"covered" was to have Sultan Mohammad Ali experience the same 
humiliation to.which he had been subjected. 
When Arung Palakka sent two of his most trusted men to Karaeng 
Karunrung to deliver the letter, Karaeng Karunrung disclosed his fall 
from favour. Then two slaves of Karaeng Lekobodong, son of Karaeng 
Lengkese, came to inform Arung Palakka that Sultan Mohammad Ali 
had removed Karaeng Karunrung from his office and replaced him with 
Karaeng Lambengi, one of those who had committed the crime·against 
Arung Palakka. Karaeng Karunrung had been stripped of all his posses-
sions and servants except five old women and had been accusingly told to 
"go wherever Arung Palakka allows you". His conciliatory attitude 
toward Arung Palakka had brought nothing but abuse and suspicion 
from the younger members of the Goa government. The final humilia-
tion was confiscation of his goods and property af ter his many years of 
loyal service to Goa (KA 1208a:5JOv). 
Arung Palakka saw little alternative now but to issue an ultimatum to 
VII Trials of Overlordship 171 
the Goa government. When his letter was read aloud in the Goa court, 
there 'Was a great uproar among those present. Some arose, unsheathed 
their swords, and swore an oath of undying allegiance to Sultan 
Mohammad Ali. They pledged never to tolerate the deliverance of his 
wife to Arung Palakka or to the Dutch. Although rumours were rife of 
an impending attack on Arung Palakka's residence at Bontoala by 
Makassar armed groups, nothing happened. Then on 10 March 1675 
Karaeng J arannikka, Bone, and Mangajene, a younger brother of Sultan 
Mohammad Ali, appeared in Fort Rotterdam to ask the Company on 
beha\f of the Goa government to mediate in the quarreIs between Goa 
and Arung Palakka. They admitted that some of their people, incIuding 
the Sultan, had committed wrongs against Arung Palakka, and they 
sincerely hoped th at the Company would take the gold which they had 
brought and present it to Arung Palakka in compensation for their 
crimes. When the Dutch asked what Goa would do if Arung Palakka 
refused the gold, the messengers replied that Goa would ask the 
Company to mediate and would then accept its judgement (KA 1208a: 
524r-v). 
The Goa government knew that the Company was the only power in 
Sou th Sulawesi which could exercise any mode rating influence on Arung 
Palakka. So strong was Arung Palakka's sense of moral indebtedness 
that he repeatedly emphasized both in public and in private that his life 
belonged to the Company. The Goa leaders had shrewdly calculated the 
importance of th is moral debt to Arung Palakka and were rewarded by a 
relenting of his attitude. Arung Palakka agreed to withdraw his demands 
for Sultan Mohammad Ali's wife in return for Goa's promise to pay in 
full its outstanding war indemnity to the Company. Insofar as the two 
other offenders were concerned, Arung Palakka remained adamant in 
his demand for their delivery. 
Arung Palakka's concession was welcomed, but it was apparently far 
less than what had been expected. On 13th March the Goa government 
informed the Dutch that Karaeng Lambengi and Daeng Mamara could 
nowhere be found. Furthermore, it explained that it could not repay the 
outstanding debt of 201,612 5/S rijksdaalders which it still owed the 
Company. The failure of the Goa govemment to concede a single point 
annoyed the Company officials who had succeeded in obtaining what 
they considered a significant conccssion from Arung Palakka. They now 
told the Goa leaders that the Company would no longer become directly 
involved and suggested that Goa send envoys to Arung Palakka at 
Bontoala to discuss the matter further. But when the Company officials 
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saw with what dread the Goa government regarded this suggestion, they 
offered to accompany any Goa delegation to Bontoala (KA 1208a: 
526r-527v). 
No Goa delegation ever appeared at Bontoala. On 21st March Arung 
Palakka appeared at Fort Rotterdam in a great rage. Notwithstanding 
the clear impression of fear which the Dutch detected among the mem-
bers of the Goa government when Arung Palakka was mentioned, there 
was no lack of courage when Sultan Mohammad Ali marched with 500 
Makassar warriors, a hundred of whom were c1ad in chain-mail armour, 
up to the very walls of Bontoala. The force was divided into three 
groups: one under the personal command of the Sultan, another under 
Karaeng Jarannikka, and the third under the old Karaeng Popo. From 
the walls of Fort Rotterdam Dutch observers had seen the Makassar 
warriors marching quickly from Goa along the woods toward Bontoala. 
According to Arung Palakka, they came to "within a musket shot" of 
Bontoala's walls, stayed there "as long as it takes one to chew sirih", and 
then left without trying to make any contact (KA 1208a:528r-530v). 
Arung Palakka ordered his Bugis troops already camped naar Goa's 
borders to move forward to prevent any traffic between Goa and the 
out si de world. But he also issued strict instructions that no harm should 
come . to man or beast, for " ... he was not inclined to shed innocent 
blood and may the God in heaven punish him if he should seek anything 
more than to bring the criminals before the. allies to be tried". He 
reiterated emphatically th at his only concern was to punish those who 
had brought him this shame and asked the Company to support him. The 
Dutch officials in Fort Rotterdam attempted to dissuade Arung Palakka 
from any action until word was received from Batavia, but Arung 
Palakka was no longer prepared to remain silent and inactive in his 
humiliation. He told the Dutch bluntly that if no approval were given to 
his plans, he would return the golden chain and the red silk umbrella 
which had been presented to him by the Company in 1672 for his loyal 
services. If he were to be released from his oath of loyalty to the 
Company, he and his followers would wreak vengeance upon Goa and 
then leave Sulawesi and roam the se as (KA 1208a:530v, 533v-534r). 
ft was this threat which convinced the Company that th is time there 
could be no compromise. Arung Palakka had succumbed at first to 
Dutch pressure and moderated his original demands on Goa. However, 
this move had not brought a solution and instead had emboldened the 
Goa government to send troops to Bontoala. To have remained silent 
any longer af ter such a defiant challenge would have undermined Arung 
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Palakka's reputation considerably within South Sulawesi. So important 
was it for Arung Palakka to maintain his siri', his self-respect, that he was 
willing to arouse the displeasure of the Company and· perhaps lose 
everything he had gained with its help in order to safeguard it. It was not 
merely a bluff but was a response which was perfectly comprehensible 
and even expected by his society. The Dutch finally conceded, for they 
realized that Arung Palakka's desperate threats were potentially of 
greater danger to the Company than a blockade of Goa (KA 1208a: 
534r). 
Arung Palakka's army was reinforced by more troops from Bone 
under the command of Arung Mampu and Daeng Memang. Prior to 
marching into battle the Bugis forces assem bied and marched past Fort 
Rotterdam accompanied by the beating of drums and the playing oflocal 
instruments. Arung Palakka, mounted on a horse, wore around his neck 
two large gold chains with medallions which had been presented to him 
by the Company. With this army of 3,000 armed men, Arung Palakka 
began a new war against Goa in the early months of 1676. A string of 
stockades marked the progress of the invading army into Goa. The rapid 
advance, however, very nearly caused Arung Palakka's death. After the 
building of the second stockade, he left a small force to man it and then 
went to seek a suitable site for the third. In the meantime the Makassar 
troops seized the second stockade and waited for Arung Palakka's 
return. Had it not been for Arung Bakke's shouting a warning at the last 
moment, Arung Palakka would have been killed by Makassar shots as 
was his companion, Datu Pammana. But this was a minor incident in a 
war whichlacked the ferocity which had characterized the Makassar 
War of 1666-9. There were the occasional skirmish and desultory 
attacks on the enemy's stockades, but there appeared little doubt th at it 
would only be a matter of time before Goa would have to concede 
defeat. In one of the battles the Goa side had been encouraged by news 
that Arung Palakka had been wounded. A large Makassar attack was 
launched hoping to capitalize on Arung Palakka's disability, but it failed 
to penetr~te the Bugis defences. There seemed little point in continuing 
a war of attrition with the Bugis, and so the Goa govemment appealed to 
the Company to mediate a peace (KA 1208a:535r-536v). 
On 13 May 1676 the Dutch arranged a meeting between Arung 
Palakka and Karaeng Goa. A bamboo meeting place was built midway 
between the opposing stockades, and there the two belligerents met at 
10:00 a.m. on the 13th. The following points were agreed upon: 
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1. Karaeng Goa would pay Arung Palakka a fine of 10,000 mas or its 
equivalent value in guns, slaves, and other goods. Half of this amount 
was to be paid within two days, at which time the armies of the allies 
would be removed from Goa. The other half would be delivered in six 
weeks. 
2. Sultan Mohammad Ali and the Goa government would deliver to the 
Company Karaeng Lambengi to be banished to whichever spot 
chosen by the Company. His wife would also be surrendered to 
Arung Palakka. 
3. Sultan Mohammad Ali and the Goa government would deliver to the 
Company guns and other firearms found in Goa in accordance with 
the Bungaya treaty of 1669. 
4. Sultan Mohammad Ali and the Goa government would destroy the 
walls around the royal settlement in Goa which they had re-erected 
by simply placing the loose red stones on top of each other. They 
would also destroy the stockades which were evacuated by the allies 
(KA 1208a:556r; KA 1208b:558v-559v). 
Karaeng Lambengi was brought to Fort Rotterdam as requested, the 
walls of Goa were destroyed, and two large cannons were surrendered to 
the Company. But these were minor concessions which did little to 
appease Arung Palakka. Neither he nor his family would accept these 
"token gestures" by Goa, he explained to the Dutch, because no amount 
of money would redeem his shame and the blood shed by Karaeng Goa. 
Only if the Company were to ask Arung Palakka to accept this settle-
ment would he agree to do so out of his life-long loyalty to the Company. 
Dubbeldekop told Batavia that he did not doubt that Arung Palakka 
would abide by the agreement, "for His Highness [Arung Palakka] is 
weil aware what his great numbers of Bugis would amount to without the 
might of the Company fighting beside them". Had it not been for the 
assistance provided by Arung Bakké and the Mandar warriors in the 
latest war with Goa, Dubbeldekop was convinced that the Bugis forces 
would have been "badly beleaguered on all sides" (KA 1208b:560r-v; 
KA 1209c:240v-241 r). It was difficult for Dubbeldekop or any of the 
Company officials to believe that any local leader would obey the 
Company except for purely selfish reasons. Despite Arung Palakka's 
persistent and consistent expressions and acts of loyalty toward the 
Company, he was not totally trusted. Yet Arung Palakka's behaviour 
was dictated by accepted custom in South Sulawesi. He was morally 
bound ta the Company, for to do Ie ss would have been interpreted by the 
people of South Sulawesi as an ungrateful act against those responsible 
for restoring his siri' and hence his life. 
Having agreed to end the short war which began on 29 March and 
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ended on 13 May 1676, Arung Palakka now attempted to fulfil the 
Company's requests to limit the Bugis rampage through the Makassar 
countryside. But the victorious Bugis armies marching home could not 
be restrained and great damage was caused in Maros, one of the Com-
pany's principal suppliers of rice. Because of marauding Bugis, the roads 
leading to Goa became unsafe. Arung Palakka finally threatened to 
make examples of those caught endangering traffic on these roads. 
All of these measures were undertaken by Arung Palakka as part of 
his obligations to the Company, but he was unhappy that the Company 
had asked him to end all hostilities before he had obtained satisfaction 
from Goa. To show his disapproval of the Company's decision, Arung 
Palakka left Bontoala to return to the security of his own kingdom. His 
plans to return to his newly-built capital in Cenrana caused the Company 
some concern because of his state of mind. His wife Daeng Talele and 
two of his most trusted members in the Bone government, Arung Tanete 
La Ompo and Arung Maruangen, tried to dissuade Arung Palakka from 
going for they feared that once in Bone Arung Palakka would believe 
slanderous remarks about the Company. There were always some Bone 
and Soppeng nobles eager to incite Arung Palakka against the Company 
as had occurred that previous year (KA 1208c:565v-567r). 
Arung Palakka could not be dissuaded. Despite his moral debt to the 
Company, he believed himself to have been grievously wronged by the 
Dutch. They had obtained a judgement from the South Sulawesi allies 
which allowed Goa to escape lightly from the heinous crime committed 
against him. On his return to Cenrana he expressed his discontent by 
telling the Dutch that he was sending envoys to Batavia to return the red 
umbrella and medals which the Company had presented to him in 1672. 
He explained th at "he was not worthy to have these since he was as one 
dead as long as he was not able to avenge himself against those in Coa" 
(Emphasis added. KA 1208d:586r). Karaeng Goa, Sultan Ali and his 
companions had caused him siri', and by being frustrated in this attempt 
to remove his shame, he was still in the state of mate siri', or having his 
self-respect de ad in the eyes of the community. Although be blamed the 
Dutch officials in Fort Rotterdam for this state of affairs, he never forgot 
that it was the Company which had once "restored his life". Therefore, 
the only effective weapon he had was to make the Company aware of his 
dissatisfaction and to make it obvious that he was as necessary to the 
Company as the Company was to him. In these first few stormy years of 
joint overlordship, both parties were constantly probing and testing the 
true intentions of the othef. But no matter how bitter the relations 
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became between some Company officials in Fort Rotterdam and Arung 
Pa lak ka throughout the 17th century, the missives to Batavia written by 
the govemor or president of the Company post in Fort Rotterdam of ten 
contained assurances from Arung Palakka that "as long as he lived he 
would sacrifice his life to the Company who had made him great and 
powerful" (KA 1208d:561v passim). 
Having the Company as an ally had, of course, considerabie political 
and military advantages for Arung Palakka. The Company desired 
peace, or more precisely the cessation of wars, because it wished to 
safeguard its position in Makassar as another link in the Company's 
entire Asian network. Arung Palakka, on the other hand, hoped for a 
peace which would politically acknowledge his status as an overlord in 
South Sulawesi. Their differing expectations of the general peace which 
was being sought explained the Company's willingness af ter the Bun-
gay a treaty of 1667 to agree to establish quick settlements with the South 
Sulawesi states which of ten proved ephemeral. But Arung Palakka 
brooded, schemed, and only consented to those points in the Dutch-
drafted treaties which furthered his political goal. As long as they both 
sought and acquired their separate but compatible versions of peace, 
they could cooperate comfortably with each other. 
The large numbers of kingdoms in South Sulawesi had now come to 
acknowledge and be responsive to the wishes of Arung Palakka and the 
Company. Arung Palakka continued to act on behalf of the Company, 
but it was not long before the South Sulawesi stat es realized that it was 
Arung Palakka, rather than the Company, who affected their Iives more 
directly and permanently. The Company was seen as a trader with an 
instinct for profit and a field of operation which extended beyond the 
South Sulawesi shores. Arung Palakka, however, was bom of local 
aristocracy with dreams and plans rooted firmly in South Sulawesi soil. It 
quickly became apparent to all that it was Arung Palakka and not the 
Company who would determine the survival or demise of any locallord. 
The measure of Arung Palakka's growing responsibility for the "peace" 
sought by the Company and himself in South Sulawesi is reflected in his 
dominant role in resolving local crises. There was no question of a major 
threat to his position, only the insidious undermining of his authority 
which demanded a firm but fair response. Arung Palakka was being 
evaluated as an overlord by his fellow rulers, and it was this knowledge 
which encouraged him to consider any crisis, no matter how minor, to be 
worthy of his full attention. 
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When Arung Palakka issued a general call for labourers from all states 
to help build Fort Rotterdam, the tiny mountain villages of Cenrana, 
Lempo, and Cam ba near Maros refused to comply. The people had 
decided instead to flee to the safety of the mountains saying that they 
would continue to recognize Goa as their overlord. Tbe reason for their 
action was soon revealed. The Bugis had ravaged their lands unmerci-
fully during their march to and from the war in Goa, and so there was 
little inclination to acknowledge Arung Palakka's or the Company's 
overlordship. A further cause of discontent was a result of action instiga-
ted by Arung Palakka's own lords, Arung Pattiro and Arung Kaju, who 
had been appointed co-regents in the principality of Camba. Their 
jealousy of one another and maneuvering for power had caused the local 
people to despair of any proper rule under Arung Palakka (KA 1208e: 
573v-575r). 
A more serious crisis occurred in Luwu. Af ter the deposed Datu 
Luwu, Daeng Massuro Matinroe ri Tompotikka', had been invested as 
Arung Larompong with the blessings of Arung Palakka and the new 
Datu Luwu Daeng Mattuju, affairs in Luwu appeared at first to have 
been resolved to everyone 's satisfaction. Then sometime in J une or early 
July 1676, the new Datu Luwu chased Daeng Massuro out of Larom-
pong and completely destroyed his residence. Daeng Mattuju had only 
agreed to establish Daeng Massuro at Larompong in the first place 
because of Arung Palakka's pressure. But once he had consolidated his 
position within Luwu, Daeng Mattuju began a campaign "to remove the 
heavy burden imposed by the people of Bone and take Bone and 
Cenrana either peacefully or by force". In preparation for this campaign, 
so it was reported, Daeng Mattuju had sent swords to various areas 
asking them to join in the attack against Bone or face the wrath of Luwu. 
These areas had returned the sword and instead had sent their envoys to 
Cenrana to seek help from Arung Palakka. One of the states which had 
been approached by Daeng Mattuju was Wajo. The Arung Matoa Wajo 
informed Arung Palakka of this approach and reassured the latter that 
he would remain loyal. But he warned Arung Palakka that Luwu's 
troops were planning to march on Peneki in Wajo within five days (KA 
1208f:397). Upon receiving th is letter Arung Palakka immediately sent 
Arung Mampu to Peneki at the head of 1,000 men. It was hoped that this 
show of strength would be sufficient to deter any further ambitions of 
Daeng Mattuju. Arung Palakka was assured that, if the situation 
deteriorated into war, his former enemies would not come to Luwu's aid. 
Neither Wajo nor Mandar dared join Luwu, and although Goa had given 
178 The Heritage of Arung Palakka 
clandestine encouragement it was still recovering from its recent defeat 
at the hands of the Bugis. As a precaution, nevertheless, the Company 
and Arung Palakka decided to have a force ready to prevent some of the 
young warriors of Goa from going as individuals to help Luwu (KA 
1208g:424-6; KA 1208e: 578v-580r). 
On 31st September Arung Palakka left Cenrana by sea for Siwa with 
10,000 men from the various South Sulawesi allies, while another 
20,000 under the command of Daeng Memang went by land. Luwu's 
troops were encamped in the north not far from Siwa and consisted of 
4,000 men from Luwu and 10,000 from Toraja. They were divided into 
three with one group at sea under Datu Luwu Daeng Mattuju himself, 
another on land under the Datu's brother, Opu Balirante, and the third 
also on land under another of Datu Luwu's brothers, Daeng Mattola. 
The Bone army under Daeng Memang arrived in Luwu first and took 
Sampano, the southernmost district of Larompong. Five Luwu princes 
came over to the side of the former Datu Luwu, Daeng Massuro, who 
was with Daeng Memang's army. They reported th at there was great 
consternation among the people of Luwu who had sent away their wives 
and children to the mountains for safety. These princes were convinced 
that the people would come and join Daeng Massuro as spon as they 
realized he had returned. With this in mind Arung Palakka made Daeng 
Massuro march with the army. As soon as the Luwu defenders saw the 
Bugis army approaching, they abandoned their p?sts and fled back to 
Larompong. Larompong itself was defended by 500 Luwu troops under 
Daeng Mattola, but at the approach of the allied army they fled without a 
fight. The people of Larompong flocked to the allied camp to seek 
"protection" from Daeng Massuro and to offer their allegiance to him as 
Datu Luwu. From the village of Larompong Arung Palakka went with 
his army by river northward and destroyed Cimpu, the northermost 
settlement in the principality of Larompong. The progress of the allied 
army was very rapid af ter Cimpu, and by the beginning of October 1676 
preparations were made for the final assault on Ware, the royal capitalof 
Luwu. At midday Arung Palakka went to reconnoitre with fifty or sixty 
of his bravest men. They were ambushed by some 2-300 Luwu warriors, 
but although hopelessly outnumbered Arung Palakka and his men soon 
put the ambushers to flight and took twenty heads. It was reported that 
Arung Teko had conducted himself with great courage and was 
rewarded by Arung Palakka with a gold-threaded robe. 
On II October 1676 the allied forces occupied three stockades built 
about a half mile from Ware. While they were busily erecting stockades, 
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a Toraja ruler named Suso (?) offered his army to Arung Palakka in the 
battle for Ware. Arung Palakka weIcomed the Toraja ruler as an ally and 
also presented him with a robe of honour and a gold chain. A further 
cause for rejoicing was the timely arrival of three Dutch sloops with forty 
Dutch soldiers. The battle began on 13th October when the Luwu army 
launched its attack. Despite the initial advantage of surprise, the Luwu 
army was decisively defeated. Datu Luwu Daeng Mattuju and his 
brothers Daeng Mattola and Opu Balirante escaped into the jungle 
accompanied by fifty or sixty of their followers. In pursuit were some 
1,000 warriors with specific instructions to deliver all the women and 
children of these refugee princes into Arung Palakka's hands. The 
fugitives successfully eluded their pursuers for a time but were even-
tually captured sometime in November. Opu Balirante gained a pardon 
from Arung Palakka because of his willingness to divulge everything that 
had occurred in Luwu which had led to the war. The other two royal 
captives were delivered to the Dutch and imprisoned in Fort Rotterdam 
to await exile. The only other resistance came from a stockade with 
about 100 defenders under Daeng Malino, one of the principaileaders in 
Daeng Mattuju's government. But they too soon surrendered for fear of 
Arung Palakka's wrath. Daeng Malino "asked forgiveness for the 
inhabitants of Luwu since they were not to blame for the war but had 
been compelled to participate as subjects [of Datu Luwu]". 
Arung Palakka stipulated the following conditions for any peace with 
Luwu: 
1. Daeng Massuro with 5 -600 [Bone] Bugis be allowed to enter Luwu to 
take possesion of the kingdom. 
2. The Luwu peopie again accept Daeng Massuro as their ruler. 
3. All those from Wajo and other areas who had fought aiongside Luwu 
be delivered to their rulers and made slaves. 
These conditions were accepted on 13 October 1676 officially ending 
the war. It was also later agreed that Luwu wouid pay the Company 100 
taels of gold for breach of the Bungaya treaty. With peace once again 
restored inLuwu, all the Toraja rulers and nob les came to pay homage to 
the new Datu Luwu Daeng Massuro Matinroe ri Tompotikka' (KA 
1209d:269r-v; KA 1214a:293; KA 1216a:87, 117-8; KA 1216b:36-7; 
KA 1216c:131-141). 
The information which Opu Balirante furnished Arung Palakka 
proved damaging to Karaeng Tanete. Although he had been installed as 
ruler of Tanete with the blessing and assistance of Arung Palakka onIy 
some six months before, he was reluctant to obey the summons from 
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Arung Palakka to join the allied expedition against Luwu. He pleaded 
illness and sent his son instead as commander over a small contingent 
from Tanete. Because of his Ie ss than enthusiastic response to the war, it 
was rumoured that he would have joined the Luwu camp if the war had 
tumed against the allies (KA 1216a:93-4). Another ruler who came 
under suspicion was Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali because of his 
correspondence with Daeng Mattuju. According to one of the letters 
presented to Arung Palakka by Daeng Mattuju's wife, Sultan Moham-
mad Ali had incited Luwu to act ion by assuring it that "all of the people 
north of Goa as far as Tanete and sou th of Goa as far as Bulo-Bulo were 
friends of the house of Goa". In this somewhat oblique fashion he 
implied that Goa and its numerous allies would co me to Luwu's support 
when the time came. 
On 22 January 1677 Karaeng Karunrung was summoned to Fort 
Rotterdam to vouch for the authenticity of th is letter from Sultan 
Mohammad Ali. He verified that it was written with the Sultan's own 
hand and stamped with his own seal. Karaeng Karunrung was c\early 
dismayed at this disc\osure and said regretfully that had he been still in 
govemment such a thing would never have happened. As long as the 
Sultan and his young supporters dominated the Goa government there 
would be no end to the troubles with Goa. Karaeng Sanrabone, brother 
of the Sultan, echoed Karaeng Karunrung's sentiments and even volun-
teered the information that he himself had seen the letter. He recom-
mended that Goa's Council, the Bate Salapang, be summoned to 
consider deposing the Sultan "since he had so faithlessly brok en the 
solemnly-sworn treaty" (KA 1216a: 104-5). Both Karaeng Sanrabone 
and Karaeng Karunrung had grievances with the Sultan and stood to 
gain if he. were deposed. Their evidence, however, was only one of a 
number of others in the past which demonstrated the Sultan's unrelent-
ing efforts to destroy the authority of Arung Palakka and the Company 
in South Sulawesi. 
Through Dutch pressure the 1676 war between Arung Palakka and 
Goa had ended prematurely without resolving the basic causes of the 
conflict. The failure of Goa to provide real satisfaction to Arung Palakka 
for the scandal involving his women, and the( openly unrepentant 
attitude of Sultan Mohammad Ali toward this incident, were a continu-
ing source of siri' to Arung Palakka. The Company had wanted peace, 
and it appeared convineed that forcing the belligerents to agree to a 
peace treaty was sufficient. To have attempted to obtain solutions to 
some of the difficult issues underlying the tension between Arung 
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Palakka and Goa would have required more time and effort than the 
Company believed necessary. As aresuIt the Company supervised 
another short-lived peace marked by yet another "peace treaty". The 
animosity between Arung Palakka and Sultan Mohammad Ali continu-
ed unabated despite the 1676 peace, and evidence of the latter's com-
plicity in Luwu's decision to wage war on Arung Palakka dangerously 
accentuated this feeling. 
The arrival of a number of rulers to Arung Palakka's residence at 
Bontoala convinced the Goa government that a new war was likely. A 
Goa dele gat ion was therefore sent to Fort Rotterdam on 5 April 1677. It 
was headed by Daeng Mangappa, brother of Sultan Mohammad Ali, and 
Karaeng Bone, son of Karaeng Karunrung, to ask the Dutch whether 
there was any truth to the rumour that Arung Palakka intended to make 
war on Goa. If there were to be a war, Goa requested only that the 
Company refrain from providing Arung Palakka with men or ammuni-
tion. Despite Goa's previous defeats at the hands of Arung Palakka, it 
believed this to be due mainly to the support of the Dutch. Apparently 
the Dutch were of a similar mind and thus worded their reply cautiously 
in order not to antagonize Goa nor encourage any new outbreak of 
fighting. They told the Goa delegation that they had heard no rumours of 
war, but if there should be one, they would act "in accordance with what 
fairness and duty demanded at the time" (KA 1216a: 107 -8). 
Goa's apprehensions were well-founded. On 7th April Arung Pa lak-
ka appeared in Fort Rotterdam and presented the Dutch with a list of 
grievances against Goa on behalf of the allies: 
1. One of the Makassar subjects had maliciously murdered a Dutch-
man, and though the Goa government knew who the murderer was, it 
had not been willing to surrender him to the Company. 
2. Goa had sent amission to Banten to buy guns and ammunitions 
without the Company's permission. 
3. Goa was conducting a regular correspondence with the Makassar 
refugees at Demang in Java and elsewhere who have brought obstruc-
tion, damage, and ruin to the Company's allies. 
4. Goa had retained and hidden runaway slaves from Ujung Pandang 
which was now under the Company's jurisdiction. 
5. Goa had promised to deliverthe bandit Kare Jaga [who had abducted 
one of Arung Palakka's court maidens] to the Company, but nothing had 
been done. 
6. Goa had promised the Company to destroy the fortifications in the 
kingdom but instead had strengthened them. 
7. Goa had promised to deliver all the large guns to the Company but 
instead had hidden them or sold them to the Malays. 
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8. Goa had encouraged Luwu to take arms against the Company and 
then had provided it with weapons. 
9. Goa had provided weapons to Camba [which had rebelled against 
Arung Palakka and the Company]. 
10. Goa had encouraged the Company's subjects in Cenrana [behind 
Maros] to rebel and had supported them with guns and ammunition. 
11. Goa had continued to retain in Goa, unjustly and unlawfully, a large 
number of Bugis, people from Turatea and other Company allies, and 
those who were now Company subjects as a result of conquest. 
Because of this treatment by Goa, the allies de mand satisfaction. "Ij 
we must suffer such shame without /onging jor satisjaction, we wou/d no 
longer be considered among the living but among the dead and unjee/ing 
people. We, therefore, have decided that Karaeng Goa [Sultan Moham-
mad Ali] and all the princes who at present remain with him should be 
delivered to the Company, if not peaceably, then by force" (Emphasis 
added. KA 1217a:228r-v). 
This document, which reflected as much Arung Palakka's as the allies' 
sentiments, is couched in terms of "shame" or siri', perhaps the most 
compelling force throughout Arung Palakka's Iife. The impact of siri' is 
usually confined to a small number of people, but because of Arung 
Palakka's position of power the whole of South Sulawesi became 
embroiled in his siri' affairs. Arung Palakka had succeeded in accruing so 
much power within the short period of a decade that with supreme 
aplomb he equated his interests with those of the South Sulawesi allies 
and the Company. In Arung Palakka's later correspondence with the 
Company, the siri' which he suffered at the hands of Goa became 
transformed into the siri' of the allies involving the credibility of the 
Company's status as Lord Protector (beschermheer), of its South Sula-
wesi allies. Tbe allies under Arung Palakka's direction told the Company 
officials in Fort Rotterdam that if the Company did nothing to bring 
justice in this affair of siri', they would also sit idly by if the Company 
were ever brought shame in the future. Under this type of pressure the 
Council in Fort Rotterdam met and agreed to provide ammunition and 
120 Dutch soldiers under Nicholas Pleun to support the allies in another 
war against Goa. 
Tbe situation in Makassar deteriorated even further when a Makassar 
prince, Karaeng Mamu, was murdered by some Bugis in Bontoala on the 
evening of 8th April. When asked about the killing, Arung Palakka 
tersely replied that he had wamed Karaeng Mamu to stay away from 
Bontoala during these highly tense times. On the following morning 
Karaeng Jarannikka came to Bontoala with some 3-400 armed men to 
get the body, but it had already been taken by Arung Teko the previous 
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evening and buried at Tallo. The tension was so great th at Arung 
Palakka considered it prudent to dispose of the body quietly at night and 
avoid an emotional confrontation which could lead to violence when the 
Goa delegation arrived. Nevertheless, feelings on both sides were so 
inflamed that it became obvious to all th at any hope for a reconciliation 
had been dashed. On 17th April the allies under Arung Palakka 
marched their armies as far as Tallo. They camped there while awaiting a 
reply from Goa's Bate Salapang to the following letter from Fort Rotter-
dam: 
... With th is you are informed that for some time Karaeng Goa [Sultan 
Mohammad Ali] with some of his evil Council members have not ne-
glected, contrary to their word and swom oath, to disturb most faithlessly 
the general quiet and peace among the allies of th is island ... They have 
made Datu Luwu take up arms against the Company's allies and their 
lands by promising him assistance and weapons. In the same way they 
were able to make the people of Camba and Cenrana rebel and abandon 
the Company. . . In order that in the future Karaeng Goa and his 
Council members take greater care not to break the swom treaty so 
lightly, we have decided to inform the regents [Bate Salapang] of Goa of 
this ... so that they may be delivered immediately into our hands. The 
Company is authorized to do this in accordance with the treaty with 
Karaeng Tallo and the Lord Admiral Cornelis Speelman agreed upon on 
9 March 1668, and with Karaeng Goa and his lords on 27 July. Karaeng 
Goa, Jarannikka, Bone, Ballo', and Bontomanompo had all accepted 
and sworn to the treaty. In order that the people of Goa, who are 
innocent, should not come to feel the shame which the above-mentioned 
five people as faithless, venomous individuals have deserved, they 
should be handed over and no bodily harm will be done to them ... 
otherwise it would be necessary to get them from Goa dead or alive (KA 
1216d:82-4). 
The letter was not delivered to the Bate Salapang but intercepted by 
Sultan Mohammad Ali. He read the letter and then sent the messenger 
back without a reply. The murder of Karaeng Mamu, eulogised in a 1669 
court panegyric as one of the brave st of Makassar warriors (Skinner 
1963: 169, 205, 211, 213), had aroused the anger of the Goa people. To 
have ignored this feeling and capitulated would have brought about the 
Sultan 's own downfall. If he had to lose his throne, what more glorious 
way was there then in defence of his land? There was no need for words; 
his message was c\early understood by the allies who now began the task 
of erecting blockades for the impending war (KA 1216a: 108-112). 
The next five or six days were quiet except for a brief skirmish on a hilI. 
The trophies of the battle - thirty heads and three standards - were sent 
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to the Dutch by Arung Palakka as a sign ofvictory. Unlike previous wars 
between Arung Palakka and Goa, this time there were several promi-
nent Makassar lords who openly sided with Arung Palakka. Karaeng 
Sanrabone disliked his brother Sultan Mohammad Ali and harboured an 
ill-concealed ambition to succeed to the Goa throne. He had brought 
some of his best warriors to fight for Arung Palakka. There were also 
Karaeng Lengkese (Arung Palakka's brother-in-law), Karaeng Bon-
tosunggu (Karaeng Karunrung's brother), and Daeng Malewa (the new 
Karaeng Galesong), although their loyalties were somewhat suspect 
because it was known they still maintained contact with Karaeng Jaran-
nikka and other nobles in Goa (KA 1216a: 113, 125). 
The war was typical of many South Sulawesi wars with the occasional 
battle without any great casualties on either side. There we re also the 
usu al harrowing incidents involving Arung Palakka, such as the evening 
when he miraculously escaped with only three flesh wounds af ter stroll-
ing around the Bugis defence perimeters unarmed and without a body-
guard. Finallyon 24th Mayamajor attack was launched against Goa and 
"came within a pistol shot" of succeeding (KA 1216e: 147). The allies 
were now in possession of Goa's walls "from the Bisei Gate to the 
Karunrung Gate", and their stockades were established far within Goa 
territory. With victory within reach Arung Palakka decided tö call a 
conference on 15th June to discuss the final moves in the war. Among 
those present were Paulus de Bocg (who was acting head of Fort Rotter-
dam af ter the death from illness of President Dubbeldekop on 18 May 
1677) and Arung Palakka's Makassar allies Karaeng Sanrabone, Leng-
kese, and Bontosunggu. De Bocg suggested that these Makassar lords 
contact their friends within Goa to encourage them to join the allies and 
thus "prevent the complete devastation of the land and the poor inhabi-
tants". The three Makassar lords agreed to carry out de Bocg's proposal 
but first expressed a wish to consult the ailing but still highly-respected 
Karaeng Karunrung in Tallo (KA 1216f: 158). 
Goa asked for a ceasefire on 19 J une 1677, but not to discuss terms of 
a surrender. Instead, it demanded that the Company either force the 
allies to withdraw from Goa or re move its men and cannons to Fort 
Rotterdam so th at the allies would have to fight Goa alone. The tone of 
the letter revealed a confidence in the Goa fighting men and a con tempt 
for those of the Company's allics, an attitude which had also been 
expressed privately by some of the Company officials in Fort Rotterdam. 
Partly because of th is, and partly bccause of the nccessity of dcmonstra-
ting the Company's loyalty to thc allies, the Dutch rejected Goa's 
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demands. They explained that they would do nothing until "satisfaction 
had been given to the Honourable Company for the humiliation it had 
suffered because of their [the Goa people's] frequent contraventions and 
transgressions of their agreement". That same evening Goa envoys 
retumed with another message: 
... Karaeng Goa [Sultan Mohammad Ali] and the other leaders are 
aware that they had contravened many of the points of the swom treaty. 
They ask that they be forgiven by the Company and not be made to 
suffer any unbearable punishments. They are also willing to follow the 
demands of the Company in the following way. Karaeng Goa, Ballo', 
Jarannikka, Bone, and Bontomanompo would be removed from the 
Goa govemment and a new ruler chosen. These lords would be allowed 
to remain in Goa or whichever place of their choosing and not become 
part of any government. Secondly, they would surrender all cannons and 
large guns which are dug up and brought to them. In accordance with 
Article 18 of the Bungaya treaty, they would return all people living 
within Goa to their rightfullord as indicated by the allies. Finally, as they 
had promised in the past year, they would deliver the bandit [Kare] Jaga 
to the Company dead or alive. All those of our inhabitants who had fled 
and claimed Goa as their home land are presently being retained. 
Later th at evening, however, a personal message from Sultan Moham-
mad Ali himself arrived stating emphatical!y th at he had no intention 
whatsoever of fulfilling the points made in the earlier letter from Goa. 
The struggle between the peace and war factions in the Goa court was 
growing more open and bitter as the war drew closer to the heart of Goa. 
The seriousness of the rift was soon demonstrated when several Goa 
nob les from the peace faction fleeing to join Arung Palakka were caught 
and put to death. According to later eyewitnesses from Goa, the killings 
had caused great commotion among both the common people and the 
nobles in that kingdom (KA 1216g: 167-171, 174-5). 
Despite the tenacity of Goa's defenders, the lack of food, water and 
other supplies was taking its toll. On 18 July 1677 the allies gained 
control of the plains in Goa and proceeded to burn and loot the con-
quered areas as was customary in local warfare. A wind blew up the 
following day which fanned the flames causing widespread destruction 
throughout Goa. So fierce was the blaze that whatever provisions which 
the Makassar forces may have stored were destroyed. Karaeng Ballo' 
and 3-400 men tried to slip away and,so it was rumoured, join the bandit 
groups under Kare Jaga in the mountains. This smal! band was inter-
cepted by Bugis forces under Arung Mario. and in the ensuing fight 
Karaeng Ballo' was wounded. Karaeng Jarannikka asked and was given 
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pardon, and so he, his family, and fifty of his warriors were placed under 
Karaeng Sanrabone's jurisdiction. All further resistance was quickly 
squashed and peace was soon dec\ared in Goa (KA 1216h: 185-6). 
Af ter this victory the Company demanded that Sultan Mohammad Ali 
and his supporters be removed from the Goa government and Karaeng 
Sanrabone be made ruler of Goa. This demand provoked an angry 
response from the Sultan who reminded the Company that he had been 
made ruler not through money or intrigue but through legitimate means 
as a result of his royal birth and of being chosen by the princes, the local 
leaders (gallarang), and the heads of the Bate Sa/apang. He was subject 
to their will alone, and if it were their wish that he submit then he would 
do so willingly. But his was the final proud and defiant gesture of a ruler 
attempting to retrieve honour from defeat. A few days later Kare Takku' 
and the interpreter Kare Gappa came to the Dutch and the allies with a 
message from the nobles in Goa. They dec\ared their willingness to 
accept the Company's demands and only asked that their wives, children 
and maidens not be taken from them by the Bugis. They also agreed to 
accept the following Company's conditions for peace: 
l. Karaeng Goa [Sultan Mohammad Ali] abdicate and his place be 
filled by [his brother] Karaeng Sanrabone. Karaeng Goa also be 
punished by the Company for having broken the treaty. 
2. Goa surrender all its cannons and large guns to the Company. 
3. Goa return all runaway slaves belonging to the Dutch and those living 
among them [i.e., the people of Goa]. 
4. Goa allow all those from Bone, Soppeng, Mandar, and Luwu held 
illegally in Goa to return home. 
They then promised to come to Fort Rotterdam to install a new ruler. 
Since the danger posed by marauding Bugis was still great. they also 
requested that a Dutch bodyguard accompany them from Goa to Fort 
Rotterdam. The Company therefore sent a contingent of some thirty 
Dutch soldiers to Goa to assure them a safe passage. On the morning of 
27 July 1677 the members of the Goa government arrived at Karaeng 
Sanrabone 's residence bearing,the Sudang, a sword which was one of the 
most revered objects in Goa, the royal umbrella, and the rest of Goa's 
regalia. In the presence of Arung Palakka, Datu Luwu, Maradia Balan-
nipa, Karaeng Karunrung, .Karaeng Lengkese, Arung Maruangen, 
Arung Amali Gellareng Tosawa, Daeng Matoaya, Karaeng Jarannikka, 
and the Dutch Captain Nicholas Pleun, the regalia was ceremonially 
presented to Karaeng Sanrabone as the new Karaeng Goa. The instal-
lation of Karaeng Sanrabone as Karaeng Goa" Sultan Abdul Jalil 
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[Tumenanga ri Lakiung] marked the formal end of the war. All stock-
ades built by Goa and the allies were destroyed, and both armies dis-
persed to their respective homes (KA 1216h: 187-192). 
When Jacob Cops arrived in Makassar in January 161.8 as the new 
Company president in Fort Rotterdam, he was impressed by the autho-
rity wielded by Arung Palakka. It was the latter who, in keeping with 
earlier practices, had summoned the various South Sulawesi princes to 
appear in Fort Rotterdam to welcome President Cops and to hold a great 
feast in his honour. Cops wrote to Batavia: "Among all of the Com-
pany's allies, without exception, Arung Palakka has been doaked with 
the Company's mantie of respect and thereby obtained great prestige 
and power". Arung Palakka was weil aware of his privileged position. 
He proudly displayed to the assembied South Sulawesi lords the 
personal gifts which he and his wife Daeng TaIele had received from the 
Company as further affirmation of his favoured status (KA 1224a:242-
3). He was astute enough to realize that as long as both he and the 
Company needed one another their positions in South Sulawesi would 
be secure. 
The large gathering of lords in Makassar to celebrate Cop's appoint-
ment provided an opportunity for the young Datu Soppeng Towesa to 
seek a private meeting with this new Company official. When the old 
Datu Soppeng La Tenribali died on 19 August 1676, his son Towesa 
succeeded him despite grave reservations expressed by Arung Palakka. 
Had La Tenribali's eldest and favourite son Arung Belo Tosa'deng been 
alive, he would certainly have been prodaimed Datu Soppeng with 
Arung Palakka's blessings. Tosa'deng had been a Toangke and had been 
one of Arung Palakka's dosest companions in exile. He was killed at 
Sambung J awa in Makassar in 1669 in the dosing days of the Makassar 
War, much to the grief of his father and Arung Palakka. Another son, 
Towesa, was therefore chosen to become Datu Soppeng, but neither the 
Dutch nor Arung Palakka were particularly pleased with the choice. 
Dubbeldekop wrote on 4 September 1676 that Towesa was 
... not the smartest there is. Yes, of ten he is no better than mad. His 
father said before his death th at if his son should become unfit to rule 
through weakness of mind, then Arung Palakka should take con trol of 
the government on the strength of his marriage [to Datu Soppeng's 
daughter We Adda] and his Soppeng royal blood. And should th is prince 
[Towesa] from that time onward be sufficiently incapable of taking the 
reigns of government, then Arung Pa lak ka should, if it so pleased him, 
take over the Soppeng government ... He r Arung Palakka 1 should then 
run the government of Soppeng in the name of his brother-in-Iaw 
[Towesa] (KA 1208h: 591v). 
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Perhaps foreseeing the problems which could arise with a weak ruler in 
Soppeng, the old Datu Soppeng La Tenribali had provided Arung 
Palakka with virtually a free hand to interfere in that kingdom's affairs. 
During the secret meeting between Datu Soppeng Towesa and Cops, 
the former complained of Arung Palakka's high-handedness in Sop-
peng. He also feit it necessary at the very outset to present his side of the 
story to dispel any malicious rumours current throughout South Sula-
wesi about his state of mind: 
... He [Arung Palakka] says that I am mad! He has married my sister 
[We Adda] and taken all the gold that she had received from my father. 
When she was in Bone, someone with a musket went under the house in 
which she was living and fired a bullet upward through the floar where 
she was standing. 4 She had become so alarmed that she left Palakka and 
went back to Soppeng, where she still is. Now my brother-in-Iaw [Arung 
Palakka] has just recently taken away my gold. Everyone knows th at my 
father was the king who possessed the richest amount of gold. 5 We do 
not even have th at now, and still that is not enough; he now wants to 
seize my state. This is the reason that I have come to the president [Cops] 
so that he will take me under his protection. 
Cops attempted to reassure Towesa that there was no plot and that 
Arung Palakka had only been appointed guardian because Towesa was 
still young at the time of his installation. Such a feebie explanation did 
not satisfy Towesa and simply made Cops appear an accomplice in light 
of Arung Palakka's subsequent actions. 
When Arung Palakka was informed by his omnipresent spies that 
Datu Soppeng Towesa had avoided the "proper" channels and had 
spoken directly to Cops, he immediately sent Arung Amati Gellareng 
Tosawa to Towesa to seek an explanation. Towesa told Arung Amali 
that he had merely discussed lands under dispute between Soppeng and 
Arung Bakke. Arung Palakka was apparently unconvinced, for a few 
days later Towesa reappeared in Fort Rotterdam greatly upset by the 
fact that Arung Palakka had ordered all the Soppeng princes (anaka-
rung) to abandon Towesa. He also c1aimed that Arung Palakka had 
sought his wife [We Adda]'s approval to de pose her brother Towesa as 
Datu Soppeng (KA 1224a: g4-99; KA 1227a : 19Hr). 
To defend his own reputation and establish his credibility with the 
newly-arrived President Cops, Arung Palakka went personally to Fort 
Rotterdam. In their meeting Cops confronted Arung Palakka with the 
accusations made by Towesa. Cops appeared to have been convinced 
that something was afoot since Towesa, ruler of a major kingdom, had 
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come to Fort Rotterdam with a pathetic retinue of four slaves. Towesa 
himself had expressed his humiliation that, though bom a king, he had to 
sneak into Fort Rotterdam without the pomp and ceremony befitting his 
status. In a moment of grief and anger he had said to Cops: "Who would 
want to de pose me? God, the Lord, has made me ruler and no one can 
deprive me of this." He no longer desired to return to Soppeng unless the 
anakarung held him in higher regard than they had in the past: 'They do 
not respect me, and they laugh at me. That, I cannot bear." In the 
present circumstances he preferred remaining under the Company's 
protection in Fort Rotterdam. Despite Arung Palakka's efforts to 
portray Towesa as dim-witted6 Cops detected little of this madness in 
Towesa during their conversations together. Towesa's somewhat erratic 
behaviour, so Cops believed, was directly attributable to his youth and 
pampering from his late father (KA 1227a:198v-20Ir). Cops was in 
sympathy with Towesa and began to suspect Arung Palakka's motives in 
wanting Towesa deposed. An incident which occurred a few days later 
appeared to confirm his suspicions about Arung Palakka. 
A trusted slave whom Towesa had inherited from his mot her was 
seized by Arung Palakka's people and krissed outside Bontoala. Fearing 
for his own life, Towesa requested and was granted protection by the 
Company. Cops' spies reported that Arung Palakka had ordered the 
brothers Arung Mampu, Arung Maruangen, and Arung Teko to go that 
evening as the moon was rising to seize Towesa and bring him to 
Soppeng. Although Cops did not wish to become embroiled in local 
dynastie quarrels, he did consent to grant asylum to Towesa. The reasons 
which Cops gave to Batavia to justify th is decision were: 
I. Towesa's father Datu Scippeng [La Tenribali] had been one of the 
oldest and most important allies of the Company. 
2. Arung Palakka's treatment of Towesa was displeasing and contribu-
ted to th is sorry state of affairs. 
3. No other ally would be able to trust us any longer if protection were 
refused. 
Towesa was billetted for the night in the house of Jan Japon, the 
Company's interpreter, with guards stationed outside. Later that same 
evening one of Towesa's secondary wives came to report that when the 
moon rose th at night, men acting on Arung Palakka's orders had entered 
Towesa's residence. Discovering that he and his wife were no longer 
there, they stripped the house of everything, inc1uding the pots and pans 
(KA 1227a:202v). 
When Arung Palakka Iearned that Towesa had tled to the Dutch, he 
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sent envoys to Fort Rotterdam asking th at Towesa be released so that 
"his crazy whims would not cause misfortune to the Company". Arung 
Palakka reminded Cops that he had been made guardian over Towesa by 
the latter's own father before his death, and th at he, Arung Palakka, 
treated him no differently from his own "son", La Patau. The Dutch in 
Fort Rotterdam considered th is comparison to be rather odd since 
Towesa was about twenty-one years old, married to the daughter of 
Datu Pammana, and had a three year old son, whereas La Patau, Arung 
Palakka's nephew, was merely five years old (KA 1224a:114). Perhaps 
Arung Palakka had intended the analogy of Towesa with a five-year old 
child. But all the psychological abuse of Towesa did not accomplish his 
downfall but had instead complicated matters because of his being 
granted asylum by the Company. Arung Palakka now decided to pro-
pose Towesa's sister and his wife We Adda as the new Datu Soppeng. 
Although she had initially refused to cooperate in this plan while her 
brother was still alive, pressure was brought to bear and she finallY 
relented. Her decision to become Datu Soppeng caused Towesa great 
anguish, and he was reported by the Dutch to have practically retreated 
from any contact with the outside world. Except for the rare occasion 
when he went on the hunt with a group, he remained quietly in the Fort. 
When some localleaders came to speak to him in the Fort, he said not a 
word except "yes" (KA 1227b:243r-v; KA 1236a:453v-454r). Cops 
described Towesa as a pathetic figure living in exile in the Fort: "A mad 
person Datu Soppeng [Towesa 1 certainly is not, nor is he clever. While 
he has been here, he has remained very quiet and has no more than forty 
rijksdaalders worth of clothes and money ... " (KA 1227c:252v). 
Towesa was not the only ruler who had hoped for support from the 
new President Cops against the increasing political encroachments of 
Arung Palakka. A few months after Cops' arrival in January 1678, the 
Arung Matoa and the nobles of Wajo appeared in Fort Rotterdam to 
complain about the ill-treatment of Wajo at the hands of the people of 
Bone. They reported that Arung Palakka had seized some of Wajo's 
territories on the basis, so he claimed, of the 1670 treaty signed af ter the 
defeat ofWajo at Tosora. These areas were Pammana, Timurung, Wage, 
Totinco, Wugi, and Sengkang (half ofwhich remained under Wajo). To 
these general grievances were added those of Arung Peneki who had 
been deposed by Arung Palakka in favour of the latter's nephew, La 
Patau. Cops consulted the 1670 treaty and informed the Wajo delega-
tions that there was no mention of any cession of Wajo land to Arung 
Palakka. While assuring the Wajo lords th at he would seek the return of 
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these lands and some solution to their grievances, he encouraged them to 
speak to Arung Palakka once more (KA 1224b: 191-2,198-9,208; KA 
1227a: 199r-v; KA 1236b:392v-397v). 
The problems between Wajo and Bone we re not as easily resolved as 
Cops had hoped. When Arung Matoa Wajo was again in Fort Rotterdam 
a year later, Cops inquired about the situation in Wajo. Arung Matoa 
Wajo merely placed one hand over his mouth and moved another across 
his throat to indicate that if he said anything he would lose his life. He 
than said: "It would not help since Arumpone [i.e. Arung Palakka] and 
the Company are one, and everything that Arumpone does is approved 
[by the Company]. The people of Wajo should see everything clearly in 
perspective since they were defeated by Arumpone [i.e. Arung Palakka] 
and thereby considered as his slaves" (KA 1236b:392r-v). 
The Arung Matoa Wajo's view that the Company and Arung Palakka 
we re one was not an unusual belief among the people of South Sulawesi. 
It was deliberately cultivated by Arung Palakka himself as a very basic 
element in his poliey of maintaining his authority as the local overlord. 
But when Cops was presented with this long-held assumption within 
South Sulawesi of the inseparable unity of the Company ard Arung 
Palakka, he quickly disabused Arung Matoa Wajo of th is idea. Cops 
explained that it was a grave error to believe th at anything that Arung 
Palakka did met the approval of the Company. The people of Wajo were 
neither slaves of Arung Palakka nor of the people of Bone, but true 
subjects and people of the Company. When Cops learned that Wajo did 
not have a copy of the 1670 treaty, he had the treaty brought out and 
read aloud to prove that Wajo was obligated to no one but the Company. 
According to Article 1 of the treaty signed by the Company and its allies 
with Wajo on 23 December 1670, Wajo had become a vassal of the 
Company alone. Article 8 required Wajo to pay the Company's war 
costs, but not those of Arung Palakka since he was merely one of the 
Company's commanders. In times ofpeace Arumpone [Arung Palakka] 
was an ally of the Company, as were Datu Soppeng, Arung Ajattappa-
reng, Datu Luwu, Maradia Mandar [Balannipa], Karaeng Goa, etc. 
Cops pointed out to Arung Matoa Wajo th at as a subject of the Com-
pany, he should have reported all oppressive acts committed against 
Wajo by Bone. 
Encouraged by these words, the Wajo delegation returned a few days 
later with a list of complaints against Bone. They said that about ,3,000 of 
their people with their buffaloes and their goods had been seized and 
taken to Bone. WajQ traders who had the misfortune of being caught in 
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Luwu in 1676 during the Bone-Luwu war we re made slaves of Bone. In 
fact anyone from Wajo that Arung Palakka found outside of Wajo was 
made a slave. Af ter this war many Wajo smiths, carpenters, and various 
other skilled workers with their wives and children were forced to move 
to Bone. Perhaps the most painful of all was to watch as Wajo was 
dismembered af ter the 1670 war. 
Cops expressed his sympathy for the Wajo people. Yet for the 
moment he and the Council had agreed th at prudenee was perhaps the 
best policy to adopt. Arung Palakka was busily engaged at this time in 
preparations for sending Bugis troops to Java to help the Company, and 
any attempt to reprimand him or any mention of the reprehensible deeds 
of his people in Wajo could have jeopardized the entire expedition. The 
Dutch were content to register their concern about the situation in Wajo 
to the four commanders of the Bone forces: Arung Sawalaba, Arung 
Mampu, Datu Mario, and Datu Lamuru (KA 1236b:392v-397v). Soon 
af ter the departure of Arung Palakka and the allied expedition to Java 
on 1 October 1679, Arung Matoa Wajo demanded that Bone return all 
the people and property seized from Wajo. The Bone leaders refused 
and said th at they could do nothing as long as Arung Palakka was away. 
And here the matter rested (KA l236c:436v). 
The problems in Soppeng and Wajo did not pose as great a danger to 
Arung Palakka's authority as that in Goa. The 1677 war had removed 
Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali and his advisers from the govern-
ment, but they remained within Sulawesi and continued to provide a 
focus for opposition. At the time of Cops' arrival in January 167R. Sultan 
Mohammad Ali had been deposed and was living in a house owned by 
Kaicili' Kalimata in Vlaardingen, one of the quarters under Company's 
jurisdiction near Fort Rotterdam. But when Arung Palakka returned to 
live in Bontoala from Bone, Sultan Mohammad Ali began to realize how 
exposed his living quarters were and how vulnerable he was to attack by 
Arung Palakka's men. He and his followers began sleeping during the 
day and maintaining a watch at night. Despite these precautions. some 
men with chainmail armour succeeded in getting under Sultan Moham-
mad Ali's house in an attempt to assassinate him hy thrusting their spears 
upward through the floorboards. He no longer feit secure in Vlaardingen 
and thus asked and was granted permission to live in Fort Rotterdam 
(KA 1227a:204r-v). 
There was little doubt in the minds of the Company officials as to who 
had instigated the assassination attempt. They had received reliable 
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reports that sometime in early 1677, or late 1676, Arung Palakka, 
Karaeng Karunrung, and Karaeng Sanrabone (the present Karaeng 
Goa) had made a solemn pact to destroy Sultan Mohammad Ali. This 
pact, so it was reported, had been renewed at Bontoala some eight or ten 
days before the,.assassination attempt. When the Dutch asked Karaeng 
Bone, Ballo', and Bontomanompo about thts secret agreement, they 
admitted to knowing about its occurrence about eighteen months 
previously. At the time, so reported these karaeng, Arung Palakka had 
been displeased with the Company's lack of resolve toward Goa and had 
said that he was inclined to part ways with the Company. He had turned 
to Karaeng Sanrabone and had said that if Karaeng Sanrabone and his 
anakkaraeng and Makassar followers were to join him in a war against 
Sultan Mohammad Ali and were to be victorious, Arung Palakka would 
make Karaeng Sanrabone ruler of Goa. What had been promised to 
Karaeng Karunrung was not known, but he once demanded that the 
people of Maros, Segeri, Siang, Labakkang, Bungoro, Galesong, Wajo, 
and some others, be placed under his jurisdiction "as had been intended 
by Arung Palakka" (KA 1227a: 138-9, 199r, 204r). 
Af ter Goa's defeat in 1677, Karaeng Sanrabone and Karaeng Karun-
rung were duly rewarded with the positions of Karaeng Goa and 
Tuma'bicara-butta, respectively. But neither leaders gained the support 
of the people because of their close association with Arung Palakka. If 
war were again to break out with Goa, there was every indication that 
the Goa people would abandon these two lords and give their loyalty to 
the deposed Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali (KA 1227a:204v; KA 
1224a: 122). At the very outset of his reign Karaeng Sanrabone, now 
Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil [Tumenanga ri Lakiung], had two 
distinct disadvantages insofar as the Goa people were concemed: he was 
associated with Sanrabone, an area outside the heartland of Goa,7 and 
with Arung Palakka, a sworn enemy of the Goa people. His was there-
fore a most formidabIe task in attempting to gain the confidence and 
loyalty of his subjects. 
The people of Goa registered their disapproval of the new Karaeng 
Goa in the traditional manner by seeking to serve another lord in a 
different land. Most tled to other Makassar areas such as TaIIo, but many 
also sought refuge in the lands of their enemies, the Company and the 
Bugis. There wae others, including most members of the former Goa 
government, who sought to remain with the previous Karaeng Goa 
Sultan Mohammad Ali in Makassar under the Company's jurisdiction. 
The reasons which the Goa people gave the Dutch for leaving their 
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homes we re because of the destruction of their land and the fear of 
marauding Bugis (KA 1216c:197-8). 
Immediately af ter the 1677 war it is true that security within Goa was 
precarious, but a similar situation had existed af ter every war which Goa 
had fought against Arung Palakka and the Company. What was different 
af ter the 1677 war, however, was the lack of confidence among the Goa 
people in the ability and willingness of Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil 
to protect them against marauders. In short they had already prejudged 
the new Karaeng Goa and expected the very worst for their kingdom. 
From court pedagogical works to village folktales the people would have 
been inculcated with the belief that the ruler's personal conduct would 
be reflected in the state of the kingdom. An ho nest ruler means that the 
land will be free from disaster, the people will multiply, and the ricefields 
will be fertile. But a ruler who is deceitful will be responsible for 
unending suffering throughout the land as epidemics rage among the 
people and rains and droughts destroy the rice seedlings (Mattulada 
1975:122-3, 148,9; Matthes 1883a:249, 258). So fearful were the 
people of the consequences of having a bad ruler on the throne that the 
exodus from Goa continued unabated. In desperation and with great 
humiliation Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil was finally forced to seek 
Arung Palakka's assistance since he no longer had any people to look 
af ter his food, water, clothes, and horses (KA 1227a: 198v). 
While the initial distrust of Sultan Abdul Jalil, coupled with the 
turmoil of the immediate post-war days, were certainly important 
factors for the outflow of people from Goa, Sultan Abdul Jalil's own 
personal conduct or misconduct confirmed the dire predictions of 
alarmists within the kingdom. A ga/larang from Sanrabone told the 
Dutch that in his land Sultan Abdul Jalil had "applied neither law nor 
lawfulness". So contemptuous was he of the laws of the land that no 
gallarang dared submit alegal petition. Everything in the land was being 
allowed to go to rack and ruin. Those who had served weil were over-
looked and those unqualified put in their place. Such an extreme picture 
seemed to the Dutch to be contradictory to the well-established reputa-
tion of Sultan Abdul Jalil's good nature and of apopulous Sanrabone. 
The ga/larang agreed th at this may have been so in the past but things 
had changed completely since Sultan Abdul Jalil had become good 
friends with Karaeng Karunrung and Arung Palakka (KA 1236b:404r). 
The pressure from the exiled Goa nob les for the removal of Karaeng 
Karunrung as Tuma'bicara-butta Gaa became so great that Cops decid-
ed to seek Arung Palakka's advice. On 26 April 1678 Arung Palakka 
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arrived in Fort Rotterdam for the meeting accompanied by Arung 
Maruangen, his closest adviser in the Aruppitu, Arung Amali Gellareng 
Tosawa, who now also held the position of Arung Tanete Matoa, Arung 
Mampu, Arung Teko, various other Bugis princes, as weil as the Makas-
sar lords Karaeng Lengkese and the new Karaeng Galesong, Daeng 
Malewa. Cops explained the problem of the growing Goa refugee com-
munity in Makassar whose loyalty to the deposed Sultan Mohammad Ah 
was causing considerable strain on the Company. One of their demands 
was the removal of Karaeng Karunrung as Tuma'bicara-butta Coa 
because it was he who was "the cause of the disasters" which had 
befallen the kingdom. In an ultimatum the exiled Goa government told 
Sultan Abdul Jalil th at he had to choose either Karaeng Karunrung or 
the anakkaraeng, gallarang, Bate Salapang, and subjects of Goa. Cops 
had been sympathetic to th is ultimatum and had reminded Sultan Abdul 
Jalil of Article 11 of a resolution which had been adopted on 9 Novem-
ber 1668 by Speelman, Arung Palakka, the rulers ofTemate, Soppeng, 
etc. According to th is Article, it had been resolved th at Karaeng Karun-
rung, as punishment for his misdeeds, be removed from government and 
be sent to Makassar unless he hum bied himself before tl1e Company, 
sought permission to remain there, and agreed never to interfere directly 
or indirectly with the Goa government. Despite Cops' citing of a "legal" 
point to convince Sultan Abdul Jalil, the latter remained adamant in his 
refusal to remove Karaeng Karunrung from his government. Cops now 
requested the help of Arung Palakka and the allies to solve this impasse 
between the two Goa governments. 
Arung Palakka appeared touched by th is request. He turned to Cops 
and said: 
... We of Bone are deeply grateful th at you have done us the honour of 
communicating this weighty matter to us, for this is a case which most 
properly deserves to be discussed by us. 
Arung Palakka now sent Arung Teko back to Bontoala to bring the 
book in which were kept all the treaties and every letter sent by the 
Company to Arung Palakka.8 When the book was brought, Arung 
Palakka read everything that the Company had written to him about 
Karaeng Karunrung's misdeeds. As Arung Palakka saw it, there would 
be problems if Karaeng Karunrung were dismissed from his office as 
Tuma'bicara-butta Coa and exiled to Batavia. Karaeng Karunrung's 
daughter, married to Karaeng Tallo, would certainly accompany him, as 
would Karaeng Karunrung's trusted uncle Karaeng Popo and his fol-
lowers, and Karaeng Karunrung's brother Karaeng Bontosunggu and 
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his people, and many others. What had to be considered, therefore, was 
whether it was worse to lose those who had al ready left Sultan Abdul 
J alil, or those who would leave with Karaeng Karunrung. Arung Palakka 
interjected at this point that the Makassar people had still not paid their 
indemnity to the Company, but Cops assured him that this was not a 
primary concern since "it is obvious th at they are poor and scattered 
about". Arung Palakka then suggested that the Goa princes who were 
now under the Company's jurisdiction should be told to return home. If 
more problems should arise, he himself would intervene and severely 
punish those responsible, even if it were the ruler of Goa himself (KA 
1227a:214r-216r). 
Despite Arung Palakka's advice, when he was away in Java cam-
paigning on be half of the Company, Karaeng Karunrung did lose his 
position. Although the Company had said he could live anywhere he 
wished, it was believed that he would not remain long in Tallo because of 
the great iII-will he had engendered among the nobles and gallarang 
there. As self-procIaimed regent of his young son-in-Iaw, KaraengTallo, 
he had exercised too much power for the Iiking of the local people. 
Another alternative proposed by the Dutch as a possible place of refuge 
was on the south side of Fort Rotterdam where Karaeng Lengkese 
himself had settled (KA 1227c:254v). But Karaeng Karunrung decided 
instead to seek his fortunes abroad. With 200 followers on nine boats, he 
went from Tallo to Mandar for a few days and then straight on to Pasir in 
eastern Kalimantan. Halfway to Pasir lack of drinking water and strong 
winds finally forced the fleet to return to Binuang in Mandar. Karaeng 
Karunrung then took a boat and thirty men to Barru, from which pi ace 
he asked the Dutch for permission to return to Tallo. Permission was 
granted, and Karaeng Karunrung once again settled quietly in Tallo. But 
the original fears which had prompted him to Ie ave had not diminished, 
and he later requested permission to live near Fort Rotterdam (KA 
1235e: 125-7). 
The opposition to Sultan Abdul Jalil was centred around the former 
Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali who had been given protection in 
Fort Rotterdam on 7 March 1677. On 19th April he was joined by some 
important members of his former government - Karaeng Ballo', Bone 
and Bontomanompo - as weil as many of the anakkaraeng and half 
of the bate-bate and gallarang (KA 1224a: 167). It was this exiled 
Goa government which subjected Sultan Abdul Jalil's already battered 
pride to further blows by presenting him with the following list of 
grievances: 
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1. We find it unbearable to have to go hither and yon without any secure 
place where we can settle. 
2. You cast aspersions on our honour with foullanguage. 
3. You mistrust us. 
4. You believe all false tongues which scatter much poison about us and 
come to bring you untruths. 
5. You imagine evil things daily of us though no evil is intended, or [you 
imagine] something which approximates the truth. 
6. You pretend in our presence and slander us in our absence. 
7: You make us do unbearable court duties. 
8. You oppress our people and they suffer at the hands of your foremen 
(mandur) who rob them in their poverty-stricken circumstances. 
9. You demand improper services from the princes (anakkaraeng) 
themselves. 
10. You sell freemen and retain those not free who do not belong to you. 
11. You use us and our children at night and by day. Even in bad weather 
you use us to serve as guards and to cut firewood. 
12. You make our wives and daughters [whenever you so desire] serve 
against their will in your wife's retinue, although it has not been the 
cu stom of old to follow the queen to Tana Kongkong [Bantaeng] and to 
Pare[-Pare]. 
13. You demand more and longer water bamboos ... or more money 
than is our duty to pay as a fine for something inconsequential. 
14. If we gravely affront you for a minor reason, you refuse to let us visit 
your residence, even though we hum bie ourselves without bearing 
weapons. 
15. We are threatened with death and accused of being traitors to our 
land whenever we appear at Ujung Pandang [under the Company's 
control] for our own interests. 
16. We are blamed for a service badly performed by others. 
17. On pain of death we are forbidden to speak to the former ruler 
Karaeng Bisei [Sultan Mohammad Ali], notwithstanding the articles [of 
peace of 1677], the fact that he is now in the Company's hands, that you 
are his brother, and that we have no other lords but you and him. 
18. You turn away the ruler of Ternate's envoys whenever they come to 
collect the indemnity [for the 1666-9 war], and instead send them to us 
and expect us to pay it. 
19. You pretend that we have resolved that, as long as Karaeng Bisei is 
not raised again to any office, we would not dress in accordance with our 
status or custom. 
20. You will not allow us to go to seek the necessities of life. 
21. You ridicule us daily in a very humiliating fashion. 
22. You seek reasons daily to vent your anger on us. 
23. You accu se us of secretly corresponding with Karaeng Bisei and the 
Company. 
In view of the above, if you should solemnly swear in the presence of 
the [Goa] nobles in the Fort [Rotterdam] to abdicate, we will again heed 
you (KA 1227a:211r-212v). 
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What had been solemnly pronounced in the Rapang, a Makassar 
"Mirror of Kings", was coming to pass: 
... The ruler asks his advisers, 'What are the signs that a great land will 
die?' The adviser answers, 'There are five: A ruler does not want to be 
reminded; secondly, there are no able, skilled people (tau manngasseng) 
in the great land; thirdly, the judges (gallarang mabbicara) take bribes; 
fourthly, there are many arbitrary acts in the great land; and fifthly, the 
ruling lord does not love his servants' (Matthes 1883a:253). 
All the.se points appeared to the people of Goa to have been trans-
gressed, particularly th at special relationship of "love" which ideally 
existed between a ruler and his subjects. 
The first complaint in the letter from the Goa nobles focusses upon the 
very raison d'être of a ruler, to provide a secure place for his subjects so 
th at they, and hence he, would prosper. Since Sultan Abdul Jalil was 
unable to provide his people with security within the kingdom, he had 
failed in his basic duty as a ruler. The following complaints numbered 2 
to 16, 18, 20-22 could have come directly from the Rapang with its 
admonitions concerning good and bad rulers. Sultan Abdul Jalil's 
behaviour coincided with the symptoms of a bad ruler as mentioned in 
the Rapang. It would be surprising if the authors of this list of grievances 
were not aware of the similarity of the charges which they were bringing 
against their ruler and the signs of a bad ruler in the R.apang. By 
deliberately drawing this comparison, they would also have issued an 
unmistakeable warning to Sultan Abdul Jalil that if he persisted in his 
ways, he too might be destroyed as were the evil rulers in the Rapang. 
The rest of the complaints, numbers 17, 19 and 23, deal specifically with 
the deposed Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali. 
It was no secret that Sultan Mohammad Ali still had the love and 
loyalty of the vast majority of the Goa people. To prevent him from 
continuing to rule from his place of exile, in complete defiance of the 
Company and its allies and to the humiliation of the new Karaeng Goa 
Sultan Abdul Jalil, Goa subjects were forbidden on pain of death to 
communicate with him. Although Sultan Abdul Jalil had undergone the 
traditional installation ceremonies· in becoming Karaeng Goa, many 
deplored the fact that Arung Palakka had played a decisive role in his 
election contrary to accepted South Sulawesi interstate practice. The 
Goa ChronicIe, too, had explicitly condemned interference in the choice 
of rulers between the kingdoms of Bone and Goa, the two most powerful 
states in the area in the 16th and 17th centuries (Abdurrahim n.d. :71). 
Since the hallowed adat had been invoked against Sultan Abdul Jalil, 
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even the investiture performed with complete propriety was subject to 
question. As long as this ambiguity remained, the people of Goa could to 
some extent justify their continued loyalty to Sultan Mohammad Ali. 
The Goa government in exile refused to adjust to its new circum-
stances but sought ways of returning to power, including an appeal to 
Batavia. In a letter received in Batavia on 23 April 1678 the exiled 
Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali informed the Company's leaders 
that "all the most important individuals in Goa, namely Karaeng Ballo' 
[head of the Bate Salapang], Bone [son of Karaeng Karunrung], Bonto-
manompo, the gallarang, the Bate Salapang, and all of their followers 
have left their ruler and fled to seek protection from the Company purely 
because of the unbearable government of Karaeng Karunrung and the 
new ruler [Sultan Abdul Jalil]" (KA 1227d:22l r). Having argued in this 
letter to Batavia for the continuing legitimacy of the Goa government in 
exile, it now approached Sultan Abdul Jalil to persuade him to relinquish 
his rights to the regalia, a gesture which was tantamount to renouncing 
any claims to the throne. The letter to Sultan Abdul Jalil read: 
... We Makassar folk living in Ujung Pandang have met, agreed, and 
resolved (since we have heard three or four time that you wished to 
return the crown [sic, Sudang, the state sword]9 and the regalia be-
longing to Goa) to send a gallarang so that he may receive them from 
your hand. In this way you will have performed a good and worthy deed 
for the Makassar people. We will then be willing to resume residence 
once again in Goa (KA 1235a: 100). 
As long as Sultan Abdul Jalil continued to keep the regalia at his 
residence in Sanrabone, the exiled Goa government was powerless to 
choose another ruler. The offer made to Sultan Abdul Jalil in return for 
the Sudang and the regalia was therefore a tempting one. He would 
again be shown the respect he had had as Karaeng Sanrabone instead of 
suffering the humiliation of ruling over an empty land. The massive 
outflow of people was in itself a damning commentary on his reign and a 
source of ridicule among his fellow rulers. But Sultan Ahdul Jalil refused 
to surrender his throne. In a strongly worded reply, he wrote: 
... You de mand from me the Sudang and the regalia belonging to the 
kingdom of Goa and say that they should be used for the best welfare of 
our land. I would gladly see that wc henefit together. But at the time that 
Goa was conquered, you did not consent to give me the crown [sic, 
Sudang] and regalia, hut it was the Arumpone [Arung Palakka] and the 
lords ofthe Company who placed them in my hand. Furthermore, on his 
departure [for Java] the Arumpone did not instruct me to return the 
Sudang and the other royal regalia to you if you came to demand them. 
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Only when the Ammpone returns and he and the Company instmct me 
to do so would I then obey their commands (KA 1235b:101). 
Taken aback by Sultan Abdul Jalil's refusal to return the regalia and his 
seemingly abject submission to the will of Amng Palakka and the Com-
pany, the exiled Goa nobles decided to send another much more forceful 
letter: 
... Why do you say th at we should wait to receive the Sudang and the 
regalia from you until the Ammpone's return and until he and the Com-
pany recommend it? Why did you seek such a pretext? At the time th at 
Goa was conquered, the Ammpone did not take the crown [sic] and 
regalia from our hands and place them in yours, but we brought them to 
you on your orders. Therefore, we now demand that they be returned to 
our envoy. If you refuse to do so but wish to await the return of the 
Ammpone, you will have demonstrated through this that you have no 
other intention but to make us slaves. We already have been made to 
understand that you had wanted to surrender the regalia to the Bugis. If 
you are in no way inclined to give them to us, we will deciare ourselves 
completely free people who will acknowledge no one but the Company 
as our sole lord. 
We understand that you wish to leave the land. Do not do this, but 
instead give us the crown [sic] and the regalia so that they would redound 
to your and our advantage (KA 1235c:101-2). 
The Goa nob les were obviously in a quandary. While they had 
employed the most dire threat to any mIer - the loss of his people - they 
we re uncertain whether they really wanted to become subjects of their 
erstwhile enemy, the Company. They had few options available to them 
if they wished to remain in South Sulawesi. Sultan Abdul Jalil, on the 
other hand, was little worried by the threat for he feIt secure in his 
possession of the regalia and his belief of support from Arung Palakka. 
His finalletter to the Goa nob les exudes this confidence: 
... It has been customary among our forefathers never to de pose mIers 
except for two reasons, to wit: if they were mad, of if they possessed no 
belief or religion. Furthermore, sin ce we have entered into the Treaty of 
Bungaya, those [miers] who do not fulfill it [the treaty] mayalso be 
deposed. Since none of these three charges can be made against me, I am 
not resolved to hand over the regalia. You say th at I want to flee the land, 
and I say th at I have never entertained such a thought (KA 1235d: 103). 
The possession of the Sudang and the Goa regalia were a potent weapon 
in Sultan Abdul Jalil's hands. So reverently were these objects regarded 
that it has been suggested that they, rather than the person of the 
king, we re the true mIers of a kingdom (Abu Hamid 1965:138; 
Kooreman 1883: 186). As long as he retained the regalia Sultan Abdul 
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JaliI was cloaked with legitimacy despite arguments of irregularities in 
his selection as Karaeng Goa. He had also earlier taken the precaution of 
reaffirming his loyalty to Arung Palakka. According to Karaeng Mang-
alle, who was with his brother Sultan Abdul Jalil at Bontoala, the latter 
had said to Arung Palakka: "0, father, three more princes have fled to 
Ujung Pandang. What shall I become? A king without people.1t is best if 
I surrender the crown [sic, Sudang] to you, for I leave myself entirely in 
your hands. Wherever you go I shall always be at your side, whether it be 
in Bugis [Soppeng], Bone or Luwu" (KA 1227a:221 v-222r). 
President Cops and the Dutch Council in Fort Rotterdam were uneasy 
about the growing influence of Arung Palakka, especially in the king-
dom of Goa. Af ter Speelman's departure from Makassar in 1669, a 
policy of maintaining a balance of power between Arung Palakka and 
Goa had evolved. Even at this early stage of the Company's permanent 
presence in Makassar, astute Dutch officials had foreseen a time when 
the Company's favoured ally would become a potential threat to its 
interests in South Sulawesi. The powerful kingdom of Goa with its 
history of enmity toward Bone appeared the logical choice to cultivate as 
a counterweight to Arung Palakka. But af ter the 1677 war the new 
Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil had become so dependent upon Arung 
Palakka that to all intents and purposes Goa had become Bone's vassal. 
Though Goa had failed to provide a balance to Arung Palakka, the 
policy itself was not abandoned. There began a new search for a power to 
assume the brief role that Goa had played vis à vis Arung Palakka. 
The need for some con trol over Arung Palakka's activities became a 
matter of great urgency to the Company officials in Fort Rotterdam. In a 
letter to Batavia they described with dismay the deteriorating situation 
in South Sulawesi: 
... the numerous insults which the allies of the Company had to be ar at 
the hands of the anakarung10 of Soppeng and Bone with the connivance 
and even the order, so they say, of Arung Palakka, make him a figure of 
great hate among all the allies. He govems so much like a sovereign ruler 
over th is whole land that many say that they cannot long remain here and 
th at there are those who are just waiting and hoping th at some change 
would come (KA 1224a:123). 
These officials even recommended th at the deposed Sultan Mohammad 
Ali be sent to Batavia to provide a focus for Makassar refugees abroad in 
opposition to Arung Palakka. Krisses had already been sent to Sultan 
Mohammad Ali by the Makassar refugees to demonstrate their loyalty 
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and readin~ss to fight for him. To convince Batavia th at Goa no longer 
was the fearsome enemy that the Company had fought in the 1666-9 
Makassar War, they stressed that in 1677 Goa had warred with Arung 
Palakka but not with the Company (KA 1224a:126, 128). 
The de sire of President Cops and his Council to undermine Arung 
Palakka's strong influence in South Sulawesi led them to offer encour-
agement to Sultan Mohammad Ali living in exile in Fort Rotterdam. The 
latter, therefore, wrote to Karaeng Galesong and Daeng Tuloio, two of 
the most powerful refugee Makassar leaders abroad telling them to 
return home. Cops had assured him that they would have a place to settle 
in Ujung Pandang as weil as land in Maros for their upkeep (KA 1224c: 
181). In reply these two leaders reported that the Makassar refugees 
scattered throughout the area, inciuding some 2,000 in Ayutthaya and 
many others in Aceh and Palembang, were willing to return and live 
under the protection of the Company. They emphasized, however, th at 
they would not tolerate the overlordship of Arung Palakka (KA 1224b : 
219). 
Despite this encouraging news there was no noticeable increase in the 
numbers of returning Makassar refugees. But the flood of people leaving 
Goa to seek a home in the Company's lands continued unabated. By 
mid-1679 the Dutch estimated that living within the shadows of Fort 
Rotterdam were some 600 Makassar nobles, of which 300 had seen 
experience in the wars against Arung Palakka and the Company. The 
Dutch were convinced that they would eventually join the vast majority 
of their compatriots in Java and only the lack of boats had prevented 
their immediate departure. Inciuding men, women, children, and slaves, 
there were an estimated 3,000 Makassar people living in Ujung Pandang 
(KA 1235f:89). How serious this continuing out flow of people was had 
become painfully apparent in Sultan Abdul Jalil's attempt to assembie 
his subjects to participate in the Company's campaign against the 
Makassar refugees on Java. As was customary in wartime Sultan Abdul 
Jalil had sent out the bila-bila setting out the time and place that the 
warriors were to gather. To his great humiliation only sixteen people 
appeared, of whom seven were nobles. The rest had apparently fled to 
give their allegiance to Sultan Mohammad Ali at Fort Rotterdam (KA 
1227b:223r). 
Cops and the Council were of mixed minds over the deluge of Goa 
people seeking protection from the Company. There was the fear, which 
was of particular concern to Batavia, that these folk would seek to join 
the refugee bands outside Sulawesi and further jeopardize trade in the 
VII Trials of Overlordship 203 
archipelago. Yet the prospects of astrong Goa government coalescing 
around Sultan Mohammad Ali as a counterforce to Arung Palakka could 
only become a reality through the continuing influx of people into 
Makassar. Since events within South Sulawesi we re of more immediate 
concern to Cops and his Council, they we re more inclined to seeing the 
second possibility occurring and hence took no steps to stem the refugee 
flow. 
The growing numbers of favours which Cops and his Council began 
bestowing on Sultan Mohammad Ali did not go unnoticed by Arung 
Palakka. The fact that Sultan Mohammad Ali had not been adequately 
punished by the Company for his role in the 1677 war had angered 
Arung Palakka. But to add insult to injury, the Company had then 
offered him an asylum within Fort Rotterdam. From his pi ace of protect-
ed exile, he had been able to conduct himself as if he we re still the 
Karaeng Goa. It became an almost impossible task for his successor, 
Sultan Abdul Jalil, to govern a kingdom whose loyalty remained with the 
former ruler. As long as Sultan Mohammad Ali remained alive and weil 
within re ach of the Goa people, the new Karaeng Goa would remain 
ruler in name only. This reasoning was apparent not only to Arung 
Palakka, but also to Sultan Mohammad Ali who now took extraordinary 
precautions for his safety. Only once did he dare venture out trom the 
Fort, and then only with Dutch bodyguards, to visit his sister and some 
Makassar nob les who were living on the south si de of Fort Rotterdam 
(KA 1224d:305). 
The already strained relations between Cops and Arung Palakka 
reached a critical point as communications between Fort Rotterdam and 
Bontoala grew noticeably fewer. Fortunately, Arung Palakka's wife 
Daeng Talele intervened and succeeded in defusing the highly danger-
ous situation. This was a role which she came to play admirably through-
out Arung Palakka's reign and during part of La Patau's (1696-1714).1t 
was her ability to recognize the danger signs and her influence with 
Arung Palakka and La Patau which were responsible for preserving the 
alliance between Bone and the Company through some difficult periods 
in the 17th and 18th centuries. On this particular occasion she merely 
voiced what Cops had long suspected: Arung Palakka would not 
condone the presence of his enemy enjoying the Company's protection 
in Fort Rotterdam. A meeting was arranged between Cops and Arung 
Palakka to discuss the matter, but it began on an ominous note. Arung 
Palakka informed Cops that Sultan Mohammad Ali had planned "not a 
human but a beastly undertaking" to have Arung Palakka assassinated 
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with a poison dart at the hands of a Mandar prisoner-of-war. Af ter Cops 
had assured Arung Palakka th at the matter would be investigated, he 
turned the conversation to the matter of Sultan Mohammad Ali's con-
tinued residence in Fort Rotterdam. He explained that he had given the 
Sultan protection because his life was in danger. As an example Cops 
cited the case where some Bugis had set fire to the house where the 
Sultan and his wife we re living. If Captain Pleun had not killed one of the 
Bugis attackers and his men not broken through a ring of Bugis warriors 
surrounding the house, both Sultan Mohammad Ali and his wife would 
have burned to death (KA 1227c:249r-v). Despite this explanation 
Arung Palakka made it c1ear that he and Sultan Mohammad Ali could 
not live peaceably on the same island. If the latter were to remain in 
Sulawesi, then Arung Palakka requested that Cops provide him a ship or 
give him permission to sail with his own boats to Batavia (KA 1224d: 
305). 
Even while expressing his displeasure at the granting of asylum to 
Sultan Mohammad Ali, Arung Palakka's annoyanee was not aimed at 
the Company as sueh, but to the various individuals who represented it in 
South Sulawesi. Arung Palakka was ready to leave South Sulawesi if 
Sultan Mohammad Ali were allowed to remain, but he would go to 
Batavia as a faithful friend of the Company. The Company could do no 
wrong since it was the Company whieh had restored the siri' of Arung 
Palakka and the Bugis nation. Onee when the Company was partieularly 
hard-pressed to obtain ri ce for Batavia, Arung Palakka sent about 100 
tons (fifty last) from Bone. The Company had offered to pay for this riee 
but Arung Palakka had refused saying: 
... This gift of the fifty last riee last year [1677] was but a sm all token of 
gratitude to the Company for helping the people of Bone attain their 
freedom. If it had not been for the Company, they would have been 
enslaved (KA 1227c:251r). 
Arung Palakka never eeased to remind the Company, more par-
ticularly the Supreme Government in Batavia, that he would never turn 
against the Company which had "restored his life" and treed his people. 
Although there we re Company representatives in Fort Rotterdam who 
were suspicious of Arung Palakka's motives and aetivities, Arung 
Palakka never undertook any deliberate eampaign to destroy the Com-
pany once he was in power. Whenever Arung Palakka had any quarrel 
with the Duteb, he regarded it as a misunderstanding between himself 
and an official but never the Company. When differenees threatened to 
beeome crises, Arung Palakka always appealed to the Company in 
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Batavia, and he was almost always vindicated, thus further reinforcing 
his image of the Company as a powerful, virtuous entity represented at 
times by weak and unscrupulous officials such as those found in Fort 
Rotterdam. Interestingly enough the Bugis chronicIers to this day retain 
this image in referring to the "Kompani" in Batavia in a vague way, quite 
apart and separate from the "Belanda" (= Dutch) with whom the Bugis 
came in contact. Arung Palakka's displeasure at discovering that Sultan 
Mohammad Ali had been granted asylum in Fort Rotterdam was seen as 
Cops' personal decision and not that of the Company. Arung Palakka, 
therefore, decided to appeal directly to the "Kompani" for a final 
judgement on the matter. The response from Batavia confirmed Arung 
Palakka's belief that Cops, or any other Dutch official with whom he 
came in conflict, did not represent the true sentiments of the Company. 
In June Fort Rotterdam sent word that a ship was now at Bima and on its 
way to take Sultan Mohammad Ali and his family to exile. On 15 
September 1678 Sultan Mohammad Ali and his family we re finally 
taken on board a Dutch ship, the Haesenburgh, which brought them to 
Batavia (KA 1227e:270r). 
Batavia had adjudged the concerns of the Company as a whole to be 
more important than those of Fort Rotterdam. Arung Palakka was being 
asked to raise an army to help the Company against its enernies on Java. 
If his position at home were to be dangerously strengthened as a result of 
the decision to exile Sultan Mohammad Ali, then Batavia considered the 
risk to be weil taken. As the years progressed Batavia began to rely more 
and more upon Arung Palakka as the Company's policeman in the 
archipelago. UnwiUing to jeopardize this useful arrangement Batavia 
consistently over-ruled any attempt by Fort Rotterdam to cu rb Arung 
Palakka's power at home and thus helped create perhaps the most 
powerful ruler in the history of South Sulawesi. 
Arung Palakka now proceeded with greater conviction than before to 
organize an expedition to fight alongside Speelman and the Company in 
Java against the Makassar refugees. Large numbers of native boats were 
built along the northwest and southwest coasts of the Bay of Bone to 
supplement the four Dutch ships sent to carry the South Sulawesi troops 
to Java. By October some 1,000 Bugis from Bone and Soppeng had 
already arrived in Makassar for the expedition (KA 1227c:280r-v). 
Finallyon 6 October 1678 the first Bugis contingent left for Java (KA 
1227f:286v). In June of the following year another large South Sulawesi 
army was assem bied at Makassar to be sent to Java under the personal 
command of Arung Palakka himself. On the day of departure Arung 
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Palakka appeared in full view of the assem bied nobles wearing the gold 
chain and medallion which had been presented to him in 1672 by the 
Company. He approached President Cops and told him th at he was 
going to war in the service of the Company. His only request was that 
Cops respect his interests and be the guardian of his heritage. And with 
that he took his leave and boarded the Dutch ship which was to take him 
to Java (KA 1236d:380v-381r). 
Arung Palakka was still unsure of how much authority he could 
command while absent on Java. By calling Cops the guardian of his 
heritage in front of the South Sulawesi nobles, he hoped to impress upon 
them th at the Dutch would act on his behalf to meet any threat to his 
interests. To forestall any squabbles among his own followers, he had 
also carefully demarcated different spheres of authority. Daeng 
Memang, son of the former Arumpone La Ma'daremmeng, was placed 
in charge of Maros; Arung Maruangen of Bulukumba; and Arung 
Taneta Matoa (Arung Amali Gellareng Tosawa) and Arung Teko of 
Bone (KA 1224d:309-31O). The position of "Supreme Commander" 
was to be held by Arung Cibalu (KA 1235g:30). Arung Belo was to 
oversee affairs in Soppeng, while Datu Mario was instructed to assist 
Towesa's sister, We Adda Datu ri Watu, with the goveming of Soppeng 
(KA 1236e:332r). To all of his regents Arung Palakka had left explicit 
instructions that they we re not to do anything during his absence without 
the express approval of President Cops in Fort Rotterdam (KA 1236d: 
380v). 
At long last Arung Palakka had the opportunity to destroy the last 
remnants of Makassar resistance to his rule. Although he had been 
instrurnental in the downfall of Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad AIi, the 
latter continued to be revered by his people. The new KaraengGoa 
Sultan Abdul Jalil owed his position to Arung Palakka but wielded Iittle 
real power since he was being abandoned by his people in droves seeking 
to offer their allegiance to their old Karaeng Goa. At the height of th is 
exodus there was an excitement running through the exile community in 
Makassar that the time was quickly approaching when they would be 
able to regain thei~ lost kingdom. Rumours of fleets of Makassilr refu-
gees returning home to free their land from oppression grew daily and 
nurtured hopes of a spectacular undertaking approximating Arung 
Palakka's feat a decade earlier. As long as these Makassar refugees 
continued to roam the lands and the seas throughout the Malay-Indone-
sian archipelago with impunity, the Makassar people at home could 
believe in this dream. Only with the destruction of the refugees could this 
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myth be finally put to rest and the Company and Arung Palakka succeed 
in establishing their "peace". 
When Arung Palakka embarked for Java in October 1678, he could look 
back on the most recent events in South Sulawesi with great satisfaction. 
There had been severe trials involving wars with Mandar, Luwu, and 
Goa, and personal battles of wills with Presidents Harthouwer and 
Cops and with Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali Tumenanga ri 
Jakattara. But Arung Palakka emerged from these trials with his pres-
tige enhanced and power greatly increased. Through an effective mix of 
threats and blandishments, he had succeeded in systematically removing 
all opposition to his overlordship. The Company, the other partner in 
this joint overlordship, found itself in a dilemma of its own making. 
Having acquiesced in Arung Palakka's assumption of leadership of 
intemal affairs in South Sulawesi the Company had been rewarded with 
the desired peace and predictability so vital to trade. And yet with 
leadership came power, and the Company began to fear that perhaps 
one day it would find itself opposed by this newly-found might. 
Perspicacious officials at Fort Rotterdam had earlier foreseen the 
dangers and had therefore pursued a surreptitious policy of maintaining 
a balance between Arung Palakka and the kingdom of Goa. With the 
defeat of Goa in the 1677 war and the elect ion of a new Karaeng Goa 
responsive to Arung Palakka, this policy proved no longer suitable and a 
search for a new balancing force was begun. Meanwhile, however, 
Batavia was encouraged by Arung Palakka's frequent and fervent 
expressions of loyalty to the Company. When he proved amenable to 
requests for military aid against the Company's enernies, Batavia was 
reassured that the old formula governing the joint overlordship - i.e., the 
Company to deal with trade and external affairs and Arung Palakka with 
internal affairs - was succeeding. Once Batavia was satisfied that Arung 
Palakka had accepted implicitly the Company's right to call upon his 
services in fulfillment of its part of the formula, it too began to exercise 
great discretion in matters dealing with the intra-kingdom disputes, 
regarding them as rightfully the preserve of Arung Palakka. The joint 
overlordship had been buffetted by a number of serious crises in the 
1670's, but it had survived and become so much the stronger for them. 
Batavia had supported Arung Palakka's measures in South Sulawesi, 
and now it was Arung Palakka's turn to reciprocate in the serious 
"extemal" problem facing the Company, that of the Makassar refugees 
on Java. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE REFUGEES 
The fall of Sombaopu in 1669 was a significant event for the Makassar 
people. It marked not merely the end of "the war" against the Company 
and Amng Palakka, but also the ènd of an era when the name Goa was 
synonymous with power and supremacy. It is noteworthy that the Tallo 
ChronicIe ends in 1641 af ter the death of one of its greatest miers, while 
that of Goa lists miers into the early 17th century, but has no commen-
tary on the miers after the death of Sultan Hasanuddin on 12 June 1670 
(Abdurrahim and Wolhoffn.d.; Abdurrahim and Borahima 1975). The 
great period of Makassar history came to a close in 1669, and it was as if 
all the scribes realized this and put their pointed lont ar writing ins tm-
ments away. To these scribes whose task was to list the genealogies and 
deeds of the miers for the edification of the royal progeny (Abdurrahim 
and Wolhoff n.d. :9), a defeat in war was recorded as just one of a number 
of events in the past. Other wars besides that of 1669 had been fought 
and lost by Goa but still recorded in the ChronicIe. Yet the 1666-9 
Makassar War, culminating in the destmction of Sombaopu, is not even 
mentioned. 
It was the scribes of the victorious Bugis who succeeded in capturing 
the essence of the spiritual debacle in Goa by speaking simply of "the fall 
of Sombaopu" when recalling the events of the war. In using this phrase 
they were not merely referring to the actual event itself but alluding to a 
whole world which had collapsed. Sombaopu had been the citadel of the 
Goa miers and symbolized the almost legendary might of this Makassar 
kingdom. There was no kingdom in the entire region of Eastern Indone-
sia which believed that Goa would ever fall. Such belief was recorded by 
Europeans in the area and is echoed in a Makassar folktale recalling th is 
great past. And yet Goa proved to be vulnerable in every way. lts armies 
and navies were destroyed, but more painful and ignominious still was 
the betrayal of some of its own leaders in th is great war. 
At the start of hostilities there had been two major factions within the 
Goa government reflecting basically the degree of commitment to the 
war. As the years passed and the situation for Goa began to seem 
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increasingly desperate, the original division in the govemment became 
more extreme and attitudes were transformed into deeds. By 1669 there 
were Makassar nobles actively fighting on the si de of Arung Palakka and 
the Company. This betrayal poisoned the atmosphere within Goa and 
Tallo in the post-war years and hindered the formation of an effective 
govemment which could provide the badly needed leadership for a 
demoralized people. Moreover, whatever goodwill created by a post-
war govemment in Goa was quickly destroyed in being forced to satisfy 
the victors' incessant demands for corvée labour from its people. Having 
been for so long a respected and feared people, it was humiliating to be 
summoned to work alongside their former vassals in such tasks as 
strengthening Fort Rotterdam, destroying all Makassar and allied forti-
fications built in the war, and for various other building programmes in 
and around Makassar. With Arung Palakka occupying the ancestral 
home of Karaeng Pattinngaloang and Karaeng Karunrung at Bontoala, 
and with the Dutch securely ensconced in the former Makassar fortifica-
tion Ujung Pandang, the Makassar people felt constrained and at the 
mercy of these conquering powers. Rampaging Bugis added to the 
torment as they wrought havoc on the Makassar people and countryside. 
The final insult was the impunity with which Arung Palakka .interfered in 
the affairs of their kingdom. Af ter the death of Sultan Hasanuddin in 
1670 and the ineffectual govemment of Sultan Amir Hamzah Tumam-
malianga ri Allu' (1670-1674), many important Makassar princes and 
nobles, no longer willing to tolerate the scom and con tempt of their 
conquerors, fled with their followers to various parts of the archipelago 
even as far as Ayutthaya. 
In late 1670 the total destruction of Tosora and the systematic razing 
of the Wajo countryside added to the growing stream of refugees leaving 
South Sulawesi. The Wajo migration immediately after 1670 appeared 
to have been on a larger scale than that from the Makassar lands and 
caused noticeable demographic changes within South Sulawesi and 
neighbouring islands (L-3:324; Noorduyn 1955: 124). 
To leave one 's land to escape an oppressive or uncaring government is 
a familiar feature in South Sulawesi society to the present day. In the past 
individuals had several options: they could go with their families to a 
neighbouring community and pi ace themselves under another lord; or 
they could flee to the periphery of society into wild areas unclaimed by 
other settlers; or they could join groups "outside the law", groups 
operating within their own created system of behaviour. There were 
certain major differences in the migrations which occurred on a large 
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scale in the late 17th century. They we re of ten led by royalty or high 
nobles, which meant that their following was often very large. In South 
Sulawesi men of any consequence accumulated followers among his 
close relatives, his subjects, his slaves, and any other individuals bound 
by the "patron-client" relationship (Chabot 1950: 15-6; Kooreman 
1883, Vi:352). Moreover, the greater influence exercised throughout 
South Sulawesi by the overlords in the 17th century made the traditional 
manner of escape hazardous. Wherever these refugees chose to go in 
South Sulawesi, the long arm of the overlord could reach them. The only 
real escape was to seek a new lord overseas who would be willing to give 
them land and a livelihood in return for loyal manpower. While these 
migrations had occurred earlier in the century during Goa's overlord-
ship, they increased considerably during the turmoil of the late 17th 
century. 
The groups migrating overseas were of ten so vast that their fleets were 
likened to floating cities. The numbers and the mobility of these refugees 
in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago introduced an element of instabili-
ty in the area. The sudden appearance of these fleets of armed men 
aroused terror in the local populations which we re of ten incapable of 
repelling these newcomers. Those kingdoms which we re larger and more 
confident provided them with homes in return for assistance against 
enemies. But they quickly found that once these groups became estab-
lished in one place, it was almost impossible to dislodge them. In the end 
the unwelcome refugees either used force or threat of force to retain 
their position. If they left, they sought revenge by causing great havoc 
within the kingdom. Some of the refugees we re fortunate in becoming 
successful kingmakers and even marrying into the local royal families, 
but they were a rare minority.l 
Among the most famous of the Makassar refugee leaders in the 17th 
céntury we re Karaeng Tallo Sultan Harunarrasyid Tumenanga ri Lam-
pana; Karaeng Galesong, a son of Sultan Hasanuddin; Daeng Man-
gappa, the brother of Karaeng Tallo; Karaeng Bontomarannu, the 
Tuma'bicara-butta Goa and son of Karaeng Sumanna; and Daeng Tulo-
10, an uncle of Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali. Of the five Karaeng 
Bontomarannu was the first to flee from the Company and Arung 
Palakka. He had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the ill-fated 
Makassar punitive expedition which left to attack Butung in November 
1666. Af ter the utter devastation of the fleet by Speelman's forces, 
Karaeng Bontomarannu surrendered to Speelman. Speelman later 
became friendly with Karaeng Bontomarannu and even presented him 
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with a finely-worked gun and a golden kris. On ce Speelman's confidence 
had been won, Karaeng Bontomarannu was allowed to go ashore at 
Galesong. But this was precisely what Karaeng Bontomarannu had 
hoped, and he seized this opportunity to make his escape (Stapel 1922: 
141). When the Bungaya treaty was signed on 18 November 1667, one 
of the articles required Goa to surrender Karaeng Bontomarannu to the 
allies. Before this could be done, Karaeng Bontomarannu "disappear-
ed" and emerged later in Mandar in the company of Goa's ally (KA 
1157k:416v). In 1671 the Dutch sent an envoy to Mandar with the 
instruction that if Karaeng Bontomarannu and Opu Cenning, or Crown 
Prince, of Luwu were found in Sendana they should be told of their 
pardon by the Company. But both the Opu Cenning and Karaeng 
Bontomarannu were nowhere to be found (KA 1171d:757v). This Opu 
Cenning was a nephew of Karaeng Bontomarannu and was only fifteen 
years old when he sailed on the Makassar fleet to Butung. He was 
captured and sent by Speelman to Batavia from which place he escaped 
to Banten in November 1668. Toward the end of that year or early the 
next he returned to Makassarvia Semarang (De Graaf 1962:65). He too 
sought refuge in Mandar once again in the company of his uncle, 
Karaeng Bontomarannu. It appears that they left sometime in early or 
mid-1671, for in mid-August 1671 a certain Karaeng Kassi'jala arrived 
in Japara saying that he was awaiting Karaeng Bontomarannu and Opu 
Cenning so that they could sail together to Banten (Dagh-Register 
1670-1:406). On 19th August Karaeng Bontomarannu arrived in 
Banten with 800 people on three boats and a large junk (Dagh-Register 
1670-1 :404) and was joined at about mid-September by the Opu 
Cenning and his wives and some 300 followers (Dagh-Register 1670-1: 
420). 
The arrival of these distinguished refugees in Banten was apparently 
at the invitation of its ruler. They were straightaway given permission to 
live there and provided with an area to settle close to his residence in 
Pontang, "on the east side of the large marketplace" (Dagh-Register 
1670-1:416). They were quickly joined by other groups of Makassar 
refugees under their leaders. Among these was a certain Kare Mamu 
who promised the Sultan of Banten that by the beginning of the east 
monsoon he would be ab Ie to provide him with 3,000 warriors from both 
Makassar and East Java (Dagh-Register 1672:53). Such a promise was 
appealing to the leaders of Banten who we re dismayed at Goa's defeat, 
for they werè certain that the Company intended the same fate for their 
own kingdom. 
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At first the mutual needs of the Makassar guests and their patron lord 
assured a satisfactory arrangement in the land. Difficulties soon OCCUf-
red, however, over the Sultan 's right to take any woman belonging to his 
subjects. When he attempted to apply the same standards to the Makas-
sar refugees, he met an entirdy different response. Karaeng Bontoma-
rannu's son was killed attemptihg to reclaim his wife from the Sultan's 
palace, and other Makassar noblemen contemplated desperate action 
against the Sultan for seizing their wives. Unable to tolerate th is and 
other forms of harassment from the Banten community, Karaeng 
Bontomarannu and his large following finally left for East Java where 
they had been invited to settle by Mataram's Adipati Anom (Crown 
Prince). Karaeng Bontomarannu had earlier asked the Susuhunan for 
permission to settle in Mataram but the request had been refused. 
Whether the refusal reflected Mataram's fear of the power of the Makas-
sar refugees or its unwillingness to grant certain conditions for settle-
ment is not known. Tbe Adipati Anom, however, was so eager to 
strengthen his following that he welcomed them' with open arms and 
gave them land in his apanage areas in East Java (De Graaf 1962:66-7, 
69-70). 
One of Karaeng Bontomarannu's chief companions was Daeng 
Mangappa who had followed his brother, Karaeng Tallo, into exile. 
Af ter the death of Karaeng Tallo on the island of Sumbawa on 16 June 
1673 Daeng Mangappa and Karaeng Galesong "returned to Bali and 
bought a piece of land on which to settle" (KA 119li:742r). But Dutch 
reports mention nothing about their experiences on Bali. On 9 Novem-
ber 1674 Daeng Mangappa appeared in Banten at the head of a fleet of 
nineteen boats and 7-800 followers. Karaeng Galesong was not with this 
group and may have gone to east coast Java. The reason which Daeng 
Mangappa gave for going to Banten was to buy gunpowder and wea-
pons. He intended to attack the kingdom of Bima whose ruler, so it was 
said, had ordered Karaeng Tallo's body to be exhumed and burned (De 
Graaf 1962:75-6; Dagh-Register 1675:339-340). Daeng Mangappa 
was to go from Banten to meet Karaeng Bontomarannu in Balambangan 
in East Java and then proceed to Bima where they were to join Karaeng 
Jarannikka for the attack. But these plans never materialized. Daeng 
Mangappa remained in Banten, and his sister married the chief minister 
of that kingdom. Tbe Sultan of Banten disapproved of this second influx 
of Makassar refugees and wanted them to leave his kingdom. However, 
the Chief Minister Kiai Arya Mangunjaya prevailed upon him to mod-
erate his demands. And so Daeng Mangappa and his followers remained 
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in Banten and learned to tolerate suspicion, fines, and even laws which 
allowed anyone in Banten to kill any Makassar person found in the 
streets at nights. But wh at they never learned to accept was the Sultan's 
behaviour toward their women. They, too, finally abandoned Banten 
toward the end of April 1675 to join Karaeng Bontomarannu, Karaeng 
Galesong, and Daeng Tuioio in east coast Java (Dagh-Register 1675: 
12, 14-5,93-4, 104, 117). 
Any hopes that these Makassar princes may have had of persuading 
Banten to assist them militarily to regain power in South Sulawesi 
quickly vanished. Rather than face the ignominy of living under an 
overlord who showed scant respect for them, they preferred to seek a 
home free from the demands of any local lord. 2 The particular area 
chosen, Demung, was suitable in more than one respect.1t was an area in 
East Java which was a no man's land between the jurisdiction of the 
Adipati Anom of Mataram and Trunajaya of Madura (De Graaf 1962: 
86). Equally important, the Makassar leaders were ideally located to 
seek help from either or both of these leaders who had already indicated 
an interest in the military potentialof the refugees. Arung Palakka had 
demonstrated how patience, persistence, and good fortune had finally 
succeeded in gaining a powerful ally who had helped free his land. With 
this example in mind these Makassar leaders were willing to emulate 
Arung Palakka, even to the extent of fighting other rulers' wars in order 
ultimately to obtain military support for the reconquest of South Sula-
wesi. 
A hopeful beginning toward this goal was made with the arrangement 
of marriage between Karaeng GaIesong and Trunajaya's niece. The 
Adipati Anom of Mataram, however, had now become reconciled with 
his father, the Susuhunan, and saw no further need to court the refugees. 
But the loss to the Makassar leaders of a potential ally was more than 
compensated by the urgency with which Trunajaya, the Adipati Anom's 
erstwhile ally, now sought the assistance of the refugees in his bid to 
become ruler of Mataram. Before the marriage could take place, Truna-
jaya asked as acondition that the Makassar forces participate in an 
attack on Gresik and Surabaya, cities subject to the Adipati Anom. Thus 
began a series of successful campaigns along the coastal areas of East 
Java. By the end of 1675 their conquests included Gresik, Surabaya, all 
the areas between these two cities, as weil as the four strong and 
well-populated ports of Pasuruhan, Pajarakan, Gombang, and Ge-
rongan. With the Makassar warriors having lived up to their reputation, 
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Trunajaya was more than p!eased to present his niece in marriage to 
Karaeng Galesong in the fall of 1675 (De Graaf 1962:70, 85-8). 
With the growing danger posed to the Mataram throne by the alliance 
of the Makassar refugees and Trunajaya, the Susuhunan appealed to the 
Company for help. In a series of hard-fought battles in May, June, and 
July 1676, the Makassar refugees were forced out of most of the cities 
they had conquered but not without severe losses to the Javanese-Dutch 
armies. Karaeng Ga!esong escaped from Panarukan with eighty boats 
and sought safety in Madura. The alliance between the Makassar refu-
gees and Trunajaya was reaffirmed in August or September 1676 when 
Trunajaya took the title of Panembahan Madu Retna and Karaeng 
Galesong that of Adipati Anom (De Graaf 1962: 104-110). In accepting 
the foreign title of Adipati Anom (Crown Prince, Raja Muda), Karaeng 
Galesong symbolically declared the intention of the Makassar refugees 
to champion the eau se of the Panembahan, Trunajaya. Several decades 
later a refugee Bugis prince was also declared Raja Muda in the Malay 
kingdom of Johor. But the Raja Mudaship under this Bugis prince and 
his successors differed in two crucial aspects from th at in the past: it did 
not provide the incumbent with any rights to the throne, and it assumed 
much greater powers than ever held by previous office-holders (L.y. 
Andaya 1975:295, passim). Though little is known about the arrange-
ments between Karaeng Ga!esong and Trunajaya, the former may have 
interpreted his appointment in the same light as his compatriot in Johor 
was to do some years later. Karaeng Galesong and his followers had 
made their commitment to Trunajaya, for they hoped th at in time he in 
turn would !end his might to their cause. 
While Karaeng Ga!esong and his peop!e had found a sanctuary in 
Madura, the other Makassar groups under Daeng Mangappa and 
Karaeng Bontomarannu remained at Demung. Captain Christofel Po!e-
man, who had fought in the Makassar War of 1666-9, led a successful 
expedition against the refugee strongholds in East Java in the beginning 
of September 1676. Only Madura eluded him because he lacked the 700 
Europeans or 1-2,000 native troops he considered necessary to invade 
that island (De Graaf 1962: 112-4). As long as Madura offered a safe 
haven and the Company was unwilling to establish a permanent military 
post in East Java, the Makassar refugees were ab Ie to operate with 
impunity in the waters and along the coasts and islands of East Java. 
Despite Po!eman's claims to have "crippled the strength of the Makassar 
[refugees]", at the end of September 1676 Karaeng Ga!esong crossed 
over to Java from Madura to form a 9,000 man armY from Java, Madura, 
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and Makassar. At Gegodog this army decisively defeated a much larger 
force under the Adipati Anom of Mataram. It was later claimed that the 
Adipati Anom had only feigned battle against the enemy (De Graaf 
1962: 123-5). 
Af ter the victory at Gegodog the armies under Trunajaya and 
Karaeng Galesong proceeded westward, and by January 1677 had con-
quered all the ports along the north coast of Java as far west as Ceribon. 
They failed to capture Japara because of some quarrel between the 
Madura and Makassar forces iR the beginning of December 1676 which 
resulted in the latter's withdrawal from the besieged city and their return 
to Demung (De Graaf 1962:133-5). According to one report from 
Ceribon the differences had arisen because of the continuing raids, 
looting, and insufferable conduct of the Makassar troops who had even 
demanded that the cities of Gresik and Surabaya be given to them as 
recompense for their assistance. Trunajaya had been so angered by their 
behaviour that he had four of the most important Makassar leaders, all 
from Tallo, krissed. Among those reported killed was Daeng Mangappa 
(Dagh-Register 1677:109-112). 
In view of known reasons for previous Makassar participation in wh at 
were essentially Trunajaya's campaigns, it would have been unlikely that 
they would have demanded cities for themselves. Raiding and looting 
were very much part of native wars and would not have been the 
exclusive preserve of the Makassar forces, as can be seen from Dutch 
reports of the behaviour of the Java troops in these wars (De Graaf 
1962:passim). A more likely re as on may be found in Trunajaya's own 
explanation to the Dutch of his quarreis with the Makassar lords. When-
ever Karaeng Galesong visited the royal capital in Madura, Trunajaya 
honoured him with a horse and an umbrella, which were the traditional 
signs of respect shown to royal guests. In the last visit, however, Karaeng 
Gaiesong had refused to leave his boat and had simply demanded th at 
his wife, Trunajaya's niece, be brought to him. When Trunajaya showed 
his disapproval at the lack of respect shown his niece by this action, 
Karaeng Galesong threatened to get her by force. To avoid conflict 
Trunajaya relented and sent several officials to accompany his niece to 
her husband. Karaeng Galesong then killed some of the officials, thus 
causing a rift between the two allies (De Graaf 1962: 135-6). The 
familiar theme of women trouble appeared again to have been the cause 
of this serious quarrel between the Makassar refugees and their host 
lord. 
Fighting between Trunajaya and the Makassar refugees broke out in 
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mid-January 1677 without any decisive victories by either side. Truna-
jaya was too occupied on Java at the moment to concentrate his forces 
against the Makassar troops. Karaeng Galesong and his followers were 
therefore able to continue to operate successfully from east Madura, 
while Karaeng Tuioio with a force of 200 Makassar men and 1,000 
Malays under a certain Datu Louadin cruised successfully on the western 
part of the island.3 The situation in general, nevertheless, was most 
discouraging for the refugees. Having lost their one last ally among the 
Indonesian kingdoms, the Makassar refugees saw their hope of attempt-
ing an invasion of Makassar quickly dissipating. But their disagreement 
with Trunajaya did not make them any more favourably incIined toward 
the Company. Speelman had hoped to obtain an assurance of neutrality 
from the refugees in his campaign against Trunajaya but to no avail (De 
Graaf 1962: 136-7, 173-4). The refugees, now forced out of Demung 
because of the hostilities between Trunajaya and the Company, sought 
more secure bases mainly in Sumbawa and in Pulau Laut off the co ast of 
Banjarmasin. The Dutch heard that among their leaders, Karaeng 
Bontomarannu had died of iIIness, Karaeng Galesong was cruising 
between Madura and Java, Opu Cenning Luwu was preparing to avenge 
the treachery of the people of Banjarmasin, and Daeng Tuioio was based 
on the island of Kangean with a considerable force (KA 1216g:178-9). 
A later report traced Karaeng Galesong and 800 of his followers to 
Kakaper in East Java where they had built a seemingly impregnable 
fortification along a river. It was bounded by an island on one side and a 
swamp on the other, with the only access being through the swamp by 
means of a narrow path about two and a half metres wide (KA 1218: 
1896r-1895v). Yet the purely defensive nature of th is fortification 
underlined the difficulties which they, too, were facing from hostile 
elements all around them. 
'The situation of the Makassar people in Goa was equally grim. They 
had been defeated by Arung Palakka and the Dutch at the end of July 
1677 for the third time since 1666. What distinguished this war from the 
others was the strength and persistence of rumours th at the Makassar 
refugees were all planning to return to save their beleaguered land. 
These rumours proved baseless but providcd a continuing hope to the 
Makassar people in Sulawesi and possibly helped prolong the war. As 
long as large numbers of well-armed Makassar refugees remained 
abroad, peace in South Sulawesi was threatened. Arung Palakka was 
especially conscious of this since it was he, more than the Dutch, who was 
attuned to the subtie and swift changes of attitudes among the local 
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population highly prone to rumours. On 14 August 1677 he requested 
and was granted permission by the Council in Fort Rotterdam to send 
the Bugis Arung Teko and the Makassar Karaeng Jarannikka to ask all 
Bugis and Makassar refugees on Flores, Sumbawa, and other areas to 
return to their homeland (KA 1217b:218v-219r). 
The mission proved unsuccessful because many did not wish to face 
the uncertainty of their fate in South Sulawesi. They had heard rumours 
that if they were to return, 1/3 of them would be made slaves, with 1/3 
going to the Company, another 1/3 to the Bugis and the final1/3 to the 
Makassar people under Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil (KA 1227g: 
261r). Moreover, the basic cause of their flight from Sulawesi had not 
been removed. Arung Palakka was in 1677 even stronger and less 
compromising than before. Both Daeng Tuloio and Karaeng Galesong 
explained that they would not return because they found Arung 
Palakka's overlordship unbearable. They quickly added that the 
Makassar refugees in Ayutthaya, eastern Indonesia, Palembang, and 
Aceh would prefer living "under the favour and the protection of the 
Company" (KA 1224b:219-220). What they proposed was the right to 
acknowledge only the Company as their overlord beca~se they accused 
Arung Palakka of being the prime instigator of many of the policies 
which had contributed to the present degradation of the Makassar 
people. But as long as Arung Palakka continued to receive the trust of 
the Company, they saw little reason for returning since there would be 
no improvement for the Makassar people. Even the assurance from 
President Cops of the Company's protection and land in Maros for their 
livelihood failed to persuade them to return (KA 1227b:241r-242r). 
The mission to recall the refugees, therefore, ended in failure. 
There seemed no other alternative left to Arung Palakka and the 
Company but to use force to compel the refugees to return. These 
refugees constituted an unstable element within the area. They cast their 
lots with one or another faction within a particular kingdom, thereby 
creating unnatural and transitory govemments which survived at the 
pleasure of the refugees. Such arrangements bred resentment in the local 
populace and the eventual expulsion of the refugees. They were then 
cast adrift once again seeking a home and an ally and making every 
ambitious leader in a kingdom vulnerable to the attractions of such a 
powerful group of armed warriors. And so the process repeated itself. 
There were cases of refugees successfully settling within an area, but the 
vast majority roamed the seas from one kingdom to another disrupting 
the normal processes of trade and government throughout the Malay-
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Indonesian archipelago. The activities of the refugees we re anathema to 
the Company which depended upon peaceful conditions for the conduct 
of its trade. For Arung Palakka the large numbers of Makassar refugees 
abroad posed a potential threat to his position in South Sulawesi and 
served as a painful reminder that his war against the Makassar leaders 
was not yet finished. Once again the aims of the Company and Arung 
Palakka converged making the joint expedition against the Makassar 
refugees on Java of equal importance to both allies. 
In May 1678 Arung Palakka decided to go to Java himself to lead the 
South Sulawesi forces. From Bontoala he sent his trusted Arung Amali 
Gellareng Tosawa to Bone and surrounding areas to prepare forty to 
sixty large boats to sail to Bantaeng within two months. Arung Palakka 
was reported to have asked for "volunteers" fram Bone and Soppeng for 
the expedition to avoid the impression th at he was ordering the allies to 
go to Java (KA 1224b:187-8, 220). Nevertheless, w~en 626 mountain 
folk from Bone arrived on twenty-one boats in Makassar, Arung Cibalu 
explained that they had been ordered by Arung Palakka to come "on 
pain of death and the confiscation of all their goods and children" (KA 
1236f:380v). 
The first contingent of 1,500 Bugis arrived in Surabaya toward the end 
of 1678. On 8th December these Bugis traops left Surabaya, sloshed 
through rain and mud to arrive on the 13th at a village about a day and a 
half away from Kakaper (KA 1238b: 1756v-7r). The Makassar refugees 
under Karaeng Galesong we re gathered in strength at Kakaper to which 
which place Daeng TuIoIo and his followers had also gone from Sum-
bawa sometime at the end of August 1678 (KA 1227e:278v). Even 
before the fighting began, the Bugis anny was somewhat incapacitated 
by illness (KA 1238a: 1834v). Fortunately, more South Sulawesi rein-
forcements under the personal command of Arung Palakka left for Java 
at the end of June 1679. Poleman eagerly awaited Arung Palakka's 
arrival to instil discipline and morale among the Bugis traops. They had 
been decimated and debilitated by sickness, and a great gloom pervaded 
the Bugis camps through lack of activity (KA 1238c: 1883r-1884v). 
As soon as Arung Palakka arrived in Batavia, he despatched two 
messengers to the Bugis under Captain Fransen Holsteyn in East Java 
ordering them to meet him at Surabaya. These messengers were also 
given 2,000 rijksdaalders to buy horses and bring them for Arung 
Palakka and his men since most wore heavy chainmail armour (baju 
rantai) and could only travel easily by horseback (KA 1238d:1900r-v). 
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The slow progress of the ships carrying Arung Palakka and the Bugis 
reinforcements from Batavia to East Java became so exasperating for 
Arung Palakka th at he and his wife Daeng Talele and her ladies-in-
waiting and a small following left their Dutch ship and travelled over-
land. Fear for their safety made the Dutch send out boats immediately to 
search for them. They we re found at Pamanukan with all the Bugis 
boats, including some just recently arrived from Makassar. Af ter a 
Dutch word of admonition to Arung Palakka, the Dutch and Bugis ships 
set sail on the evening of 25 July 1679 and arrived at Indramayu on the 
28th. The Javanese regent's son greeted Arung Palakka and presented 
him with three water buftaloes, twenty sacks of rice, and other gifts. That 
evening the fleet continued onward to Tegal, Semarang, Japara, Gresik, 
and finally arrived in Surabaya on 19th August (KA 1238e: 1904r-
1908v; KA 1238f:1912r; KA 1238g:1923r-v). 
Arung Palakka and his Bugis established their fortifications diagonal-
ly opposite the Dutch camp on the other side of the river at Soha. When 
Arung Palakka came to see the Dutch commanders, he expressed his 
satisfaction that they had even built houses for himself and his retinue in 
the Makassar style (i.e. on stilts), much to the delight of his wife Daeng 
Talele. The hospitality of the Dutch was in great contrast to the treat-
ment accorded Arung Palakka by the Java folk. When Arung Palakka 
asked them for horses, they brought twelve which were generously 
described as "not being the best". Chided for this discourtesy, they left 
and retumed with a few more "run-down and wom-out" mounts, c1aim-
ing that nothing better was available. The Bugis had to be satisfied with 
this, and so the army set oft on 23rd August while the supplies were 
transported by boat. A few days later the expedition arrived at the 
refugee stronghold at Kakaper. Some of the refugees soon came to ask 
for peace and were brought before a meeting of the War Council. The 
Dutch Commandant Jacob Couper commented that during the meeting, 
Arung Palakka deferred to the Dutch on everything. With Arung Palak-
ka's approval, the War Council decided to send a message to the refugee 
forces at Kakaper saying that if they wished to surrender, they should 
send a fully authorized envoy to the Dutch within three days. On 30th 
August ni ne envoys arrived, among wh om was Daeng Tuloio. They 
asked for forgiveness and expressed their willingness to submit to the 
Company. Af ter the audience the envoys were presented with gifts 
suggested by Arung Palakka himself (KA 1238g: 1924v-1929v). 
In th is campaign in Java, Arung Palakka assumed a decidedly second-
ary role to the Company. He was here as an ally of the Company, 
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assisting the latter to administer the "extemal affairs" of South Sulawesi. 
The Makassar refugees were still considered by Arung Palakka as a 
South Sulawesi problem since their presence abroad in large numbers 
constituted a threat to the stability of South Sulawesi. As long as the 
kingdom of Goa continued to believe in a future deliverance by these 
refugees, opposition to Arung Palakka and the Company would remain 
strong. Arung Palakka had therefore summoned the allies to assist the 
Company, not as mercenaries to fight the Company's war, but as part-
ners in the joint enterprise of ruling South Sulawesi. The expedition was 
seen by Arung Palakka, and appeared to have been conveyed to him by 
the Company, as a war against the Makassar refugees, not against 
Trunajaya. 
The arrival of the Makassar envoys from Kakaper asking for peace 
appeared to be an auspicious beginning to the campaign. But nothing 
resulted from the talks, and preparations continued for an assault on the 
refugee stronghold. The Bugis army now stood at 3,000 able-bodied 
soldiers, and another boatload of reinforcements was expected to arrive 
from Makassar within a short time. Arung Palakka's personal body-
guard of sixty Bugis warriors arrived from Surabaya to augment the 
Dutch guards who had been assigned by the Company specifically to 
guard Arung Palakka's life. The next day the whole army was brought 
within about one and a half kilometres from Kakaper, with the Bugis 
under Arung Palakka camped about fifteen minutes away from the 
Dutch. Arung Palakka and 200 men rode for two hours that evening as 
far east as the village of Galate (?) looking for a passage into the 
well-defended fortress at Kakaper. Captain Jonekers and his Ambon 
troops had taken the same route the previous day and had returned 
without success. Arung Palakka and his men were more fortunate and 
found the narrow strip of dry land which was the only access through the 
swamp and thick reeds leading to the fortification. Preparations were 
then made for an assault through this narrow path. 
An attempt by Captain Jonckers and some Bugis to erect a gun battery 
across from the fortification had to be abandoned because of heavy 
gunfire fro\ll the Makassar forces. Leading some 2-300 Bugis soldiers, 
Arung Palakka tried to swim across but was soon attacked by about 400 
Makassar warriors.4 His Bugis managed to repel the attackers, and 
Arung Palakka was able to deliver to the Dutch that evening the heads of 
four Makassar soldiers and a banner which he himself had taken in the 
fighting. In another action Arung Palakka and his men captured a 
Makassar gun emplacement but lost forty Bugis. Arung Palakka's per-
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sonal participation in the fighting and in sharing in the most menial tasks 
demanded of his men, caused the Dutch some concern for his health and 
safety. They considered his well-being to be essential for any discipline 
and continued effectiveness of the Bugis warriors, for even with his 
presence as a moderating influence, the campaign was characterized by 
frequent Bugis raiding and looting of the surrounding countryside (KA 
1238: 1974r-1980v). 
On 21 October 1679 Kakaper feil to the combined allied forces with 
remarkably little resistance from the refugees. When the allies entered 
the fortification, there were some 2,000 women and children but very 
few men. Some 180 bodies were found, but most of the men had 
succeeded in escaping. Since Karaeng Galesong was not among the 
dead, Arung Palakka quickly assembIed 300 men and went to look for 
him. To many of the Bugis the fighting was over, and so even those 
chosen by Arung Palakka to accompany him began disappearing to get 
booty. Only sixty of the original300 Bugis we re still with Arung Palakka 
when he encountered a hostiIe force of Madura troops and was forced to 
go back. Arung Palakka returned to camp in a great rage and immediate-
Iy summoned all the Bugis leaders. He berated them for their behaviour 
and asked whether they still wanted him as their ruler. With tears in their 
eyes, the leaders asked Arung Palakka for forgiveness and swore that in 
all future circumstances they would remain at Arung Palakka's side to 
the death (KA 1238i:201Ov-2011r; KA 1238j:1998r). 
The profession of loyalty by Arung Palakka's men was sorely needed 
because of the difficulty in maintaining discipline among the 6,000 Bugis 
troops on Java. Arung Palakka had promised the Dutch that he would 
remain until peace was restored, but the capture of Kakaper. had been 
interpreted by many of the South Sulawesi troops as the end of the 
fighting and the start of the acquiring of the spoils of war. With the 
renewed support from his leaders Arung Palakka could now assure the 
Dutch th at he would pursue Karaeng Galesong "until he gets grey and is 
forced to eat the leaves of trees, for as long as the Makassar people 
remained on Java, the honour in the conquest of Kakaper would not be 
complete" (KA 1238i:2012r-2013r, 2015r, 2018v). His tas.k was made 
easier by Karaèng Galesong's own desire to re ach an accommodation 
with Arung Palakka "and by that means be freed from the people of 
Madura". Once this was accomplished Karaeng GaIesong promised to 
return to Makassar. But before any definite arrangements could be 
made, Karaeng Galesong died from illness on 21 November 1679 (KA 
1240a:2613v-2614r). Before his death Karaeng Galesong had desig-
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nated his sixteen or seventeen year old son, Karaeng Mamampang, as his 
successor to avoid a "succession" dispute among the refugees. Karaeng 
Mamampang followed the wishes of his father and persuaded his men to 
go to Surabaya for embarkation to Makassar. Some 120 of them event-
ually appeared in Surabaya, and another 8-900, incIuding some Wajo 
refugees, were expected to follow. However, the majority ofthe refugees 
refused to capitulate and joined their erstwhile Madura ally, Trunajaya 
(KA 1240b:2620r). 
Arung Palakka had made his promise to the Company, and he kept it. 
Although Makassar re si stance had been broken, there were still many 
small groups fighting separately or alongside Trunajaya. At Kalisturan, 
at the foot of the mountains at Malang, the Bugis forces found fifty 
hungry Makassar men, women, and children. They cIaimed that another 
300 of them were in the mountains but were prevented from coming 
down to surrender because the pass at the holy mountain of Rarata was 
blocked by Madura forces. The following morning the Bugis seized the 
Madura stockade at Rarata by surprise, forcing the Madura garrison to 
flee still higher up the mountain. The Madura troops retreated to the 
second line of defence, which was two bamboo stockades opposite one 
another and separated by a stream which effectively blocked any passage 
up or down the mountain. Instead of attempting what would have been a 
costly frontal attack on these stockades, Arung Palakka went with a 
group of men to see whether th ere was a way to attack from behind. 
Meanwhile the Dutch Captain van Vliet came down the mountainside 
with his Bugis and attacked unexpectedly from above, scattering the 
defenders who then fled on horseback. The Bugis pursued them for 
almost two hours and came upon a large camp of Makassar and Madura 
forces. The Dutch arrived soon af ter, but before an attack could be 
launched, ra in began falling and a dark mist descended. By the time the 
Bugis and Dutch arrived at the camp at Ngantang the following day, the 
enemy had fled except for four Makassar nob les and some 300 men, 
women, and children. They told Ä.rung Palakka that there were still 
another 1,500 Makassar folk, excIuding women and children, who we re 
up in the mountains. 
At a mountain called Kunjangan the Dutch and the Bugis laid a siege 
hoping to starve out the Makassar and Madura defenders. Af ter some 
time a certain Temenggong Wirapaksa came down with a white flag to 
Arung Palàkka saying that he had been sent directly to Arung Palakka 
by his lord Trunajaya. Arung Palakka told him, "Come, let us go below 
to the [Dutch] Commander where you can present your message. " But 
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the Temenggong refused, saying that the message was not for the Com-
mander but for Arung Palakka himself. Arung Palakka's reply express-
ed his understanding of his role in the whole conflict: "I have made no 
war against the Sultan [i.e., Trunajaya] and can therefore make no peace 
with him. I am here in the name of the Company and conduct myself in 
accordance with the wishes of the Commander." Arung Palakka saw his 
role here as a supportive one, assisting the Company in its function as a 
South Sulawesi over lord dealing with Makassar refugees. His quarrel 
was not with Trunajaya but with the refugees, and as long as they 
remained in Java his task would be incomplete. However, there was no 
question of his providing the leadership in this campaign since this was 
the concern of the Company in its role as overlord in South Sulawesi 
dealing with external affairs. The Company had provided a similar 
support to Arung Palakka in his wars against the South Sulawesi king-
doms, and it had not presumed to dictate how Arung Palakka was to 
conduct the internal affairs of South Sulawesi. Whilè no specific agree-
ment had been included in writing, both Arung Palakka and the Com-
pany had evolved an understanding of these spheres of influence which 
became more and more accepted procedure over the years. 
Having failed to gain Arung Palakka's favour, Trunajaya's envoy 
returned to the mountains. The Dutch then let the Makassar refugees in 
Trunajaya's camp know that if they surrendered they would be treated 
well. But if they refused, they would be destroyed. Some 2,500 decided 
to accept the offer and came down from their mountain strongholds on 
15th December. The size of the group greatly astonished the Dutch who 
considered themselves fortunate that the refugees had decided to sur-
render instead of fight. Abandoned by his Makassar allies, Trunajaya 
escaped through a thorny scrub forest behind the fortifications and fled 
to Pugar (KA 1240b:2620v-2623r). During the last days of Trunajaya's 
resistance there were only about twenty-five to thirty Makassar refugees 
still with him. But they, too, were soon to share the fate of their com-
patriots when Trunajaya was finally captured on 25 December 1679 
(KA 1240c:2652r; KA 1240d:2640v). 
Peace on Java had been achieved, and so Arung Palakka began making 
preparations to return home with a clear conscience. He had performed 
his duty to his ally faithfully and with great valour, but he was aware of 
the danger of prolonging his stay on Java. There had been a number of 
unpleasant confrontations between his Bugis and the local people, and 
his own relations with the Susuhunan of Mataram were decidedly 
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strained. He had foreseen the problem but could do littie to restrain an 
army of 6,000 once the fighting had ended. What he feared occurred 
with frightening regularity, with the Bugis seizing not only property but 
also the local people as slaves (KA 1238i:2012r-v; KA 1240c:2654r). 
The terror with which the local villagers regarded the marauding 
Bugis troops in the aftermath of the war was also reflected in the 
relationship between their respective rulers. In the early days of the war, 
the Susuhunan of Mataram had made no effort to conceal his con tempt 
for Arung Palakka and his Bugis by sending him a number of old, 
wom-out horses. Despite this demeaning treatment, Arung Palakka was 
ready to oblige when the Susuhunan requested a purple Makassar head-
gear (pasapu putara') and a beautiful Makassar woman as gifts af ter the 
fall of Kakaper. The Susuhunan spent two nights with the woman and 
then sent her and the headgear back. In an accompanying message 
Arung Palakka was told that the woman was too small (the Susuhunan 
preferred stronger women), and that he would not wear the headgear. 
The insult could not be ignored, and so Arung Palakka went quietly to 
the Dutch Commander Couper and told him that he was going to see the 
Susuhunan at Wirasaba "to resto re order". The Susuhunan realized 
wh at the consequences of his actions would be and had already fled 
upriver on two konting, with his nobles preparing to follow. Fortunately 
for the Susuhunan, Commander Couper succeeded in making Arung 
Palakka abandon any plans he had to avenge this insult (KA 1238i: 
2013v-l02014r). 
The quarrels between the Susuhunan and Arung Palakka grew steadi-
Iy worse. While the Dutch attributed the inexperience of the Susuhunan 
as a factor in this affair, they recognized th at the main reasons for the 
antagonism stemmed from the stealing, buming, and murdering carried 
out by the Bugis against the Susuhunan's subjects. Arung Palakka, too, 
was aware that there was little hope of reconciliation with the Susuhunan 
as long as the Bugis remained on Java and continued their depredations 
(KA 1240b:2614r-v). To the great credit of the Dutch, they succeeded 
in effecting some truce between the two rulers. In a ceremony the 
Susuhunan thanked Arung Palakka for his help and the latter reciproca-
ted with the appropriate courteous replies, thus demonstrating to the 
world that their quarreis were at an end (KA 1249a:2044v). The truce 
lasted a month. A new quarrel arose conceming a woman that the 
Susuhunan had presented to Arung Palakka prior to the battle of Kaka-
per. Af ter her disappearance, Arung Palakka was told that she had taken 
refuge in the Susuhunan's court. When Arung Palakka approached the 
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Susuhunan, the latter ordered a search and the woman was found in his 
court at Sidayu. Though the Susuhunan swore that he had no knowledge 
of this, Arung Palakka refused to believe him. And with this incident 
ended any further talk of peace and brotherhood between these two 
rulers (KA 1249b:2059r). 
On 18 February 1680 the Dutch Commander Couper and the Chief 
Merchant Jeremias van Vliet came on board 't Goedt Begin to say 
farewell to Arung Palakka. Arung Palakka asked Couper and van Vliet 
to convey his greetings and the following message to the Supreme 
Government of the Company in Batavia: "Whenever the Company 
needed his service, it need but order it, for he was obligated as long as he 
lived to repay its inestimable favour in restoring him as a free ruler af ter 
his exile from his homeland. " Arung Palakka was sincere in his declara-
tions because his life had been restored to him through the redemption 
of his siri' by the Company. But the obligations of Arung Palakka the 
individual had to be reconciled with those of Arung Palakka the over-
lord. While reminding the Company th at his presence in Java was in 
response to his moral debt, he was quick to emphasize that he was also 
here to fulfil his role as one of the joint overlords in South Sulawesi. He 
had come to Java to fulfil both a private and a public responsibility to the 
Company, and this he had done admirably. 
In addition to the 't Goedt Begin and another Dutch ship Marken, 
there were 207 native boats which left Surabaya for Maki;lssar on 19 
February 1680. In these native boats were members of Arung Palakka's 
army as weil as those Makassar refugees who were being repatriated: 
Bugis 
Makassar 
Wajo 
TOTAL 
5334 people on 139 boats 
3019 people on 51 boats 
714 people on 17 boats 
9059 people on 207 boats (KA 1249c:2074r) 
On board the 't Goedt Begin were Arung Palakka, his family, 455 of his 
subjects, and some 216 Makassar refugees, while the Marken carried 
130 refugees and sixteen Bugis (KA 1249d:2115v-2116r). With such a 
large fleet, it was difficult to maintain control over individual boats. To 
minimize piracy Arung Palakka appointed his four most important and 
dependable nobles - Arung Kaju, Arung Maruangen, Arung Macege, 
and Arung Ujung - to be responsible in preventing the Bugis and 
Makassar people from raiding the kingdom of Bima on the island of 
Sumbawa. They were also entrusted with the task of seeking a guarantee 
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from the rulers of the kingdoms of Bima and Sumbawa that they would 
forbid all Bugis or Makassar refugees from settling in their lands (KA 
1249d:2117r). 
On 13 March 1680 't Goedt Begin arrived in Makassar af ter an 
uneventful trip. Paulus de Bocq, second in command in Fort Rotterdam, 
and the Syahbandar François Prins came on board to welcome Arung 
Palakka. They accompanied him to shore with the firing of cannon, and 
when he left Fort Rotterdam an hour later to return home to Bontoala, 
he was again honoured by a cannonade (KA 1249d:2118r-v). A few 
days later Arung Palakka pres'ented to President Cops, as the Com-
pany's representative in South Sulawesi, the Makassar and Wajo refu-
gees taken prisoner in Java. With this presentation Arung Palakka 
discharged his final duties to the Company both as a joint overlord and as 
an indebted friend in the whole affair. Cops later sent these refugees 
back to their homelands and to their rightful lords (KA 1248a:345v-
346r). 
The long, hard road for the refugees had ended where it had begun. 
They had left Sulawesi because they were unwilling to accept the politi-
cal and social changes which had been forced up on them by Arung 
Palakka, the Dutch, and some of their own leaders. For some, especially 
from Wajo and Goa, leaving Sulawesi was not a "flight" but a calculated 
move to seek allies abroad for a reconquest of their homelands. Arung 
Palakka's example was fresh in their minds as they sought sanctuary 
from various rulers in Banten, Mataram, Madura, Jambi, Palembang, 
Aceh, Johor, and even Ayutthaya (Siam). As they lent their experienced 
and formidable fighters to do their host rulers' bidding, they harboured 
the hope and at times were perhaps even encouraged in the belief that 
these rulers would some day offer their resources for a military expedi-
tion to South Sulawesi. These refugees saw their ultimate aim as a 
recdnquest of their lands with arms and men from sympathetic rulers 
abroad. This goal dominated all their activities and united the many 
disparate groups of refugees. 
In 1679 in East Java alone there appeared to have been, at a conser-
vative estimate, about 4,000 of them roaming around the area. With 
such a large group of refugees, it is a wonder that so little actual piracy for 
private gain seemed to have occurred. Many of the attacks by the 
refugees on settlements and boats in and around Java appeared to have 
occurred under the orders of alocal patron lord (De Graaf 1962:80-2, 
87 -8). Unfortunately for the refugees, their services to their patron lords 
did not produce the desired effect. No offer of assistance was forth-
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coming, and the demands upon the refugees became more and more 
oppressive. One of the most offensive in the eyes of these South Sulawesi 
refugees was the demand for their womenfolk to gratify their locallords. 
On this issue the refugees quarreIed and became alienated first with the 
Sultan of Banten and later with Trunajaya, th us irreparably damaging 
any hopes of obtaining assistance from these two powerful princes for a 
reconquest of Goa and Wajo. 
After the defeat of the refugees at Kakaper in 1679, the vast majority 
of them were repatriated to Sulawesi. There were, however, some 
groups which fled further westward to seek protection and assistance 
from other lords. Among these were the elusive Daeng Tuloio, Daeng 
Mangika (a son of Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali), and Daeng 
Mangappa, whose death was reported by the Dutch in April 1677 but 
who turned up in Palembang with Daeng Mangika in 1680 (Dagh-
Register 1677:109; Dagh-Register 1680:544). But they no longer 
believed th at they could muster sufficient support from any ruler to be 
able to defeat the now seemingly invincible combination of Arung 
Palakka and the Company. Instead, they devoted their energies to 
obtaining an area to settle under their own lords without arbitrary 
interference from the local rulers, as occurred in Jambi under Daeng 
Mangika (L.Y. Andaya 1975:120). The only fut ure they could now 
reasonably expect was a life in exile free from the oppressions they had 
suffered in South Sulawesi. Whatever hope they may still have enter-
tained of a triumphant return to Sulawesi was forever extinguished at 
Kakaper in 1679. 
By destroying the large concentrations of Makassar refugees on Java, 
Arung Palakka and the Company snapped the one remaining thread of 
hope which had helped the Makassar courts to retain a post ure of pride 
and defiance despite their frequent humiliating setbacks. From this time 
forward the Makassar kingdoms offered little or no opposition to Arung 
Palakka's over lordship in South Sulawesi. The only serious challenge to 
arise during the remainder of Arung Palakka's ruIe came not from the 
traditional Makassar enemy but from Arung Palakka's own camp. 
CHAPTERIX 
CHALLENGE FROM WITHIN 
Upon Arung Palakka's triumphal return from Java, it appeared that all 
effective opposition to his and the Company's supremacy in South 
Sulawesi had been removed. Arung Palakka was realistic enough, how-
ever, to realize that much of his success was due to his unique relation-
ship with the Company. While occasion al misunderstandings had arisen 
between Arung Palakka and the Dutch representatives in Fort Rotter-
dam, Batavia never allowed these to reach a state which would endanger 
their alliance. Their outward demonstration of unity of purpose im-
pressed and overawed Sou th Sulawesi and made their joint overlordship 
effective. 
The Company's consistent policy of openly or tacitly supporting 
Arung Palakka by word or deed in any local dispute, regardless of its 
own attitudes, served to demoralize any opposition to Arung Palakka. It 
was soon apparent to and accepted by the leaders of South Sulawesi that 
the Company would defer to Arung Palakka on alilocal matters. With 
Goa's leaders effectively bridled af ter 1679, there was no one outside 
Arung Palakka's own camp with sufficient prestige and following to 
mount any serious challenge to his position. Arung Palakka came to be 
regarded as the supreme arbiter in the affairs of South Sulawesi. 
Having attained such a powerful position, Arung Palakka began to 
regard it as part of his legacy to be bequeathed to his descendants. He 
had experienced so much suffering and bloodshed in his ri se to power 
that he was determined that his accomplishments were not to be undone 
af ter his death. Although he had previously mentioned a possible succes-
sor, it was only af ter his return from Java in 1680 that he feit an urgent 
need to announce his heir to the world. One of the factors which 
precipitated th is decision was an illness caused in Java which did not 
seriously incapacitate him at first but which persisted as a reminder of his 
advancing years. Another was the fear of ambitious South Sulawesi 
leaders who were onl)" too happy to seize power af ter his death. 
Although Arung Palakka had no children of his own, he had earlier 
begun the process of grooming his nephew, La Patau, son of his eldest 
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sister We Mappolobombang Da Upi and Arumpone La Ma'darem-
meng's son La Pakkokoe Arung Timurung, as his successor. Af ter his 
return from Java, Arung Palakka informed the Dutch th at he was now 
inclined to establish La Patau as ruler in Bone as quickly as possible (KA 
1248b:365r). He was aware that there would be opposition from his own 
allies, especially from Arung Bakke Todani, who had been one of his 
closest companions in exile. But the fact that Arung Bakke was held in 
such high regard with the Company now served to condemn him in the 
eyes of Arung Palakka. The latter's suspicions of Arung Bakke's ambi-
tions were fed by rumours that he hoped to succeed the childless Arung 
Palakka. What appeared to lend credence to these rumours was Arung 
Bakke's increasing familiarity with the Company, as weIl as his growing 
infIuence in the prosperous and well-placed Ajattappareng. The lands of 
the Ajattappareng include fertile rice-growing plains around Lake 
Sidenreng and occupy a particularly strategie location. The mountain 
chain which separates the hinterlands of the, west coast from the 
southern end of the peninsuia tapers off at Suppa and breaks off precise-
ly at Alitta, th us making this area "the passageway toward the fertile 
Bugis plains" (Pelras 1977 :239-240). 
By 1677 Arung Bakke was acknowledged as the leading figure within 
the Ajattappareng. It is perhaps because of the power that he exercised 
at th is time that later scribes anachronistically presented him with the 
titles of Adatuatta Sidenreng, Datu Sawitto, Datu Suppa, Arung Alitta 
and Arung Rappeng, thus implying that he had become the single ruler 
of the Limae Ajattappareng (The Five [states] West of the Lake).l 
Although alocal historian claims that these five states first formed this 
confederation in the fifteenth century2, Speelman's Notitie dating from 
1670 indicates that there were many more states in the confederation 
than five (Speelman 1670). Wh at is indisputable, however, was the 
authority exercised by Arung Bakke in the confederation. 
The Company valued the friendship of Arung Bakke and always 
regarded him, as did most of South Sulawesi, as Arung Palakka's most 
trusted lieutenant. When Lamuru was conquered in 1670, the Company 
presented it as a fief to both Arung Palakka and Arung Bakke. Af ter the 
conquest of Tosora in 1670, the Company sent greetings and congratula-
tions not only to Arung Palakka but to Arung Bakke as weIl. To bind 
both of these leaders closer to the Company, President de Jong in Fort 
Rotterdam recommended to Batavia th at the Company honour Arung 
Palakka with 2/3 and Arung Bakke with 1/3 of the 5,500 mas indemnity 
paid by the vanquished ruler of Belawa (KA 1171 b:775r-v).1t was these 
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two lords who were also singled out by the Company for medals and 
commendation in 1672 for their loyalty (KA 1177b: 1197v-1198r). 
When the Mandar rulers surrendered in 1674, they swore an oath of 
allegiance before the Company representative, Arung Palakka, and 
Arung Bakké (KA 1191h:719v). Up to 1674 Arung Palakka was still 
too preoccupied with the more immediate problems of Luwu, Goa, and 
the Makassar refugees to be concerned greatly with Arung Bakké's 
growing intimacy with the Dutch. But the first signs of disaffection 
between these two lords occurred over the problem of jurisdiction over 
Enrekang. 
As principal ruler of Ajattapparéng Arung Bakké claimed th at he was 
entitled, according to adat, to both Leta and Enrekang. The ruler of 
Enrekang, however, refused to submit to Arung Bakké, and later 
demonstrated that, according to Enrekang's treaty with the Company of 
20 April 1671, Enrekang had become an independent land and ally of 
the Company. Furthermore, he argued, Enrekang had never been sub-
ject to Arung Bakké nor his ancestors (KA 1227b:238r). When war 
broke out between Enrekang and Leta, the ruler of Enrekang refused to 
heed the Company's summons to appear in Fort Rotterdam. Instead it 
sought Arung Palakka's mediation. To the dismay of Arung Bakké, 
Arung Palakka ruled in favour of the ruler of Enrekang. This decision 
was the first clear indication to the Dutch that there was some ill-feeling 
between Arung Palakka and Arung Bakké. But any local lord would 
have been aware that something was amiss when the ruler of Enrekang 
was actively encouraged by Soppeng and Pammana to reject Arung 
Bakké's overlordship. These latter two stat es were closely attuned to the 
affairs of the Bone court and would never have acted without obtaining 
either an explicit or implicit approval from Arung Palakka. Soppeng 
resented the fact that it had to surrender several districts to Ajattap-
paréng, and Datu Pammana was jealous of Arung Bakké's growing 
power which had resulted in the deposing of a close ally, the Datu 
Sawitto Totanre (KA 1200a:181r-182r; KA 120ge:193v). The Datu 
Sawitto had refused to acknowledge that his land was subject to Ajattap-
pareng, and so he had been deposed by Arung Bakké. The latter justified 
his action to the Company by accusing Datu Sawitto of having succeeded 
to the datuship without the Company's knowledge (KA 1191a:654v). 
The Company accepted Arung Bakké's explanations and approved his 
rights to Sawitto, quite oblivious to the subtIe political manoeuvres 
occurring between Arung Palakka and Arung Bakké or to its own 
practice of refraining from interfering directly in the internal affairs of 
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South Sulawesi without first consuiting Arung Palakka (KA 1191 d: 
727v). 
If Arung Palakka had been distressed at the Company's decision to 
support Arung Bakke over Sawitto, his behaviour over the next few 
months did in no way betray this. On the contrary he seemed in good 
spi rits in September 1675 at Bacukiki when he attended the ceremonial 
clipping of Arung Bakke's hair. He, Arung Palakka, and the other 
Toangke had vowed not to cut their hair until their lands were freed from 
Makassar overlordship (Matthes 1875:95; KA 1196b: 174r-v).3 Ac-
cording to the Company's representative at the celebrations, Arung 
Bakke provided a fe ast "the Iikes of which, according to everyone there, 
had never been seen in Makassar, Mandar, Luwu, Bone, or the entire 
Sulawesi" (KA 1196b: 174r-v). Such a display ofwealth and the extrava-
gant praise of the guests could not have been especially pleasing to 
Arung Palakka whose own hair-cutting ceremony two years before was a 
modest affair in comparison. But Arung Palakka did not let his displeas-
ure show and continued to delegate duties to Arung Bakke commen-
surate with his favoured status. It was Arung Bakke who was entrusted 
with the delicate task of krissing Arung Palakka's women who had been 
indiscreet in their relations with Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali 
and with some ofhis nob les (KA 1208i:566v). But even the Dutch began 
to discern a change in the relationship between Arung Palakka and 
Arung Bakke. They rightfully diagnosed the problem to be Arung 
Palakka's resentment in having to share with another South Sulawesi 
ruler his position of honour with the Company (KA 1208a: 543v). 
For a while in 1676 there was a real threat of an open rift between 
Arung Palakka and Arung Bakke over the latte r's claim to territory in 
the north. Arung Palakka and Datu Soppeng La Tenribali sent envoys to 
Arung Bakke to urge him to refrain from interfering in the affairs of 
Enrekang, even though the general allies had previously approved 
Arung Bakke's jurisdiètion over that district. They also warned Arung 
Bakke to desist in any of his pretensions over the areas in dispute with 
Soppeng, among which were Kiru-Kiru, Balusu, and Maiwa, and pro-
posed that regents be established over these places. Arung Bakke 
refused to comply with these demands and sent the envoys back with a 
message th at in such matters he was not subject to the wishes of Arung 
Palakka or Datu Soppeng, but to the Company alone (KA 1209b: 
223v). This reply revealed where Arung Bakké's ultimate loyalty lay and 
further aroused Arung Palakka's suspicions that Arung Bakke intended 
to displace him as the Company's favourite and as joint overlord in South 
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Sulawesi. Reports that Arung Bakke's son had been warmly received 
and feted in Batavia did nothing to allay Arung Palakka's fears (KA 
1224a:85). 
At the feast held in honour of the arrival of President Cops in Makas-
sar in January 1678, many sighed in relief to see Arung Palakka and 
Arung Bakke engaging in a~iable conversation. But a day or two later, 
when Arung Bakke attempted to deliver a gift personally to Arung 
Palakka, he was rebuffed and his gift of a slave woman rejected. Arung 
Palakka simply told him: "It was the President who made us eat and 
drink together". At Cop's suggestion Arung Bakke again tried to see 
Arung Palakka, but he was treated like a total stranger. A further 
attempt to send Arung Bakke's interpreter to see Arung Palakka was 
equally unsuccessful. He was stopped at the gate by Arung Palakka's 
men who said that none of Arung Bakke's people would be allowed to 
enter. 
Meanwhile, news reached Fort Rotterdam that Arung Palakka had 
sent the Bone Aruppitu to meet the leaders of Soppeng to discuss the 
disputed areas claimed by both Soppeng and Arung Bakke. At this 
meeting the delegates, clearly reflecting the wishes of Arung Palakka, 
decJared their willingness to war with Arung Bakke rather than surren-
der these areas. The Dutch were placed in the unenviable position of 
attempting to mediate between their two most faithful allies without 
appearing to favour one or the other. Yet if they were to imp Ieme nt their 
policy of maintaining some balance to Arung Palakka 's power in South 
Sulawesi they had perforce to assist the we aker Arung Bakke. There-
fore, they assured him of assistance while advising him to return to 
Ajattappareng and be on hisguard (KA 1224a:86-9). Three Dutch ships 
were ordered to bring Arung Bakke to Bacukiki, from which port he 
only had to travel a short distance overland to return home. News soon 
reached Arung Palakka that some type of arrangement was being made 
between Arung Bakke and the Company. To prevent the further spread 
of damaging rumours about the Company's involvement, Cops explain-
ed that no Dutch soldiers were being stationed at Ajattappareng and of 
the three ships setting sail northward, only one was to bring Arung 
Bakké home (KA 1227a:200v). Despite this explanation, the very fact 
that the Company had put one ofits ships at Arung Bakke'sdisposal was 
proof enough for Arung Palakka of the Company's inordinate affection 
for Arung Bakke. 
Another factor which contributed to the animosity between Arung 
Palakka and Arung Bakké was the break-up of the marriage between 
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the latter and Arung Palakka's sister, We Tenrigirang. 4 Their sepa-
ration, unfortunately, had been especially acrimonious, and she had left 
him to go and live in Palakka in Bone (KA 1227a:195v). Herpresence in 
Bone only served to remind Arung Palakka of his quarrel with Arung 
Bakke. Once when she was visiting her brother in Bontoala Arung 
Bakke attempted to send messengers to her, but Arung Palakka turned 
them away saying that anything their lord Arung Bakke had to say 
should be said to him (KA 1224b:190). There were many of Arung 
Palakka's followers, especially the Toangke, who we re particularly 
grieved by this quarrel. They urged Arung Bakke to make a conciliatory 
gesture toward Arung Palakka by seeking a solution to his marital 
problems with We Tenrigirang. On Arung Amali's advice Arung Bakke 
and some of his nobles made a special visit to Cenrana to speak to her, 
but she refused all entreaties to return. Following this rejection Arung 
Bakke made no further efforts to effect a reconciliation with We Tenrigi-
rang or with Arung Palakka. In defiance of all, he married a princess 
from the royal house of Sawitto (KA 1235f:87). 
In th is quarrel Arung Bakke was aware that his well-being depended 
upon the support of the Company, although he was the acknowledged 
leader of the rich and potentially powerful Ajattappareng confedera-
tion. A few centuries earlier it had been well-served by the port of 
Bacukiki which had been the gateway to the international trade and 
wealth which flowed to the Ajattappareng states. In the middle of the 
16th century the Ajattappareng had witnessed the beginning of a decline 
as a result of a Goa invasion and the removal to Makassar of many of the 
foreigners and skilled personnel associated with the international trade 
at Bacukiki and Suppa. The transformation of Makassar into an inter-
national·entrepot resulted in the demise of Bacukiki as a principal port 
and the loss of a principal revenue-earner for the Ajattappareng. Never-
theless, its rich rice-growing areas, substantial population, and strategie 
location goveming the entrances into the Bugis and Makassar rice-bowls 
in the south had always provided the ingredients for a powerful king-
dom. Any ruler with ambitions for overlordship of the whole of South 
Sulawesi eventually had to contend with the possibility of a serious 
challenge arising from the Ajattappareng. It was this challenge posed by 
Arung Bakk~ to Arung Palakka's overlordship which the Bugis sourees 
regard as the basic cause of the conflict between these two men (La Side 
1968:29; L-l:149). 
Since the differences between Arung Palakka and Arung Bakke were 
gene rally known, Towesa, who became Datu Soppeng in 1678, sought to 
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gain Arung Bakke's support for his own quarreis with Arung Palakka. 
Arung Bakke, however, acted with circumspection and refused to 
accompany Datu Soppeng to Fort Rotterdam for fear of further arousing 
Arung Palakka's jealousy and ire (KA 1235f:85). Arung Bakke charted 
a careful course, avoiding any incriminating alliances which were in-
effectual and likely to be regarded as provocative, while cultivating the 
one ally that mattered~ When in mid-1679 the Company asked Arung 
Bakke whether he would be willing to go to Java with his men if his 
services we re needed against the Makassar refugees, Arung Bakke 
replied effusively: 
... The Raja Tamparang [i.e., Arung Bakke] is like a white Iinen cIoth 
upon which the Company can write whatsoever it wishes. If the Com-
pany says it shall be white, white it shall be; if it says it shall be black, then 
black it shall be. Raja Tamparang's life and well-being depend upon the 
Company. What it commands him to do, that will he do. He himself 
would go with 1,000 men, incIuding rulers and princess all from his 
choicest and best people (KA 1235f:88). 
At the end of September Arung Bakké left Makassar and promised to 
return within two months with the promised 1,000 men (KA 1236a: 
455v). But before Arung Bakke could assembie an army and return to 
Makassar, news arrived of the victory of Arung Palakka and the Com-
pany over the Makassar refugees at Kakaper on 21 October 1679 (KA 
1238i:201Ov-2011r). 
Although Arung Bakke could not share in the glory of the successful 
Java campaign, his sincere intentions toward the Company were not 
forgotten. The Company urged Arung Bakke to go to Bontoala in 
October 1680 to weIcome Arung Palakka back from Java with the hope 
that there could be some reconciliation between the two. To the delight 
of the Company, Arung Bakke was received in a friendly fashion, and 
Arung Palakka even brought out some guns and other souvenirs from 
Java to show him. Relations between them appeared to have improved 
during the two or three visits which Arung Bakke made to Bontoala, but 
on 2nd December Arung Bakke arrived before President Cops in Fort 
Rotterdam visibly upset. He recounted how Toala', a son of Arung 
Palakka's now deceased e1der brother Arung Tana Tennga, had griev-
ously insulted him. He had. demanded that Arung Bakke repay a 
gambling debt of 350 gold mas. Having been so affronted in public, 
Arung Bakke believed that his continued presence in Makassar would 
only provide a target for abuse by Arung Palakka and his followers. He 
requested permission to return home since his own anakarung would no 
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longer tolerate these attacks on the dignity of their prince and we re 
ready to retaliate. 
Cops must have known the real cause of the insult to Arung Bakke, 
but nevertheless he berated Arung Bakke for being remiss in repaying 
his debt. On the other hand, Cops also saw the truth to Arung Bakke's 
fears and so encouraged Arung Bakke's anakarung to return home. 
However, he asked Arung Bakke to delay his departure awhile until the 
problem of the succession to Sawitto could be settled to the satisfaction 
of all, or at least of the Company. The former Datu Sawitto Totanre had 
been deposed by his subjects because of his bad government. The logical 
successor was Arung Bakke, and so Cops had suggested this to Arung 
Palakka earl ier. This suggestion had obviously displeased Arung Palak-
ka, and he had curtly rep lied that nothing should be done until the 
deposed Totanre arrived in Makassar to present his version of events. 
Nevertheless, Cops again raised the question of Arung Bakke's rights to 
the Sawitto throne with Arung Palakka. This time, Arung Palakka 
agreed and also assured the Company that he wanted no quarreis with 
Arung Bakke. To prove his good intentions toward Arung Bakke he was 
planning to honour him with a visit. What appeared to be a return to 
friendly relations between Arung Palakka and Arung Bakke was soon 
discovered to be a mere ruse. Arung Palakka had already approved a 
well-planned attempt to assassinate Arung Bakke (KA 1257a:377v). 
On 9th December 1680 a messenger from Arung Bakke arrived in Fort 
Rotterdam with ominous news for Cops. It was being said that Arung 
Palakka had commissioned the nephew of one of his nob les to kill Arung 
Bakke. Another rumour, equally disturbing, was that Arung Palakka 
would openly challenge Arung Bakke's authority in Sawitto. He planned 
to return to his Bone residence at Cenrana and then'summon the people 
of Sawitto to him. If Arung Bakke we re to evince any opposition 
whatsoever, he would be attacked. Karaeng Karunrung, who was sup-
posedly there when th is conversation took place, had asked Arung 
Palakka what he would do should the Company support Arung Bakke. 
He had answered, so went the rumours, that "he would do to the 
Company wh at he would do to Arung Bakke" (KA 1257a:379r-v). 
While the Dutch were accustomed to hearing rumours of every sort, the 
danger of open conflict between Arung Palakka and Arung Bakke 
forced them to take this report of Arung Palakka's plans seriously. There 
was, therefore, some tension in the air when Arung Palakka came to visit 
Cops toward the end of the month. The news which Cops had to convey 
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to Arung Palakka did little to lighten the atmosphere. Batavia decIared 
that Sawitto was an independent state as a result of having remained 
faithful to the Company in the Makassar War. Further research into the 
background of Arung Bakke had also shown that he was next in line as 
Datu Sawitto (KA 1257a:379v). While this news must have been dis-
appointing to Arung Palakka, he showed na sign of this. He even agreed 
that it was best for Arung Bakke to return home since it was the 
rice-planting season. But Arung Palakka's accommodating manner 
be lied the sinister plans for destroying Arung Bakke that had already 
been set in motion. 
On 9 January 1681 Arung Palakka sent a messenger to inform Cops 
and the Council in Fort Rotterdam that he was returning to Bone via 
Ajattappareng to demonstrate th at he harboured no ill-will toward 
Arung Bakke. But the next day the Dutch received word that Karaeng 
Bone, Bontomanompo, Pommalikang, Beroanging, and Mangalle had 
accompanied Arung Palakka with four boatloads of armed men to attack 
Arung Bakke. They were to be joined later by others under the Kare 
Mandalika, the Gallarang Manngasa of Goa. Arung Bakke's wife, who 
was living in Makassar, had also co me to the Dutch to say that she was 
certain that Arung Palakka was going to Ajattappareng to war with her 
husband. Most of the people who had been left with her by Arung 
Palakka had been recalled and had gone north with him. The same day 
the Gugugu ofButung, Kaicili' La Manimpa, said th at he and his nephew 
Karaeng Rappocinni had been summoned to Bontoala by Arung Palak-
ka two days before. They we re told that he was going to Sawitto "to 
make the people of Sawitto mindful, and to war with them if they refuse 
to heed their ancient laws and customs" (Emphasis added; KA 1257a: 
380v-381v). In the traditional manner Arung Palakka had decIared his 
justification before undertaking any action against Arung Bakke and his 
subjects. They had refused to be "reminded", i.e. to acknowledge that 
Arung Palakka was the overlord. Their failure to heed their "aneient 
laws and customs" was simply a formula by which a ruler or a people 
accused of disregarding the power realities within South Sulawesi was 
equated with one contravening the laws and customs of the land. Arung 
Bakke had dared to challenge Arung Palakka, and for this he was being 
accused according to a prescribed formula familiar to all in South Sula-
wesi. 
The Company interpreter Jan Japon returned to the Fort af ter talking 
to the widow of Kaicili' Kalimata. According to this widow, there had 
been a gathering at Bontoala at which Karaeng Karunrung, Karaeng 
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Rappocinni, Arung Ujung Bulo (the Arung Berru'), Karaeng Tallo, 
Karaeng Sanrabone, Karaeng Lengkese, Daeng Malewa, and most of 
the Goa anakkaraeng were present. They had come to swear allegiance 
to Arung Palakka and had then left with him to go to war with Arung 
Bakke in Ajattappareng. It had been agreed, so it was said, that if the 
Company were to provide assistance to ~rung Bakke, the Company 
would be considered an enemy. Arung Palakka had originally intended 
to have Arung Bakke killed within Fort Rotterdam itself, but Karaeng 
Karunrung had dissuaded him from this plan. Prior to his departure, 
Arung Palakka had supposedly announced: "This will now co st my life 
or that of Raja Tamparang [i.e. Arung Bakkers." Realizing the gravity 
of the situation, the Council in Fort Rotterdam met on 16th January to 
discuss the situation but no decision was taken. The next day it was 
reported that war had broken out between Arung Palakka and Arung 
Bakke (KA 1257a:380v-383r). 
The Company's worst fears were confirmed. Jan Japon reported on 24 
January 1681 that Arung Bakke, his son Daeng Memang, and some of 
his followers had fled from Ajattappareng and had sought safety in 
Mandar. Af ter leaving Makassar Arung Palakka had sent his army to 
Nepo, whose ruler was Arung Bakke's nephew and his most trusted 
friend. When Arung Bakke was told that Arung Palakka was coming to 
war with him, he summoned his vassal rulers of Palanro, Marappa, 
Suppa, Sawitto, Bulo Cenrana, plus various others, but none came. 
Finding himself without an army, Arung Bakke fled with his son and a 
few followers toward Mandar. On Arung Palakka's orders the deposed 
Sawitto ruler, Totanre, and his people went in pursuit. They overtook 
the fugitives, and one of Totanre's men on horse back dressed in chain-
mail armour narrowly missed spearing Arung Bakke. But the latter and 
his followers managed to escape and were thought to be headed either to 
the Toraja mountains or to Alitta, whose ruler was Daeng Memang's 
father-in-Iaw. Arung Teko and Daeng Rioso, the former Maradia 
Balannipa, were also sent in pursuit but they spent their time mainly in 
plundering the countryside. 
While going through Suppa, the ruler of th at land gave Arung Bakke a 
horse to make his flight easier. For this act of kindness, he was later put 
to death by Arung Palakka. Arung Bakke then fled to Binuang in 
Mandar where he was treated weil by the ruler. News of Arung Bakke's 
safe arrival in Mandar displeased Arung Palakka. AIthough Mandar had 
been repeatedly invaded and forced to acknowledge the overlordship of 
Arung Palakka and the Company, it had never been submissive. It was 
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with great care, therefore, that Arung Palakka approached the Mandar 
leaders with gifts of Makassar shirts, twenty ribbons and twenty beIts, 
and a request that Arung Bakke be surrendered to him dead or alive. In 
return Arung Palakka promised to prevent Daeng Rioso from re-estab-
lishing his authority over Balannipa, a promise which was highly attract-
ive to the Mandar people who had suffered so much from the pretensions 
of the former Maradia. Arung Palakka further promised that all those 
still serving Daeng Rioso would be surrendered to the Mandar people. 
Despite these attractive promises and the iII-disguised threats if 
Mandar continued to harbour Arung Bakke, the leaders of Mandar 
refused to be intimidated. Instead, they informed President Cops that 
they were bringing Arung Bakke to Fort Rotterdam. Cops sent a ship to 
assure Arung Bakke's safe journey to Makassar, but it had to turn back 
because of contrary winds and bad weather. By the time it was possible 
to make another attempt, Arung Palakka had already gained knowledge 
of these plans and had sent another mission to Mandar. This time he 
brought so much pressure to be ar upon the Mandar leaders th at they 
finally succumbed and agreed to move Arung Bakke and his followers to 
the island of Salemo across from Segeri. Arung Bakke was persuaded by 
his hosts that the move to Salemo was for his own safety. But wh en he 
arrived on the island, he found waiting for him a Wajo follower of Arung 
Palakka called Tobutu with several men armed with chainmail armour 
and swords. Realizing it was a trap Arung Bakke tried to re sist but was 
quickly killed. His son Daeng Memang fought desperately but even-
tually he too was cut down. On 13 February 1681 Arung Palakka was 
presented with the head of Arung Bakke as proof of the success of the 
mission. The head was then sent back to be buried with the rest of Arung 
Bakke's remains alongside his son (KA 1257a:384r-385v). 
In anticipation of these events, Arung Palakka had sent the following 
letter to President Cops on 30th January: 
... With this letter Arumpone [i.e. Arung Palakka] wishes to teil the 
President in the Fort that we are returning from Tamparang [Ajattap-
pareng] where we have reminded the people there of their ancient laws 
and customs which have been in use since time immemorial. It was 
because one of them had forgotten these customs th at I have been 
involved in the conflict ... I have acted for the peace and welfare of the 
land and for love of the Company's alliance (emphasis added; KA 
1257a:383v). . 
This historical episode is treated with pathos by Bone sources, recog-
nizing that Arung Bakke had once been a Toangke and a favourite of 
Arung Palakka's. They recount how malicious insinuations of Arung 
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Bakke's ambitions toward overlordship finally convince Arung Palakka 
to take action. Arung Bakke flees to the mountains in Nepo intending to 
hide until he can gain Arung Palakka's pardon. Failing that, he is 
determined to leave Sulawesi until there is a change in the situation. 
These plans, ho wever, are quickly dashed by the speed and ferocity of 
the attacks by Arung Palakka's men which force Arung Bakke and his 
followers to move upward to Galinkang. Under the command of Arung 
Tanete, the pursuing army is divided into a Bone half under its banner 
the Petta Semparaja and a Soppeng half under its banner the Petta 
Bakka. One group is made to approach Arung Bakke's defences from 
the south on the Nepo road, while the other attacks from the north. Not 
even halfway up the mountain they are forced to retreat with heavy 
losses from the hail of stones thrown by the defenders. The failure of the 
attack leads to the dismissalof Arung Tanete as Commander-in-Chief 
and his replacement by the Tomarilaleng Bone, Toappaliweng, and the 
Sulledatu Soppeng, Toappaujung. Arung Palakka promises Toappa-
liweng the office of Makkedangetana in Bone for himself and his descen-
dants if he is successful. Datu Soppeng makes a similar promise to make 
Toappaujung and his descendants Sulledatu in Soppeng. These new 
commanders are urged by their respective rulers to bring fame (tan-
reangi birittana) to Bone and Soppeng. A quick victory is sought, for a 
prolonged war would bring ridicule to these two kingdoms. 
The first move of the new commanders is to unite the divided army 
and to attack together from the north. Since both the south and the east 
lead to Soppeng, it is thought unlikely that Arung Bakke would flee into 
the arms of his pursuers. As the army moves upward, stones begin to rain 
down but this time the army is not deterred. Arung Bakke and his men 
are eventually forced to abandon their positions. They flee to Tebbas-
seng and then westward to Mandar. By some ruse the Mandar people 
seize Arung Bakke and bring him to Salemo where he is strangled on 11 
February 1681. He is known to this day as "Our Lord who passed away 
in Salemo" (Adatuatta Matinroe ri Salerna). Three days af ter Arung 
Bakke's flight from Galinkang, Arung Nepo, Arung Kiru-Kiru, and 
Arung Ceppaga appear before Arung Palakka and Datu Soppeng. The 
first two are accused and found guiIty of providing shelter to Arung 
Bakke. As punishment the land of Batu Pute, upon which ground the 
Petta Samparaja has flown, is surrendered by Nepo to Arung Palakka 
who then grants it in perpetuity to Toappaliweng and his descendants. 
Kiru-Kiru cedes Tana Siddo, the land upon which the Petta Bakka has 
been planted, to Datu Soppeng who awards it to Toappaujung and his 
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descendants (L-1:149-154; La Side 1968a:(15)27-30; (16)7-13,16). 
As is the nature of South Sulawesi sources, the account of the quarrel 
between Arung Palakka and Arung Bakke emphasizes much more than 
just the unfolding of a particular event. Treasonous behaviour, realor 
imagined, is the justification for Arung Bakke's death, but the episode 
itself becomes the framework for establishing the legitimacy of a particu-
lar practice within society. What has been legitimized is the right of the 
descendants of the 17th century Tamari/a/eng of Bone, Toappaliweng, 
to hold the office of Makkedangetana6 and of the descendants of Toap-
paujung to inherit the office of Sulledatu in Soppeng. 
The manner in which Arung Palakka resolved this long rivalry with 
Arung Bakke stunned and impressed both the Sou th Sulawesi leaders as 
weil as the Company. There were those who knew th at the Company had 
intended to provide refuge for Arung Bakke and now believed that an 
open conflict between Arung Palakka and the Company was imminent. 
It was this kind of reasoning which produced rumours that Arung 
Palakka had sent his envoys on twenty boats to the kingdoms of Bima, 
Sumbawa, and neighbouring areas to teil them to be prepared to come to 
his as si stance (KA 1257a:390r-393v). To the great relief of many, not 
the least of whom was Arung Palakka himself' a letter from Batavia 
arrived not to condemn Arung Palakka for the death of Arung Bakke, 
but to praise him for his role in the Java campaign against the Makassar 
refugees. Realizing th at its good relations with Arung Palakka could be 
endangered, the Company exercised admirable discretion in these days 
af ter Arung Bakke's death. When PIoen was sent by Fort Rotterdam to 
Bontoala, he was especially solicitous about Arung Palakka's health, 
inquiring about his difficulty in breathing because of a growth in his nose. 
Only af ter Arung Palakka appeared relaxed and reassured of the Com-
pany's sincere concern for his well-being did PIoen broach the subject of 
Arung Bakke's death. Arung Palakka explained that Arung Bakke had 
committed numerous misdeeds against him, as had been verified by a 
Dutchman in Batavia. Without attempting to argue or condemn, PIoen 
simply reiterated the Company's de sire to promote Arung Palakka's 
best interests. A few days later PIoen returned with two Dutch surgeons 
to treat Arung Palakka (KA 1257a:394v-395v). 
The Company had been disturbed by the news of Arung Bakke, but it 
had been presented with a fait accampli. Realizing the futility and even 
the danger of remonstrating with Arung Palakka, the Company had 
adopted instead a prudent approach of reaffirming its faith in him. The 
Company was naturally upset at the loss of a staunch ally in South 
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Sulawesi, yet it was also relieved. The dangerous enmity between Arung 
Palakka and Arung Bakke had ended quickly and effectively without a 
destructive war which would have been inimical to the Company's 
interests. While there was still hope for a reconciliation between their 
two most faithful allies in Sou th Sulawesi, the Company had been 
untiring in its efforts to find a solution. But now th at the problem had 
been resolved, the Company had accepted it and resumed its cultivation 
of Arung Palakka as its most useful and powerful friend in South 
Sulawesi. 
Arung Palakka was pleased at the Company's continuing display of 
affection toward him. It not only reaffirmed his favoured status with the 
Company but also increased his prestige and authority in South Sula-
wesi. Nevertheless, the death of his old companion Arung Bakke dis-
turbed him greatly. On one of Daeng Talele's frequent visits to Fort 
Rotterdam, she remarked how her husband had spent many sleepiess 
nights thinking of Arung Bakke's death. In discussing the final campaign 
against Arung Bakke, she professed to tot al ignorance of Arung Pa lak-
ka's intentions. She had apparently been brought along on the expedi-
tion to allay any suspicions th at it was intended as anything else but a 
normal journey to Bone via the northern route. Only when they arrived 
at Batu Pute in the north did the weapons become visible and Arung 
Palakka's plans become clear. Prior to the assault against Arung Bakke, 
a meeting was held with some of the Makassar leaders from Kampong 
Baru and with those nobles who had deserted Arung Bakke to plan their 
course of action. However, Daeng Talele never learned the outcome of 
this meeting because she was immediately sent home to Bontoala. Only 
when she arrived back in Bontoala did she hear of Arung Bakke's fate. 
When Arung Palakka returned, she castigated him for this deed "which 
had robbed him of one of his own hands". She reminded him how "as is 
sufficiently well-known to all in th is land of Sulawesi" Arung Bakke had 
remained faithful to him even when he was in "a humbie and miserabie 
state", as a refugee from Makassar domination (KA 1257a:417v). 
The Arung Bakke affair demonstrated even more strikingly than before 
how powerful Arung Palakka had become. Only a few months before it 
had been difficult to conceive of anyone as well-placed for protection 
and favour as Arung Bakke. He was honoured by the Company and 
respected and loved by Arung Palakka. But his "fatal flaw" was the 
challenge, realor imaginary, that he posed to Arung Palakka's dreams 
for Sou th Sulawesi. Arung Palakka had sacrificed much to attain his 
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position of power, and he now believed that he had gained the right to 
dispose of his accomplishments as he saw fit. The whole of South Sulawesi 
was now within his political ambit, and he did not flinch at the prospects of 
ruling it or in preparing his successors to undertake such a seemingly 
formidable task. Toward this end he had be gun the unofficial grooming of 
his young nephew, La Patau, to continue his work after his death. 
Arung Bakke's misfortune was his devotion to the Company. So vital 
an ingredient was the Company in Arung Palakka's formula for over-
lordship that anyone who deflected its favour or attention from him 
could only be regarded as a threat. Arung Palakka may not have feit th at 
his own immediate position was in jeopardy, but he feared for the future 
of his own dreams for South Sulawesi. La Pat au was only a young boy 
and no match for the experienced and politically astute Arung Bakke. It 
was, therefore, as much to save his future hopes for South Sulawesi, as it 
was to safe guard his own position, that Arung Palakka had finally 
decided to move decisively against Arung Bakke. 
Throughout this whole affair the Company had been very cautious. 
But in the final analysis it had adjudged the friendship with Arung 
Palakka of greater value than the life of the faithful but less useful friend. 
Arung Palakka had demonstrated his ability to maintain order in South 
Sulawesi and had displayed convincingly in Java his readiness to back his 
professions of loyalty to the Company with deeds. Furthermore, he was 
ruler of the most populous and powerful of the Company's Bugis allies. 
This fact was not regarded lightly by the Company whose survival in 
many areas depended upon the good will of local rulers. In the beginning 
the Company was willing to pro vide protection to Arung Bakke, but it 
never lost sight of its priori ties. Ultimately it was Arung Palakka who 
really mattered to the Company, and no person or thing was too valuable 
to be sacrificed toward the preservation of th is friendship. This was one 
of the important messages which emerged from the whole affair. An-
other was the readiness of Arung Palakka to use ruthless methods to 
safe guard his privileged position in South Sulawesi and to preserve it for 
his descendants. If he had shown no compunction in destroying a trusted 
friend and companion-in-exile, how much more implacable would he be 
to those with whom he had no emotional bonds? From this time onward 
Arung Palakka was greatly feared, even among the most powerful rulers 
on the island (KA 1257c:460v). The example of Arung Bakke had made 
an indelible impression on the minds of the local people and removed 
any lingering doubts concerning Arung Palakka's authority as supreme 
overlord in South Sulawesi. 
CHAPTERX 
SECURING TUE SUCCESSION 
The Arung Bakke affair highlighted the danger of leaving Arung Palak-
ka's succession unannounced and therefore subject to speculation and 
rumour. To forestall any challenges to his position and quash any intri-
gue inspired by the knowledge that he had no natural heirs, Arung 
Palakka now decided that it was time to deciare to the world his chosen 
successor. The infirmity caused by a blockage in his nose persisted, 
reminding him daily that his time was running short. There was still much 
th at had to be done before he could rest assured that his legacy would not 
be squandered af ter his death. To this task Arung Palakka now devoted 
his attention. 
The first priority was the formal announcement of La Patau as his 
official successor in all his various duties. La Patau was descended from a 
long distinguished line. His father was La Pakkokoe Toangkone Tad-
dampali, with the apanage titles of Arung Timurung, Arung Ugi, and 
Ranreng Tua, and his grandfather was Arumpone La Ma'daremmeng 
Matinroe ri Bukaka. La Patau's mother was Arung Palakka's sister We 
Mappolobombang Da Upi whose maternal grandfather was Arumpone 
La Tenrirua Matinroe ri Bantaeng (Abd. Razak 1968:5-6). When it was 
discovered in 1675 that Arung Timurung La Pakkokoe had secretly 
abetted the plans of Karaeng Massepe La Sunit, We Mappolobombang 
took their son La Patau and went to live in Bontoala with her brother, 
Arung Palakka. Arung Timurung's attempts at reconciliation were 
reportedly rebuffed by We Mappolobombang who openly declared th at 
she did not want a husband "who had abandoned his own country to join 
the enemies ofthe Company" (KA 1200a:186r). She trusted no one and 
took full charge of the upbringing of her then three year old son, La 
Patau. Apparently she was well-suited for the task, for a Dutch contem-
porary characterized her as "a generous woman and the most intelligent 
of all her sisters" (KA 1196c:39r). 
For the greater part of his early life La Patau was raised by his 
strong-willed mother under the tutelage of his uncle, Arung Palakka. 
From very early on it appeared that Arung Palakka took special care in 
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the education of his nephew, grooming him for a position of great 
importanee. Having had no children of his own, he was dependent upon 
his four sisters to pro vide him with an heir. How La Patau came to be 
selected as Arung Palakka's heir is told in a brief entertaining folktale 
recorded in a lontara'. This tale also cleverly encapsulates the major 
problem of Arung Palakka's legitimacy to the Bone throne and how it 
was resolved. 
One day Arung Palakka heard Arung Timurung La Pakkokoe singing 
the following song: "Vacate the vast pal ace which is never struck by the 
sun, you who we ars the sarung in a way in which it should not be wom." 
Arung Palakka or any Bugis of that time. would have easily understood 
that the "vast pal ace which is never struck by the sun" refers to the spot 
occupied by the Arumpone shaded by the Golden Umbrella. (Pajum-
pulaweng) of Bone, and that "sarung" is a reference to the robes of 
royalty which had been "improperly" assumed. It was common know-
ledge that Arung Timurung hoped to become Arumpone and believed 
he had prior claims to that title. He was the son of the last Arumpone La 
Ma'daremmeng, and the direct grandson through the male line of 
Arumpone La Tenrirua Matinroe ri Bantaeng. Arung Palakka, on the 
other hand, was only related to the Bone royal house through his 
matemal grandfather, Arumpone La Tenrirua Matinroe ri Bantaeng. 
Arung Palakka was weil aware of this, and so in th is folktale he does not 
castigate Arung Timurung but replies: "Do not be angry, elder brother, 
for your song is just. Rest assured that I will marry you to my younger 
sister, the Ma'danreng Palakka [We Mappolobombang]." From this 
marriage comes La Patau who is named as Arung Palakka's successor 
(L-4: section 24, unpag.). In this way, this folktale demonstrates how 
Arung Palakka is ab Ie to overcome opposition to his election as Arum-
pone and how he later restores legitimacy in the office of Arumpone by 
designating La Patau as his successor. 
As with many folktales the historical sequence is not scrupulously 
maintained because it is the theme which is more important. Histori-
cally, the marriage between We Mappolobombang and Arung Timu-
rung La Pakkokoe occurred on 16 May 1671, and theirson La Pat au was 
bom on 3 November 1672 (Ligtvoet 1880:134, 136). According to one 
souree it was on the day of La Patau's birth that Arung Palakka was 
installed as Arumpone (Bakkers.1866:162).21t was unlikely, therefore, 
that Arung Palakka had given his sister in marriage to Arung Timurung 
to appease him for his loss of a throne. If it were true that the birth of La 
Patau and the installation of Arung Palakka had occurred on the same 
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day, then the tale takes on a new significance. This tale may be alluding 
in its own folk wis dom to the fact th at Arung Palakka must have 
promised Arung Timurung, in return for his acquiescence, that La Patau 
would eventually succeed Arung Palakka and return the throne of Bone 
to Arung Timurung's line. Arung Timurung was no fooi and could see 
that he had little recourse but to accept whatever Arung Palakka had to 
offer. There mayalso have been a hope th at af ter Arung Palakka's 
death, he, Arung Timurung, could assume the powers as regent to his 
young son or as ruler in his own right. 
The formal proclamation of La Patau as heir was but the first step. 
Arung Palakka still had to obtain support for his choice, a task made 
difficult by those among his own following who believed themselves 
more entitled to this position. The recent Arung Bakke affair had clearly 
demonstrated the dangers which could arise from individualleaders with 
a strong base of support. Some of Arung Palakka's most trusted lieute-
nants, such as Arung Amali Gellareng Tosawa, had learned to manipu-
late power to their own advantage. In 1675 Arung Palakka had punished 
Arung Amali for abuse of power, although he was later reinstated (KA 
1196a: 169v; KA 1236g: 4 25v). Arung Amali was a distinguished nobIe-
man, greatly respected, and with wide support in Bone. In July 1667 
Speelman noted the importance of Arung Amali as a leader of the Bugis: 
... [He is] a venerabie and modest old man of very high repute. Arung 
Palakka holds him in great respect and refers to him as grandfather and 
in fact depends principallyon him in the governing of the people (KA 
1155d:34r). 
Arung Amali, like Arung Bakke, would have considered himself the 
logica I and legitimate heir to all that Arung Palakka had created in South 
Sulawesi. 
But Arung Palakka himself was aware that neither Arung Bakke, nor 
Arung f\mali, nor even his own chosen successor, would be able to 
inherit his authority at the moment because of the personal nature of his 
power. He had gained a body of faithful followers, the Toangke, whose 
allegiance and devotion had been forged through common experiences 
in warfare and exile. Theirs was a personalloyalty to Arung Palakka as 
an individual, and not as Arumpone. There were also large numbers of 
Bugis, Makassar, and Mandar refugees who had fled to the Company's 
lands mainly in and around Makassar. Since they were fleeing exactions 
from their own lords, they came to be included among those under 
Arung Palakka's jurisdiction acting as the overlord concerned with 
internal affairs of South Sulawesi. Many of these refugees were willing, 
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indeed of ten even happy, to receive Arung Palakka's protection because 
of his reputation as a powerful lord and as a favoured ally of the 
Company. These refugees, too, would not automatically transfer their 
allegiance to just any successor to Arung Palakka. Naming a successor 
was quickly done, but assuring that the successor would indeed become 
the heir to all th at Arung Palakka possessed required much more time 
and preparation. If La Patau were ever to accomplish some of Arung 
Palakka's unfinished plans for South Sulawesi, he would have to be 
assured the same power and authority which his uncle had wielded 
before him. It was a major undertaking, and one which Arung Palakka 
was well-placed to perform. 
The plan to win support for La Patau began with his forma I announce-
ment as heir to Arung Palakka. In October 1681 the South Sulawesi 
rulers were summoned to Arung Palakka's royal residence in Cenrana to 
attend a feast celebrating the announcement. At these festivities was a 
Dutchman, Gabriel Nacken, who reported a conversation he had had 
with Arung Palakka. When the latter was told that Speelman had been 
appointed Governor-General of the Company, he was very pleased and 
remarked that "he would not have missed hearing this news for all the 
gold in the world". Speelman had always been considered a friend, and it 
was now hoped that his new position of authority would benefit South 
Sulawesi. As pleasing to Arung Palakka was confirmation from Nacken 
that the former Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali (Karaeng Bisei 
Tumenanga ri Jakattara) had died in Batavia [on 15 March 1681]. 
Emboldened by his role as the bearer of good news, Nacken asked 
Arung Palakka why he had now decided to announce his successor. 
Arung Palakka replied: 
... lam growing more and more sickly every day, and it is apparent th at 
I shall not live much longer. To prevent all my lands from being divided, I 
have summoned all the princes here to elect my sister [We Mappolo-
bombang]'s son, La Patau, as Arung Palakka [heir to the Bone throne]. 
That is the reason they [the South Sulawesi rulers ] are all here. Once the 
fasting month is over, he [La Patau] will be circumcized. (Pointing to La 
Patau) I hope that the Company will maintain him af ter my death. I have 
built this fort so that he may live here and be freed from troubles if they 
do not wish to acknowledge him [as successor] af ter my death, and also 
principally so that each prince [anakarung] would have a place to build a 
house to live in without any harm coming to his wives and children ... 
(KA 1265a:333r-334r). 
The fort which Arung Palakka referred to was ninety metres on each 
side and built on an island in a bend of the Cenrana River. Each ruler was 
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asked to contribute labour to build one section of this fort which was to 
have walls 3% metres high, with a thickness of 71J2 metres on the bottom 
and more than two metres on the top. It was Arung Palakka's wish that it 
be as large as the fortress in Batavia. The fort was completed in a time of 
only three months and during th is period rumours flew fast and furiously 
about Arung Palakka's intentions for building such a large fortification. 
The Dutch were relieved to \earn through Nacken that the fort was not as 
menacing as they believed and that it had been intended as a safe 
residence for La Patau and his family (KA 1257d:447r). Arung Palakka 
was doing everything to assure th at his nephew La Patau became heir to 
all that he had built or acquired. Nevertheless, he was weil aware th at 
despite all he could do there was na guarantee that La Patau would be 
able to maintain power. All he could reasonably hope for was that his 
preparations were successful in sustaining La Patau in the early years of 
hisreign until he was capable of asserting his own power. 
Although the task was a difficult one, by 1681 Arung Palakka had 
already gone a long way toward achieving th is aim. During Arung 
Palakka's absence on Java in 1679-1680, Cops taak the opportunity to 
assess Arung Palakka's influence on the affairs of South Sulawesi. His 
conclusions were predictabIe, but the extent of Arung Palakka's autho-
rity must have given the Company cause for reflection. In Goa power 
was in the hands of Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil and Tuma'bicara-
butta Karaeng Karunrung, both of whom had cooperated with Arung 
Palakka in the 1677 war and had been subsequently rewarded with these 
high offices. On Dutch advice Sultan Abdul Jalil had at first gone to live 
in Goa, but the danger to his life was sa great that he quickly decided to 
settle within range of his protectors, the Company and Arung Palakka. 
He established his place of residence to the north of Fort Rotterdam on 
the coast ne ar Ujung Tana, where Karaeng Karunrung too had gone 
af ter abandoning Goa a few weeks before (KA 1248b:358v). Bath 
Sultan Abdul Jalil and Karaeng Karunrung were now almost totally 
dependent upon Arung Palakka's continuing goodwill for their survival. 
Wajo, too, had been emasculated by Bone's relentIess demands which 
had led to a dismembering of territories and denuding of population 
along Bone's borders. Moreover, Arung Palakka's decision to establish 
his official residence at Cenrana, ne ar the mouth of the Cenrana River, 
had major economie repercussions for Wajo. The Cenrana River was the 
major artery and the principal communications link between the interior 
states of Soppeng and Wajo and the sea. By building his capital at 
Cenrana and establishing a fortress on an island in a bend of the river, 
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Arung Palakka was able to control all riverine traffic. Wajo's prosperity, 
therefore, was dependent upon the goodwill of Arung Palakka. Soppeng 
was as vulnerable as Wajo to the economic pressure which was Arung 
Palakka's to wie Id. But it was even more directly responsive to Arung 
Palakka's wishes because he had been specifically requested by the late 
Datu Soppeng La Tenribali to oversee the activities of the young and 
inexperienced Datu Soppeng Towesa. When the latter had attempted to 
assert his independence he was removed from power by Arung Palakka 
and replaced by his sister and Arung Palakka's wife We Adda Datu ri 
Wat u (Matinroe ri MadeIlo). Mandar was quiescent, having been 
threatened with the forceful return of the much-maligned and feared 
ex-Maradia Balannipa, Daeng Rioso. It was the prospects of having 
once again to suffer the indignities at the hands of Daeng Rioso which 
had earlier convinced the Mandar rulers to bow to Arung Palakka's 
demands for the surrender of Arung Bakke. Arung Palakka's ability to 
influence affairs in that fiercely independent confederation of states in 
Mandar was an excellent measure of his now well-established and 
acknowledged authority in South Sulawesi. Many areas once responsive 
to Goa now transferred their allegiance to Arung Palakka. On the , 
southwest coast of the peninsuia, in the area of Bira, the people con-
tinued to make boats for their overlord, although now it was for Arung 
Palakka instead of the Karaeng Goa. 3 In the two highly productive ri ce 
areas of Maros and Bulukumba, the border states between the Bone and 
Goa spheres of influence which SpeelRlan considered "Company's terri-
tories" (Eerdmans n.d.(a):202), Arung Palakka appropriated most of 
the best lands and encouraged his followers to settle there. By this means 
he was able to exercise an authority over these areas which no other 
Bone ruler had been able to do in the past. Cops concluded his assess-
ment of Arung Palakka's power with an observation which had now 
become common knowledge within South Sulawesi: " ... the quiet, 
peace and war here depend solely upon one head, that of the ruler of 
Bone [i.e. Arung Palakka]" (KA 1236c:436v-446v). 
One reason for Arung Palakka's power, the Dutch observed ruefully, 
was "because he is held in respect and honour by the Company". Even 
the proximity of Bontoala to Fort Rotterdam was interpreted by the 
local people as a sign of the close relations between Arung Palakka and 
the Dutch. With the death of Arung Bakke there was no other locallord 
who shared Arung Palakka's unique position as the intermediary 
between the Company and the kingdoms of South Sulawesi. It was he 
who summoned the South Sulawesi lords to greet a new president for 
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Fort Rotterdam or an envoy from Batavia. Upon arrival of any impor-
tant Company official in Makassar it was Arung Palakka who formally 
introduced him to the local rulers or to their emissaries. Arung Palakka's 
intermediary role, however, was not liinited to matters of protocol. It 
extended also to the practice of screening which of the local people were 
"worthy" of approaching the Company officials personally. Those for-
tunate enough to be granted an interview were never foolish enough to 
voice any grievances against Arung Palakka. His spies were everywhere 
hindering any true dialogue between alocal ruler or noble and a Com-
pany official and making the Company more and more dependent upon 
Arung Palakka as a source of information on South Sulawesi affairs (KA 
1248b:356v-357r). Occupying such an' enviable position of influence 
with both the Company and the locallords, Arung Palakka could now 
use it to gain support for his chosen heir. 
Although by 1681 Arung Palakka appeared invincible, there were 
signs which indicated that assuring La Patau's futur.e would still be 
fraught with difficulties. The outward quiet and subservience of Goa, for 
example, belied its tensions and resentment which threatened to erupt 
yet again into violence. While Sultan Abdul Jalil and Karaeng Karun-
rung could be relied upon to remain faithful since their well-being and 
position depended upon it, little else in Goa was predictabie. Sultan 
Abdul Jalil and Karaeng Karunrung continued to maintain their resi-
dence outside Goa, leaving the kingdom without a focal point around 
which the people could rally. Moreover, there was a great reluctance 
among the people to remain in the old royal capital in Goa because of the 
belief that a settlement once destroyed by man or nature was ill-fated. 
Many abandoned the capital and roamed the area leaderless, poor, but 
fiercely proud. They were ripe for exploitation by astrong, dynamic 
individual, and these very fears became a souree of instability in Arung 
Palakka's relations with Goa (KA 1248b:358v). 
Sultan Abdul Jalil himself contributed to these volatile state of affairs. 
He sent Karaeng Jarannikka to teIl the other leaders of his govemment 
living in Goa that Arung Palakka had ordered them to go voluntarily to 
Sultan Abdul J alil's new residence in Makassar or be compelled to do so 
by force. What later came to light was th at this had be.en Sultan Abdul 
Jalil's own scheme, without Arung Palakka's prior knowiedge. The 
scheme had been further embellished by Karaeng Jarannikka to obtain 
the desired effect. This latest deception further alienated Sultan Abdul 
Jalil from his subjects. They began packing their belongings and with 
great emotion declared their readiness to live under their enemies, 
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Arung Palakka and the Bugis, rather than continue to remain under 
their own ruler. The Dutch had previously allowed many of them to 
settle around Fort Rotterdam to prevent them from leaving South 
Sulawesi to join their compatriots in Java. The danger from the refugees 
was no longer of any major concern, but the practice of providing land 
for settlement of Makassar refugees from Goa and Tallo within the 
Company's lands continued. Ironically, Sultan Abdul Jalil's scheme had 
succeeded in bringing his people to Makassar, but only to have them 
transfer their allegiance to Arung Palakka and the Dutch (KA 1248b: 
358v-359r). 
The unwavering opposition of the Goa people toward Sultan Abdul 
Jalil had been sustained by an almost fanatic devotion to the deposed 
Karaeng Goa Sultan Mohammad Ali. He had exemplified everything to 
the Goa people that the present ruler lacked. He had led his people 
against their oppressors, the Company and Arung Palakka, and had 
attempted to restore the self-respect and glory of Goa. Even when he 
was deposed, he had continued to be a symbol of the former pride of the 
kingdom. It was not unbeknownst to either the Company or to Arung 
Palakka that one of the principal stumbling blocks to acceptance of the 
new Goa ruler was the existence of Sultan Mohammad Ali as a separate 
locus of loyalty. The presence of their former lord in Fort Rotterdam in 
apparent harmony with the Dutch had once bred a hope that perhaps a 
new alliance could be forged which would resto re Goa's former power in 
the area. These hopes had been heightened by a noticeable estrange-
ment between Arung Palakka and the Dutch over the protection being 
given by the Company to Sultan Mohammad Ali. To avoid Arung 
Palakka's spies, Cops had held his meetings with Sultan Mohammad Ali 
at nights af ter the Fort's gates were closed. Despite these precautions 
Arung Palakka had learned of these meetings and had accused Cops of 
harbouring "tender feelings" toward Sultan Mohammad Ali (KA 
1248b:359v). But the Supreme Govemment in Batavia once again had 
responded favourably to Arung Palakka's appeals and had ordered 
Sultan Mohammad Ali's removal to Batavia. By this decision the Com-
pany not only salvaged its good relations with Arung Palakka, but also 
dealt a severe blow to the belief held by many Goa people that a 
reconciliation with the Company and a resurgence of their former glory 
were imminent. And with the' death of Sultan Mohammad Ali in Batavia 
shortly thereafter in March 1681, any lingering hopes that they still had 
for a revitalized Goa we re laid to rest with their beloved ruler. 
No one could replace Sultan Mohammad Ali Tumenanga ri Jakattara 
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in the affection of the Goa people in this period of Goa's spiritual 
desolation. Those who were unable to feign devotion to the new 
Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil fled to the protection of the Company. 
The Company, though a former enemy, was at least less demanding an 
over lord and was not a constant reminder of betrayal and the depths to 
which the kingdom had fallen. Before long Arung Palakka came to Fort 
Rotterdam to complain about the continuing influx of Goa inhabitants 
into the Company's lands, especially into Kampong Baru in Makassar. 
He urged that more of an effort be made to encourage them to serve 
Sultan Abdul JaIiI (KA 1248c:392v). Through Arung Palakka's pres-
sure on the Makassar refugees in Kampong Baru and on Sultan Abdul 
J alil, a modus vivendi was finally effected. Sultan Abdul J alil promised to 
pardon their misdeeds and to restore their former positions if they 
returned to Goa and served him. At a special ceremony these Makassar 
refugees laid down their krisses before Sultan Abdul Jalil, who then 
orde red that they be taken up again in his service. The principal Moslem 
official in Bontoala gave a prayer of thanks and expressed the hope th at 
Sultan Abdul Jalil would receive these his subjects in such a way th at the 
other Makassar refugees in the kingdoms of Sumbawa, Bima, and else-
where would return to their homeland. And so in the early months of 
1683 many of the Makassar people in Kampong Baru returned home to 
offer their allegiance to Sultan Abdul J alil. Nevertheless, there remained 
an underlying tension within the kingdom (KA 1274a:461 v-462v). 
In Wajo, as in Goa, the outward exterior of calm c10aked a potentially 
dangerous situation. Arung Palakka's policy of economic and political 
strangulation of Wajo had become too successful. Sometime in mid-
1680 some 4-5,000 people from Wajo under Arung Mampu arrived in 
Bontoala to inform Arung Palakka that they had deposed Arung Matoa 
Wajo La. Palili because he had become blind. In his place they had 
elected a Bone lord, Arung Mampu La Pariwusi, whose wife was from 
Wajo. Although Arung Palakka declared th at the election was Wajo's 
own affair, he was obviously concerned at this new development. 
Through his own policy Wajo had been so weakened that it had become 
a prey to the victorious Bone Bugis and an attractive political arena for 
his own ambitious nobles. News of the election of a Bone prince as 
Arung Matoa Wajo was not unexpected, but it was nevertheless dis-
pleasing to A[ung Palakka. Equally disturbing was the choice of Arung 
Mampu as Arung Matoa Wajo since he was from a powerful Bone family 
which could become a threat to Arung Palakka or to La Patau. Arung 
Palakka was already wary of the growing influence of Arung Mampu's 
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brothers, all of whom, so it was said, harboured royal ambitions (KA 
1248b:365r, 367v). 
Af ter informing Arung Palakka of the election, the Wajo delegation 
pfoceeded to Fort Rotterdam to convey this news to the Dutch. Predict-
ably, the Dutch cited the 1670 treaty as a basis for their disapproval. 
According to Articles 1 and 2 of this treaty, Wajo was forbidden to 
choose a new Arung Matoa without first obtaining the Company's 
approval. When the Malay version of the treaty was retrieved and read 
aloud, the Wajo envoys acknowledged th at this was indeed wh at they 
had agreed. But, they were quick to add, it was also their custom to elect 
a new Arung Matoa immediately af ter the old Arung Matoa had been 
deposed. Removing an Arung Matoa was justified by Wajo's customary 
laws in the following circumstances: (1) if the Arung Matoa should wish 
to abdicate; (2) if the people no longer want the Arung Matoa; and (3) if 
the old Arung Matoa is dead. There was, therefore, a basis in cu stom for 
their action. But this explanation was rejected out of hand by the 
Company officials as being no longer relevant since they claimed that 
Wajo had lost all of its former privileges af ter its defeat in 1670 (KA 
1248b:375v-376v). Such an argument was considered incomprehensi-
bly harsh by the Wajo delegation because it contravened the South 
Sulawesi conception of proper interstate relationships. Even a state 
which was considered to be a "slave" to another was allowed to retain 
certain basic privileges, among which were the rights to choose its own 
ruler and to maintain its customary laws. In the end, however, the 
Company officials relented and accepted the election of the new Arung 
Matoa Wajo (KA 1248b:394r). Behind the Dutch opposition was also 
the suspicion that Arung Palakka was instrumental in having a Bone 
Bugis elected to tighten his grip on Wajo. They were highly sceptical th at 
any Arung Matoa Wajo could have been chosen without Arung Palak-
ka's approval. When the opportunity arose they asked Arung Palakka if 
a precedent existed for choosing an Arung Matoa Wajo from Bone. He 
cIaimed that nothing like this had happened before and that he and the 
people of Bone were unhappy about this choice. Only then did the Dutch 
begin to suspect that Arung Mampu himself must have engineered his, 
own elect ion (KA 1248b:393v-394r). 
A1though the appointment of a Bone prince was opposed by many in 
Wajo (KA 1257a:402v), the feared oppression never occurred. Instead, 
all depradations by Bone against the Wajo people came to an abrupt 
halt. Few in Bone dared risk the wrath of Arung Mampu and his family 
who we re some of the most powerful and influential individuals in the 
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whole of Sou th Sulawesi. Wajo, now a part of the territory in con trol of 
Arung Mampu's family, was th us protected and given the stability which 
it had lost in 1670. The principalities of Pammana, Mampu, Amali, and 
Timurung were once again incorporated into Wajo. Peace and security 
were re-established in Wajo but not without some cost to the nature of 
Wajo society. Arung Mampu invested the formerly sober office of 
Arung Matoa with the paraphernalia of kingship more in keeping with 
kingdoms such as Bone and Goa than with the "elective monarchy" of 
Wajo. He borrowed the institutions of the royal umbrella (pajung), the 
three royal drums (gen rang tel/u), and the royal dance (pajaga), all of 
which were considered essential for royalty in Bone (L-3:341, 343; 
L-4 : section 25, unpag.). These extern al changes to the office of Arung 
Matoa Wajo reflected the increased power now being exercised by its 
new incumbent. Arung Palakka followed these developments with some 
concern because of the potential challenge which could arise from a 
revitalized Wajo under an influential Bone prince. On the other hand, 
the new Arung Matoa Wajo could bring stability to the land and re move 
any sources of friction with Bone. 
In Mandar, an area which had never been totally subjugated by Arung 
Palakka and the Company, peace was always a most fragile state. When 
Daeng Rioso was still Maradia Balannipa, Arung Palakka depended 
upon his loyalty to influence the other Mandar rulers to maintain the 
peace. But he was regarded by his fellow Mandar rulers as overly 
ambitious with the aim of making all of Mandar subservient to his 
wishes. One Mandar source states that he ignored the advice of the Pitu 
Babana Binanga and actually warred with one of these states because he 
desired its ruler's wife (Interview Darwis 1974). His intrigues "and ar-
bitrary acts finally became so unbearable that he was toppled from 
power. On 23 November 1680 the new Maradia Balannipa, Daeng 
Mabani, accompanied by the other Mandar rulers, arrived in Fort 
Rotterdam. They informed the Dutch that the people of Balannipa had 
deposed their ruler, Daeng Rioso, and had chosen in his place with the 
advice and approval of the other Mandar rulers the old deposed Maradia 
Balannipa, Daeng Mabani. The reason given for Daeng Rioso's down-
fall was his failure to adhere to the laws and customs of the land (KA 
1257a:386r).4 
Confronted once again with a fait accompli by alocal kingdom, the 
Company officials sought comfort and direction from a familiar refuge: 
the treaty. The Dutch Council met to read the Company's treaty with 
Mandar dated 10 October 1674. Unlike Wajo's treaty, this one only 
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required the Mandar rulers to inform the Company about the selection 
of their rulers. They we re relieved to be ab Ie to acknowledge the election 
of the new Maradia Balannipa without any unpleasantness. But Arung 
Palakka was obviously displeased by the deposing of Daeng Rioso and 
reminded the Dutch of his services to the Company. He had been the 
only Mandar ruler to contribute troops to the allied campaigns against 
Luwu in 1676 and against Goa in 1677. Arung Palakka advised the 
officials to withhold recognition until the new Maradia Balannipa 
demonstrated his loyalty to the Company and to Arung Palakka. If he 
proved truculent, there was always the possibility of reinstating Daeng 
Rioso who was now in Bontoala with a number of his followers. To 
prevent Arung Palakka from using this threat, Daeng Mabani agreed to 
respect his wishes (KA 1257a:387r). 
Daeng Mabani was called upon to prove his loyalty to Arung Palakka 
much sooner than he would have wished. When Arung Bakke escaped 
from Galinkang to seek safety in Mandar in January 1681, Arung 
Palakka demanded that the Mandar rulers surrender him to the allies. 
Rather than deliver Arung Bakke to a certain death, the Mandar rulers 
had at first contacted the Dutch in Fort Rotterdam and had even pro-
posed to bring Arung Bakke to Makassar. Although the Mandar down-
river states in the past had managed to use the inaccessible mou,ntainous 
terrain behind them as a refuge against invading armies, this manner of 
escape seemed no longer feasible with Arung Palakka's new weapon, 
Daeng Rioso. With Arung Palakka's support and blessing Daeng R,ioso 
could re ga in his former position of strength in Mandar and wreak a 
fearful vengeance upon those responsible for his fall from power. There 
was too much to lose and too little to gain by protecting Arung Bakke, 
and so he was sacrificed for the general good of the Mandar Confedera-
tion. Arung Palakka remained true to his word by preventing Daeng 
Rioso from undertaking any hostile action against Mandar and by sur-
rendering a number of his followers to the Mandar leaders (KA 1257a: 
385r). Daeng Rioso, seeing himself betrayed by his former patron, 
adopted a desperate plan to seize power in Balannipa with his remaining 
eighty men. However, they were intercepted in the Toraja highlands and 
destroyed. Daeng Rioso himself was strangled and his head delivered to 
the new Maradia Balannipa, Daeng Mabani (KA 1265b:341r). Daeng 
Rioso, like Arung Bakke, had been sacrificed to achieve Arung Palak-
ka's supreme goal: a peaceful and united South Sulawesi responsive to 
his and his successor's wishes. Mandar had seen the ruthless power which 
Arung Palakka could wield so effectively when challenged, and it never 
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again during Arung Palakka's lifetime deemed anything worth arousing 
his fearsome wrath. 
The next area of concern to Arung Palakka was the growing numbers 
of Bugis and Makassar people living in or around the Company's territo-
ries. The enmity between the people of Goa and those of Bone and 
Soppeng persisted in their new homes. Fear of trouble caused Arung 
Palakka to appoint local regents to maintain control. Through these 
regents he hoped to establish a familiar and responsible authority which 
could deal with any crisis, especially after his death. In the most impor-
tant area around Fort Rotterdam, Arung Amali was appointed regent 
until his fall from favour. On 1 March 1681 Arung Tanete La Ompo 
appeared in Fort Rotterdam to announce th at he was replacing Arung 
Amali as regent. He explained that he had been commissioned by Arung 
Palakka to remain in the Fort to assist the Company in its performance of 
its duties, as weil as to represent its interests with Arung Palakka. If any 
trouble were to arise between the Makassar and the Bugis people, he was 
to consult the Company as in the past and regulate affairs in accordance 
with the customs of the land. To stress the importance of his commission, 
he explained to the Dutch: 
... We in Bone now live in peace and have been freed from the slavery of 
the Makassar people .... We are stupid people and our king [Arung 
Palakka] alone has wisdom. As long as he lives everything will be fine, 
but once he dies difficulties can be expected (KA 1257a:396r-v). 
These words expressed the concern of both Arung Palakka and his 
dosest advisers that adequate preparations be made to prevent a dis-
integration of the politica I arrangements after Arung Palakka's death. 
This institution of a regent over the local people within or near the 
Company's territories proved highly successful and established a prece-
dent pleasing to Arung Palakka. Before any local individual, whether 
from these lands in proximity to Fort Rotterdam or from the interior 
kingdoms, wished to see the Dutch in Fort Rotterdam, he reported first 
to Arung Palakka's personally-appointed regent (KA 1257d:448v). The 
regent's authority was being acknowledged, which bode weil for Arung 
Palakka's plans for a smooth transition of power to his chosen heir. 
A vital ingredient in insuring La Patau's succession was the continuing 
good-will of the Company. But even this was being endangered by 
the personal animosity which existed between Arung Palakka and 
the Company's representative in Fort Rotterdam, President Cops. 
Arung Palakka told Gabriel Nacken, who was present at Cenrana 
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toward the end of 1681 to celebrate the announcement of La Patau as 
heir: 
... As long as Cops is in Makassar, I will not go to the Fort. But if a 
commissioner or another president should come, then I will immediately 
return. I cannot go with a good he art because Cops has greatly affronted 
me. I wish that there were someone else in his place, such as the late 
[President] de Jong, so that I can go to the Fort with great pleasure (KA 
1265a:333r). 
A few days later ai a royal banquet, while enjoying the newly-installed 
water fountains turned on for the pleasure of the guests, Arung Palakka 
and Nacken continued their previous discussion of Cops. Arung Palakka 
told Nacken: 
... Do you know that Cops has written many evil things about me to 
Batavia? He accused me of wanting to war with the Company, a thought 
which had never entered my head. He assumes this just because I have 
had this fortress built. I ask you to look at the fortress so that you can 
report to the Lord [Governor-] Genera!. Now, is that a fortress with 
which to war with the Company? ... What would move me to war with 
the Company? What more could I be than what lalreadyam? That my 
well-being is dependent solely upon the Company is sufficiently known, 
and I know that not one of the princes is subject to me out of love but 
only out of respect. If I were to begin a war against the Company, I would 
quickly obtain as many enemies as there are hairs on my head. Yes, it 
would be the greatest stupidity imaginable ... Who else but the Com-
pany has given us our freedom? And he who has established us in 
majesty and honour could just as quickly dash us to the ground as had 
happened to many others. But Cops, out of pure evil and bitterness, 
writes all manner of bad things about me to Batavia. This is the reason 
that I cannot have any ordinary intercourse with him as I have had with 
the other gentlemen and residents [in Fort Rotterdam]. I wish that there 
were another president so that we can live in love and unity (KA 1265a: 
332r-334v). 
Arung Palakka's conversations with Nacken indicate th at he was 
perfectly aware that the Company was responsible for his good fortune. 
Being acquainted with South Sulawesi's fluid political alignments, 
Arung Palakka realized that it would have been suicidal even to con tem-
plate war with the Company. He, along with the rest of South Sulawesi, 
knew that his power stemmed basically from his favoured position with 
the Company. This was the reason that Arung Palakka considered Cops 
to be a danger to him. Cops had chosen to interpret Arung Palakka's 
attack on Arung Bakke as the beginning of a general change of attitude 
toward the Company and had written reports in th is vein to Batavia. But 
far from wishing to war with the Company, Arung Palakka had sought 
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instead to rehabilitate himself in its eyes for a deed which he realized 
would incur its displeasure. He had taken a calculated risk in destroying 
Arung Bakke and his son. They had become well-respected and beloved 
by the Company officials both in Makassar and Batavia. When Arung 
Bakke's son went to Batavia, he was accorded such preferential treat-
ment that it became a frequent topic of gossip in South Sulawesi. Since 
the Company was the mainstay of Arung Palakka's (and hopefully his 
successors') power, Arung Palakka considered it worth jeopardizing his 
friendship with the Company to eliminate dangerous rivals for the 
Company's affect ion and favours. Significantly, both Arung Bakke and 
his son were killed, although exile could have been prescribed for Arung 
Bakke's son whose "sins" would not have been anywhere as great as 
those of his father. With surprisingly little reaction from the Company to 
the death of Arung Bakke and his son, Arung Palakka correctly assumed 
that the Company would forgive his deed as long as Cops refrained from 
interfering. 
Cops continued to wam Batavia of Arung Palakka's growing power. 
Arung Palakka was now forty-nine years old, and Cops expressed con-
cern that when his life had "run its course" his successor would be 
incapable of maintaining control over affairs in South Sulawe!;i (KA 
1274a:456v; KA 1265a:342v). What Cops underestimated was Arung 
Palakka's fierce determination to see the who Ie of South Sulawesi 
governed by his family. This dream hinged crucially upon his chosen 
heir's ability to maintain his position and authority during the first 
critical years of his rule. Arung Palakka was as aware as Cops that the 
unnatural unity of the South Sulawesi kingdoms was created basically 
through Arung Palakka's sheer power and reputation. If this unity were 
to continue af ter his death, he would have to anticipate the difficulties his 
heir would face and to assure that none would be so tormidable as to 
destroy him and Arung Palakka's dreams. South Sulawesi and the Com-
pany had to be prepared to receive La Patau as Arung Palakka's succes-
sor. Even such persistent cri tics as Cops had to be silenced or at least 
rendered innocuous in order to assure the success of Arung Palakka's 
plans. Fortunately, Arung Palakka and Batavia sawa mutual advantage 
in maintaining their close alliance, and in the end cri tics such as Cops 
were sacrificed for the general welfare of these two powers. 
The only group remaining in South Sulawesi which lay outside Arung 
Palakka's sphere of influence was the Sa'dan Toraja, or the Southem 
Toraja.s Although there were several strong confederations of Toraja 
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groups, such as the Tallu Lembangnga consisting of Sangalla, Mengken-
dek, and Makale, these Toraja communities were basically smalI, in-
dependent, and individualistic. In times of crises these communities 
would usually band together for their own safety, but they could as easily 
re gard their inter-community enmities more dangerous than an outside 
invader. Located in the mountainous region of the north of the south-
west peninsuia of Sulawesi, these Toraja communities were gene rally 
isolated from the other South Sulawesi groups. With the exception of 
Luwu, where the Toraja outnumbered the Bugis population, there was 
only very infrequent trading contact with the non-Toraja world. 
QuarreIs arose frequentlyon the border areas of the Toraja regions 
because of raids on animals and human beings perpetrated by both the 
Toraja and their neighbours. While the Toraja groups were never suffi-
ciently united to have posed any real political threat to Arung Palakka, 
they were capable of ignoring Arung Palakka's attempts to maintain, if 
not peace, at least a predictability in the affairs of Sou th Sulawesi. When 
Sawitto, Batu Lappa, and Enrekang complained to Arung Palakka of 
raids by the Toraja of Leta, Arung Palakka organized a punitive expedi-
tion consisting of troops from Bone, Soppeng, Wajo, Tanete, Pammana, 
Barru, Goa, Tallo, Ajattappareng, and Mandar. Leta was overwhelmed 
and many of the Toraja brought back as slaves (KA 1265c:353r-v). 
The impressive display of a united South Sulawesi enforcing "Arung 
Palakka's peace" was gratifying indeed and encouraged Arung Palakka 
to extend his con trol to the rest of Southem Toraja. On 8 August 1683 
Arung Palakka, Arung Mario, and Arung Tanete La Ompo came to Fort 
Rotterdam to request a sm all Dutch force. As had been the practice on 
previous occasions, Fort Rotterdam consented to send twelve soldiers, 
two corporais, and an ensign to accompany Arung Palakka. The reasons 
for the campaign were soon revealed to the Duteh. Arung Palakka 
hoped to make an example of the Toraja for affronting the Datu Luwu 
and other allies and for harbourîng "riffraff'. But perhaps an even 
greater incentive to Arung Palakka was to subdue these people who 
defiantly boasted that, though Arung Palakka had conquered Leta and 
Enrekang, he had not conquered them (KA 1274b:484v-485v). While 
Arung Palakka was concemed at Toraja harassment of Luwu and of 
some of the other states now under his "protection", there was a further 
inducement. The condition which Datu Luwu had imposed for his 
consent to his daughter's marriage to La Patau was Arung Palakka's 
participation in a war against the Toraja. Moreover, for Arung Palakka 
there was the challenge of subduing the Toraja which had always seemed 
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to have appealed to Bugis and Makassar rulers (.KA 1265d:362r). 
On 16 August 1683 a Dutch sloop carrying Arung Palakka plus an 
escort of fifteen European soldiers left Makassar to go to Bone where 
the army was to assembIe for the expedition against the Toraja .. When 
the various contingents from the different states had arrived, they 
formed the joint allied army which marched overland and arrived in the 
heart of Toraja country on 20th September. The Toraja had had ample 
warning of the approach of the army and had fled to the safety of the 
mountains. That evening some of the Toraja warriors descended from 
their mountain retreat and sneaked into the camps of the allied troops 
killing some twenty soldiers and escaping with their weapons. Despite 
the success of the previous night's raid, at daybreak several Toraja 
chieftains came to say that they wanted peace. A peace was subsequently 
agreed upon between these chieftains and the allies, and as silently and 
mysteriously as they had appeared they vanished into the mountains. 
One of them had earlier told Arung Palakka of a secret passage into the 
fortified mountain position of the Toraja, but when the invading army 
arrived, it found the entire place abandoned except for 2,000 water 
buffaloes, some sheaves of rice, and seven people. On 25th September 
the army found another 500 men, women, and children, but no Toraja 
warriors. 
The deeper the expedition penetrated into the Toraja countryside, the 
more difficult it became. The first real battle came on the 26th when the 
Toraja suffered about 100 killeq and sawanother 300 taken prisoner. 
The Bugis and Makassar allies also received heavy losses in that battle. 
From 28th September to 8th October the allies marched through Liang-
batu, Batta, and the Tallu Lembangnga inflicting and receiving heavy 
casualties. In one campaign alone on 5th October, Arung Palakka 
claimed to have lost 500 of his best people by gunfire and another 100 by 
mantraps. Even within their fortifications the allied troops were harass-
ed by the Toraja. Some 200 men wounded by the mantraps who had 
been left to recuperate in a fort we re found dead the next day from 
poison darts. When La Patau sent 200 of his men to the mountains to 
obtain rice, 116 of them were killed. Hendrik Geerkens, one of Arung 
Palakka's Dutch bodyguards, told the Company officials later in private 
that the campaign had been difficult and Arung Palakka had taken great 
risks. By night and early mo~ning Arung Palakka would go out alone 
reconnoitring to see whether a road was safe. Twice poison darts just 
barely missed him, with one passing between his legs and the other 
landing right in front of his feet. News of Arung Palakka's dangerous 
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exploits did not surprise the Dutch officials, for similar reports had been 
made in previous campaigns in which Arung Palakka had participated. 
On 10th October there finally appeared to be a chance of a ceasefire 
between the two warring groups. At midday some Toraja descended 
from the hills leading a very old, blind woman who they said was a queen. 
She announced th at many of the Toraja desired peace, and so the 
following day the army marched to Liangbatu to make peace on her 
homegrounds. A few days later this queen, accompanied by a number of 
other Toraja rulers, came to make peace bearing the traditional gifts of 
submission: cloth, krisses, and a young girl. Other Toraja chieftains also 
descended from their mountain strongholds to make peace and prom-
ised to deliver 1,000 gantang (3,125 kilogrammes) rice and 1,000 water 
buffaloes. The areas which submitted to Arung Palakka we re a place 
called "Laia", and the Tallu Lembangnga. According to reports 
reaching the Dutch, of an allied army of some 50,000 men which had 
gone on the expedition to Toraja, there were 780 dead, including 130 of 
La Patau's best men. Although the Makassar contingent claimed th at the 
toll was much higher, their estimate would have also included those who 
had died from di se ase and accidents. Of the 600 Toraja slaves brought 
back to Makassar, Arung Palakka kept only a few for himself and 
divided the others among Sultan Abdul Jalil of Goa, Karaeng Karun-
rung, Karaeng Tallo, and the other rulers who had participated in the 
war (KA 1289a:32-8; KA 1274c:511r; KA 1289b:36; KA 1292a: 
283v).6 
Thë invasion made a lasting impression on the Toraja people and is 
still commemorated in their oral traditions. According to one source, the 
BugiS' inva"sion of Toraja was a result of one party in a civil war in Toraja 
requesting military assistance from Luwu. The Datu Luwu then invited 
Arung ~alakka to intercede on its side, th us involving the whole of South 
Sulawesi in the conflict (Interview Parinding 1975). Other sources 
simply cite the bad behaviour of the Bugis on their joumey through the 
Toraja lands which finally forced the Toraja to take measures to repel 
them (Interview Sarungallo 1975). When reports reached the Toraja 
areas of the arrival of a large Bugis army, representatives from the 
Toraja communities - some 120 of them according to one report (Inter-
view Parinding 1975) - met and agreed to form a defence alliance. 7 This 
alliance appeared to have had two centres, one in the area of Rantepao 
and the otheT in the area of Makale. When news of the Bugis invasion 
arrived, representatives of the Toraja groups in the Rantepao area met 
at Gandang atop a mountain called Sarira in Kesu, Rantepao. There was 
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one area which did not send a representative to th is war council: 
Karunanga. Af ter the gathered representatives had decided upon the 
alliance, the Untula' Buntunna Bone, a tailless pig (bai pokke') was' 
slaughtered and the following oath intoned before the meat was divided 
among those present: 
... Whoever refuses to enter into th is agreement will be stabbed by the 
hairs of this pig. You people of Karunanga, from this day onward you 
will be killed with the spear (pobongsorang doke) by all the groups in the 
Toraja lands. 
Af ter the meeting preparations were made for the defence of Toraja. 
Fortifications were built all along the Sarira mountain, in the middle of 
which waited the Toraja army. To reach the Toraja, the Bugis troops 
we re forced to ascend in single file, giving the Toraja a change to count 
them. Each enemy soldier was noted by dropping a pebble into a large 
Toraja hat (palo). The number of pebbles filled seven of these large hats. 
In the fighting which followed there we re many Bugis soldiers who 
survived but surrendered af ter their leaders were killed. Af ter this great 
victory over the Bugis, a large evening fair was held. The Toraja troops 
then dispersed to their respective homes and the Bugis prisoners were 
repatriated (Interview Sarungallo 1975). 
In the Makale area, all the representatives of the Toraja met at Bokko 
in Sangalla when they learned of Arung Palakka's plan to invade their 
lands. These representatives agreed that everyone without exception 
should participate in the war. Whoever refused to participate was 
threatened with slavery af ter the war. Dne of the tactics which they 
adopted was to dig holes for traps. 8 They also built bridges with the ends 
cut so that any heavy weight would bring them down. Another tactic 
which they employed was to sneak into the allied camps at night, cover 
the Bugis horses with the hair of the Aren palm tree, and then set them 
alight to cause panic in the camps. This last tactic was used successfully to 
rout the enemy thereby giving the Toraja a complete victory. According 
to a Makale source, in th is war two areas in Rantepao did not participate 
in the fighting: Karunanga and Karre. Although they had been at the 
general meeting, they did not send their people to fight. The rest of the 
Toraja communities agreed that, if any group lost its chieftain or nobles 
in warfare, it could go and seize anyone from either of these villages to be 
slaughtered as sacrifice in the burial ceremonies. These people we re tied 
to large stones and speared, hence the name pobongsorang doke 
meaning "target of the spear" . This practice only ended officially in 
1905 (Interview Linting 1975). 
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Both the Toraja and the Bugis sources remember this as a great victory 
for their respective sides. Although Arung Palakka claimed a victory, 
and treaties of submission were signed by some Toraja chieftains, the 
allied troops sustained heavy losses and could not impose its will on the 
Toraja as a whoie. Expeditions against them continued throughout 
Arung Palakka's lifetime and that of his successor, La Patau. While the 
large allied army may not have brought the total victory that Arung 
Palakka had desired, it caused such large-scale devastation to the 
countryside that Toraja was effectively neutralized for some time. By 
this expedition Arung Palakka had also acquired in return a firm prom-
ise from Datu Luwu that La Patau would marry his daughter, and that 
the offspring of this marriage would become the next ruler in Luwu. This 
promise itself was worth the long and costly expedition to the moun-
tainous "wilds" of the Toraja lands. 
There were several other campaigns to Toraja in later years, but they 
never reached the magnitude ofthe invasion of 1683. In 1686 the Toraja 
in Enrekang refused to pay the promised indemnity to Arung Palakka 
and therefore suffered an invasion from an allied punitive expedition of 
3,000 men. The outcome was predictabie, with the expedition returning 
victorious with 964 slaves and the Toraja groups made submissive for a 
time (KA 1317a: 188r). Problems with one or anotherTorajagroup kept 
flaring up, and Arung Palakka continued to enforce his demands by 
despatching troops, as occurred in Duri and Baroko in 1687, Awang in 
1688-9, and another troublesome area in Toraja in 1694. (KA 1326a: 
271v-272r; KA 1342a:134r; KA 1350a:517v; KA 1446a:689r). But 
never again during Arung Palakka's lifetime did the Toraja unite as one 
people as occurred in 1683. His ability to forge a powerful fightingforce 
from all the disparate and often warring states of Sou th Sulawesi had 
been demonstrated to good effect in the Toraja campaign, much to the 
awe of the Toraja people. In subsequent years there were difficulties 
with various Toraja communities but they were easily resolved with the 
first sign of displeasure from Arung Palakka. Toraja, like the rest of 
South Sulawesi, had become responsive to the wishes of Arung Palakka. 
In a thorough and systematic fashion Arung Palakka had dealt with the 
problems which he believed could jeopardize the successful transition of 
power to La Patau. The choice of La Patau as heir was not unopposed. 
However, Arung Palakka managed to overcome all objections, in-
cluding those of Arung Timurung and Arung Amali, two with perhaps 
the greatest claims to Arung Palakka's position and power. Those areas 
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which we re expected to become a source of trouble for La Patau were as 
effectively silenced. In Goa the people's confidence in their leaders was 
undermined leading to distrust, flight, and ironically, a plea for protect-
ion from the very source of their misfortune: Arung Palakka. Wajo was 
not only shackled economically by the establishment of Arung Palakka's 
residence and fort on the Cenrana River, the main access to the vital 
international trade, but also politically by having a Bone prince as its 
Arung Matoa. While Arung Palakka distrusted the increased power of 
the Arung Mampu family, the election of this Bone prince as Arung 
Matoa Wajo assured stability in that land. Mandar had witnessed the 
ruthlessness with which Arung Palakka had treated a former Maradia 
Balannipa and was unwilling to risk arousing his wrath again for any 
minor reason. Another source of potential danger to Arung Palakka's 
heir was the mixed communities of Bugis and Makassar people living in 
the Company's territories. By appointing regents over these communi-
ties, Arung Palakka succeeded in establishing a precedent of authority 
and order emanating from his position as the pre-eminent locallord in 
South Sulawesi. 
These successes, however, we re being blighted by President Cops' 
efforts to discredit Arung Palakka in the eyes of the Company. But 
Batavia quickly reacted to Arung Palakka's protests and adjudged his 
friendship too valuable to be jeopardized by any Company official. 
Having weathered th is minor crisis, the only other source of danger in 
the horizon, remote though the possibility, was the Toraja. For Arung 
Palakka, as it had been for Goa before him, the Toraja appeared a 
challenge, an untamed frontier where the actual campaign itself was 
rewarding whatever the final outcome. Though both the allies and the 
Toraja claimed victory, the Toraja campaign of 1683 was fruitful in one 
important respect: it demonstrated to the Toraja, as other campaigns 
had done so effectiveiy to the rest of South Sulawesi, th at Arung Palakka 
commanded the power to enforce his role as overlord. As overlord, 
therefore, he demanded aliegiance to himself and to whomever he 
decided to appoint as his successor. This message was clear, and it now 
remained for Arung Palakka to insure that this message became incon-
testable through a gradual but thorough acceptance of his political order 
in South Sulawesi. 
CHAPTERXI 
THEPEACEOFARUNGPALAKKA 
The successful conclusion ofthe Toraja war in 1683 brought the whole of 
South Sulawesi under Arung Palakka's peace. Yet his authority was 
incomplete because ofthe curious position ofthe Company. The unoffi-
cial demarcation of power between the two over lords was complicated 
by the fact th at the Company had become a landholder in South Sula-
we si. When Admiral Speelman completed his duties in Makassar in 
1669, he left a long and detailed report for his successor concerning the 
areas which were acquired by the Company through conquest. It was th is 
report which became the basis of a number of Company claims to 
territory which threatened to jeopardize Arung Palakka's control of 
internal affairs on the island. 
Armed with this report, the Company quickly laid claim to those lands 
previously in dispute with local ruIers. This unilateral action was based 
on Speelman's interpretation of Western European ideas of inter-
national law concerning "rights of conquest" and by Article 20 of the 
Bungaya treaty. He had therefore pronounced that "the rulers of Goa 
and Tallo have no rights over a single foot of land outside their gates" 
(KA 1342b: 113r). Powerless to contest the Company's claims, the 
rulers of Goa and TallO pleaded for the usufruct of these lands since their 
greatly diminished landholdings were insufficient to provide the basic 
necessities of their courts (KA 1342b:l13r-v). When Karaeng Goa 
Sultan Abdul Jalil requested a clarification of his actuallands, he was 
told that, based upon Speelman's report, the only land which he owned 
was his apanage land of Sanrabone(KA 1342c: 163r). 
The Goa and Tallo rulers refused to acknowledge the Company's 
claims and persisted in their demands for their former lands, especially 
the rich rice-growing areas of Polombangkeng and Maros, which had 
supplied these two kingdoms with large quantities ofrice prior to 1669. 
Karaeng Tallo's request for the restitution of his lands included an area 
so extensive that Arung Palakka considered it to be both "impertinent 
and ludicrous" (KA 1406a:703v). These lands which Karaeng Tallo 
c1aimed were those of Tallo of a former day when it was at the height of 
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its power, rather than the grim reality of the present Tallo of 208 families 
with only 300 able-bodied men capable of bearing arms'(KA 1406a: 
704r-705r). To settle this troublesome boundary question with the 
Makassar rulers, Batavia ordered a map to be drawn showing the lands 
which the Makassar people occupied, those which belonged to the 
Company, and the lands formerly owned by the present Karaeng Tallo 
and his forefathers. 1 
In contrast to the straitened circumstances of the rulers of Goa and 
Tallo because of their greatly reduced territories, the Company enjoyed 
the benefits of having appropriated some of the richest ricelands from 
these two kingdoms. By following the local practice of demanding 1/10 
of all produce as an acknowledgement of overlordship, the Company 
was able to receive the following quantities of rice from Qnly six of its 
"territories" : 
Maros 43,938 gantang 
Barru 5,954 gantang 
Siang 8,748 gantang 
Bungoro 2,714 gantang 
Labakkang 7,898 gantang 
Segeri 22,896 gantang (KA 1371:163) 
According to Speelman's report, the Company was one of the largest 
landowners in South Sulawesi. lts lands included Bantaeng, Bira, 
Polombangkeng, Galesong, Batu-Batu, Aeng, Barombong, Pa'nakku-
kang, the whole of Makassar, and areas of Bulukumba and the west coast 
from Maros to Segeri (Speelman 1670:15-28; Eerdmans n.d.(a):202). 
Although Bantaeng feIl to the Company as spoils of war, it was present-
ed as an apanage to Arung Palakka and his lawful male descendants 
because Arung Palakka had been "one of the most important instru-
ments through which the business of Makassar was brought to such a 
desired end" (Bakkers 1866:200). 
As soon as it became obvious that the Company intended to remain in 
their newly-won territories, these enclaves became a refuge for all 
discontented elements in neighbouring states. The Company's scattered 
outposts in Sou th Sulawesi reported frequent movements into their 
lands of local people claiming to be Company's subject. In 1693, for 
example, there were some 9,194 recorded as subjects, but the next year 
that number had climbed to '11,770 (KA 1446b:699r). The Dutch 
boasted th at the reason for the influx of people was the relative lightness 
of the tribute and services which the Company demanded (KA 1387a: 
549r-v). While this may have been one ofthe contributing factors, there 
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was another more important reason for the flight. The refugees we re 
principally from Goa, Tallo, Bulukumba, and Layo and had left to avoid 
serving a ruler they did not respect. 
Goa's ruler, Sultan Abdul Jalil, had served Arung P<ilakka weIl and 
had been rewarded with the crown of Goa. The Makassar people never 
forgave his treachery and preferred living under the Dutch and the 
Bugis. Insofar as Tallo was concemed, its ruler had become a degenerate 
who spent most of his time smoking opium. His inattention to govem-
ment led many of his people to seek a better ruler elsewhere. The ruler of 
Bulukumba, too, was accused of mistreating his people because they had 
at first shown a preference to a rival contender to the throne. In Layo it 
was the accession of an unpopular ruler which resulted in an exodus of 
large numbers of people wishing to settle within the Company's territo-
ries (KA 1342c: 156r-v). 
The Company's lands became regarded as an ideal refuge, not only 
because the demands may have been light, but because the Company 
could pro vide protection and security. These last two qualities had been 
sadly absent from large numbers of areas for the grea'ter part of the 17th 
century. As long as one did not antagonize Arung Palakka or become a 
fugitive from his justice, one could expect to be unmolested under the 
Company's protection. The Company was thus incorporated into the 
well-established South Sulawesi practice of fleeing one's land to avoid 
serving an unjust or oppressive ruler. There are frequent admonitions in 
the B ugis Latoa and the Makassar Rapang (books presenting the wis-
dom of the ages and serving as a guide to good govemment for court 
princes) for a ruler to be good and just to his people or lose them and 
hence lose his principal source of prosperity and Iivelihood. 
But while these refugees may have indeed found a kind master in the 
Company, they quickly found the disadvantages of having not one but 
two overlords to satisfy. In addition to the Company's demands for 
tribute, they had to fulfil those of Arung Palakka as weil. For example, 
Arung Palakka was allowed the usufruct of those lands Speelman 
claimed for the Company, such as Bantaeng, various areas in Maros, 
Segeri, Bungoro, and Siang, which we re some of the best rice-growing 
areas in South Sulawesi. The Company also discovered that other areas 
in Maros not designated for Arung Palakka's use we re nevertheless 
sending ri ce to him (KA 1248b:369r-370v, 387v). On one occasion 
Arung Palakka asked the Company's subjects in-Cenrana (in the moun-
tains ne ar Maros), Galesong, and Polombangkeng to deliver a certain 
quantity of wood to him and the traditional boatbuilders of Bira to build 
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his boats (KA 1350b:544v). Other areas which the Company claimed by 
right of conquest were similarly forced by Arung Palakka to recognize 
him as their lord. He demanded and they complied by performing 
certain duties, delivering their traditional tribute, and summoning thei·r 
men for war expeditions (KA 1274a:463r, passim). Polombangkeng, 
Kanrepepe (Tanakeke[?]), ~nd Galesong were clearly established as 
Company territory af ter 1669, but when Arung Palakka was assembling 
an army against Toraja in 1683, these areas we re summoned by Arung 
Palakka to contribute men for this expedition (KA 1289b:40). This 
summons was a prerogative of an overlord toward a vassal, and it was 
unquestioningly obeyed. 
In Bulukumba the Company was forced to delimit its boundaries 
based on Speelman's report because of the likelihood of disputes with 
the belligerent local ruler. One of the are as claimed by the Company was 
Gantarang, one of the best rice-growing lands in Bulukum~a. Karaeng 
Gantarang protested that he was an independent lord who recognized 
Arung Palakka's overlordship. Af ter a close study of Speelman's report, 
it was discovered that he was indeed a free lord (KA 1289c:71). Tbe 
other lands in Bulukumba claimed by the Company proved to be some of 
the most fertile in the area (KA 1326b:291 v-292r). Although the 
Company had taken such pains to delineate its lands in ~ulukumba, 
Arung Palakka considered them as much his as the Company's and 
continued to de mand their services (KA 1350b:544v). In some ot her 
Company lands, such as the sm all mountain states behind Maros, Presi-
dent Cöps had at one time openly declared that Arung Palakka could 
collect his 1/10 tribute (KA 1326c:228r). Later, however, rulers of these 
mountain states had protested to Cops and only agreed to deliver timber 
to the Company if they did not have to do the same for Arung Palakka 
(KA 1274a:463r-v). 
The mounting protests from the Company's subjects at having to 
satisfy two overlords forced Cops to be more circumspect in openly 
encouraging Arung Palakka and his principalleaders to demand tribute 
in the Company's lands. When Arung Tanete La Ompo had attempted 
on be half of Arung Palakka to obtain bamboo from the Company's 
subjects, Cops politely refused him. He explained to Arung Tanete that 
"the kings and princes are never more jealous over the point of jurisdic-
tion, that he who levies the tithe must be the lord of the land" (KA 
1289b:37). But it was precisely this point which Arung Palakka was 
intent on making. Except for the areas around Fort Rotterdam itself, 
where the Company's presence was visible and real, its other territories 
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saw almost no sign of its overlordship. There were Compapy posts in the 
more important territories of Maros and Bulukumba, but these were 
mere handfuIs of men who made little or no impact on the lives of the 
people. The small European presence in South Sulawesi made it impos-
sible for the Company to maintain anything but token garrisons, and 
these only in the most important areas. Arung Palakka, on the other 
hand, delegated various areas, incIuding many in the Company's territo-
ries, as apanages of his most trusted followers. The latter we re then 
responsible for assuring the smooth delivery of tributary goods and 
services whenever required. Arung Palakka's representatives in the 
Company's lands served as his eyes and ears and were essential for the 
proper implementation of his policies. Since the Company re lied so 
heavily upon Arung Palakka as a final arbiter in native affairs, these 
representatives assumed great importance in the Company's lands. 
There evolved, therefore, a type of parallel government within the 
Company's lands: th at of the Company, which was the distant overlord 
content simply to receive tribute; and that of Arung Palakka, with 
representatives on the spot exercising all the prerogatives of overlord-
ship. 
The tributary goods which went to Arung Palakka we re later sold and 
bartered by Arung Palakka's own men trading in areas restricted by the 
Company. Even Arung Palakka's wife, Daeng Talele, was said to be 
involved in what the Company termed "iIlicit" trade. Although Com-
pany officials in Fort Rotterdam attempted to enforce ArticIe 7 of the 
Bungaya treaty, which listed prohibited areas of trade, there was little 
hope of preventing any trade conducted on behalf of Arung Palakka 
(KA 1303a: 147v). Arung Palakka himself had attempted to obtain the 
right to issue passes on behalfof the Company from his base in Cenrana. 
This request had been refused outright because of the well-founded fear 
that such a practice would provide ample opportunity for the Bugis to 
evade any Company trading restrictions. Cenrana was far enough away 
from Makassar to afford an ideal place to carry on wh at the Company 
considered "cIandestine", as weIl as "legitimate" , trading activities. 
Batavia instructed Fort Rotterdam in frank terms what it should be 
doing with regard to the Bugis encroachment on the Company's "sphere 
of influence": 
... the Bugis who wish to trade overseas must continue to be obliged to 
come to Fort [Rotterdam] to obtain their passes, without which they wiII 
be punished without further ado for having broken the treaty. The 
intention is to turn them away from navigation and to foster the fulfil-
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ment of their inclination to agriculture, with which they were raised since 
their birth (KA 1342b: 114v). 
Without the power to issue passes, Arung Palakka was unable to 
divert many foreign traders from Makassar to Cenrana. Although Cen-
rana never became an important economie centre, it was an ideal politi-
cal capital for Arung Palakka. It fulfilled admirably its function of 
controlling Wajo's trade and hence its economie independence, which 
was an important consideration especially af ter the accession of Arung 
Mampu as the Arung Matoa Wajo in 1679. Furthermore, Cenrana's 
location allowed Arung Palakka to act free from the constraints of the 
powerful Aruppitu in the heart of Bone. Cenrana, therefore, had its 
advantages as a capital, but it never fulfilled Arung Palakka's hopes that 
it would riyal Makassar as an important entrepot. 
To have achieved such an economie status for Cenrana would have 
been a great triumph, but it was not an important priority for Arung 
Palakka. What mattered more was a South Sulawesi at peace responsive 
to his wishes and to those of his heirs. After Goa's defeat in 1669 Arung 
Palakka hadsystematieally planned his route to power. Among his most 
successful weapons was the use of marriage diplomacy. Since he had no 
children of his own, he used his sisters in judicious marriage alliances 
which proved politically advantageous to him. The eldest of his sisters, 
We Mappolobombang Da Upi, married Arung Timurung La Pakkokoe, 
son of Arumpone La Ma'daremmeng. This marriage was intended to 
appease Arung Timurung and to obtain support for Arung Palakka's 
later accession to the Bone throne (See Chapter X). Another of Arung 
Palakka's sisters, We Tenrilekke' (We Tenriabang in L-4, Section 24, 
unpag.) Da Emba, was given in marriage first to Datu Luwu Tomalagu 
and later to Karaeng Tanete La Mappajanci (L-26:19). Although 
Luwu's heyday had long passed, it remained a relatively powerful 
kingdom whose support was necessary for any individual with 
pretensions toward supreme overlordship in South Sulawesi. Arung 
Palakka was weil aware of this and used his influence to obtain 
this favourable match. Furthermore, Tanete had proved to be a faithful 
aHy in the past and this marriage was intended to cement this bond. 
A third sister, We Tenrigirang Da Ompo, married Arung Bakke Todani, 
a close friend and companion-in-exile of Arung Palakka's. The early 
trust which Arung Palakka placed in Arung Bakke made this arrange-
ment of marriage one of love, to bind Arung Bakke even closer to 
Arung Palakka, as weil as one of political expediency. As a member of 
one of the most important families in the Ajattappareng, Arung Bakke 
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exercised influence over a strategie and potentially powerful area. 
Through these carefully arranged marriages, Arung Palakka was able 
to secure allies in the early years when his position was still insecure. He 
pursued the same policy to win support for La Patau. He arranged 
matches between La Patau and the daughters of the ruIers of Luwu, Goa, 
and to one of the most powerful families in Bone. A unique feature of 
these marriage arrangements was the agreement that the first-born of 
the union would rule in the mother's homeland. By this means Arung 
Palakka hoped to guarantee continuing support for himself and his 
successors from the particular kingdoms or families involved. The survi-
val of his blood to rule in the most powerful kingdoms in South Sulawesi 
depended upon the success of this policy. 
By the early 1680's all South Sulawesi acknowledged the overlordship of 
the Company and Arung Palakka. There were a few occasions when 
force or a threat of force had to be used against Toraja and Mandar. 
Elsewhere no local ruler or government dared undertake any major 
initiative without obtaining prior approval from Arung Palakka. So 
completely did he dominate affairs in South Sulawesi, even within the 
Company areas, th at his pronouncements were of ten sufficient to re-
solve any conflict or difference of opinions within a kingdom or between 
kingdoms. No one dared contradiet him for fear of sharing a similar fate 
as Arung Bakke. By the mid-1680s Arung Palakka's authority as over-
lord was firmly-rooted. His important concern now was to assure that, 
af ter his death, the precedents of power he established as overlord would 
be sufficient to sustain his successor, La Patau. An opportunity to 
demonstrate the powers of overlordship arose in an incident in Lampo-
ko, Soppeng, involving the Datu Soppeng Towesa. 
In late September or early October 1690 the Dutch learned that 
Arung Palakka, accompanied by the Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil, 
Karaeng Tallo, and a number of important nobles, had gone to Soppeng 
to seize the lord of Lampoko. A few days before Arung Palakka had 
demanded that Arung Lampoko return a certain slave, but instead of 
complying the latter had defiantly given the slave to the son of Arung 
Berru. Arung Lampoko refused to surrender the slave because "he 
could not submit all of his subjects to be destroyed in th is manner" (KA 
1386a: 14). This open rejection of Arung Palakka's authority would 
have been intolerable in the best of éircumstances. But when it orig-
inated from a favourite of Datu Soppeng Towesa, with whom Arung 
Palakka had already c1ashed over rights to the Soppeng throne, an 
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example had to be made of Arung Lampoko as a warning to Datu 
Soppeng and to any others foolish enough to challenge Arung Palakka's 
authority. 
The Company attempted to prevent bloodshed by sending two of its 
officials in early October to try to intercept Arung Palakka's men before 
they reached Lampoko. At Tanete they we re told that some eleven days 
before Datu Soppeng, Arung Lampoko, and some of the Soppeng 
getlareng had gone to Gantarang in the mountains on a deer hunt. They 
were also told that Anreguru Tojumaat had gone to Lampoko with a 
large number of Arung Palakka's soldiers and had seized the inhabi-
tants, their krisses, buffaloes, and other possessions. When the two 
Dutchmen arrived in Lampoko, they found that this report was true. 
Tojumaat's explanation for his behaviour was that· he was merely 
obeying orders. If Arung Lampoko had been there, he too would have 
been seized and brought to Arung Palakka. Although the Dutch argued 
that Soppeng was a Company ally and that Bone's troops should be 
removed from Soppeng, Tojumaat refused saying that he dared not 
oppose Arung Palakka's orders. Realizing the futility of further argu-
ment, the Dutch decided to go to Segeri to speak directly to Arung 
Palakka. 
On 7th October they arrived in Segeri and found Arung Palakka with 
the rulers of Goa, Tallo, and Tanete with their nobles. When the Dutch 
officials were brought to Arung Palakka, they complained to him about 
the attack on an ally, Lampoko. This action, they reminded Arung 
Palakka, was in grave breach of the Bungaya treaty which states specifi-
cally that all conflicts between rulers and nob les must be resolved by the 
Company in the presence of the allies. If any further action were taken 
against Lampoko, Batavia would be notified. This warning aroused 
Arung Palakka's anger. Not only had they dared threaten him in front of 
his subjects, but they had also invoked the treaty to question the division 
of responsibilities which Arung Palakka had evolved with other Com-
pany officials in the past. Batavia, too, had acquiesced in Arung Palak-
ka's authority over internal affairs in South Sulawesi, and so these 
remarks by the Dutch messengers appeared brazen and provocative. 
Arung Palakka accused President Hartsink of continuing to listen to the 
Chief Merchant Prins. The latter had earlier earned Arung Palakka's ire 
by advising Hartsink to forbid the Company's subjects from performing 
services for Arung Palakka while they were needed by the Company. 
While such a recommendation appeared reasonable to Hartsink, it went 
counter to Arung Palakka's established custom condoned by earlier 
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Company presidents in Fort Rotterdam and by Batavia. "And so now", 
continued Arung Palakka, "the Company also wants to draw the people 
of Soppeng to itself so that Arung Palakka will have no one since 
everyone will be under the Company". In Bone he was free to command, 
and, if necessary, to punish his people "as was also the case with the 
people of Soppeng if they commit any wrong toward me since there can 
be no distinction made between Soppeng and Bone or Bone and Sop-
peng". He explained that, if Datu Soppeng we re in Bone and some 
people in Bone were to commit a wrong against him, then Datu Soppeng 
could punish them since there was no difterence between Soppeng and 
Bone. If there were anyone who dared to say otherwise, he would have 
him killed "even if he were his own child, La Pat au ". 
When the Dutch asked Arung Palakka whether he had spoken to 
Arung Lampoko, he replied that he had. On 7th October he had sum-
moned both Arung Lampoko and Datu Soppeng to the Segeri moun-
tains. He had asked Datu Soppeng whether what had occurred in Lam-
poko had been done with his knowiedge. Datu Soppeng denied having 
played any part in this, and so Arung Palakka directed the full force of 
his anger at Arung Lampoko. He had Arung Lampoko's lips sliced oft 
for having uttered oftensive words against Arung Palakka and then had 
him chased into the forest like a wild anima!. Without a word of remorse 
Arung Palakka told the Dutch envoys that wh at he had done was 
"nothing more than what was right and just". It was later discovered that 
the person who had been assigned the task of punishing Arung Lampoko 
was the very same individu al who some years back had been used to 
execute Arung Bakke Todani (KA 1386:2-9). By using the same execu-
tioner, Arung Palakka was making certain th at no one failed to see the 
waming"that whoever dared defy Arung Palakka would not long remain 
inviolable. If the memory of Arung Bakke had grown dim over the years, 
the frightful punishment of Arung Lampoko once again served as a 
reminder of the power which was still Arung Palakka's to wield. 
The immediate result of the Lampoko incident was to limit the autho-
rity of both Datu Soppeng and his wife Karaeng Langelo, sister of 
Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil. The people of Soppeng disliked 
Karaeng Langelo because she demanded more from them than their 
own princes. Af ter the Lampoko incident, however, she became much 
more moderate in her activities. Datu Soppeng himself became ruler in 
name only and was rende red powerless by his own sister and former wife 
of Arung Palakka, We Adda Datu ri Watu, and by the Soppeng nob les 
and gellareng (KA 1387a:543v-544r). By Arung Palakka's swift moves 
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to punish what he believed to constitute acts of lèse majesté, he removed 
any doubt th at he was the supreme overlord in the area. This incident 
further consolidated Arung Palakka's position within South Sulawesi 
bringing a step closer his hopes for an untroubled transition of power to 
LaPatau. 
While Arung Palakka was successful in reasserting his authority, his 
methods earned the reproof of the Company. His experience in the 
Arung Bakke affair made him wary of undertaking any major expedition 
without the explicit, or at least implicit, approval of the Company. But 
when he asked his fellow rulers and nobles whether he should broach this 
matter of his quarrel with Datu Soppeng with the Company, he was 
advised that they could handle the who Ie affair without its help (KA 
1386b:8). The unexpected arrival of the Dutch envoys in Segeri with 
their threats convinced Arung Palakka th at President Hartsink and the 
Chief Merchant Prins, both of whom Arung Palakka believed had long 
shown little affection for him, would now use this incident to discredit 
him in the eyes of the Supreme Government in Batavia. Relations 
between Arung Palakka and these two Dutch officials became so 
strained th at Batavia sent a special commissioner to Makassar to try to 
mediate in their quarrel. 
Commissioner Dirk de Haas arrived in Makassar harbour in the 
evening of 5 June 1691. His initial meetings with Arung Palakka were 
especially pleasant, and he remarked that Arung Palakka's behaviour 
had been irreproachable ever since the departure of Hartsink to Batavia 
on 12 October 1690, immediately after the Lampoko incident (KA 
1387b:27). Af ter a month of private talks and general meetings with 
Arung Palakka and the allies, de Haas filed his "Report on the findings 
of the Makassar Commission focussing principally upon the investiga-
tion of the differences which have arisen between the Honourable 
Company and the Arumpone with the general allies ... " A lesser con-
cern of the Commission was to determine wh at should be done with the 
request by Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil and the Makassar people for 
the return of Syaikh Yusuf whom the Dutch had exiled to Ceylon. 
From his investigations de Haas learned th at Arung Palakka's quar-
reIs with President Hartsink could be traced directly to four causes: (1) 
the refusal hy Hartsink in 1688 to grant Arung Palakka's wife Daeng 
Talele the lands of Lange-Lange in Bulukumba; (2) the refusal by 
Hartsink in 1690 to allow thirty Bulukumba subjects ofthe Company to 
work for Arung Palakka for a brief period; (3) the refusal of Arung 
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Palakka to honour Hartsink with a visit on the latte r's request; and (4) 
the attempt by Hartsink to prevent Arung Palakka from taking revenge 
for the insult done to him by Datu Soppeng through Arung Lampoko. 
De Haas discussed each of these points in turn with the hope of explain-
ing to Arung Palakka and the allies the reasons for Hartsink's actions. 
Insofar as Lange-Lange was concerned, it was beyond Hartsink's 
power to grant since only Batavia could decide the disposal of Com-
pany's lands. De Haas suggested that Arung Palakka himself write 
directly to Batavia to make his request known. With re gard to the second 
point de Haas explained that the decision had been made by Batavia. In 
hisreport, however, he emphasized that on previous occasions Arung 
Palakka had been allowed to use the Company's subjects for his own 
projects. Only when Hartsink wrote to Batavia recommending that the 
Bulukumba subjects be exempt from serving Arung Palakka did Batavia 
issue an order to that effect. Batavia dearly re lied on the advice of the 
official dosest to any situation, and so de Haas simply implied to B~tavia 
that Hartsink was not altogether inculpable insofar as the quarrel was 
concerned. On the third point Arung Palakka expressed regret th at he 
was too ill to come to the Fort. Although de Haas had learned from 
various sources that Arung Palakka had spent that day fishing at the 
seashore, he discreetly omitted any mention of this. Finally, on the 
recent trouble in Lampoko, Arung Palakka told de Haas that he had 
acted without the Company's knowledge because the Company had no 
lawful right there. These lands we re his inheritance through birth and 
marriage. Arung Palakka ended his case by stating with great emotion 
that he would certainly have left the Company's service and retired to 
Bone if Hartsink had not been removed from Fort Rotterdam (KA 
1387c:578r-580r). 
The success of de Haas' mission was assured because of Arung Palak-
ka's basic attitude toward Batavia. Throughout his dealings with the 
Company, Arung Palakka had of ten expressed displeasure with Com-
pany officials in Fort Rotterdam. His criticism, however, was directed at 
what he considered attempts by these officials to misrepresent him to 
Batavia or to misinterpret Batavia's intentions toward him. In any 
conflict with a Company official, Arung Palakka threatened to write to 
Batavia to learn the "reai" truth and, if all else failed, to go and live in 
Batavia. The inability of some of the officials in Makassar to appreciate 
the heavy moral obligation which Arung Palakka felt toward the Com-
pany made them believe the occasional rumour th at Arung Palakka was 
planning to turn against the Company. In both word and deed Arung 
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Palakka continually demonstrated his readiness to give his life to the 
Company for having "covered" his shame and "restored his life". So 
well-known was Arung Palakka's sense of debt to the Company th at it 
was one of the major themes found in a Makassar folktale about Arung 
Palakka and the Makassar War of 1666-9 (L.Y. Andaya 1980). Arung 
Palakka even swore before de Haas never to abandon his trust in the 
Company "to which he pledged his body and soul" (KA 1387c:580v). In 
the eyes of his society, to have gone against the Company which was 
responsible for his life would have been a serious crime indeed. When 
Arung Palakka criticized a Outch official, it was never meant as a 
criticism of the Company, as can readily be seen in the numerous 
missives written by different Company representatives at Fort Rotter-
dam to Batavia throughout Arung Palakka's life. Arung Palakka was not 
unaware that his supreme position in South Sulawesi was being main-
tained because of the continuing support of the Company. But to believe 
that this more practical, political reason for embracing the Company was 
Arung Palakka's principal consideration is to adopt a highly cynical view 
of past events, but even more seriously, to disregard a culturally impor-
tant motivating factor for Arung Palakka's deeds. 
Ouring de Haas' investigations in Makassar, he voiced an opinion 
which was unspoken but generally acknowledged by the Company offi-
cials both in Fort Rotterdam and Batavia. He wrote that, "the whole 
land of Celebes [Sulawesi] is so large that the Company would only be 
able to con trol it at extraordinarily high costs, and among the allies are 
many powers who, without such an eminent servant [as Arung Palakka], 
would be difficult to restrain". Therefore, he conc1uded: 
... I t would not be doing a disservice [to the Company] if Arung Palakka 
were granted this or that minor request, such as a piece of land or the use 
of the services which he requires of our subjects, etc., since it is he who 
maintains the loyalty of each of the allies to the Company. By so doing 
[the Company] will be able to obtain good services from him not only in 
this but in other cases and circumstances. His disposition is dependent 
upon honour and pride; if he were not obstructed in these matters by 
granting to him things of little importance, as now a piece of land or the 
service of the Company's subjects ... and especially rif he we re ] not 
opposed in the management of the govemment of his own lands, mainly 
Bone and Soppeng, I believe that he will do his utmost to serve the 
Company with great vigour (KA 1387c:580v-581 v). 
Oe Haas proved an ideal representative for Batavia because he always 
placed the activities in South Sulawesi within the framework of the 
Company's wider interests. He pinpointed the singlemost important 
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contribution of Arung Palakka: the ability to con trol the activities of the 
Sou th Sulawesi people at home and abroad. To obtain this service, de 
Haas argued, the Company could afford to grant the relatively minor 
demands of Arung Palakka. Once de Haas had concluded that the points 
of dispute were of minor consequence and that maintaining Arung 
Palakka's support was of paramount concern to the Company, then he 
suggested that every effort be made to encourage Arung Palakka's 
special devotion to the Company. The question of Arung Palakka's 
honour and pride were central to these differences, and so de Haas 
recommended that nothing be done which could be interpreted as com-
promising these values. Even the matter of Arung Palakka's influence in 
the selection of the rulers in Soppeng, Luwu, and in the Mandar kingdom 
of Parapuang, de Haas chose to ignore for the greater good of the 
Company-Arung Palakka relationship. In recent times Arung Palakka 
had acted on behalf of the Company by bringing Datu Soppeng Towesa 
and his nobÎ'es to answer for their misconduct, by sending men to Mandar 
to investigate and frustrate "smuggling" there, by despatching envQYs to 
Bima to mediate in the hostilities between the kingdoms of Sumbawa, 
and by applying pressure on the ruler of Sumbawa to prevent the escape 
of a large number of South Sulawesi refugees now in that kingdom. 
Arung Palakka's success in these missions was due to the fact that "his 
orders were not only venerated but also effectively implemented" (KA 
1387c:582r-583v). These examples, de Haas concluded, were sufficient 
to see the wisdom of removing anything which could cause Arung 
Palakka any dissatisfaction with the Company. 
The second major problem which de Haas was sent to investigate was 
the matter of the return of Syaikh Yusuf to Makassar. Syaikh Yusuf had 
left Makassar many years before and had spent ,!!tost of his life in Mekka. 
On his return he was invited to remain at Banten to be the adviser to 
Sultan Agung. When the latter was overthrown by his son Sultan Haji 
with Company assistance in 1683, Syaikh Yusuf was exiled to Ceylon. 
The movement for the return of Syaikh Yusufto Makassar had begun in 
the court of Goa and had the whole-hearted support of Arung Palakka's 
wife, Daeng Talele, who was herself a Goa princess. On 11 May 1689 
Sultan Abdul Jalil, Daeng Talele, and all the important Makassar nobles 
came to Fort Rotterdam to speak to President Hartsink. They brought 
with them 2,000 rijksdaalders which had been donated by both com-
moners and nobles alike to make it possible for Syaikh Yusufto return to 
Makassar from Ceylon. Without first consulting Batavia, Hartsink 
agreed to th is request. This decision, according to Hartsink, "caused 
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such excessive joy which is difficult to describe, and each of them came to 
the President and gave him his hand and embraced him, including the 
queens of Bone and Goa" (KA 1350c:51Or-511 v). Hartsink then tried 
to persuade Batavia to approve his compulsive act of generosity by 
warning that otherwise "there would be hatred erupting into widespread 
turmoil". If Batavia did not intend to repatriate Syaikh Yusuf, then 
Hartsink advised that the Goa representative bearing the request for 
Syaikh Yusufs return be retained until reinforcements could be sent to 
Fort Rotterdam. No help could be expected in Makassar "because the 
request had come from the common man, and the masses in Makassar 
hold th is same Syaikh in such great love and awe as though he were a 
second Muhammad". Yet Hartsink was also able to recognize that the 
return of Syaikh Yusuf could lead to trouble if he should ever recall the 
harsh treatment he had received at the hands of the Company (KA 
1350c:512r-v). 
While Hartsink had painted a picture of all Makassar wanting the 
return of Syaikh Yusuf, de Haas found comfort in the fact that Arung 
Palakka declined to lend his support to the request. Although Daeng 
Talele had contributed 600 rijksdaalders for the Syaikh's return, Arung 
Palakka remained adamant in his opposition. He explained th at he was a 
servant of the Company which would make his advocating the return of 
the Company's enemy highly improper. Further investigation revealed 
that even if all the Makassar people were to oppose the Company over 
the Syaikh Yusuf issue, there would not be any real danger since Arung 
Palakka and the other allies would come to its assistance (KA 1387c: 
584r-586r). Armed with this information Batavia could rest assured that 
there was no reason to act immediately upon the request by the Makas-
sar delegations. 
What caused Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil to ask for Syaikh 
Yusuf's return in 1689 is unclear. The explanation he gave to de Haas in 
1691 was "because he [Syaikh Yusuf] was of his line, he and his father 
having had the title of gallarang in the kingdom of Tallo. His mother was 
married to the old ruler of Goa [Sultan Hasanuddin] so that th is Syaikh, 
Karaeng Bisei [Sultan Mohammad Ali Tumenanga ri Jakattara] who 
died in Batavia, and he were all true and lawful brothers" (KA 1387c: 
583v).2 His request was couched in terms of brotherly concern, but the 
true reason was probably the hope that Syaikh Yusuf, who was now 
considered a living saint by the Makassar people, could perhaps infuse a 
strong sense of unity and hope once again in the demoralized Makassar 
lands. A few years later the situation had changed little, and the Dutch 
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governor noted the deep despair of the Makassar people in a poignant 
description of something he had witnessed in Goa: 
... They [the Makassar people] have a very sad song which is usually 
pertormed by eight to ten young women in men's clothing, but beauti-
fully dressed in old finery, dancing with guns and swords. The close of 
each verse ends in Malay with these words of lamentation: "Kompania 
sudah [me-]rusak Makassar" (The Company had destroyed Makassar). 
This is wh at the elders listen to with rapt attention and with sighs and 
tears, and what the youth are being nurtured on in great bitterness and 
aversion toward our state (KA 1458c:23). 
This gloom and despair3 had perhaps been the reason for the Goa court 
wanting the return of Syaikh Yusuf. Because of his great prestige among 
the Makassar people, his presence among them would have been suffi-
cient to instilI a renewed sense of pride in their lives. But a more 
pragmatic reason for initiating demands for Syaikh Yusuf's return, ac-
cording to one Goa nob Ie man, was to provide an ideal cover for a Goa 
delegation to deliver Goa's complaints to Batavia without arousing 
Arung Palakka's suspicions (Consideratiën 1708:7). Once the Company 
had received Arung Palakka's promise of support over the Syaikh Yusuf 
issue, it confidently rejected the Makassar pleas for the return of this 
Moslem saint. The turmoil which Hartsink had predicted never oc-
curred, and all Makassar agitation for Syaikh Yusuf's returIl quickly 
subsided. 
During de Haas' mission in Makassar he called a meeting to provide 
an opportunity for all of the Company allies to air their grievances. It was 
during this meeting held on 9 July 1691 that he was able to witness the 
great influence and virtually unchallenged position which Arung Palak-
ka had among the local rulers. All the rulers of South Sulawesi were 
present except for those of Soppeng and Bulukumba. The ruler of 
Bulukumba was away hunting when the messenger arrived summoning 
him, and so he did not learn of the meeting in time. The envoy to 
Soppeng did succeed in delivering the summons to Datu Soppeng 
Towesa, but when the latter and his wife attempted to leave, they were 
stopped at the border. The Datu Soppeng's sister, We Adda Datu ri 
Watu, ordered all the Soppeng subjects in the retinue to return home on 
pain of death. Since We Adda had been given authority by Arung 
Palakka to "oversee" affairs in Soppeng, there was no one who dared 
disobey her. And so Datu Soppeng Towesa was unable to continue his 
journey to Makassar to attend the general meeting. Although there were 
suspicions th at Arung Palakka preferred not having the quarrelsome 
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Datu Soppeng raising complaints about his condition, Arung Palakka 
denied vehemently that he had any responsibility for this act (KA 
1387d:603r-v,611r). 
In the beginning of the meeting de Haas had the Bungaya treaty read 
and th en asked if there were any grievances. The only ones to reply were 
the rulers of Goa and Tallo who wished to have certain lands restored to 
them. Since no other ruler wished to speak, de Haas asked then if they 
would all abide by the articles of the treaty. Most of the lesser alIies, 
beginning with Wajo, answered that they would, "as long as the Arum-
pone [Arung Palakka] himself did so". When de Haas asked if they 
would still do what Arumpone did if he went against the treaty and were 
punished, they did not answer and just remained silent. At this moment 
Arung Palakka arose and protested that he was one of the most impor-
tant of all the allies but nevertheless a servant of the Company. He asked 
de Haas if he, Arung Palakka, had ever opposed the treaty which had 
just been re ad or had ever misused or abused it in serving the Company. 
De Haas acknowIedged that he had not, and Arung Palakka continued: 
... If in my conduct I had committed a misdeed against the Company, 
then certainly you [i.e. the Company and the other allies ] could not 
support me and I would certainly be punished or deposed. I am certain 
that, as a consequence, you would place your feet on my ~ck and 
strongly bring about my downfall. 
These words, according to de Haas, made such an impression on the 
gathered allies that everyone lowered his gaze, not daring to look up. 
The only other notabIe occurrence at this meeting was Arung Palakka's 
open condemnation of Karaeng Lengkese for refusing to accompany the 
general allies on the expedition to Lampoko. He recommended that 
such people deserved to be punished for being "such liars who are 
accustomed against all truth and generosity to lie to the Company". De 
Haas succeeded in calming Arung Palakka sa that the meeting could end 
without any drastic measures being taken against old Karaeng Lengkese 
(KA 1387c:588v-592r). 
Throughout the proceedings Arung Palakka 's total domination of the 
other allies was c1early evident. Even when Arung Palakka professed his 
willingness to have them "place their feet on his neck" if he should 
commit a disservice to the Company, there was none among the local 
lords bold enough to raise his eyes from the floor for fear of being 
suspected by Arung Palakka of acquiescence with the suggestion. The 
allies had seen the examples of Arung Bakke and Arung Lampoko and 
were not so imprudent as to give Arung Palakka any cause for suspicion. 
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So powerful had Arung Palakka become th at a public castigation of 
Karaeng Lengkese. was sufficient to send the .latter scurrying to the 
Dutch in Fort Rotterdam for protection. No one was beyond the reach of 
Arung Palakka in South Sulawesi unless he were kept safe within the 
walls of Fort Rotterdam itself. 
De Haas' report of the power of Arung Palakka merely confirmed the 
findings of previous Company officials. There could no longer be any 
doubt of the wisdom of de Haas' suggestion that the Company con ce de 
to Arung Palakka the small requests which had little significance to the 
Company. By this means it would receive in return the valuable friend-
ship and loyalty of Arung Palakka, and through him, the compliance of 
the whole of South Sulawesi. The Company was to adopt this suggestion 
and was duly rewarded with peace in South Sulawesi made possible by 
Arung Palakka. 
The only major threat to peace and the good relations between Arung 
Palakka and the Company for the remainder of the 17th century came 
not from South Sulawesi itself but from Sumbawa, an area outside Sou th 
Sulawesi but within its sphere of infIuence. It was first drawn into the 
political orbit of South Sulawesi in the beginning of the 17th century. 
Between 1618 and 1623 Goa extended its conquests eastward and 
absorbed all the tiny kingdoms in western Sumbawa, which then became 
the kingdom of Sumbawa. Bima was conquered some years later in 
1633, and the kingdoms of Tambora, Sanggar, and Dompu feIl soon 
thereafter. Af ter the signing of the Bungaya treaty in 1667, the Com-
pany deposed the rulers of Bima, Dompu, Sanggar, and Tambora and 
exiled them to the Moluccas for their assistance to Goa (Nusa Tenggara 
Barat 1977/78:51-3). In their place were installed rulers who appeared 
to be friendly to Arung Palakka and the Company. But it soon became 
apparent that the links with Goa remained strong. Instead of being 
dooile and submissive, these new rulers grew more and more indepen-
dent as a result of support from the people who approved their rulers' 
blood ties with Makassar royalty. The ruler of the kingdom of Bima 
married the daughter of Karaeng Lengkese, and the ruler of the king-
dom of Sumbawa married the sister of Karaeng Tallo (KA 1292b:260r). 
Marital ties were also forged among the lower princes and nobles. On 
one occasion in 1685 the ruler of Bima complained that all the Makassar 
princesses had been recalled to Makassar and had been accompanied by 
their princely Bima husbands. What upset the ruler of Bima was not the 
flight of these Makassar princesses but that of their husbands who held 
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important offices in his kingdom (KA 1303b:123v). While Arung 
Palakka and the Company had forced the Sumbawa kingdoms to ac-
knowledge their overlordship, they we re unable to undo immediately 
the deep relationships established through more than a half century of 
intermarriages among the royalty of Sumbawa and Makassar. 
Of all the Sumbawa kingdoms only Dompu appeared to have genuine-
Iy welcomed Arung Palakka and the Company as overlords and become 
acknowledged as a faithful ally (Nusa Tenggara Barat 1967/78:53). 
With the approval of Batavia, the ruIer of Dompu even received "robes 
of honour" from Arung Palakka in 1685 for his service against the 
Makassar refugees on Sumbawa (KA 1303c: 138r).1t was therefore with 
some alarm that the Company and Arung Palakka leamed in 1693 that 
the queen of Dompu had been murdered. The rulers of Dompu and 
Bima each accused the other of the deed, and the seriousness of the 
crime was aggravated by the fact th at the murdered queen was from the 
Goa royal house. A meeting of all the allies was called on 19 May 1693 to 
discuss the problem (KA 1425a:572r-v). The rulers ofBima and Dompu 
were summoned by President Prins to Makassar and given compounds 
for their retinues. The ruler of Bima was assigned a place among the 
people of GaIesong just behind Kampong Baru, while the ruler of 
Dompu was given an area in the Company's "Grote Tuin" (Large 
Garden) at the Mandar Syah redoubt (KA 1425b:588r). The Company 
had decided to provide protection to both these rulers, but especially for 
the ruler of Bima, since some secret letters intercepted by the Dutch 
revealed that Arung Palakka believed the ruler of Bima to be guilty. 
Prins was apparently as convinced of th is ruler's innocence and hoped to 
prevent his being condemned by the allies (Eerdmans n.d.(a):53). 
At the general meeting of the allies, only four witnesses could be 
found to speak in defence of the ruler of Bima, and he was found guilty 
by the allies. Prins was displeased by this verdict and asked whether the 
judgement ofthe allies should be cOilsidered as final. Visibly annoyed by 
this interjection, Arung Palakka remarked that the Dutch would cer-
tainly not have raised any objection if the verdict had been in their 
favour! Prins asked for time to confer with Batavia since this was the first 
time ever that the general allies had not agreed with the Company on a 
major issue. This suggestion only upset Arung Palakka more, and he told 
Prins that if Batavia were to decide the matter, then no meeting should 
have been called. No matter how much Prins tried to explain his position, 
Arung Palakka remained unmollified. Prins, like Hartsink befare him, 
refused to accept the fact th at Arung Palakka considered himself the 
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final arbiter in native affairs. Fearing for the life of the ruler of Bima, 
Prins decided to move him and his family into Fort Rotterdam. Tbis 
confirrned Arung Palakka's suspicions that Prins intended to thwart the 
allies and allow the ruler of Bima to escape unpunished (KA 1425c: 
617r-620r). 
Another incident which angered Arung Palakka was the attempt by 
two of Bima 's chief ministers to have Fort Rotterdam forward to Batavia 
three sealed letters from themselves and their ruler. Word ofthis quickly 
reached Arung Palakka who saw this as an act of great impertinence. He 
let it be known that it was clearly against their laws and customs to allow 
someone like the ruler of Bima, who in the presence of all the allies had 
been convicted of the murder of the queen of Dompu, to send letters 
declaring his innocence to the Supreme Govemment in Batavia. If those 
in Bima wanted to present material in defence of their ruler, then it 
should have been presented during the general meeting. Arung Palakka 
wanted to have the se als broken and the letters read, for he suspected 
that the letters may have implied that the ruler of Dompu, his principal 
ally on the is land of Sumbawa, was involved in the murder of his wife. 
Tbe request was refused on the basis that it was against the "Company's 
old laws and customs". The almost mocking quality of the reply merely 
reinforced Arung Palakka's dislike of the Company officials in Fort 
Rotterdam and especially of President Prins (KA 1425d:629r-630v). As 
in the past wh en Arung Palakka feit aggrieved by his treatment at the 
hands of the Company representatives in Fort Rotterdam, he made 
immediate plans to return to Cenrana. Before his departure he sent a 
letter remonstrating with the Company on behalf of himself and the 
allies over the interference of President Prins in the proceedings to 
determine the murderer of the queen of Dompu (KA 1425d:635r-v). 
The letter from Arung Palakka and the allies to Batavia dated 31 
October 1693 outlined the recent occurrences in the Dompu affair as 
they understood them. According to their version of events, it was Prins 
who had first suggested that a meeting of all the allies be held to 
determine whether the ruler of Bima or that of Dompu was responsible 
for the murder of the latte r's wife. There were twenty-one rulers repre-
senting the allies who met on the 19th and the 26th of August. They 
decided th at the ruler of Bima was guilty of the murder by employing the 
following criteria to determine guilt: 
1. to be seen [in the act] by others; 
2. to have one's act seen by others; and 
3. to have one's words heard [while committing the act] by others. 
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All of these factors were demonstrated by the Dompu witnesses to 
establish the guilt of the mIer of Bima. When those from Bima present at 
the meeting we re called by Prins, they did not deny the charges. They 
merely said that on the night of the murder the mier of Bima was as leep 
on his boat. Insofar as permitting the ruler of Bima to send letters to 
Batavia af ter being convicted by the allies, the letter went on to say that 
never in the period of six presidents in Fort Rotterdam had such a thing 
occurred without the allies' prior knowledge and approval. The letter 
then concluded: 
... We allies have agreed unanimously to avenge the murder as long as 
this does not countermand the resolutions of the Honourable Company. 
The fact that our heads are still attached to our bodies, that we have been 
able to regain our freedom, and that we still are in possession of our 
kingdoms is primarily because we have not countermanded the orders 
and resolutions ofthe Honourable Company (KA 1425e:678v-681r). 
Even while declaring their intention of avenging the murder of the queen 
of Dompu, they we re careful to express their continuing loyalty and 
indebtedness to the Company for their present good fortune. 
This reaffirmation of loyalty was considered especially warranted 
since relations with Fort Rotterdam had deteriorated oonsiderably. 
Amng Palakka had been distressed by Prins' comment th at it would take 
two or three years to assem bie enough evidence to settle the matter. By 
traditional criteria the mIer of Bima had already been adjudged guilty, 
but now Prins was ignoring this judgement (KA 1425f:675v-676r). 
Although Prins had hoped to prevent the mIer of Bima from being 
punished by the allies who had prejudged his guilt, his stand on the issue 
further aggravated his already strained relations with Amng Palakka. In 
a personalletter to Batavia, who se contents were made known to Prins, 
Arung Palakka protested at Prins' handling of the whole affair: 
1. If someone we re to plot evil against Arung Palakka" then he [Amng 
Palakka] should be free to kill that person before the latter killed him ... 
2. If this first [alternative] were not granted, then he [Arung Palakka] 
should be allowed to go to Batavia""to end his life there as the Com-
pany's subject" ... 
3. If neither of the two points were to be approved, then he should be 
permitted to go and establish his domicile in Bone, "where he would 
continue to remain a servant'ofthe Company". 
If none of these were granted, Arung Palakka warned that nothing good 
should be expected from him. Despite Arung Palakka's threats, Prins 
later reported that he was able to dissuade him from taking any drastic 
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action (KA 1425d:636r-v). ludging from the tone of Arung Palakka's 
"ultimatum", he merely wished to express his dissatisfaction with Prins 
in a dramatic manner. He was careful to affirm his loyalty to the Com-
pany, even to the point of suggesting that he go to Batavia, to "end his 
life as a Company subject". He confidently assumed that, as in the past, 
he would be vindicated by the Company. 
On 4 March 1694 President Prins died (KA 1446f:604r). His death 
eased somewhat the disquiet of the Dutch caused by the de te rio rating 
relations between Prins and Arung Palakka. Nevertheless, reports of 
people from all quarters being summoned to Cenrana by Arung Palakka 
were disturbing. A letter from the Company's representative in Bulu-
kumba arrived in Fort Rotterdam stating that much of the Company's 
lands in Bulukumba had gone unploughed and unsown because many of 
the Bugis who worked the land were leaving daily for Bone. A trusted 
native servant of another Dutch officiallearned from his friends in his 
home in Mario, Soppeng, th at there and elsewhere the people had been 
ordered by Arung Palakka to be ready to come with their weapons when 
summoned. Preparations were in progress, so it was reported, for an 
army of 30,000 men consisting of the Bone Bugis and other allies (with 
the exception of Maros) to go to Fort Rotterdam to demand that the 
Dutch surrender the ruler of Bima. If the Dutch officials were to refuse, 
the ruier of Bima would be seized by force. A trustworthy informant 
reported that Arung Palakka's messengers had also ordered those of 
Wajo, Luwu, and Mandar to gather at Cenrana. Similar war summons 
were delivered to the princes living in the neighbourhood of Fort 
Rotterdam, and they and their entire families had obeyed. There we re 
still some who remained behind but who intended to follow later because 
Arung Palakka threatened that those who refused to heed his call would 
be "sold to buy gunpowder and lead" (KA 1446g:634r-635r). 
To determine the truth of these reports and to seek some accommo-
dation with Arung Palakka, the Dutch Council in Fort Rotterdam 
resolved to send amission to Cenrana in lune 1694. From the very 
outset Arung Palakka's hostile attitude toward the mission was ap-
parent. The envoy Berghuysen was told th at his small knowledge of the 
Dompu affair couid only bring the Company into disrepute. Arung 
Palakka then went on to claim that, though he and Batavia enjoyed a 
mutual affection and had each other's interests at heart, there were those 
who wished to destroy this relationship. When pressed for further in-
formation, he revealed that the Dutch Syahbandar 10annes lunius and 
his followers were intent on discrediting Arung Palakka and the allies by 
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proving the innocence of the ruler of Bima. In all the long years that he 
had served the Company, Arung Palakka complained, never before had 
he seen anything so regrettable and disagreeable. Wh at he intended to 
do now was simply to wait for the new president to re-examine his 
grievance (KA 1446c:636v-638v; KA 1458a:36-8). 
Despite Arung Palakka's initial antagonism toward Berghuysen, the 
latter remained undaunted. He presented the latest Dutch findings on 
the murder of the queen of Dompu which he thought would please 
Arung Palakka. According to the latest evidence, it was the ruler of 
Tambora who had arranged the murder. The queen of Dompu had 
apparently insulted the ruler of Tambora by claiming that his subjects 
were really subjects of Dompu (KA 1446d:639r-v). There had been 
some justification for the queen's allegations since Tambora was once a 
part of the kingdom of Dompu. During the Company's troubles with the 
Sumbawa kingdoms in 1674, the people of Tambora were the first to 
submit to the Company. As aresuIt they were made an independent 
kingdom by the Company (KA 1458b:114). 
Arung Palakka, however, reJected the accusation that the ruler of 
Tambora was responsible for the queen of Dompu's murder: 
... It is impossible that such a brave man (as the ruler of Tambora is), of 
whom one can only expect good, would commit such a wrong and evil 
deed. But such a thing could be expected of those of Bima or Dompu, 
since they are evil-natured people ... (KA 1458a:39). 
He was clearly disappointed by the news of the involvement of Tambora 
in the whole affair: 
... I am most amazed at wh at I hear. You [the Company] came here and 
restored life to Bone, which had almost been destroyed. For this I can 
never repay you with money or goods, for God wil! repay you. However, 
the kings of Bima and Dompu4 have committed a great crime with which 
they have tried to befoul the other [i.e. the king of Tambora] by looking 
for a third party. God is my witness, I have never conducted myself in any 
way or advocated ,anything but that which was in accordance with our 
present laws and customs (KA 1446c:639v). 
Having made so little progress in his talks with Arung Palakka, Berg-
huysen attempted the next day to take his leave to return to Makassar. 
But Arung Palakka would not allow him to dep art until he had heard an 
account of the two general meetings of the allies in 1693. While it was 
being read, a Dutch member of the mission noted that Arung Palakka's 
facial expressions gradually changed. When the reading was over, Arung 
Palakka burst out: 
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... There, now you have heard the truth of what had taken place in the 
two meetings. The president [Prins] promised me in the presence of my 
interpreter Lessang (who also confirmed this) that his letter to the 
Supreme Govenment of India [i.e. the Company leaders in Batavia] 
would agree completely with mine. But now I Ieam that the president 
has not only misled me but has also given the Honoured Lords [of 
Batavia] reason to doubt me or consider me a liar. 
This outburst was followed by a flood of tears, and it was a half hour later 
before he was again able to speak: 
... Do not be amazed to see me crying like this. My heart is full indeed 
with pent-up emotions. I, who have reached such an old age and have 
always been held in high regard by the Company, must now in my old 
days be ar the name of a liar. For this I can only thank the president, who 
is now dead. Now I have become of no use to the Company because of 
this censure. Iintend, therefore, not to assist any more in the delibera-
tions of the officials in the Fort, but to let them govem this land of 
Makassar as they think fit ... Upon arrival at the Fort, do not forget 
above all to report everything you have seen and heard me say (KA 
1446d:640v-641r). 
If there were any threat implicit in Arung Palakka's words to the 
Dutch mission, it was his decision to let the Company run its own affairs 
on the island without the benefit ofhis counsel. Since the Dutch presence 
was limited principally to Makassar, with Fort Rotterdam at its hub, and 
to posts consisting of a few soldiers scattered throughout the Company's 
lands, the Dutch relied upon Arung Palakka to keep them informed on 
local developments. The unofficial division of responsibilities of over-
lordship between the Company and Arung Palakka had also resulted in 
Arung Palakka's almost sole con trol over intemal matters of South 
Sulawesi. Without his authority, there was little hope that the Company 
could effectively establish and maintain the peace among the various 
kingdoms. When Commissioner de Haas was in Makassar, he recog-
nized the value of Arung Palakka in preserving order and stability in 
South Sulawesi. He recommended, therefore, that all minor requests 
from Arung Palakka should be granted to assure his continuing loyalty 
to the Company. 
Renewed troubles in Sumbawa and the need to send a punitive expe-
dition strengthened 8atavia's determination to remove the source of 
friction in its relations with Arung Palakka. The arrival in Makassar of 
Govemor Isaacq van Thije as the replacement for the late President 
François Prins on 22 January 1695 provided the opportunity to resolve 
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the deadlock in the Dompu affair. A Dutch mission was again sent to 
Cenrana, this time under Lieutenant Pieter Scipion. Arung Palakka 
again voiced his complaints, but it was his wife Daeng Talele who made 
the stronger impression on the mission. She berated the Dutch for not 
having taken appropriate action against the ruler of Bima, whom she had 
raised as a child: 
... If we merely wished to si ander him with this murder, then you could 
say we are unfair. But the kings of Goa and Tallo with all their nob les 
know very weIl that he is the cause of it [the murder of the queen of 
Dompu]. Why should we wish to blame him for something if it were not 
true? He is of our own flesh and blood (KA 1458c:5-6). 
Despite the protestations by Arung Palakka and Daeng Talele, they 
were genuinely pleased by the announcement of the arrival of the new 
govemor in Fort Rotterdam. They now hoped that cordiaI relations with 
Fort Rotterdam would be re-established thus paving the way for a 
satisfactory resolution of the problems in Sumbawa. 
On 7 March 1695 twelve Bugis lords, the most importantofwhom was 
La Patau, appeared in Fort Rotterdam accompanied by some sixty 
princes to welcome Govemor van Thije. They were greeted at the Land 
Gate of the Fort and conducted through a row of soldiers to the gover-
nor's residence. Van Thije met the delegation on the steps and brought 
them to the anteroom where greetings were exchanged. They all sat 
around a table and conversed politely while sirih, tea, and sweetmeats 
we re served. La Patau then rose and af ter uttering the required formali-
ties said th at he hoped that van Thije would be "the instrument by which 
all the evil in the land would be purified and that he would work toward 
the establishment of unity and harmony between the Company and the 
kingdom of Bone". Having been so graciously weIcomed, van Thije was 
further enheartened by a letter from Arung Palakka later that month 
stating that though his iIlness had worsened he would return to Bontoala 
(KA 1458c:37-42). 
On 9th June Arung Palakka arrived in Bontoala and began prepara-
tions for a proper weIcome for the new governor. Although he was tired 
from his long journey and was lame on his right side, he was in high spirits 
and still strongly aware of proprieties. When the governor's wife sent 
two Dutch ladies on her behalf to Bontoala to weIcome Daeng Talele, 
Arung Palakka was upset and was reported to have said to his wife: "It is 
different insofar as you are concerned. You are healthy, and it is not 
proper that the govemor's wife should come to you. You yourself should 
go first to the Fort". It was gestures such as these which caused van Thije 
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to write to Batavia that Arung Palakka's inward affection for the Com-
pany "streams through as bright as sunlight" (KA 1458d:69-78). 
The extent to which Arung Palakka was prepared to go to win the 
affection of the new governor was evident in his sending five palanquins, 
each borne by eight men, with a retinue of princes to the Fort to bring the 
governor, his wife, and their party to Bontoala. This was a sign of special 
favour which had never before been accorded to a Company official in 
Fort Rotterdam. At Bontoala the Dutch guests were regaled and even 
given the signal honour of being served personally by Arung Palakka's 
second wife, Karaeng Laikang. A return visit to Fort Rotterdam was 
made by Arung Palakka and his principal wife, Daeng Talele, on 24th 
June to commemorate the victory over Sombaopu in 1669. In accord-
ance with the Company's official procedures for receiving any important 
local lord, Arung Palakka and Daeng Talele were met by va rio us offi-
cials on be half of the governor at the Land Gate and conducted through 
a row of honour guards to the governor's residence.Upon arrival at the 
steps of the residence, the palanquin top was removed and Arung 
Palakka and Daeng Talele welcomed with the firing of eleven cannon-
shots from the ramparts of the Fort. On ce the welcome formalities were 
over, it quickly became apparent that wh at lay behind the overwhelming 
display of affection and friendship for van Thije and the Company was a 
belief th at everything would now be set aright. 
There was little surprise, therefore, when Arung Palakka raised the 
issue ofthe Dompu affair. Van Thije suspected that the only reason that 
the rulers of South Sulawesi had become so intimately involved in the 
affairs of Sumbawa was that the queen of Dompu and her son by a 
previous marriage were of Makassar royalty (KA 1458c:12-13). Since 
the marriage of La Patau to I Mariama, daughter of Karaeng Goa Sultan 
Abdul J alil, the ties between the royal houses of Bone and Goa had 
become much closer. A number of subsequent marriages between the 
noble and princely classes of Bone and Goa had reinforced these ties, 
causing van Thije to lament the fact that the much heralded "balance" 
between these two kingdoms established by the Bungaya treaty was now 
in shambles. But he did go on to say: 
... it is consoling th at this balance has tipped to the right side, to a ruler 
who considers his greatest fame to be that of having served the Company 
faithfully for thirty years, and who also regards the benefits he enjoys, all 
the possessions he has, and his life itself to be due to the Company. 
Therefore, he and also most of the [Bone court] nobles demonstrate an 
extraordinarily intimate and passionate, if not feigned, affection for the 
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Company ... As long as the Arumpone [Arung Palakka] lives, one need 
fear no defect ion or estrangement (KA 145 8c: 6-14). 
Van Thije recognized the importance of Arung Palakka to the Com-
pany and had therefore prepared to discuss the issue of the queen of 
Dompu's murder. He ordered letters written by the Company officials in 
Fort Rotterdam to Batavia concerning this affair to be read aloud for 
Arung Palakka's benefit. In one of these letters Chief Merchant Schen-
kenburg spoke of "the sadness being experienced by Arung Palakka". 
When Arung Palakka heard these words, tears came to his eyes and he 
thanked Schenkenburg for writing to Batavia so faithfully about this 
affair. He added that not only he but the entire people of Bone were 
thankful. Having said this, he offered his hand to Schenkenburg. The 
emotional atmosphere of the proceedings and the heartfelt pleas made 
by Arung Palakka convinced van Thije that the situation could not 
remain as it was. He wrote immediately to Batavia urging that "the 
quarrel" between the Company and Arung Palakka be settled as soon as 
possible to remove any future difficulties arising because of this affair 
(KA 1458d:78-84). 
Finallyon 1 July 1695 the Dompu problem was resolved. Van Thije 
accepted the judgement of the local allies based on the laws of the land 
that the ruler of Bima was guilty of the murder of his aunt, the queen of 
Dompu. He was therefore senteneed to exile in Batavia. Once the 
decision was made known, there was great rejoicing. Daeng Talele 
herself came to van Thije to teil him that "Bone had almost been 
strangled, but the governor had set it free". In the euphoric atmosphere 
of the celebration dinner which followed, Arung Palakka ate weil 
despite his illness and made a number of toasts to the Company, to the 
leaders of the Company, and to the kingdom of Bone (KA 1458e:89-
94). 
With the Dompu affair finally settled, van Thije now approached 
Arung Palakka for assistance in new troubles faced by the Company in 
Sumbawa. The whole island of Sumbawa had become embioiled in a war 
which had been instigated by the ruler of Tambora at the end of 1694. 
Most of the villages of Bima, Dompu, and Pekat had been destroyed in 
the ruler of Tambora's attempt to make himself master of the whole 
island. Even though the kingdoms of Bima, Dompu, and Sumbawa could 
field a joint force 10 to 1 in their favour against Tambora, they were too 
demoralized and intimidated to put up any effective re si stance without 
the Company's military support (KA 1458f: 17-24). And so a small 
Dutch contingent was sent to Sumbawa, but it made little difference in 
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the situation. In May 1695 it too eame under attaek by Tambora in its 
own fortifieation in Bima. The Company now looked onee again to 
Arung Palakka for assistanee against itsenemies (KA 1458d:55-9, 69). 
On 21st July van Thije went to Bontoala to diseuss this matter with 
Arung Palakka. He was greeted with all the formalities aeeorded a royal 
visitor. About thirty metres from the entranee of Arung Palakka's 
residenee, van Thije was met by Arung Tanete Maioio and Arung 
Tanete Matoa and eondueted up the stairs. He was welcomed at the top 
of the stairs by Daeng Talele, who then brought him to Arung Palakka. 
The latter was already sitting on a ehair whieh had been plaeed on a 
earpet. Van Thije was plaeed at the, honoured position to the right of 
Arung Palakka and to the left of Daeng Talele. In front of them on mats 
sat Arung Palakka's four most important advisers, Arung Tanete 
Maioio, Arung Tanete Matoa, Arung Meru, and Arung Tanete 
[Karaeng Agangnionjo]. 5 The lesser prinees and nobles sat about ten 
me tres further back. Sirih was served, and then news about the latest 
developments in the war in Sumbawa were discussed. Arung Palakka 
and his four advisers criticized the people on the island of Sumbawa, 
especially those of Bima, as "a mendaeious and fiekle people upon 
whom one could not depend". They urged that the whole matter be 
investigated since the rulerofTambora would not have undertaken such 
drast ie measures without good eause. Van Thije explained that the 
Dutch had tried to diseover the cause, but they eould only conc1ude that 
the whole thing was due to "the proud, uneasy, and arrogant nature of 
the ruler of Tambora" (KA 1458b: 109-115). But Arung Palakka was 
not satisfied with th is explanation and sent his own envoy to the ruler of 
Tambora to discuss the matter.hle told van Thije th at he would wait till 
the return of his envoy before making a definite deeision on sen ding 
South Sulawesi fighting men to Sumbawa (KA 1458g: 134-5), 
Despite Arung Palakka's initial caution, he eventually decided to 
assist the Company. He was upset to hear that there was a high attrition 
rate among the Dutch soldiers through illness in the Sumbawa campaign. 
He blamed the sad state of affairs to the eowardiee of the Company's 
allies on that island and promised to send about 250 men immediately to 
assist the Dutch forces. The only thing he asked of the Dutch was that 
they supply these men with bullets and gunpowder, whieh were in short 
supply amorg the Bugis. He assured the Dutch that as soon as his boats 
at Cenrana were ready, more people would be sent. As the interpreter 
turned to leave, Arung Palakka called him back and said to him in a weak 
voice and with tears in his eyes: "Say to my son, the governor, that there 
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are still more allies with people, weapons, and boats" (KA 1458h: 169). 
Because of Arung Palakka's illness, La Patau was made head of the 
Bone expedition. Arung Tosiada and Anreguru Tojumaat, two of Arung 
Palakka's most prominent warriors, were made field commanders of the 
2,000 Bone troops. Arung Palakka later reported to van Thije that the 
other allies, especially Goa, Soppeng, Luwu, and Mandar, were also 
preparing their ships and men to go to Sumbawa. As van Thije explained 
to Batavia, these large numbers of men were unnecessary for the war on 
Sumbawa, but these allies had wished to demonstrate their loyalty by 
following Arung Palakka's example. Arung Palakka, toa, had been 
placed in a delicate position. Though he realized that these troops from 
the allies would not be needed, he dared not refuse them for fear of 
conveying an impression of disfavour toward these rulers (KA 1458h: 
170-1). 
Final preparations were made for the oath-giving ceremony, or the 
aru, prior to the embarkation of the allied farces for Sumbawa. Slight1y 
to the east of the redoubt Mandar Syah, a covered pavilion was built 
some forty metres long and ten metres wide. Carpets and rattan mats 
were placed on the floor and various expensive canopies were hung from 
the ceiling. The ceremony took place on 14 September 1695.and was 
described in fascinating detail by van Thije: 
In accordance with the agreement made on the previous day, the 
principal Queen Putri [i.e. Princess] Daeng Talele, accompanied by 
the interpreter Karre Lessang, entered the Fort at 6:30 in the moming 
to get the governor, his wife, and their party. When they arrived at the 
covered pavilion, they saw before them the entire field of Bontoala 
covered with armed folk, which at a guess consisted of same 25,000 
men, arranged in such good order and rows, such as one could see 
in an army in Europe formed in battle order, under a multitude of 
banners, pennants, and standards attached to poles the length of pikes. 
It provided a pleasant sight. The army of Bone, consisting of about 
12,000 men representing the corps du battaille. stood facing west 
or toward the covered pavilion. The Makassar force, about 3,000 men 
strong, formed the left wing facing the north. But most of it was 
composed of people from Bone under Tosappewali. the eldest son of 
Arung Palakka [i.e. La Patau] and appointed to thc same officc. 6 The 
general allies of Mandar. Soppeng. Luwu. Barru. Wajo. Toraja. and 
others formed the right wing and faced the south. At the very least they 
were estimated at 10.000 men. 
The Golden Umbrella (Pajumpulaweng), representing the standard 
of Bone and decked with a stitched cover hung with gold chains, was 
brought to the army by the cavalry, which consisted of two standards 
each with 126 men all provided with yellow saddles and banju rantaÎ or 
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new chainmail armour and armed with decorated lances. They th en went 
and fetched the Arumpone [Arung Palakka] from Bontoala. His High-
ness sat on an ordinary palanquin accompanied by the ruler of Goa, the 
second queen [of Arung ·Palakka] KaJaeng Laikang, and a large con-
tingènt of queeris, princesses, and court maidens, all elegantly adorned 
with gold chains and armlets, and also splendid trousers with gold cIoth, 
bodidaars (?), moirras7, allegia8 and similar type cloths, with fine white 
and thin trailing transparent cloth over it. Upon His Highness's arrival at 
the pavilion, the respective armies were ordered to co me closer until 
they came to about twenty me tres from the pavilion enclosing it from the 
front and on both sides. Af ter this was done, the various kings and 
princes who stood before their troops were told in the name of the 
Arumpone by his interpreter, Karre Lessang, accompanied by the Com-
pany's interpreter Jan Ferdinandus, th at their paramount chief, the 
governor, had appeared in the pavilion to receive their oaths of loyalty to 
the Company. Therefore, they could approach in an orderly manner and 
do their kanjar in turn. This word kanjar means the act which they 
normally employ according to local usage to present their highest testi-
mony of loyalty. 9 The most important among them came forth modestly 
with shield and lance to the pavilion. Then they threw the shields down 
and stuck their lances into the ground. Having tied two weapons to the 
hip, namely a kris, or a short dagger, and a sword, they quickly un-
sheathed the latter, it being the larger, and sprang up into the air with 
passion and fury as if in a mad frenzy declaring with total earnestness in 
between shouts and springs into the air th at they would remain faithful to 
the Company and would live or die with it. Each one of them said 
whatever came into his mouth, according to his own language and 
intentions, the one longer than the other. It appears th at it would not be 
possible for them to express such thoughts if their ecstasy vanished and 
they we re sober. But everything comes out all right with its meaning. 
Having performed this, they then picked up their weapons and modestly 
returned to their positions. 
The order of swearing before the governor at the pavilion was the 
Arung Palakka [La Patau]'s two sons, aged seven and five ... , which 
young princes wearing arms, chainmail armour, golden helmets, and the 
double weapons (kris and sword) performed their task beautifully. The 
first who began the act was the Somba ri Goa [Sultan Abdul Jalil], who 
jumped down from the pavilion and, af ter having completed his duty, 
went back up again and sat down on the carpet beside the governor ... 
Then Karaeng Bontosunggu, alias Raja Tua [Tuma'bicara-butta], the 
second in the kingdom of Goa; then came Arung Palakka [La Patau], 
Karaeng Agangnionjo [Karaeng Tanete], Arung Meru, Arung Teko, 
Arung Tosiada, Anreguru Tojumaat [all Bone nobles]; and then the 
Makassar ones Karaeng Lekobodong, Karaeng Mangalle, Karaeng 
Jarannikka (the field commander); then the other kings and princes of 
Bone and then of Goa. There were some who did the kanjar twice, once 
for themselves, and once for the place which they controlled through 
inheritance or marriage. 10 
XI The Peace of Arung Palakka 293 
There then followed the princes of the allies such as Mandar, Soppeng, 
Luwu, Ajattappareng, Sawitto, Layo, etc., and those ofWajo and Toraja 
closed the procession. This ceremony lasted about three hours. AI-
though the Arumpone was very weak and in pain, he received the kanjar 
from those ofBone and Goa and the most important ofthe other allies in 
his open palanquin, now sitting and now Iying, but throughout it all 
weeping tears of joy. No longer able to bear it, he left the Som ba ri Goa 
and the Arung Tanete Matoa in his place and took leave from the 
govemor. He was borne back to Bontoala accompanied by his second 
queen, his bodyguards, and the cavalry. 
Extraordinarily splendid was the entire speetade, and those of Bone 
shone above all the others. The large majority wore golden helmets, as 
weIl as krisses, swords, lances and spears. Arung Palakka [La Patau)'s 
helmet had about six to eight pounds of gold set with diamonds and 
rubies. He ware around his neck outside his splendid chainmail armour 
bordered with beaten gold a large gold chain with the medallion which 
had been presented to his unde the Arumpone [Arung Palakka] by the 
Company in 1672, along with the medallion for His Highness's heroic 
deeds in Pariaman in 1666. Many wore si Ik stockings of various colours 
but without shoes. There were also many among the allies wearing 
helmets with two golden horns sticking out, and helmets which rep-
resented buffaloes with white horses' tails hanging behind. 
Those ofWajo and Taraja, being the poorest and humblest among the 
allies, were also nicely dressed. Most of them ware around their heads 
bunches of black feathers two handspans high and around their necks 
strands of wild boa r's teeth strung together. There were those among 
them who with their wild and beautiful capers made the spectators 
laugh. ll 
The most important kings swore their oath .of loyalty while the cymbals 
(tatabuang)12, the darinets13, and the gongs played, and the bystanders 
dapped their hands to the beat and the sound of the music. 14 The 
troops under the command of the person completing his oath of loyalty 
then fired their guns. Others of less prominenee gave their oaths two by 
two, and sometimes even three or four at a time. But this cost the life of 
one of the Bulukumba princes unluckily struck under his left breast by 
his nephew who was jumping around with his sword. He [the prince] was 
in such a frenetic state that he was not aware of it until he was returning 
to his people and feIl down bloodied and gave up the ghost. 
Many of the troops in the Bone regiment were neatly outfitted. There 
was one whole company mounted with golden helmets, swords, and 
krisses. Nine large companies, each with 150 men, had special uniforms. 
There were three in red, three in yellow, and three in red-yellow. His 
Highness's bodyguard was also in yellow with chainmail armour and 
golden helmets, part of them fumished with lances and shields and all 
with firelock and with double rounds of ammunition. 
The soldiers were then dismissed and went oft in order ... The South 
Sulawesi nobles and the Dutch were then feasted. At the end Arung 
Palakka sent his interpreter Karre Lessang to the gathering with the 
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message that "he had now achieved what he had long sought, the joyful 
renewal and confirmation of the marriage between the Honourable 
Company and the allies" (KA 1458h: 171-9). 
This impressive spectacle was a convincing demonstration of loyalty to 
the Company. But more important it was a glowing tribute to Arung 
Pa lak ka's efforts to unite the peoples of South Sulawesi under his ban-
ner. He viewed the proceedings with intense emotion because for him this 
was the finest manifestation of the fruits of thirty years labour. During 
this period he had succeeded in maintaining the confidence and alliance 
of the Company - if not always with the Company's representatives in 
Fort Rotterdam, then at least with the Company's leaders in Batavia. 
The belief that ·the Company would intervene if necessary to maintain 
Arung Palakka's position was widely-held throughout South Sulawesi, 
thereby contributing further to his image of invincibility. He could 
influence the choice of rulers in various kingdoms with impunity and 
appeared capable now of compelling the acceptanceof his own chosen 
heir. But Arung Palakka was only too aware that the nature of his 
support could not easily be transmitted to his successor. His upe' and the 
Toangke were two personal sources of power which could not be re-
created for the benefit of anyone else. Another was the legend which 
grew around his war exploits which enhanced his prestige and hence his 
influence among the people of South Sulawesi. A further cause for 
concern was La Patau's own capabilities. In private the Dutch had 
considered him to be "unsuitable to govern since he is foolish, cruel, 
lecherous, and niggardly ... " (KA 1469a:58). 
Faced with such difficulties, Arung Palakka realized that much had to 
be done before his death to assure the survival of not only La Patau but 
also of all of his dreams for the future course of South Sulawesi. The 
creation of a "family bond" among the kingdoms of Bone, Goa, Luwu, 
and Soppeng was a major step in the right direction. Another achieve-
ment was the development of La Patau's image as a warrior. In 1683 La 
Patau was made commander of the allied expedition to Toraja and was 
again awarded this honour for the campaign in Sumbawa in 1695. 
Though La Patau acquitted himself adequately, his exploits were not 
those to excite mythmakers. Nevertheless, he had proved to be compe-
tent and capable of leading his armies. Another significant victory was 
gaining the approval and support of the Company. With the outbreak of 
war in Sumbawa at the end of 1694, and the problems faced by the 
Company in re-establishing its authority there, aH minor differences 
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whieh had marred the good relations between Arung Pa1akka and the 
Company we re set aside. The Company needed Bugis troops, and Arung 
Palakka eomplied. As in the past these Bugis troops were to prove 
invaluable, reminding the Company of its need to preserve such a 
profitabIe arrangement with Arung Palakka's heir. The Company came 
quiekly to the realization that La Patau, like Arung Palakka before him, 
was an essential part of its own seeurity in the archipelago. Finally, the 
local lords and people had to be convinced of La Patau's ability to keep 
the peaee. Toward th is end Arung Palakka had created a precedent of 
power and authority exercised by a single local overlord with the bless-
ings and support of the Company. It was this precedent which estab-
lished a style of governanee familiar to Sou th Sulawesi, .hence enabling 
La Patau to rule as effeetively as his great predecessor. By 1695 Arung 
Palakka could rest as su red that most of the difficulties facing La Patau 's 
succession had been surmounted. 
Though beset with arecurring iIIness which had crippled his right side, 
Arung Palakka continued to amaze the Duteh doctors by recovering 
from several seemingly fatal attacks. It was as though he had wiIIed 
himself against death until he was satisfied that he had done everything 
in his power to assure the safe and successful transition of his successor. 
Van Thije described Arung Palakka in late August 1695 as "an old 
secretive man who oceupies himself with trifles of Iittle importance while 
lending his ears to sycophants; and from his deathbed he rules with such 
authority and is obeyed without opposition as ever a sovereign could 
wish to do, not only over his lawful subjects but also over the alleged 
allies" (KA 1458e:61). But af ter the satisfying display of his authority in 
the oath-giving eeremony of all the allies in September 1695, Arung 
Palakka must have deeided that his work was done. While all around him 
was feverish aetivity in preparation for the expedition to Sumbawa, 
Arung Palakka occupied himself with something totally different. On his 
orders an unusually large pavilion was erected in Goa expressly, so it was 
said, to have the "eastrated or scandalous young men of Goa"lS dance, 
sing, and pray for the restoration of his health. This and other types of 
ceremonies became daily oeeurrences in Bontoala. Sometimes Moslem 
religious offieals dressed in straw saeks would come and pray at Arung 
Palakka's bedside and hang written magie al formulas above his head. 
For this and other local curative practiees, Arung Palakka expended a 
great deal of money. Once he had to ask Daeng TaIele to go to Fort 
Rotterdam to pawn a gold chain weighing some 37lj2 taels in order for 
him to buy medicines (KA 1458i:62).16 
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Despite treatment by both the Company doctors and the native ones, 
there was no improvement in Arung Palakka. His diary in the last year 
and a half of his life is principally a reco~d of his deteriorating condition. 
For example the first three entries in January 1695 are: 
3 January 1695: My illness is very severe. 
8 January 1695: At six (o'clock) I was very ill. 
21 January 1695: lam beginning to feel astrong pain in my stomach 
(L-31:58v). 
The beginning of the end seemed to have arrived a year later where, 
under the date 12 January 1696 in his diary, were the words: "I have 
begun to swell up". Then under 6 April 1696 is the simple entry: 
"Torisompae ["He who is given obeisance", the title by which Arung 
Palakka was also known] Matinroe ri Bontoala ["He who had passed 
away (lit. "slept") in Bontoala", which is Arung Palakka's posthumous 
title] had departed [this world] at 12:00 [noon]" (L-31:59v). 
Contemporary notes made by Govemor van Thije in Fort Rotterdam 
provide a fuller account of Arung Palakka's death. In the early moming 
of Friday, 6 April 1696, rumours spread throughout the area that Arung 
Palakka, who was critically ill in bed, had died. The Company's inter-
preter recently retumed from Bontoala brought this news to van Thije 
which he himself had already heard from the Gellareng Sancerrê', 
Arung Palakka's regent in Bontoala. However at 9:00 a.m. Arung 
Palakka's own interpreter Karre Lessang arrived in Fort Rotterdam 
saying that Arung Palakka was alive but in a very bad way. At 10:30 a.m. 
he again retumed requesting in the names of the rulers of Goa and Luwu 
th at the govemor send his chief surgeon to feel Arung Palakka's pulse. 
Two Dutch doctors and an interpreter went immedjately to Arung 
Palakka's bedside and retumed shortly af ter 11:00 a.m. with the report 
that tire end was very near. Finally about midday Karre Lessang came 
once again to Fort Rotterdam and said in Malay with great emotion and 
with tears in his eyes: "Tuan punya bapak sudah hilang (Your father has 
departed)." Arung Palakka, he said, had died at 11 :30 that moming. At 
4:00 p.m. th at same aftemoon some envoys again came to van Thije to 
say th at the nob les of the land intended to bury Arung Palakka's body at 
7 :00 the next moming in Goa by the graves of the old kings. This burial 
place had been designated by Karaeng Goa Sultan Abdul Jalil even 
though Al1lng Palakka was not of the Makassar royal family (KA 
1469b:68-72). Since custom dictated that a deceased ruler could not be 
removed from his residence until his successor was chosen, La Patau was 
immediately elected by the Aruppitu. The next moming a Bone delega-
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tion went to inform the Dutch of the new Arumpone while preparations 
went ahead for Arung Palakka's burial. 
Final arrangements were being made even before the official Bone 
delegation had gone to the Fort. At 6:30 in the morning van Thije sent 
three official representatives of the Company with some sixty-two men 
on horse back to Bontoala to participate in the funeral procession. The 
body was brought from the royal residence to the bier, with the greater 
part of the way covered with white linen. The body itself was wrapped 
from he ad to foot with linen and placed on top of the bier. It was then 
covered with all manner of beautiful cloths. At the top of the bier was La 
Patau surrounded by court maidens with fans and Moslem officials all 
weeping and shouting. In the background tolled the bells which began at 
7: 00 in the moming and continued for two hours. As the procession went 
by one of Fort Rotterdam's redoubts, seven shots we re fired, and later 
when it passed the Fort itself, another seventeen cannon shots went off in 
salute. The bier was borne by a large number of people who took turns 
carrying the load because of the difficulty in walking on the muddy 
roads. Behind the bier came the Dutch cavalry at the head of which were 
the Company officials, the Kapitan China, and various others, including 
some Company personnel who volunteered for the procession out of 
curiosity. At about 11 :00 a.m. the procession entered the buria) grounds 
in Goa. The body was then laid in a coffin and placed in a hole cut in the 
side of the grave. The hole was blocked up by a wooden plank and the 
grave filled with dirt. Ten white umbrellas were placed around the grave. 
With the firing of three salvoes by the Dutch brigade, the ceremony 
ended (KA 1469c:73-4). 
The death of Arung Palakka did not mean the demise of his policies. He 
had instituted wide-ranging changes in South Sulawesi society which 
we re to have repercussions within the society for generations to come. It 
was during his long lifetime th at a mutually beneficial arrangement was 
developed between Bone and the Company. Arung Palakka assumed 
responsibilities over intemal affairs while the Company concerned itself 
with trade and the external relations of the island. By this arrangement 
the Company profitted by having Arung Palakka willingly contribute his 
troops to assist in wars in Java and Sumbawa where the South Sulawesi 
connection could be established. In return the Company discreetly 
avoided direct interference with Arung Palakka's govemance of South 
Sulawesi. This policy assured Arung Palakka and his successors of 
unquestioned dominanee within South Sulawesi long af ter his death. 
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From his posItIOn of strength, Arung Palakka was ab Ie to arrange 
judicious marriages for his heir La Patau and thereby fulfil a long-held 
ambition of having the whole of South Sulawesi ruled by members of his 
own family. To this day local rulers aspire to link their names to La Patau 
as the first genuine, full-blooded royalty in South Sulawesi from whom 
all later royal lines are descended. Although the kingdoms remained 
proudly separate, the rulers were now related so intimately that the ruler 
of one of ten could justifiably become the ruler of another kingdom. The 
close blood relationships among the royal families helped ameliorate the 
enmities among their peoples and prevented ever again the intense 
hatred which characterized the relationships between the Bugis of Bone 
and Soppeng and the Makassar people of Goa and Tallo, especially 
during the Makassar War of 1666-9. Arung Palakka had achieved what 
no other ruler before him had done: a unity of South Sulawesi ruled in 
effect by one royal family. If Arung Palakka had done nothing else 
during his lifetime, this accomplishment would have ensured his place as 
one of the greatest rul ers in the history of South Sulawesi. No greater 
praise could have been given to him than that of a lontara' scribe who 
wrote: 
Arung Palakka obeyed the laws strictly, supported the adat, established 
astrong and trustworthy government, was true to his pro mise and fair in 
his behaviour. Thus the crops and the animals flourished ... Under 
Arung Palakka there was no confusion, the people were safe and secure 
(L-l:78-9). 
CHAPTERXII 
THELEGACY 
On 18th April at midday a delegation consisting of six of the most 
prominent Aruppitu of Bone and the Bontoala regent Gellareng San-
cerre' came to Fort Rotterdam. It informed Governor van Thije that the 
Aruppitu had elected La Patau as Arumpone in conformity with the 
wishes of their late ruler, Arung Palakka. Van Thije acknowledged the 
announcement and told the delegation he would inform Batavia so that 
approval could be granted. This reply was received coldly, and the 
spokesman for the delegation said tersely: "We had not.come to consult 
about the matter of the election, but merely to inform you of it." Van 
Thije recognized the futility and even danger of attempting to thwart the 
choice of the Bone Aruppitu, and so he and the Dutch Council in Fort 
Rotterdam gave their approval to the election. Since they had counter-
manded a direct order from Batavia dated 29 February 1696 to seek its 
approval for the election of a new Arumpone, they told Batavia of their 
decision with the following explanation: 
... the Company, as a result of its treaties, especially that of Bungaya, is 
no more than one ally, although it is considered the head, and is not 
empowered nor qualified to vote for a king, even Ie ss to disapprove of an 
election - and especially this one (KA 1469~l:58-62). 
There was nothing that Batavia could do but accept the decision, but it 
feared nevertheless that no one, even Arung Palakka 's own hand-picked 
successor, would be able to maintain the same peace and security in 
South Sulawesi that had been achieved by Arung Palakka during his 
lifetime. 
When van Thije explained th at Batavia's orders had been issued solely 
with the interests ofBone and its alliance with the Company at heart, the 
delegation appeared pacified. It then responded graciously with the 
words: "We will always acknowledge the friendship ofthe Company, for 
we have been released from bondage and made free by the Honourable 
Company." With the inital misunderstanding now forgotten, van Thije 
informed the delegation of Arung Palakka's "Last Will and Testament" 
which had been found among some of the secretary's papers. It had been 
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written in both Bugis and Malay and then translated into Dutch. The 
date of the document was uncertain, but it was thought to have been 
made more than twenty years before because it was written in the hand 
of a former secretary, Willem Bastinck, who left Makassar in 1676. On 
18 May 1686, during the presidency of Willem Hartsink, Arung Palak-
ka's "Last Will and Testament" was brought out and again authentica-
ted. Another copy was made the following day and authorized with the 
seal of the Arumpone [Arung Palakka] in the Malay and Bugis scripts. 
The only alteration in the will since the re-authentication in 1686 was the 
cession to Arung Palakka's niece, the present wife of Datu Luwu's eldest 
son, the area of Pattiro in Bone, which, together with the village Babuae, 
had been originally willed to one of Arung Palakka's sisters. Since there 
were no other changes which anyone was aware of, the entire document 
was read aloud to the Bone delegation: 
If the merciful hand of God Almighty should kindly pass his rightful 
judgement upon me, which is irreversible, and deprive me of this life, no 
one has the right, nor the power, to administer my wife [Daeng Talele], 
house and estate except the Honourable Company, which is closer to 
her, except for Goa and myself. And to the Company she is like one free 
bom. Furtherrnore, she has placed all her trust in me. Therefore, I would 
wish that no one will interfere with her after my death except the 
Company. 
With regard to my golden umbrella, two large gold chains and medal-
lions, and the gold kris La Suni studded with diamonds, it is my wish that 
they be given to the President residing in Fort Rotterdam in Makassar to 
be dispensed with according to his wishes, whether to be sent to Batavia 
to remain as my memorial to the Company or to be presented to the 
person who succeeds to my position (KA 1469d:67).1 
Now there still remains Bantaeng and Lamuru, as weIl as my other 
smaller items - household effects and clothes, gold, silver, jewels, etc. 
All of these have come to me solely from the Company. But I propose 
that af ter my death these be considered as having been "consumed", for 
if these above-mentioned gifts, in a manner of ~peaking, had been food, 
they would certainly have been consumed; and were they clothes, they 
would have also certainly been wom out. Therefore, I say th at all of it 
belongs to Daeng Talele and is her very own. It may please her to share 
these things with Daeng Marannu [Karaeng Laikang, daughter of 
Karaeng Bontomarannu, Arung Palakka's second wife], but she is not 
obliged to do so. 
With regard to Pattiro and Babuae, being two communities which 
have come to me through inheritance, af ter my death they will have to 
choose a lord from among my four sisters. Whoever they choose shall 
have the inheritance of the two areas as her own. No one is entitled to 
these possessions except one of my four sisters who belong to the family 
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of my grandfather who died at Bantaeng [Arumpone La Tenrirua, 
Matinroe ri Bantaeng] whose inheritance has come down to me. 
The settlement of Amali, which has come to me through the death of 
Arung Amali La Sekati, will again return to whomever among the family 
of Arung Amali La Sekati most entitled to it. They [the people of Amali) 
will then accept him as their king. 
There now remain some settlements in Bone which were conquered 
by force when I was in command on behalf of the Company. They are 
Pattampidange, Ata Lamuru, Bulo-Bulo, along with their appendages 
and dependencies. These, therefore, are to be placed at the Company's 
disposition. As I have said, I had jurisdiction over these places only on 
behalf of the Company. Therefore, if God Almighty should be so kind as 
to visit me with death, no one ex cept the Company will be able to 
exercise this overIordship. 
The Last Will and Testament was dated 18 May 1686 and signed by 
Nicholaas Blom, Secretary. Impressed on it was a black seal with the 
words in Arabic characters saying, "This seal is the signature of Arum-
pone or Sultan Sa'aduddin [Arung Palakka's Arabic title)" (KA 146ge: 
75-81).2 The document precisely encapsulated Arung Palakka's credo 
during the thirty years which he influenced affairs in South Sulawesi. 
Contrary to the Company's expeétations, the transition of power from 
Arung Palakka to La Patau was a peaceful one. In a tone of incredulity 
mixed with relief, the Council at Fort Rotterdam sent this secret report 
to Batavia on 17 July 1696: 
... The Bone court ... since the death of the old king [Arung Palakka) 
and succession of the new [La Patau] has conducted itself in an extra-
ordinarily peaceful fashion. To this day not the least opposition has been 
heard from either the eJectors [the Aruppitu], the lesser nobles, or the 
allies. Furthermore, the young king lately known as La Pat au, more 
recently called Arung Palakka, and now with the title of Arumpone, is 
sufficiently well-established on the throne because he has followed the 
advice of the Governor [van Thije] and shown himself to be polite and 
amicable. He has especially availed himself of the advice of his uncIe 
[Arung Palakka]'s old and experienced counciIIors and nob les of the 
land (KA 1469f:83-4). 
Arung Palakka had do ne his work weil and enabled La Patau to inherit 
his power and authority with no se rio us opposition within South 
Sulawesi. 
In other significant ways Arung Palakka had left his legacy to South 
Sulawesi. Through his long overIordship he was able to overcome the 
centrifugal forces inherent in the traditional political units. In the past 
the strength of the individual Tomanurung and gaukeng traditions had 
preserved the uniqueness and the political independence of a large 
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number of small states in South Sulawesi. While they continued to retain 
their separate entities, as evidenced by the elaborate treaty ceremonies 
reaffirming their basic rights to choice of ruler, customs, and processes of 
law, they were no longer immune to Arung Palakka's encroachments on 
these privileges. He had developed a special relationship of trust and 
support with the powerful Dutch East India Company which in time 
became translated into an implicit division of power in South Sulawesi. 
Arung Palakka was th us able to use his influence effectively among the 
local states because they believed that the Company would ultimately 
support Arung Palakka if he were challenged by any individual or state. 
The Company's feeble protests at the ignominious assassination of 
Arung Bakke Todani, one of its strongest supporters in South Sulawesi, 
highlighted its commitment to Arung Palakka. This message was never 
lost to the people of South Sulawesi. Therefore, while Arung Palakka 
was circumspect in outwardly respecting the basic privileges of a state, he 
had but to indicate his pleasure to assure the elect ion of a friendly or 
trustworthy ruler or the adoption or rejection of a particular course of 
action. By the end of the 17th century the whole of Sou th Sulawesi came 
to act as one body, as was so impressively demonstrated by the oath-
giving ceremony of the local armies in Makassar in 1695. Arung Palakka 
had arrested the particularistic tendencies of local states and forced them 
to share his dream of a united South Sulawesi. But in the process of 
achieving this goal, Arung Palakka had been the direct and indirect 
cause of the flight of many thousands from the island seeking refuge 
from his power. These refugee groups came to exei-t great and con-
tinuing influence on many kingdoms throughout the Malay-Indonesian 
archipelago and Siam. Arung Palakka was now forced to extend the 
politica I vision of the South Sulawesi overlord to embrace whatever 
lands his people had gOflè to begin new lives. ' 
In a period of thirty years Arung Palakka had welded a unity among 
the South Sulawesi states, established in effect a single royal family 
linked by blood to his successor La Pat au, and created the conditions 
whereby many South Sulawesi princes and their followers were forced to 
seek homes abroad with lasting consequences for the history of the area. 
This was the heritage which Arung Palakka bequeathed not only to 
South Sulawesi but to the whole of the Malay-Indonesian archipelago. 
APPENDIX A 
RUL ERS OF TUE MAJOR KINGDOMS IN SOUTU SULA WE SI 
IN TUE 1 ifU CENTURY 
GOA (Karaeng Goa) 
14. Sultan Alauddin Tumenanga ri Gaukanna (1593-1639) 
15. Sultan Malikussaid Tumenanga ri Papambatuna (1639-1653) 
16. Sultan Hasanuddin Tumenanga ri Balla'pangkana (1653-1669) 
17. Sultan Amir Hamzah Tumammalianga ri Allu' (1669-1674) 
18. Sultan Mohammad Ali (Karaeng Bisei) Tumenanga ri Jakattara 
(1674-1677) 
19. Sultan Abdul Jalil (Karaeng Sanrabone) Tumenanga ri Lakiung 
(1677-1709) 
(Principal sources Abdurrazak 1969b; Koloniaal Archief (KA)) 
BONE (Arumpone) 
10. We Tenrituppu Matinroe ri Sidenreng (1590-c. 1606) 
11. La Tenrirua Matinroe ri Bantaeng (1607 -1608) 
12. La Tenripale Matinroe ri Tello (1608-1626) 
13. La Ma'daremmeng Matinroe ri Bukaka (1626-1643) 
14. Tobala', Arung Tanete Riawang, made regent by Goa (1643-
1660) 
15. La Ma'daremmeng Matinroe ri Bukaka (1667-1672) 
16. La Tenritatta (Arung Palakka) Matinroe ri Bontoala' (1672-
1696) 
17. La Pat au Matinroe ri Nagauleng (1696-1714) 
(Principal sources Bakkers 1866; Matthes 1864; Koloniaal Archief 
(KA» 
WAJO (Arung Matoa Wajo) 
14. La Mangkace' (c. 1567-c. 1607) 
15. La Sangkuru (c. 1607-c. 1610) 
16. La Ma.ppepulu (c. 1612-c. 1616) 
17. La Samalewa (c. 1616-c. 1621) 
18. La Pakallongi (c. 1621-1626) 
19. Topassaunnge (c. 1627-1628) 
20. La Pakallongi (1628-1636) 
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21. To Udamang Matinroe ri Batana (1636-1639) 
22. La Isigajang Matinroe ri Patilla (1639-1643) 
23. La Makkaraka Matinroe ri Panngaranna (1643-1648) 
24. La Temmasonge' (1648-1651) 
25. La Paremma' Matinroe ri Passirinna (1651-1658) 
26. La Tenrilai (1658-1670) 
27. La Palili (1670-1679) 
28. La Pariusi Matinroe ri Bulu'na (1679-1699) 
29. La Tenrisessu' (1699-1702) 
(Principal source Abdurrazak 1965) 
SOPPENG (Datu Soppeng) 
14. Beowe (reigning at the time of the defeat of Soppeng by Goa in 
1609 in the Islamic Wars) (c. 1609-c. 1659) 
15. La Tenribali Matinroe ri Datunna (c. 1659-1676) 
16. Towesa Matinroe ri Salassana (c. 1676-1691) 
17. We Adda Matinroe ri MadeIlo (1691-1705) 
18. Towesa Matinroe ri Salassana (1705-1707) 
(Principal sources Matthes 1864; Koloniaal Archief (KA); genealogy 
owned by Datu Ghalib in Ujung Pandang) 
LUWU (Datu Luwu/Pajungri Luwu) 
14. Sultan Muhammad Waliyu Musahiruddin Matinroe ri Ware' (Late 
16th century-early 17th century) 
15. Sultan Abdullah Muhidin Matinroe ri Malangke (early 17th 
century-1637) 
16. Sultan Ahmad Nazaruddin Matinroe ri Goa (1637-1662) 
17. Sultan Mohammad Muhidin, Daeng Massuro, Matinroe ri Tompo-
tikka' (1662-end 1675?) 
18. Daeng Mattuju (end 1675?-Sept. 1676) 
19. Sultan Mohammad Muhidin, Daeng Massuro, Matinroe ri Tompo-
tikka' (1676-1704) 
(Principal sources Matthes 1864; Braam-Morris 1889; Koloniaal 
Archief (KA» 
APPENDIXB 
mE BUNGA YA TREATY OF 18 NOVEMBER 1667 * 
1. The treaty signed between Karaeng Popo, plenipotentiary of the 
governrnent in Makassar [Goa] and the Governor-General and 
Council of the Indies in Batavia on 19 August 1660 and that 
between the Makassar government and Jacob Cau as Commis-
sioner of.the Company on 2 December 1660 shall be observed. 
2. All European officials and subjects of the Company who have fled 
recently or in the past and still live in and around Makassar shall be 
delivered to the Admiral [Speelman] without delay. 
3. All remaining ship equipment, cannons, specie, and other goods 
which had been taken from the Walvisch at Selayar and the Leeu-
win on Don Duango shall be returned to the Company. 
4. All those persons found guilty of the murder of various Dutchmen 
in different places shall receive prompt and appropriate justice 
before the Dutch Resident. 
5. The king and nobles of Makassar shall pay the indemnity and all 
debts still owing to the Company by the next season at the latest. 
6. All Portuguese and English shall be expelled from Makassar 
territory and never again be admitted to live here or carry on trade. 
No European nation will be allowed to enter or conduct trade in 
Makassar. 
7. The Company alone shall have free trade and commerce in Makas-
sar. No "Indian" nations, whether "Moors" [Indian Muslims], 
Javanese, Malays, Acehnese, or Siamese shall be allowed to bring 
to market any Coromandel, Surat, Persian, or Bengal cloths and 
wares or any Chinese goods since only the Company will be allowed 
to do this. All offenders shall be punished and have their goods 
confiscated by the Company. 
8. The Company shall be exempt from all import and export tolls and 
duties. 
9. The government and subjects of Makassar may not sail anywhere 
but to Bali, the Java coast, Jakarta, Banten, Jambi, Palembang, 
Johor, and Borneo and must obtain passes from the Dutch Com-
mand er here. Those without passes shall be considered as enemies 
and shall be treated as such. No ships shall be sent to Bima, Solor, 
Timor, etc., anywhere east of the Hook of Lasso, north or east of 
* This is an abridged translation of the treaty as cited in Stapel 1922: 237-247. 
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Borneo, Mindanao or the islands in the vicinity, on pain of for-
feiting both life and goods. 
10. All fortifications along the coastline of Makassar shall be destroyed: 
Barombong, Pa'nakkukang, Garassi, Mariso, Boro'boso. Only 
Sombaopu may be allowed to remain standing for the king. 
11. The Ujung Pandang fort shall be delivered to the Company in good 
order, along with the village and land belonging to it. 
12. Dutch coinage such as those used in Batavia shall be valid in 
Makassar. 
13. The king and nobles shall send the value of 1,000 men and women 
slaves, reckoned at 2% taels or 40 Makassar gold mas each, to 
Batavia. Half shall be sent in June and the rest in the following 
season at the latest. 
14. The king and nobles of Makassar shall henceforth not interfere in 
the land of Bima and its territories. 
15. The Raja Bima and Karaeng Bontomarannu shall be delivered to 
the Company for punishment. 
16. All those taken from the Sultan of Butung in the last Makassar 
attack shall be returned. Compensation shall be paid for those who 
have since died or are unable to be returned. 
17. To the king ofTernateshall also be restored all those people taken 
from the Sula Islands and some cannons and guns. Goa shall 
abandon all pretensions to overlordship over the islands of Selayar 
and Pansiano [Muna], the whole east coast of Celebes from 
Menado to Pansiano, the Banggai and Gapi Islands and others on 
the same coast, and the lands between Mandar and Menado, which 
in the past have belonged to the crown of Temate. 
18. Goa shall renounce all overlordship over the lands of the Bugis and 
Luwu. The old king of Soppeng [La Tenribali] and all his lands and 
people shall be set free, as weil as other Bugis lords held prisoner in 
Makassar territory and women and children still held by the ruler of 
Goa. 
19. The kings of Layo, Bangkala, and the whole of Turatea and Bajing 
and their lands shall be acknowledged as free. 
20. All lands conquered by the Company and its allies, from Bulo-Bulo 
to Turatea, and from Turatea to Bungaya, shall remain Company 
lands by right of conquest. 
21. The lands ofWajo, Bulo-Bulo, and Mandar shall be abandoned by 
the Goa govemment which shall never again assist them with 
people, weapons, etc. 
22. All Bugis and Turatea men who have married Makassar wamen, 
and all Makassar men who have married Bugis or Turatea women, 
may keep their wives. Henceforth, any Makassar person hoping to 
live with the Bugis or Turatea people, or any Bugis or Turatea 
person hoping to live with the Makassar people, may only do sa 
with the permission of the lawfullord and king concerned. 
23. The Goa govemment shall keep its land closed to all other nations 
fexcept the Dutch]. It shall also come to the Company's assistance 
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against its enemies in and around Makassar. 
24. There shall be friendship and an alliance of the kings and nob les of 
Makassar and the kings of Ternate, Tidore, Bacan, Butung, Bugis 
[Bone], Soppeng, Luwu, Turatea, Layo, Bajing, Bima, and other 
lords and rulers who in the future may request to enter this alliance. 
25. In any dispute between the allies, the Captain ofthe Dutchmen [i.e. 
the president or governor of Fort Rotterdam] shall be asked to 
mediate. If one party should disregard the mediation, then shall the 
general allies take appropriate action. 
26. When this peace treaty is signed, sworn, and sealed, then shall the 
king and nobles of Makassar send two important lords with the 
Admiral [Speelman] to Batavia to present the treaty to the 
Governor-General and Council of the Indies. If the treaty should 
be approved, the Governor-General may hold two important 
princes as hostages as long as he sees fit. 
27. Further to Article 6, the English and all their goods in Makassar 
shall be brought to Batavia. 
28. Further to Article 15, ifthe Raja Bima and Karaeng Bontomarranu 
should not be found alive or dead within ten days, then the sons of 
these two lords shall be held as security. 
29. The Goa government shall pay an indemnity of 250,000 rijks-
daalders in five successive seasons, whether in cannons, goods, 
gold, silver, or jewels. 
30. The king of Makassar and his nobles, the Admiral on behalf of the 
Company, and all the kings and princes included in his alliance 
swore, signed, and sealed the treaty in the name of the Holy Lord 
on Friday, 18 November 1667. 
GLOSSARY 
adat: customs, traditions, common practices. 
alcatir a carpet with a long pile. 
allegia/allegae/alachae: striped piece goods made of cotton and silk in 
Gujerat and of cotton in Coromandel. 
anakarung/anakkaraeng: "princes", bom of a ruler and his royal or 
non-royal wives. 
aru: oath-giving ceremony in which the person jumps up 
with kris or sword in hand and swears his loyalty to 
his lord. 
Arumpone: 
arung: 
Aruppitu: 
atap: 
bahar: 
ballo': 
banawa: 
bate-bate: 
Bate Salapang: 
bicara: 
bi/u': 
bissu: 
catty: 
core-core: 
Daeng Kaluia: 
Datu: 
Ruler/Lord of Bone. 
Bugis for lord, ruler. 
''The Se ven Lords", the name of the Advisory Coun-
cil in Bone and successor to the Matoa Pitu. . 
palm-frond used for roof-thatching. 
from the Sanskrit bhara, "a lead". A weight used 
in large trading transactions varying according to the 
goods being weighed and the area where it is being 
used. In the Indonesian area it is of ten estimated to be 
about three picul or about 170 kilogrammes. 
fermented drink made from the aren palm, the lontar 
palm, or the nipa palm. 
a kind of ship used to transport cattle and horses. 
a Makassar prince, ruler of a small area or principality. 
"The Nine Banners", the name of the Advisory 
Council in Goa. 
processes of law. 
a type of warship. 
pre-Islamic holy men and women revered in Bugis-
Makassar communities as being intermediaries be-
tween the spirit world and the world of man. 
measure of weight about 600 grammes. 
female bissu. 
one of the early titles of a community he ad in Bone. 
ruler; title used by the rulers of Soppeng and Luwu. 
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Dewata: general name for the pre-Islamic deity. 
gantang: 31/2 kilogrammes. 
gaukeng/gaukang: sacred objects around which the original Bugis-
Makassar communities formed. They are considered 
to be the palladium ofthe community. 
gellareng/gallarang: he ad of a village or an area. 
Hadat: Advisory Council. 
I La Galigo: earliest known Bugis epic originating from Luwu. 
jennang: regent. 
kafir: "unbeliever [in the faith of Islam]". 
kali: chief Islamic official in a kingdom or state. 
kanjar/kannjara': dancing with drawn swords or krisses and swearing 
karaeng: 
kawerrang: 
konting: 
kris: 
last: 
Latoa: 
lesung: 
the oath in the aru ceremony. 
Makassar for lord, mIer. 
literally, a bundIe of rice staIks tied together. Term 
used to designate the original union of seven states 
which came to form the core of the kingdom of Bone. 
a native fishing boat. 
a native dagger. 
a Dutch last was about two tons or about 2,000 kilo-
grammes. 
a Bugis "Mirror of Kings" representing the wisdom of 
the ages and serving as a guide to good govemment. 
a hollowed-out log where the rice ears are pounded to 
remove the husk. 
Mado: one of the early titles of a community head in Bone. 
Makkedangetana: "Spokesman of the Land", the most important 
Maradia: 
mas: 
Matoa Pitu: 
Pacealla: 
official position in the kingdom of Bone next to the 
mIer, of ten likened to a prime minister. 
mIer; title used by the mIer of Balannipa in Mandar . 
a sm all gold coin; also a weight equal to 1/16 of a tael. 
"The Seven Elders~', the name of the first Advisory 
Council in Bone, predecessor of the Aruppitu. 
an early official of the original nine communities in 
Goa chosen to regulate affairs of the group prior to 
the establishment of the institution of the Karaeng 
(Lord/Ruler of) Goa. 
Pajumpulaweng: "The Golden Umbrella", state symbol of Bone. 
palili': vassal state. 
perahu: boat. 
pesse/pacce: commiseration; a Bugis-Makassar concept of em-
pathy with the members of one's community. 
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Pitu Babana Binanga: "Seven Estuary [States]", the confederation of 
downriver Mandar states. 
Pitu Ulunna Salo': "Seven Upriver [States]", the confederation of 
upriver Mandar states. 
Punggawa: title of the Commander-in-Chief of Bone's armies in 
wartime. 
raga: a rattan balI; a game in which skill is measured by how 
long and how weIl a player can keep the rattan balI in 
the air. In early times there was an entire ritual 
attending the learning and the playing of this sport of 
princes. Skill was then a measure of spiritual strength. 
Rapang: a Makassar "Mirror of Kings" representing the wis-
dom of the ages and serving as a guide to good govern-
ment. 
rial or rial-of-eight: a Spanish silver coin imported into Asia by the 
Dutch and English. lts value varied but it was worth 
about 2% Dutch guilders. 
rijksdaalder: silver-coin of The Netherlands and some other 
northern European countries varying in value but 
worth about 2% Dutch guilders. 
sarat: Islamic religious council. 
sarung: "robe"; loose cloth worn around the waist like a skirt 
of varying length depending upon how large a knot is 
made at the waist. 
sebbu/sabbu kati: literally, "a thousand catties [of gold]", but any 
specific sum of money or its value in goods demanded 
by one party from another as a condition for peace. 
sü:i': a concept in Bugis-Makassar society embracing the 
idea of both self-worth and shame. 
sirih: 
Sudang: 
Sulledatu: 
suku: 
Syahbandar: 
Syurga: 
tael: 
betel Ie af prepared for chewing with areca-nut, 
gambier, and lime. 
Goa's state sword and one of the most important 
objects of Goa's regalia. 
"Replacement for the Datu", hence the title used by 
the person who replaces or who would replace the 
ruler of Soppeng should he be deposed. 
tribe, ethnic group. 
official in charge of international trade and affairs 
occurring in the ports of a kingdom. 
Heaven. 
trade name of a Chinese ounce worth about llt6 of a 
catty (see under catty). 
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Tautongeng: men of good birth but not high nobility. 
Tomanurung/Tumanurung: "He/She who descended [from the 
Upperworld]". Upperworldly figures who deseend to 
earth and become the first rulers of the early Bugis-
Makassar kingdoms. 
Tomari/a/eng Ma/% (in Bone)/Tumailalang Lolo (in Goa): an official 
whose principal function was to serve as an inter-
mediary between the ruler and his chief minister on 
one hand and the Advisory Council on the other in 
attempting to resolve difficulties in implementing 
policy. 
Tomarilaleng Matoa (in Bone)/Tumailalang Toa (in Goa): head of 
the Advisory Council and the principal intermediary 
between the people via the Council and the ruler and 
his chief minister. 
Tuma'bicara-butta: "Spokesman of the Land", the most important 
official position in the kingdom of Goa, often likened 
to a prime minister. 
Tumakkajananngang Ana'bura'ne: title of a Goa official in charge of 
overseeing the work of a number of local groups 
assigned specific tasks. 
ummat: the community of Islam. 
upe': "good fortune"; special quality attached to indivi-
duais destined for greatness. 
windu: cycle of eight years. 
NOTES 
CHAPTERI 
1 The Sa 'dan Toraja be long to the South Toraja group, of ten referred to as Tae' Toraja. 
Ethnographically, the tenn Toraja is used generally to refer to the non-Islamic groups 
living in Central and South Sulawesi and divided into the East Toraja, West Toraja, and 
South Toraja groups. Despite being c\assified as one ethnic group, there is a great 
diversity among these three groups in language, religion, social stratification, house-
building, agriculture, weaving techniques, etc. (Nooy-Palm 1975: 53). 
2 From an examination of all fragments of the I La Galigo in Europe and Indonesia, 
R. A. Kern estimates that th is work would contain between 6,000 and 8,000 pages, 
making it one of the largest epic poems in world literature (Kern 1954: v). 
3 Since there is astrong likelihood th at the I La Galigo was an open-ended epic tale, one 
perhaps should not use a word such as "end" to indicate what is possibly only the last 
extant tale known to us. So little research has been done on collecting the ta les of th is 
epic th at one should perhaps wait for more conc\usive evidence before suggesting any 
~efinite conc\uding section of the I La Ga/igo. The late Haji Andi Pangerang Opu 
Tosinilele of Belopa, Luwu, said that his family possessed a "large number" of volumes 
of the I La Ga/igo prior to Kahar Muzakkar's rebellion (1950-1963). As aresuIt ofthe 
destmction of those years only about forty volumes remained (personal communica-
tion, April, 1975). 
4 Borahima obtained this story from Watampone, the capitalof Bone. When I was there 
collecting information on tales of the origin of society in South Sulawesi, there was only 
one person who told me this story. He was a devout Moslem who even tried to deny the 
existence of bissu, pre-Islamic religious men who still fulfil a function in present-day 
South Sulawesi. There is a possibility that the story of the flood may have been 
borrowed from Islamic traditions, which would not have been unknown to this person. 
5 Among the Maloh in the upper reaches of the Kapuas River in West Kalimantan, 
certain stones are regarded with great veneration and as receptac\es of a spirit or 
power. In one of the villages, the powers of the stone are said to be capable, through 
ritual action, of providing "a successful rice harvest, a period of rain-free. flood-free 
weather during the ripening and harvesting months, and more general benefits of 
health, good fortune, fertility, prosperity and formerly. success in war" (King 1975: 
112-3). 
6 The Bugis reads: Sianre-anre bale taue, which means literally "the people are like fish 
eating one another". This is a metaphor mentioned in ancient Indian literature as the 
concept of matsyanyaya, or the "Iogic of the fish". According to ancient Indian ideas of 
the Cyc\e of Ages, man wlll degenerate at the end ofa cycle and lose his sense ofnatural 
duty. Since there will be no mIers, and a society without a king cannot be viabIe, the 
"Iogic of the fish", or the Western equivalent of the "Iaw of the jungle". will then 
prevail (Lingat 1973:2(7). 
7 There are variations in the story of how much authority was conceded to the 
Tomanurung in the beginning, all of which reflects the relative strength of the councils 
vis à vis their Tomanurung miers. One of the most interesting of the Tomanurung 
stories is from Bone where the Tomallllrllng is said to have appeared in an open field 
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standing on a flat stone. It is tempting to see in this story an attempt to show that the 
gods of both the Upper- and Underworld (stone; Oeity of the Soi!) are responsible for 
presenting the Tomanurung to the people. There are also traditions of the Totompo', 
"He/She who arose [from the Underworld]", which are not as common as those ofthe 
Tomanurung but nevertheless exist, suggesting a stronger role of the Underworld in 
the people's beliefs than usually admitted (Noorduyn 1955: 47-8; Pelras 1971, I: 177). 
8 The states which all agree on are Aralle, Mambi, Rantebulahan, Matanga, and Tabang. 
There is no agreement as to which of the last three states formed part of the seven: 
Tu'bi, Bambang, and Tabulahan. 
9 With the rapid growth of population in the Toraja areas in the 20th century, many 
Toraja were forced to seek a livelihood in the city of Makassar and elsewhere in 
Indonesia. 
10 This statement is based on interviews with Toraja historians in 1974-5, on an 
unpublished manuscript on Toraja history and culture by Sarungallo' Parenge Kesu, 
and on L. T. Tangdilintin's Toraja dan Kebudayaanya, Ujung Padang, 1974. 
11 Royalty was said to have blood the colour of the milky sap of the takku' (Bugis)/ 
tangkulu' (Makassar) tree, hence indicating its heavenly origin. 
12 One is reminded of the same contradictions which Western scholars used to "discover" 
with delight in Javanese dualisms of right-Ieft, light-dark, good-evil. Vet these 
dualisms are seen as uni ties without any religious connotations. These concepts of 
right-Ieft, lightness-darkness, good-evil, are two sides of the same coin and are 
regarded as essential to each other and part of the very fabric of life. See Rassers 1959. 
13 Personal communication, Or Shelley Errington. 
14 See KA 1217a, fol. 228v, concerning some complaints about the Goa government. 
15 Personal communication, Professor Zainal Abidin bin Farid, 1975. 
16 While the chronicles of the Makassar kingdoms of Goa and Talló do not indicate any 
direct relationship between their kingdoms and Luwu, Makassar oral traditions trace 
Goa's past to a ruler named "Batara Guru" who, according to the I La Galigo, is the 
first godruler of Luwu. The people of Selayar also claim Luwu as their original 
homeland and still use the noble title Opu, which is a Luwu title. See Noorduyn 1955: 
47, quoting H. E. O. Engelhard, "Mededeelingen over het eiland Saleijer", BK/32 
(1864), p. 399. 
17 In Bugis these measures are called ma'polo leteng, "breaking of the bridge" (Sultan 
Kasim 1970: 17). The origin ofthis term can perhaps be traced to the decision taken by 
the gods, as recounted in the / La Galigo, to remove the rainbow which served as a 
bridge between heaven and earth af ter the second set of godrulers left the earth 
(Matthes 1885 in van den Brink 1943:379). 
18 In later years the nine members changed from time to time and only Tombolo, Data, 
and Saumata remained part of the original Bate Salapang (Mukhlis 1975:60-1). 
19 This latter statement appears more acceptable since Goa under Tuma 'parisi' Kallonna 
allied with Bone against the greater threat posed by Luwu. See Abdurrazak 1969b: 
18-23. 
20 Matthes defines the Bugis word boeco as "column (of soldiers)". But in the Makassar 
dictionary he compares boeco with another Makassar word, tumpu, meaning "fighting 
force" or "army". He prefers, therefore, to translate the word loosely as "power" 
(Matthes 1874: 193-4; Matthes 1859: 180,286). The last Ranreng Tua of Wajo, Haji 
Andi' Ninnong, explained that boeco meant "the highest one; the ane with no equal" 
(Lineton 1975:92). "Tellumpocco" cauld therefore perhaps also be translated as "The 
I ncomparable Three". 
21 It was common practice among Bugis-Makassar chronicIers to givc a posthumous 
name to a ruler to describe how or where he died. For example, Tunijallo', means "he 
who was killed by an amok". 
22 His personal name was I Mallingkaang and his honorific 1 Daeng Mannyonri'. He also 
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had the territorial titles of Karaeng ri Kanjilo, Karaeng Segeri, Karaeng Barombong, 
Karaeng Data, Karaeng Allu, and various others. Af ter the "Islamic Wars" ended in 
1611, he was given the title "Karaeng Matoaya", by which name he is best known 
among the Makassar people. See Abdurrahim 1974: 15; Abdurrazak 1969b:18. 
23 Some features of Islamization which may have added to Goa's strength. See L. Y. 
Andaya 1976 unpublished paper, "Kingship and Adat Rivalry in Bugis-Makassar 
Society". 
24 According to a Bone ChronicIe, Luwu adopted Islam a year before Goa (Matthes 
1864, 1:529). The Tallo ChronicIe implies that Luwu may have already been Moslem 
by the time ofthe Islamic Wars by saying that Karaeng Matoaya Islamized all the Bugis 
lands except Luwu (Abdurrahim 1974: 15). 
25 Literally, th is term means "a thousand catties (of gold)", but it came to mean any 
specific sum of money or its value in goods demanded by one party from another as a 
condition for peace (Matthes .1864:546; Abdurrahim 1974: 16). 
26 A kind of ship used to transport cattle and horses. 
27 A fermented drink made from either the aren palm, the lontar palm, or the nipa palm. 
28 Anakkaraeng (Makassar)/Anakarung (Bugis) means literally "princes". They are the 
offspring of a royal father and royal or commoner wife. Their penchant for oppressing 
various members of their own community, let alone those of vassal states, was 
notorious. The Bugis version of a "Mirror of Kings", the Latoa, advises the ruler to be 
certain to bridle the activities of the anakarung (Mattulada 1975: 154-5; 172-3; 
275-7). They were generally dependent for their livelihood on the royal bounty. For a 
study of the general phenomenon of such groups in Malay-Indonesian society, see B. 
W. Andaya 1976:162-186. 
29 In later times there were two Tumailalang posts: Tumailalang Toa or the elder 
Tumailalang, and the Tumailalang Lolo, or the younger Tumailalang. There is no 
indication from contemporary Dutch sources that there was this division in the 17th 
century, though th is may be explained by the fact th at the Dutch would have had little 
to do with the Tumailalang Lolo. His principal function was to serve as an intermediary 
between the ruler and his chief minister, the Tuma'bicara-butta, on the one hand and 
the Bate Salapang on the other in attempting to resolve difficulties in implementing 
policy. The Tumailalang Toa was the more important figure who was the head of the 
Bate Salapang and hence the chief intermediary between the people, via the Bate 
Salapang, and the ruler and Tuma'bicara-butta (Mukhlis 1971:83-4). 
30 Although contemporary Dutch sources tend to equate the authority of Wajo's Arung 
Matoa with that of rulers of other major kingdoms, the Arung Matoa was much less 
secure. He was nominated by a body ofWajo lords known as the "Forty Lords"(Arung 
Pattappulo) and ultimately chosen by the Arung Bettempola. This latter lord and the 
Ranreng Tua and Ranreng Talotenreng were hereditary positions with great prestige 
and power in Wajo, but it was the Arung Bettempola who was c1early the primus inter 
pares (See Abdurrazak 1964:16-20; Noorduyn 1955:39-40; Zainal Abidin bin Farid 
1971: 163). 
31 In the Nägarakertägama, the ruler of Majapahit also designates as "friends" only those 
considered to be his equal (Pigeaud 1960, lIl: 16-9). 
32 The Sufi doctrine was well-known among Goa court members. In 1667 Encik Amin, a 
scribe from the Makassar-Malay community employed in the Goa court, wrote a 
panegyric to the Makassar ruler and nobles which exhibited a knowledge of the kind of 
Sufi ideas which were associated with the Aceh Sufi mystic poets (Skinner 1963:23). 
Syaikh Yusuf, a 17th century Moslem saint, greatly revered by the Bugis and Makassar 
people, was a well-known Sufi mystic who was related to the Goa royal house (Cense 
1950:51). 
33 This gracious act is often cited by pro-Wajo local historians as proof of the 
"democratic" character of Wajo society which abhorred slavery of one's fellowman. It 
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is tempting to see th is as a later interpolation by a Wajo chronicIer to urge moderation 
on the part of Bone rulers in the late 17th and early 18th centuries who held the fate of 
Wajo in their hands. 
CHAPTER II 
1 In a raga (a rotan bali) game, the raga is tossed in the air and kept there by the 
participants by using any part of the body but the hands. Skill is measured by how weil 
and how long a participant can keep the bali in the air. Special ceremony attended the 
teaching of the raga game by a master (guru pa'raga), and purity of heart and mind 
were prerequisites for skill in th is spiritual exercise/game (Abdurrachman 1967: 
16-7). 
2 There are many ways of tying a sarung to serve different purposes. When a man ties his 
sarung up high so that the bottom edge touches his knees, he usually intends to do hard 
labour and thus does not want the sarung to hinder his movements. 
3 The name was chosen because in the Bugis areas a raft is usually built by tying 
individu al logs together. The word "raft" would conjure up the image of individual 
units forming one entity, hence a union or alliance. 
4 A strip from a leaf of a lontar palm (Borassus flabelliformis) on which certain number 
of knots are tied to indicate the number of days before a war would begin. It is usually 
sent to an ally or to a vassal to summon him to war within a certain number of days. A 
failure to respond to these summons did not go unpunished (Matthes 1874:211). 
5 The term used for "defy" is lariangi ba'ba'na, which means literally "to run away with 
the whip", hence indicating an act of defiance. In another manuscript the term is c1early 
used to refer to a group of kingdoms rejecting Goa's overlordship (L-17: 1). 
6 According to Speelman's Notitie, the Bugis were waiting with a sizeable force to meet 
the enemy. There were 10,000 men under Arung Palakka at Mampu, another 10,000 
men under Arung Kaju, Arung Maruangen, Arung A wo, and Arung Balieng, and a 
further 8,000 under Arung Mario. Datu Soppeng La Tenribali brought additional men 
to Arung Palakka, swelling the latter's force to about 20,000 (Speelman 1670:731r). 
7 This is a gesture with the left hand extended outward offering peace and the right hand 
placed on the hilt of the kris signifying a willingness to war if necessary (Matthes 1874: 
702). 
8 This appears to be an early manifestation of Arung Palakka's upé', or "fortune", which 
attracted the direct loyalty of the Bugis people. They seemed to f10ck to his banner of 
their own accord and not as a result of orders from their locallords. 
9 The term used is paréllessempatua, which means the opening in the rocks. Wh at is 
probably. meànt here is not actually caves, but the cracks and spaces between large 
boulders which can afford hiding places for a man. 
10 In L-3:295 Datu Mario is given the title of Karaeng Eje and Karaeng Tanete the 
"daeng" name of Leppo(?). 
11 Literally, "those who pound the rice staiks to separate the ears from the staik". 
12 "Patarana" refers to the husband of the woman who nurses a royal or noble-bom child. 
In Bugis-Makassar society the nursemaid and her husband become a type of foster 
parents toward whom the child feels a strong bond, sometimes even stronger than th at 
toward his own natural parents. 
13 In performing the aru, or to manngaru, a warrior jumps up with kris in hand declaring 
his total devotion and loyalty to his lord, of ten in bombastic and sometimes incom-
prehensible woi'ds. 
14 All the manuscripts say "Java", but th is is a general term used by the Bugis and 
Makassar people to indicate anything föreign. Subsequent events indicate that in the 
beginning Java was not their ultimate destination. 
15 In a manuscript from Soppeng, Arung Palakka's words are more bitter and scathing 
toward Bone: "I have no place to live in the land of the Bugis because the people of 
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Bone are not sincere/firm/faithful (matetté) and no longer want to fight." And of the 
question of the amount of gold which Arung Palakka was able to collect for his trip to 
Java, this manuscript says that only twenty catties of gold was from Mario ri Wawo and 
none from Bone (L-3:298). 
16 In an unpublished manuscript of the history of Bone, the three princes mentioned are 
Arung Bila, Arung Appanang, and Arung Belo, not Datu Citta (Sejarah Bone n.d.: 
136). The reason for the omission of Datu Citta from Bone sources may have been 
because of the circumstances of Datu Citta's death in later years. Datu Citta of the 
Bugis sources was Arung Bakke Todani who was married to one of Arung Palakka's 
sisters. The later rivalry between Arung Palakka and Arung Bakke resulted in the 
latter's death under very ignoble circumstances which Arung Palakka, his descendants, 
and the court of Bone may have wished to forget. For the story of the rivalry and 
subsequent murder of Arung Bakke see Chapter 9. 
17 Speelman says the flight occurred in the beginning of 1661 (Speelman 1670:761 v), but 
the Diary of the Kings of Goa and Tallo records the date as 25 December 1660 
(Ligtvoet 1880: 119). 
18 For greater detail on this incident, see Stapel 1922:74-7. 
19 Karaeng Karunrung had returned from exile and was once again in favour in the Goa 
court (Stapel 1922: 85). 
CHAPTER III 
1 In the Dutch sources the Arung Belo Tosa'deng is referred to as "de radja van Soping", 
"the king of Soppeng". He was actually a son of the Datu Soppeng La Tenribali 
Matinroe ri Datunna who was living in exile in Sanrangang. 
2 Among the Makassar people the Bajau are known as Turije'ne' or "water people". 
They appeared to have served the Goa court as rowers, seafighters, and envoys, in the 
same way that the Orang Laut (Iit., the seapeople) in the western half ofthe Indonesian 
archipelago seemed to have served the Malay kingdoms. See Speelman 1926: unpag. 
and Andaya 1975: 50-1 passim. 
3 A mas was a small gold coin. There were a number of different types of rijksdaalders 
circulating in this period. This particular coprijksdaalder may refer to a head (cap) 
struck on one or both sides of the coin. 
4 Contrary to popular belief, the "Datu Luwu" who went to Butung was not Daeng 
Massuro Matinroe ri Tompotikka', but his half-brother by the daughter of Karaeng 
Sumanna, Daeng Mattuju (Ligtvoet 1878:49). 
5 The excitement of the time is captured in a Bugis lontara's depiction of the arrival of 
Arung Palakka at Pattiro and his welcome by the multitudes who instantly recognized 
his upe' (Undang-Undang 1914: 119). It was th is upe' which overcame all barriers and 
made the people follow Arung Palakka and believe in his destiny. The manner of 
Arung Palakka's return and his remarkable achievements established a cultural-
historical pattern which came to characterize later events in South Sulawesi. The 
Makassar refugees af ter 1667 and 1669 left with similar hopes of returning with an ally 
powerful enough to free their home land. Although they were unsuccessful, the prece-
dent had been established by Arung Palakka. Arung Sengkang La Ma'dukelleng's 
story almost directly parallels that of Arung Palakka, and he, too, is considered to be an 
"unusual" figure in South Sulawesi history. A more recent figure with the same pattern 
is that of Kahar Muzakkar. See L. Y. Andaya 1977. 
6 This may have been the "Daeng Mattoana" mentioned by Speelman as Arung 
Palakka's maternal uncle who accompanied Arung Palakka into exile (Notitie 1670: 
709r). 
7 A shortened version of this account can also be found in Stapel 1922: 121)-130 and in 
Macleod 1900: 1275-7. 
8 According to Bugis sourees, after the main rebellion had been suppressed Makassar. 
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Wajo, and Bone troops intercepted Arung Palakka and his followers at Palette on the 
Bay of Bone. Several of Arung Palakka's followers were killed, but Arung Palakka and 
most of his men succeeded in escaping by boat to Butung (L-I:27; L-3:300; L-4: 
unpag., section 23). 
9 According to contemporary Dutch sources, Arung Cibalu was with Speelman at this 
time. 
10 The core area or lale'bata, literally, "within the walls", refers to the ma in settlement of 
the kingdom where the ruler resided. 
11 Although L-l says the Treaty of Pappolong, the previous statements indicate that the 
Treaty of Attappang was meant. This is also confirmed in L-3:307 and L-4: unpag., 
section 23, where only the Treaty of Attappang is mentioned. 
12 1 t was a common practice in B ugis and Makassar society for a ruler to reward or punish 
a whole family, even up to third cousins, for a particular deed of one individual in the 
family. For example, af ter Bone's unsuccessful revolt against Goa in 1660, forty 
members up to third cousins belonging to the family ofTobala', who had been placed as 
regent in!lone byGoa's leaders in 1643, were said to have been put todeath (L-l :27). 
13 Pre-Islamic holy men and women who are considered to contain within themselves 
both the female and male elements. They were especially revered as being inter-
mediaries between the spirit world and the community. In the past they received royal 
patronage and we re keepers of the regalia. For a discussion on the bissu, see 
B. F. Matthes 1872. 
14 These Bugis accounts are corroborated in the Dutch sources where thirty Dutch 
soldiers and two cannons were brought by Captain Poleman to join Arung Palakka. 
However, Poleman arrived at Kassi, not Lamatti. See Stapel 1922: 133. 
15 The "four districts" in present-day Sinjai include Bulo-Bulo, Lamatti, Balannipa, and 
Raja. 
16 Macleod (1922: 1285) only mentions the first alternative, but Stapel's account (1922: 
156) of the suggestions offered by Arung Appanang is more accurate. 
17 The Bugis sources say that the Arung Belo was among the three Soppeng princes 
leading the northern Bugis attack, and yet the Dutch sources say that he was with 
Arung Palakka in Makassar at th is time. 
18 The mention of indebtedness is perhaps a reference to the time he was in the caves of 
Maruala and was helped by Tanete to escape from Makassar pursuers (L-3:295). 
19 A lesung is a hollowed-out log where the rice is pounded, hence what Karaeng 
Karunrung threatened Tanete was a pounding such as that given to a lesung. 
20 This refers to a Bugis-Makassar practice of taking the head of an enemy and "dancing" 
with it in the aru upon offering it to one's lord. 
21 A rial or rial-of-eight was a Spanish silver coin imported into Asia by the Dutch and the 
English. lts value depended partlyon the weight and fineness of the individual coin, 
and partlyon supply and demand. It normally was worth about 21j, Dutch guilders. 
CHAPTER IV 
I Stapel 1922:181 mentions that the individual intended here was not the Sultan 
Ternate, but the Raja Turatea, which he interpreted to mean Karaeng Layo since in 
previous references in the Dutch records a copyist had written "Ternate" instead of 
"Turatea" (KA 1157a:323v). But in this case it appears that it is the Sultan Ternate 
which is intended since he did play a prominent role in the negotiations. See also the 
Sya'ir Perang Mengkasar's reference to the Sultan Ternate's presence in Bungaya 
(Skinner 1963:179; KA 1157a:325r). 
2 One should no te that the sequence of the draft treaty articles discussed here do not 
correspond to those in the final treaty document reproduced in Stapel 1922:237 -24 7. 
3 A llegia= alegie=allegaes, may be related to alaehae, piece goods from Gujerat usually 
striped of mixed cotton and silk. Those from Coromandel were made of cotton and 
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either red and white or blue and white. 
4 After the establishment of colon ia I mIe in many parts of the world by Western 
European or American powers, the writers of internationallaw began to deny sover-
eignty to Eastern mIers and their communities. Anand 1962:383,385, 1386. 
5 While the following discussion is based principallyon the records of the Bugis, who are 
the numerically dominant group in South Sulawesi, these observations may be applied 
generally to the other major ethnic groups in the area. 
6 This reference is probably to the practice of dividing the children bom of a sI ave and a 
freeman. 
7 The terms of the treaties were taken from a number of Bugis manuscripts, especially 
from L-4, L-28, the Makassar Sedjarah Coa edited by Abdurrahim and Wolhoff, and a 
Makassar contract signed between Bantaeng and the Dutch East India Company in 
Matthes 1883: 217-220. 
8 This was a widespread practice in the Malay world, and frequent references can be 
found in the Sejarah Me/ayu. 
9 A tree, the Antiaris toxicaria Leseh, from which a sap is extracted to make a poison 
used for blow darts and arrows. 
10 In South Sulawesi the written word is treated with great reverence. Many written 
documents are preserved as sacred heirlooms which can only be exhibited af ter a 
proper appeasement of the guardian spirits. A similar attitude among the Javanese is 
described in Berg 1938: 14ff. 
11 This belief is not peculiar to South Sulawesi but may be found in many parts of the 
Malay-Indonesian world. An interesting discussion of a similar concept called 
maratabat among the Maranao people of southern Philippines is found in Saber 1974: 
219-224. 
12 In this regard South Sulawesi appeared to be different from powerful mainland 
Southeast Asian states where it was common practice for the victor to transport a 
subject population to his own realm to augment his power. For an interesting study of 
manpower in the late Ayutthaya and early Bangkok period, see Rabibhadana 1969. 
13 An interesting example of this process is described in one of the Bugis chronicles where 
Bone remembered its treaty with Goa and forSook that with Soppeng, only to do a 
complete turnabout some years later when Goa was clearly on the decline. See L-28: 
32ii. 
14 On 28 December 1655 the Company's envoy was instmcted by his superiors in Batavia 
to make peace with the Makassar mIers of Goa and Tallo at any cost. The resulting 
document clearly demonstrates the influence of local treaty-making traditions. While 
the framework of the treaty is borrowed from the Western European practice of 
including each new subject in separate numbered articles, the contents re ad like a 
typical South Sulawesi treaty. It begins: " ... the Governor-General [ofthe Company] 
wants to make peace and is a great and strong man, whereas we are so much smaller 
and weaker. Would we make peace if no misdeeds were committed against our 
subjects?" (Heeres 13Ia:82). But the traditional formula is inverted so as to leave no 
doubt whatsoever in the minds of the native signatories that they were not vassals ofthe 
Company: (Article 6) The enemies of the Company shall not be the enemies of these 
mIers; (Article 7) If these mIers should have aquarrel with any state "below the 
winds", the Company will not interfere. Only in Article 8 does the treaty again revert 
to the precision of a European document but with the important difference that it is 
made in the form of a request rather than a provision. In th is article the Company asks 
these mIers to prevent their subjects from going to certain proscribed areas. Although 
the Company has no light to such a request in traditional practice, it is not rejected 
outright but left unresolved (Heeres 1931a:82-4). 
In a treaty between the Company and four minor states in South Sulawesi on 
December 1671, the rulers of the four states promise to uphold their treaty with the 
Notespp.115-135 319 
Company by swearing on the Koran, making an oath, and drinking bal/o' - all in the 
traditional fashion. They agree to recognize the Company as their overlord, take the 
Company's friends as their friends and the Company's enemies as their enemies, 
pro vi de the same royal services to the Company as they had performed for the ruler of 
Goa, and give a small number of slaves to the Company (Heeres 1931d:441-2). All of 
these terms were in the traditional South Sulawesi treaty idiom, including the symbolic 
presentation of slaves to demonstrate one's submission to an overlord Noorduyn 1955: 
176, 202, passim). 
CHAPTER V 
1 Although it is not known when this folktale was first recited, its preciseness concerning 
the factors contributing to Goa's defeat could argue for either a time of origin close to 
the events which it describes, or a faithful retention of detail in the folk memory of the 
Makassar people over several centuries. The written text of the tale was made from a 
performance by a pasinrili', a story teller, in the 1930s (personal communication A. A. 
Cense, 27 December 1975). 
2 So impelling an impact did Arung Palakka make in South Sulawesi th at in time he even 
became transforrned into a Makassar hero whose association with the Dutch was 
justified because he sought to avenge a personal insult by his father, the ruler of Goa. 
For a discussion of this transformation of Arung Palakka from a Bugis to a Makassar 
hero, see L. Y. Andaya 1980. 
3 This was a common way of "hedging one's bets". During the long and destructive 
Kahar Muzakkar rebellion in South Sulawesi between 1950-1963, many families had 
one son fighting for the rebels and one for the government. Some have openly 
explained this as a conscious policy of families to ensure the preservation of their 
property. 
4 According to contemporary Dutch sources Syahbandar Daeng Makkulle had also 
commanded a sm all Goa fleet which had been sent against Butung sometime in April 
or May 1666 (KA 1148b:51 I). 
5 One of the Bugis chronicles from Soppeng describes the desolation in Soppeng where 
no human being but only wild pigs and deer could be found. In this episode Bone's 
betrayal is blamed for the sad fate of Soppeng, and many of the nobles urge Arung 
Palakka to be cautious in once again entwining the fortunes of Soppeng with those of 
Bone. Although this particular incident is placed a short time af ter the landing of Bugis 
troops in Bone in 1666, it may very weil have referred to this particular event 
mentioned in 1668. See L-l :30. 
6 The Dutch records state unequivocally "radja toua". Whether the Tumailalang Toa 
was intended is not known. When some Bugis princes seized power in Johor in the early 
18th century, two posts which they created with distinctive South Sulawesi connota-
tions we re "Raja Muda" and "Raja Tua". These two offices were considered the chief 
advisers to the ruler (L. Y. Andaya 1975:295-6). 
7 Neither the chronicIe of Goa nor of Tallo speaks of Goa's defeat. The former merely 
presents a list of rulers and their descendants from the period of Sultan Hasanuddin 
until Sultan Abdul Jalil (d. 1709), and no indication is given that a war was even fought. 
See Abdurrahim and Wolhof n.d.: 74-8. The Tallo ChronicIe ends in the middle of the 
17th century at the height of Makassar power in South Sulawesi, as if regarding what 
followed as unworthy of mention. See Abdurrahim and Borahima 1975:320; L-4: 
unpag.; L-17 :65 etc. 
8 These two villages are not mentioned in a 1693 map of the area. Since the Makassar 
people, as many other Indonesian groups, consider any site struck by a disaster as 
inauspicious, it is unlikely that these two villages would have been reoccupied. 
9 During the coronation of the Arumpone in 1931, descendents of the Toangke were 
given a prominent place in the procession. See Cense 1931 :4. 
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CHAPTER VI 
1 La Tenrilai Tosenngeng wasaccidentally blown up by gunpowder in the defence of 
Tosora (L-1:67; L-3:325). 
2 A Bugis version of the treaty appears to give a direct translation of leen or leenman in 
the Dutch version. It refers to the people of Wajo as being toinreng, literally "vassals", 
of the Company (L-3:331-4). A more common word for "vassal" in interstate 
relations among South Sulawesi states is pali/i'. It appears, therefore, that Wajo may 
have been simply given a draft treaty which was translated literally into Bugis without 
any proper attention to local treaty conventions. 
3 Pammana is listed along with Gilireng and Belawa as siding with Wajo in L-3:324. 
4 The Bugis word would have beenpesse. See Chapter I for adiscussion ofthisconcept in 
Bugis-Makassar society. 
5 These are traditional phrases of a South Sulawesi "treaty". What is being suggested 
here is to have Soppeng "reminded" of its treaty with Bone. See Chapter IV. 
6 For a discussion of the significance of burying the stone in a treaty, see Chapter IV. 
7 This was the traditional manner of submitting to a conqueror. For other examples, see 
Noorduyn 1955:168-171, 172-3,passim. 
8 Arung Palakka 's wife at first continued to live in Barru and refused to go to Bontoala to 
join Arung Palakka because she considered it "too difficult and unpleasant" (KA 
1 191a:656v). 
9 While no mention is made of the status of the members of this band, there would have 
been slaves, commoners, and ordinary criminals seeking safety from traditional society 
and norms in "outlaw" groups in the hills. These "outlaw" groups were not uncom-
mon, and it was to prevent their growth that there was such strict provision in interstate 
treaties for the return of runaway slaves. While the economic loss to their masters was a 
factor in attempting to destroy these bands, the loss of prestige of a ruler was perhaps 
as, if not more, important a reason for condemning the existence of these groups. The 
rise of this alternative authority was an unpleasant reminder to a local lord that he had 
somehow failed to provide prosperity and protection to his people, two crucial deter-
minants of a good ruler in South Sulawesi traditions. See L. Y. Andaya 1975: 120-1. 
CHAPTER VII 
1 There is no mention of a seventh state in the Dutch contemporary accounts. It is 
difficult to know whether there were only six states within the Mandar confederation at 
this time or if the Company reports omitted to name the seventh. 
2 Betelleaf prepared for chewing with areca-nut, gambier, and lime. 
3 Most of the informants I spoke to in 1974-5 in South Sulawesi gave this explanation for 
Arung Palakka's inability to have any children. 
4 A more common way prior to the introduction offirearms was to stick a kris or spear 
through the floor to kill someone in a house. Since South Sulawesi houses were built on 
stilts, this method of killing one's enemy was popular and very effective. 
5 Bugis lontara' support this contention. When Arung Palakka and three of his com-
panions, all important nob les from Soppeng, decided to leave Sulawesi to escape from 
the Makassar people, they ca me to Datu Soppeng to ask for gold. According to one 
source Arung Palakka was given 100 catties of gold by the Datu Soppeng (L-l :24). 
6 Since Towesa had lost an eye from smallpox, he would have been considered by people 
to be unwhole and hence not fit to be co me ruler. Cops himself commented upon 
Towesa's unbecoming behaviour which, coupled with the loss of an eye, made him an 
easy figure of attack and abuse by his enernies. 
7 Sanrabone had only become part of the Goa empire af ter its conquest by Tumapa 'risi' 
Kallonna in the 16th century. Since then, however, its rayal family had intermarried 
with the Goa rulers and had become intricately enmeshed with the fortunes of Goa. 
One of Sultan Hasanuddin's wives was I Peta' Daeng Nisali, the daughter of Karaeng 
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Banjuanjara from Sanrabone, and the offspring of this marriage was I Mappadulung 
Daeng Mattimung Karaeng Campagaya. After the death of Karaeng Banjuanjara, the 
Sanrabone Council appointed I Mappadulung Daeng Mattimung as Karaeng Sanra-
bone. Af ter ten years as Karaeng Sanrabone, he was made ruler of Goa with the title of 
Sultan Abdul Jalil (Abdurrazak 1970:55-6). 
8 None of these originalletters and treaties has been found, although certain sections of 
treaties and selected phrases from letters may have been incorporated into some of the 
extant !ontara'. 
9 According to Makassar traditions, there were two lords who came from the east during 
the time of Goa's Tumanurung. One was Karaeng Bayo, who married the Tumanu-
rung, and the other was Lakipadada. The latter had a sword called the Sudang which 
became an important part of Goa's regalia (Matthes 1883a:21O). 
10 The Dutch actually reads bastert kinderen (bastard children). This seems to define the 
anakarung, literally "princes", who are usually offspring of a royal father and any one 
of his wives not necessarily of royal birth. 
CHAPTER VIII 
I The most spectacular examples of South Sulawesi refugee successes abroad are in 
Malaysia. Many contemporary royal families on the Malay peninsuia have Bugis blood 
dating from the period of Bugis involvement in the Malay world in the late 17th and 
early 18th centuries. See L. Y. Andaya 1975. 
2 A similar experience of Bugis refugees in the Malay world in the early 18th century led 
to their settlement in a thinly populated and lightly govemed territory belonging to the 
kingdom of Johor. This area later became the Sultanate of Selangor ruled by a Bugis 
dynasty. See L. Y. Andaya 1975; B. W. Andaya 1979. 
3 This large Malay force was part of the following of a certain Minangkabau leader who 
was known as Ibn Iskandar. For a discussion of his activities in the late 17th century, 
see Kathirithamby-Wells 1970. 
4 It was to this river crossing th at Arung Palakka later attributed the beginning of a 
certain growth in his nose which was to cause him such suffering and anxiety until his 
death. 
CHAPTER IX 
1 The Tempe, Sidenreng, and Crocodile Lakes once formed a single body of water 
known as the "Tappareng Karaja" or the "Great Lake" (Pelras 1977:242; see also the 
reproduced 1693 fold-out map of South Sulawesi). 
2 According to this historian, in the 15th century there was a meeting held in a village 
called Ajattappareng in Suppa of the Addaong Sidenreng La Pateddungi, the Adda-
tuang Sawitto La Paleteyange, the Datu Suppa La Makkariwie, and the Arung 
Rappeng, who was also the Arung Alitta, La Pakkollongi. In this meeting they agreed 
to form the Limae Ajattappareng (Burhanuddin 1974:42-3,57). 
3 The Bugis and Makassar people, like many other societies, believe that a person's 
power resides in all partsofthe body. When a person's hairor nails are cut, a part ofthe 
person's power is detached from the body, hence weakening that person (Kruijt 1914: 
233). By making this vow Arung Palakka and his companions had symbolically 
declared their intention of devoting their entire strength and energy toward their goal. 
4 La Si de 1968a: 28 mentions that the name of Arung Palakka's sister who married 
Arung Bakkè-Todani was We Kecumpureng Da Ompo. This version is repeated by 
Abdurrazak 1968:48 who gives the name as We Kacimpurang Daompo. But a recently 
compiled history of Bone (in press), written by a committee, of which La Side was a 
part, says her name was We Tenrigirang. I have come across no other source which 
confirms one or the other vers ion or which gives a third reading. Because the history of 
Bone is more recent and includes La Side among its contributors, I have assumed that 
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he agreed that We Tenrigirang was the name of the sister who married Arung Bakke 
Todani. 
5 Arung Bakke would have been thinking in terms of the Bugis words arung and 
anakarung. Arung refers to any ruler, whether from a major kingdom or a sm all 
principality, with its own head and regalia. The anakarung were all those even only 
vaguely related to the ruler who were found in great numbers in and around the court. 
6 Despite Arung Palakka's long enmity toward the Goa government, he was sufficiently 
impressed by Goa to have borrowed several Makassar titles and made them into Bone 
titles. The office of Makkedangetana was the direct translation of the Goa office of 
Tuma'bicara-butta, meaning "Spokesman of the Land". It was a powerful position 
second only to that of the ruler. The honorific title for the Karaeng Goa, Tunisambaya. 
meaning "He who is given obeisance", was borrowed by Arung Palakka for his own 
use. He is the only Bone ruler who is referred to as Tarisampae, which is the Bugis 
translation of Tunisambaya. The position of Tamari/a/eng is also a direct equivalent of 
the Goa office of Tumai/a/ang. The position of Tamari/a/eng in Bone appears for the 
first time during Arung Palakka's reign. One source attributes Arung Palakka with the 
establishment of the offices of Makkedangetana, Tamari/a/eng Matoa, Tamari/a/eng 
Ma/ala, and Ma'danreng (Undang-undang Bone 1914: 181-2). 
CHAPTERX 
1 Karaeng Massepe La Suni had been accused of various things, the most serious of 
which were attempting to seize the throne of Bone and abducting one of Arung 
Palakka's concubines, I Sarampa. He was ordered seized and beheaded by Arung 
Palakka. This incident occurred in 1673 and became a much discussed and romanti-
cized episode. A colourful version of this story is found in La Side 1968b: (11) 18-22; 
( 12)22-23. 
2 Bakkers is the only source which dates the installation of Arung Palakka as Arumpone. 
Although the Diary af the Kings af Caa and Tal/a mentions La Patau's birth, it omits 
any mention of Arung Palakka's installation. Contemporary Dutch sources indicate 
th at Arung Palakka became ruler of Bone sometime toward the end of 1672, but 
without giving a specific date. Perhaps Arung Palakka himself was aware that his action 
would not be received weil by his allies and therefore dispensed with any ostentatious 
celebrations which would have drawn attention to it. 
3 The fame of the Bira and Ara people as boatbuilders is evident to this day. They 
explain that their skill as boatbuilders was acquired by their forefathers in the distant 
past when they reconstructed the wrecked boat which had once carried the legendary 
. god-rulerofthe I La Ca/iga, Sawerigading. See Pelly 1975:9-10. 
4 Mandar traditions speak of this period as one in which the unity of the Confederation 
had been destroyed (Interviews Darwis 1974). 
5 This group is also known as the Tae' Toraja, although the latter name is generally 
shunned by the people themselves as being derogatory. The Southern Toraja groups 
live within South Sulawesi proper, whereas the Northern Toraja and Western Toraja 
occupy the areas of Central Sulawesi. (Nooy-Palm 1975:55 and 1979:6-7). 
6 The above account of the allied expedition into Toraja was taken principally from KA 
1289a:32-8, which is a diary of Hendrik Geerkens, one of the Dutch soldiers who 
served as Arung Palakka's bodyguard on this campaign. 
7 It was called "Topada Tindo Tomisa Panngimpi", meaning literally, "Sleeping 
together and having one dream", to indicate the unity of purpose of the Toraja 
communities. The motto "Misa kada dipotuo, pantan kada dipomate" was adopted, 
which translated freely is the Toraja equivalent of "United we stand, divided we fall". 
The movement itself was given a name "Untula' Buntunna Bone", which means 
"Repel the Strength of Bone" (Tangdilintin 1974:37). Another way in which this 
period is referred to among the Toraja is "Ullangda' Tosendana Bonga", from 
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"ullangda'" meaning "to repel"; Tosendana, meaning "people of Sendana"; and 
"bonga", a spotted pink and black water buffalo (highly valued among the Toraja, 
hence referring here to a "great man"). Although th is informant indicated that the 
"Tosendana" were the people from Sendana in Mandar (Interview Linting 1975), 
"Sendana" has a variant spelling and pronunciation which is "Cenrana". It appears 
much more plausible to interpret the whole phrase "Tosendana Bonga" to mean "the 
great man of Cenrana", which would only have referred to Arung Palakka. In view of 
the events this appellation for the period is intended to relate, this interpretation 
appears more convincing. 
8 This would have been the "mantraps" referred to in Dutch reports which caused 
numerous casualties among the allied troops in th is campaign. 
CHAPTERXI 
1 The map was finally completed in 1693 and is listed in the map collection of the 
General State Archives in The Hague as Leupe 1293. 
2 A. A. Cense notes that on his mother's si de Syaikh Yusufwould have been the brother 
of Karaeng Bisei Sultan Mohammad Ali (reign dates 1674-7) and Sultan Abdul Jalil 
(r.d. 1677-17(9). However, Cense finds thisdifficult to accept since Karaeng Bisei was 
bom in 1654, Sultan Abdul Jalil in 1652, and Syaikh Yusuf c. 1626 (Cense 1950: 
51-2).11 is interesting, nevertheless, that this relationship was openly acknowledged by 
Sultan Abdul Jalil himself in 1691. A contemporary Dutch report dated 13 January 
1690 states bluntly that Syaikh Yusuf was from "a family of gallarang, although from 
the lowest type" (Consideratiën 1708:7). 
3 However, a village tale of a later date dealing with the Makassar War of 1666-9 
transforms this defeatism and exudes a striking optimism among the Makassar 
common people (Andaya 1980). The process of selective memory, which is a 
mechanism of survival and adaptation in many non-literate and semi-literate societies, 
had also occurred in Makassar society sometime between 1695 and 1936, when the 
village tale was first recorded. For a discussion of the selective memory process and its 
function in non-literate and semi-literate soci.eties, see Goody and Watt 1968:30-4. 
4 There is nothing in the sources which implicates the ruler of Dompu, but apparently 
some new evidence must have come to light to incriminate the formerly trustworthy 
ally of the Company and Arung Palakka. 
5 From the curious reference here of the Arung Tanete Matoa and the Arung Tanete 
Maioio being among Arung Palakka 's chief advisers, it appears that perhaps these 
were the titles used interchangeably during Arung Palakka's reign with Tamarilaleng 
Matoa and Tamarilaleng Malola. The former's task was to serve as the mediator 
between the ruler and the Aruppitu while the latter's principal preoccupation was with 
the continuing good relations between the ruler and the vassal areas. A Bugis manu-
script recopied in the 20th century but of a much earlier period mentions the Tamarila-
leng Matoa and Tamarilaleng Malalo during a military campaign in the late 17th 
century (L-l :77-8). 
Another possibility is that the Arung Tanete Maioio and Arung Tanete Matoa may 
refer to two members of the Aruppitu: the Arung Tanete Riatang and the Arung 
Tanete Riawang, or the Arung Tanete of the South and the Arung Tanete of the North. 
Tlu:re is no indication, however, that one was designated "young" (malola) and the 
other "old" (mataa). 
6 This was the son born of the marriage between La Patau and I Mariama, daughter of 
Sultan Abdul Jalil of Goa. According to the terms agreed upon by both parties in the 
marriage, the first born would rule in the kingdom of the mot her. Tosappewali, 
therefore, became the crown-prince of Goa, hence the comment that he was appointed 
to the same office as Arung Palakka, which was the Bone title for crown prince to the 
Bone throne. Af ter 1672, when Arung Palakka La Tenritatta became Arumpone, he 
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began to be referred to in Dutch sources as "Arumpone". The title "Arung Palakka" is 
retained throughout this work to refer to La Tenritatta to avoid confusion. 
7 "Moirras" is probably "Morees", one of the categories of cotton cloth woven on the 
Coromandel Coast. The traditional centre of manufacture was Masulipatnam. This 
cloth was usually of excellent quality and in great demand in Europe. 
8 See footnote 3, Chapter IV. 
9 The ceremony itself is ca lied the aru, and kanjar (kannjara' in Makassar), simply refers 
to the performance of the aru, that is the dancing and swearing with drawn swords and 
krisses. 
10 For example, Arung Teko did the kanjar for himself and for Tanete as the Karaeng 
Tanete, a title he had inherited through marriage. 
11 Van Thije must be referring to the Toraja since this de script ion accords much more 
with what we know of Toraja ceremonial dress than that of the people of Wajo. 
12 Tatabuang is found more in Ambon and is properly a set of twelve or more copper 
cymbals (van der Crab 1878:464). Wh at is meant here is simply various metal 
instruments which are struck together to make music or to ward off evif spirits, 
depending upon the purpose of the ceremony. 
13 These "clarinets " are known as pui-pui, a single reed instrument. 
14 It was important that the music be played continuously while the oath is being 
delivered, all of which contribute to a hypnotic and frenetic atmosphere. While 
watching a modern-day version of a kanjar performed at a royal wedding in Maros in 
March 1973, I was told that there have been incidents of a person in the midst of a 
kanjar running amok because the music had stopped, causing him siri'. 
15 The Dutch reads "de gelubde of schandjongens van Goa" (KA 1458i:62). What is 
most likely meant here is the bissu, who were pre-Islamic religious figures who 
continued to perform their functions even af ter the coming of Islam. The male bissu 
frequently exhibited female traits and are of ten homosexuals. There is no evidence that 
these male bissu were ever castrated, and so the more figurative meaning was probably 
intended by van Thije. 
16 In his own diary Arung Palakka records this one fact carefully under the date 26 March 
1695 where he says that he sent a gold chain weighing three catties [48 taels) to the 
governór (L-31 :58v). 
CHAPTER XII 
I Governor van Thije decided to return all of these to the new Arumpone, La Patau. 
2 The Diary of the Kings of Coa and Tallo mentions under the date 26 November 1677 
that Arung Palakka was praised by th is title in a Friday sermon (see Ligtvoet 1880: 
144). It is not known whether this is the first time he had taken this title or whether he 
had been known by it since becoming Arumpone in 1672. 
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B. South Sulawesi Lontara' 
L-1 Lontara'na H. A. Sumangerukka, ex-Patola Wajo. Owned by 
H. A. Pancaitana, ex-Datu Pattojo. 
L-2 Lontara' owned by H. A. Pancaitana, ex-Datu Pattojo. 
L-3 Lontara'na Wajo, owned by Prof. Mr. Andi Zainal Abidin, No. 
273, vols. 15-16-17. 
L-4 Lontara' Sukku'na Tana Wajo. Owned by Andi Makkaraka, 
compiled by La Sangaji Puanna La Sengngeng, Arung Bettempola (of 
the 18th century). (According to Professor Zainal Abidin b. Farid, the 
original of this lontara' was composed by the Arung Bettempola at the 
behest of Arung Matoa La Mappajung Puanna Salowong (1764-1767). 
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C. South Su/awesi Ta/es, Legends, Fo/kstories by Informants 
(In the text of the book, informants are referred to by name, 
preceded by the word "Interview", for example, Interview La Hali, 
etc.) 
1. Informant: La Hali 
Age: ca. 75 
Occupation: ex-police, Bone 
Place: Pattirosompe, Bone 
Date: 10 September 1974 
2. Informant: Andi Pan ge rang Opu Tosinilele 
Age: 66 years 
Occupation: Pensioned, former Pabbicara Hadat Luwu 
Place: Ujung Pandang 
Date: 6 May 1975 
3. Informant: Hamzah Daeng Tompo 
Age: ca. 57 
Occupation: ex-District Head, Borongloe 
Place: Kampung Bontote'ne, Desa Borongloe, Goa 
Date: 11 April 1975 
4. Informant: Petta Mani (aunt of Andi Mappasissi) 
Age: ca. 100 
Occupation: Housewife 
Place: Watampone 
Date: 11 October 1974 
5. Informant: Andi Parenrengi 
Age: ca. 80 
Occupation: Subdistrict Chief of Galung (retired) 
Place: Lajjoa, Soppeng 
Date: 30 September 1974 
6. Informant: Andi Parellei 
Age: 50's 
Occupation: ex-Assistant Village Head, Pattojo 
Place: Pattojo, Soppeng 
Date: 30 September 1974 
7. Informant: La Palawa 
Age: ca. 100 
Occupation: Farmer 
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Place: Watang Soppeng 
Date: 29 September 1974 
8. Informant: La Habbe 
Age: 110 years 
Occupation: Farmer 
Place: Wa tang Soppeng 
Date: 2 October 1974 
9. Informant: Andi Palloge 
Age: 50's 
Place: Ujung Pandang 
Date: 15 August 1974 
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10. Informant~ Andi Panrenrengi, son of Andi Mappanyuki 
Place: Ujung Pandang 
Date: 7 August 1974 
11. Informant: Rahim Hamid 
Occupation: Head English Department, Universitas Hasanuddin 
Place: Ujung Pandang 
Date: 1 August 1974 
12. Informant: Wife of Rahim Hamid 
Occupation: Schoolteacher 
Place: Ujung Pandang 
Date: 1 August 1974 
13. Informant: Andi Parabba 
Place: Ujung Pandang 
Date: 9 August 1974 
14. Informant: Andi Rukka 
Age: ca. 62 
Occupation: Judge in an Islamic Court 
Place: Ujung Pandang 
Date: 27 March 1975 
15. Informant: A. Ahmad Petta Longi 
Age: ca. 100 
Occupation: ex -Village Head, Walanreng 
Location: Cina, Bone 
Date: 11 October 1979 
16. Informant: Paiwa Petta Solo 
Age: ca. 70 
Occupation: Farmer 
Location: Pattirosompe 
Date: 10 September 1974 
17. Informant: Andi Paliheng, Daeng Mangatta 
Age: 50 years 
Occupation: Farmer 
Location: Sinjai 
Date: 13 December 1974 
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18. Informant: I Pipa 
Age: ca. 83 years 
Occupation: Story teller to Datu Pattiro 
Place: Lajjoa, Soppeng 
Date: 1 October 1974 
19. Informant: Andi Pananrang 
Age: Late 50's 
Occupation: ex-District Head 
Place: Takkalalla 
Date: 30 September 1974 
20. Informant: Andi Muhammad Nur 
Age: Late 40's 
Occupation: Contractor 
Place: Takkalalla 
Date: 30 September 1974 
21. Informant: F. K. Sarungallo 
Age: 63 years 
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Occupation: Chairman of Research into Custom and Culture, 
Toraja Church 
Place: Kete, Rantepao 
Date: 4 May 1975 
22. Informant: Pendeta Y. Linting 
Age: ca. 60 years 
Occupation: Minister of the Toraja Church 
Place: Ujung Pandang 
Date: 13 April 1975 
23. Informant: C. Parinding 
Occupation: Retired civil servant 
Place: Ujung Pandang 
Date: 8 May 1975 
24. Informant: Darwis Hamsah 
Occupation: Self-employed, researcher 
Place: Polewali 
Date: 21 October 1974 
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Map 5. Fort Rotterdam and Environs. 17th Century. 
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